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.BSTRACT
The Theasury, the Commissariat and the Supply of the Combined Army in
Germany during the Seven Years War (1756 - l763).
Hamish Macdonald Little
This study is concerned with the provision of non-com-
bative supplies and services by the Theasury and its commissaries to
the Combined Army, which campaigned in Germany during the Seven Years
War. It examines the limitations and complexities of the traditional
system of British military administration arid the magnitude and prob-.
lems of the task which was undertaken. It traces the slow and somewhat
erratic emergence in the course of the war of a 'commiseariat' in a re-
cognizable institutional form, and finds evidence of experience, ex-
pertise and integrity among those chosen to staff it. The work of Brit...
ish administrators in providing forage, bread, transport and hospital
services is investigated in detail from the points of view of the form-
ulation of general policies and. detailed arrangements, the execution
and supervision of the latter, the keeping of statistical records and
the process of account. Evidence is found of some effective and effic-
ient work, involving the introduction of new and forward-looking meth-
ods, as well as examples of the inadequacies and failures known to be
characteristic of the administration of the period. It is argued that
the latter derived partly from contemporary preconceptions and pout..
lea], realities and. the inherent difficulties of supplying a large
multi-national army campaigning in Germany, and riot merely from blat-
ant incompetence. It is thus concluded that in this sphere of invest..
igation the record of British administrators was not devoid of succ-
ess, nor their work of significant elements of vitality.
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QJRRCIES AND CALQJLATIONS
The German silver currency wass -
8 pfennigs - 1 (marien)groschen
36 groschen - 1 (rix-)do].lar or reichetaler
Dollars were usually expressed in gold ducats, whose value was subject
to less fluctuation
The Ditch currency was s-
2 pennings or penningens - 1 doit
8 doits - 1 stiver
20 stivers - 1 guilder
Calculations are made correct to the nearest whol e
number or to two decimal places if greater accuracy is required.
Calculations involving sterling do not use fractions
smaller than a quarter of a penny.
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CHAPTER I
ARMY SUPPLY AND THE WAR IN CERMkNY
8.
If Napoleon ever did observe that an army marches on
its stomach, he merely stated a truism. Supplying soldiers with the
common necessities of life, as opposed to supplying them with the
means and instruments of war, is a matter of paramount importance,
and authorities, both military and civil, must always have been aw-
are that they ignored such considerations at their peril, that in-
adequate provision of food, clothing, shelter and other basic coin-
forts bore a direct causal relationship to physical weakness, sagg-
ing morale and defeat in battle • And yet although such essentials
are the 'sine qua non' of an efficient fighting force, they have
not always been provided effectively. The problems of supplying an
amy which is operating over a wide area of difficult terrain in a
barren or wasted land have frequently, and not surprisingly, proved
insuperable, while it has perhaps been inevitable that faced with
limited financial resources the assumption that a soldier may fight
on an empty belly but that he cannot fight without arms and airimunit-
ion has usually been made • The supply of the British army in the
eighteenth century was subject to these universal difficulties, but
matters were further complicated by the political climate of that
age, Mhich on the basis of bitter past experience tended to view
standing armies as primarily a threat to civil liberty. On this was
founded the conviction that it should not be the function of the
government to provide a soldier 's daily needs: troops who were gen-
erously provided with the material comforts of 15!e would represent
a greater danger to freedom, and thus paradoxically, as in the case
9.
of the preference for a militia as opposed to a regular army, a cert-
ain degree of military inefficiency was a not undesirable state of
affairs.
The first result of this attitude of mind was that the
army itself was obliged to seek many of its essential supplies from
unofficial or semi-official sources. Thus at home quantities of food
and drink might be furnished by private citizens, who, on their own
initiative or in response to personal approaches and public advert-
isements by military officers, offered various provisions for sale by
item or in bulk. Abroad, householders with whom the troops were bill-
etted would provide their guests with a table, while a similar ser-
vice was performed by innkeepers in England, where compulsory quart-
ering in private houses was illegal) Further supplies came from the
sutlers, private merchants or shopkeepers, who followed the army with
meat, dairy produce, grain, meal and pulses, and inevitably beer and
spirits. It was the responsibility of commanding officers to see that
their men were served by adequate numbers of sutlers, some of whom
were accorded the status of official suppliers to regiments or to
companies of infantry and to troops of cavalry 2
 although many others
attended the army on a temporary, informal and frequently haphazard
basis. 3 Compared to these methods of supply the role of the civil
government in the victualling of the army was often a subordinate one,
1 See below p.1.2.
2 Sir J, W. Fortescue, The rly !istory of Transport and Supply.
(1928) . p.13.
3 Journal of Corporal Todd, f. 144, (1) July 1761.
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for although complete rations of food and drink might be provided by
the Treasury for troops serving in far-flung colonial spheres and
garrisons, where supply on the spot presented considerable or even
insuperable difficulties, 1 in Britain and Europe the Board's respon-
sibilities usually amounted to no more than the provision of bread
and. biscuit when the army was in camp or on campaign. 2 Moreover, in
executing all these commitments exclusively by means of contracts
with private merchants rather than through the activities of state
officials such as were to be found in Prussia for example, this coun-
try dissociated itself from continental absolutism and at the same
time from the most direct and effective method of supplying an army.3
Food for horses was as vita], a commodity as food for
men, but forage was also obtained from a variety of mainly unofficial
1 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 17711. -
92. (1958) p.177. N. Baker, Government and Contractors: the British
Treasur and War Suoplies,
2 Binney, op. cit. p.177. Such was the extent of the Treasury's comm-
itments to its own troops and those of other nations in the Com-
bined Army in Germany in the Seven Years War, although to this gen-
eral rule there were some limited exceptions, such as the provision
of a range of foodstuffs for troops undergoing conditions of part-
icu].ar hardship or those in hospital. See below pp.24 & 306.
-
3 R.A. Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of
Prussia. (19.3) pp.148 - 149. C. Duffy, The Army of Frederick the
Great. (197k) pp.13k - 135. M. Howard, War in European History.
I977) pp.68 - 69. In Supplying War: Logistics from Waflensteln to
patton, (1977) pp.21 & 33 - 3k, N. Van Creveld argues that con-
tracts with private merchants for army supply were still the norm
under eighteenth century absolutist regimes, and that no state be-
fore the end of the century possessed a professional supply corps.
Nevertheless, there was still a significant difference between the
British method of supplying bread to its troops and the Prussian
system of a field bakery administered by military officers, and.
drawing its raw material, in part at least, from reserves of grain
amassed as a result of nobles and peasants paying their taxes in
kind, fluffy, op. cit. pp.134 - 135.
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sources. Whenever possible grass was consume4 or taken from where it
grew wild, although together with hay, oats and other suitable grain
the army could purchase it from farmers and local inhabitants. In any
of these cases the soldiers themselves might be res ponsible not only
for amassing and transporting the provisions, but also for actually
harvesting the crops from the fields) Forage contracts with merch-
ants could be concluded by commanding officers in cases of necessity
when the army was serving abroad, 2 and it was usual for the Treasury
to make such agreements when the troops were encanroed. in Bri.tain,3
but this method of supply was regarded as an exceptional and. ecpen-
sive way of feeding horses. As far as possible the army was expected.
to make its own arrangements to live off the land with little or no
14.
assistance from the civil authorities.
Arrangements for quartering the troops also strike
the modern observer as somewhat irregular. In Britain and the colon-
ies there were some garrisons and barracks, equipped with furniture
and supplied with fuel and lighting, but the proportion of the army
thus accommodated was always very small, for as General Wade remark-
1 See below p.15]..
2 See below p.156.
3 Binney, op. cit. p.177.
4 Vary Creve].d, op. cit. pp.27 - 29 & 38, has called into question the
commonly held belief that all eighteenth century armies were total-
ly dependent on magazines for their forage supplies, and. effecti.ve-
ly demonstrated that when on campaign they lived to a large extent
off the surrounding countryside. But if the British army was no
different in this respect from continental forces, it still knew
nothing of the Prussian system whereby forage could be requisition-
ed from the localities in preparation for a campaign and military
horses compulsorily grazed on peasants' fields in peace-time. Duffy,
op. cit. p.134.
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ed:- "the people of this kingdom have been taught to associate the
idea of Barracks and Slavery so closely together, that, like dark-
ness and the devil, though there be no manner of connection between
them, yet they cannot separate them, nor think of the one without
thinking at the same time of the other".1 Most troops were therefore
quartered in civilian establishments, although in England a statute
of 1679 prohibited the use of private houses for this purpose with-
out the owner's consent, and thus recourse was usually had to inns
and places of public entertainment. 2 In foreign countries with fewer
scruples in connection with civil liberties the forced or voluntary
billetting of British soldiers in private dwellings was more common.3
But the army also lived and slept for considerable periods in the
open air, for which purpose the military authorities accepted a re-
sponsibility to supply tents and a range of camp necessities, inclu-
ding blankets, knapsacks, kettles, canteens and bow1s. In official
encampments in Britain the Treasury provided firewood and straw for
1 quoted in C.M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: their Ad-
ministration and. Government. (1869) Vol.1, p.223.
2 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century. (1977)
p
.38 . The author incorrectly makes a proclamation of 1689 the auth-
ority on billetting, whereas this merely reaffirmed the statute of
ten years previously, 31 Chas.II, c.1. I am indebted to Professor
I.R. Christie for directing my attention to pp.Ll9 & 287, n.22 in his
book Em pire or Indeoendence. 1760 - 1776: a British-American Dia-
jointly with B.W.Labarei, whire this information is to be found.
3 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.6, 5 May 1761, f.8, 18 May 1761.
k R.E. Scoufler, The Armies of gueen Anne. (1966) pp.128 - 129. It may
be assumed that blankets were supplied from various references to
blanket wagons which accompanied the troops, for example Ixtract of
a Letter of R. Oswald, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood ?S.
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bedding, materials for which the military commander was responsible
when the army served abroad.1
If the army thus had to rely to a considerable extent
on private citizens for its food and shelter, it was no less depend-
ent on their co-operation when it came to move itself from place to
ilace. Apart from an artillery train for transporting bulky military
equipment and stores, and a strictly limited number of wa gons pro-
vided by the bread contractor for delivering his loaves, 2 the army
had no permanently established and regular means of carrying its pro-
visions, baggage and non-military stores. Consequently, in Britain it
had to resort to the temporary hire of civilian wagons, carts and an-
iinals in the areas where it happened to be , while similar methods
prevailed when campaigning abroad with the additional possibility of
impressment in enemy territory. This failure to create an adequate
system of transportation has been described as 'one of the most re-
markable features of English military history', 1 and in the eight-
eenth century derived at least in part from the principle that an
army thus kept in chains was unlikely to be an effective oppressor of
1 Estimate of the Amount of the Different Proposals for Supplying the
Several Camps ...., 1757, T/l/37.5 No.138, f.245. Straw came under
the general heading of forage and a certain quantity was included in
a complete ration. See below p.143.
2 Both could be used for a variety of other purposes, and thus ammunit-
ion wagons might be fitted with baskets so that they could carry bread,
Ropers, op. cit. pp.86 - 87. See below pp.259 - 260.
3 B.C. Jarv1.s, Army Transport and the English Constitution with St,ec-
ial Reference to the Jacobite Risings. 'The Journal of Thansuort ffist-
ory', Vol.11, 1955 - 1956, pp.l01 - 104.
4 Ibid. p.101.
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civil liberty.
Two other aspects of the supply of goods and services
to the British army provide further examples of the informality of
the system of military administration, or at least of its workings.
In theory the soldier received all necessary clothing and uniform
from, and had it periodically replaced by the colonel of his regi .
-ment. In practice, however, the men might well have to provide extra
items of dress for themselves at their own expense, because regiment-
al finances were frequently so inefficiently or so fraudulently man-
aged that there were insufficient funds to provide all the necessary
items, 1
 although this state of affairs derived more from faulty ad-
ministration than from deliberate policy. Finally, if the soldier
fell ill or was wounded he could. be  cared for by official medical
services and personnel. But there were few examples of permanently
established and generally available hospitals, for while garrisons
and barracks might contain some informal accommodation, the Royal.
Hospital at Chelsea for invalid soldiers was the only significant ex-
ample of such an institution. Thus in peace-time most unfit soldiers
simply stayed with their regiments and presumably travelled in carts
if unable to walk. On campaign both general hospitals and regimental
infirmaries were usually set up in a town near the sphere of action,2
1 C Barnett, Britain and her Army, 1509 - 1970 . ... (1974) pp.143 -
1144.
2 T/52/55 f.374, 16 January 1764, referring to the appointment of an
Inspector General of Regimental Infirmaries and Chief Director of
Hospitals in Germany during the Seven Years War.
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while so-called 'flying' or mobile hospitals dealt with the wounded
on the spot. 1 'Hospital' is, however, rather an inflated term to des-
cribe such establishments, for the former might be found scattered in
private houses rented or requisitioned for the purpose, 2 while the
latter were really ambulances rather than institutions designed to
care for patients over a considerable period of time. Nevertheless,
it would be wrong to lay too much stress on the informality of medi-
cal arrangements in the British army, for no contemporary state had a
particularly impressive record in efficient and compassionate care of
its sick and wounded soldiers.
A second result of anti-military prejudice in eight-
eenth century Britain is to be found in the administrative structure
of departments and boards, officers and. officials responsible for
army supply. Duplication of function and overlapping jurisdictions
were the order of the day, and derived partly from the determination
to submit the army to a significant measure of civilian control, and
at the same time to prevent the concentration of power in too few
hands. Among the institutions of central government involved in such
matters, the Treasury, staffed entirely by civilian administrators,
clearly played an important role in connection with its provision of
bread, bread wagons, forage and fuel at various times, and it deleg-
1. Minutes at a Meeting of Lord Granby, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Martin ...,
27 March 1760, Add. ?S. 3290k f,k9.
2 Standing Orders ...., 29 July 1760, Add. !S. 28855 f.lO. General
hospitals could presumably be accommodated in some large public
building if available.
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ated the detailed formulation of its contracts for the troops at home
to the two civilian Comptrollers of Army Accounts. 1 The Board of Ord-
nance, a department which enjoyed considerable independence, also had
a vital part to play in supplying the drivers, horses, wagons and
equipment of the artillery train, as well as in exercising responsib-
ility for the construction and upkeep of barracks with their furnit-
ure, stores, fuel and lighting, and for the provision of tents and
camp necessities. 2 Another department whose multifarious activities
touched on the supply of the army was the War Office, where the Sec-
retary at War had charge of the provision of medical supplies, per-
sona]. camp equipment and uniform. The responsibility for transport-
ing troops overseas fell to the Navy Board, for feeding them on board
ship to the Commissioners of Victualling, and for caring for invalids
abroad to the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, 4 although in trans-
port matters the OrtrIance was again a law unto itself, making its own
arrangements to transfer its personnel and property overseas, even to
the extent of hiring its own ships.5
1 E.E. Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American
Revolution. (I^6) p.46.
2 Rogers, op. cit. p.37. Scouller, op. cit. p.l95.
3 Curtis, op. cit. p.35. R.A. Bowler, The Influence of Logistical
J IJ.. 1IZh JhL £IS .1, e& kfl	 a . j.%a& .j .Lè &flSJ. UL4 flAIL .L s..a	
. ( ( J -
(1971) pp.22 — 23. There was also, however, a sub-committee of the
Board of General Officers, the Clothing Board, which laid down
standards for dress and uniform and supervised the colonels' cloth-
ing contracts, without enjoying any real power to control the act- -
ual supply. Curtis, op • cit • pp.48 — Lj9 • Scoull er, op • cit. pp.
158 — 160.
4 D.A. Baugh, E)l., Naval Administration, 1715 — 1750. (1977) p.3.
Scouller, op. cit. pp.212 & 237. The Navy Board's repeated efforts
to rid itself of army transport business did not succeed until 1794.
5 Scouller, op. cit. p.2O9.
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The principles of civilian involvement and multiple
fission were equally evident in the provision and administration of
supplies and services in the field, where a plethora of officers and.
officials was to be found, exercising functions which frequently
lacked precise definition. In theory there was no matter beyond the
purview of the army's Commander-in-Chief, on whom rested the ultimate
responsibility for the welfare of his men, and he was usually assist-.
ed in his tasks by a number of staff officers. Among the latter were
the Quartermaster-General, who supervised the activities of sutlers
and foraging parties , 1 and dealt with matters of quartering which
were not the responsibility of the Board of Ordnance, 2 as well as
with the issue, care and maintenance of camp and field equipment,'
the Wagon-Master-General, an officer of the Board of Ordnance, who
controlled all vehicles and animals on the march, 4 and the Physician-
General, Surgeon-General and Apothecary-General, civilians who were
accorded military rank, and who exercised various functions inclizi-
ing the provision of drugs, 5 and presumably of other items of medical
stores and equipment. Another officer who could be a civilian was the
Commissary General, one of the oldest offices in the British army
1 Ibid. pp.6k & 26k. These functions had been taken over from the
Provost-Master-General at the end of the seventeenth century.
2 Rogers, op. cit. p.3.5. The dividing line was not clearly drawn and
demarcation disputes were common.
3 Bowler, op. cit. p.35. The Quartermaster-General's department also
exercised responsibilities for food and forage during the American
War of Independence.
4 Scou].ler, op. cit. pp.63 - 64 & facing p.78.
5 mid. p.236. Such officers would not always be found in the field.
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staff. 1
 He was primarily an employee of the Treasury, administering
the goods and services which the Board provided, but he was also in-
volved in the hiring and requisitioning of transport and the issue of
medicines and medical stores.2
Acting under the authority of these staff officers
were many other subordinate officials and minor employees. There were
controllers of trains, wagon masters, commissaries of draught horses
and conductors, responsible for the administration of the train and
its stores and the control of its hired civilian drivers . The expan-
sion of hospital services in war-time involved the appointment of
many extra personnel, some of whom were accorded military rank but
who remained civilians, and including surgeons, surgeons' mates, phy-.
sicians, apothecaries and matrons, assisted .by purveyors of provis-
ions and equipment, storekeepers, quartermasters, stewards and clerks,
the whole establishment being managed by an Inspector and Director
General. A number of Treasury commissaries, frequently but not always
civilians, worked under the direction of the Commissary General. 5 Fur-.
1 Bowler, op. cit. p.4].
2 Rogers, op. cit. pp.83, 85 & 96.
3 Scouller, op. cit. p.174. As late as 1798 the horses drawing field
guns at a Woolwich review were driven by ploughmen wearing smock
frocks. Curtis, op. cit. pp.6 - 7.
4 Establishment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761,
Hotham ?S. DDHO 4/227.
5 The term 'commissary' must always be used with precision, for in
its widest sense it means anyone holding a commission. Thus dip-
lomats charged with certain missions could be called commissaries,
and the army contained commissaries of musters and commissaries for
the exchange of prisoners of war, whose tasks were not directly
concerned with providing supplies. Scoul].er, op. cit. pp.60 & 65.
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ther subordinate officers and officials were attached to the regi-
ments, which were in most senses the real basis of the British army,
and where the colonel's responsibility for the well-being of his men
was exercised through such officers as the regimental quartermaster,
who assigned quarters and billets and distributed supplies and stores
inclixilng clothing, and the major appointed to supervise the activit.-
lee of the sutlers. 1 Regiments also carried a surgeon and his mate on
their establishments, and It is possible that some colonels accorded
the loose appellation of 'commissary' to officers charged with var-
ious tasks connected with supply. 2 Fina1.y, It should be noted that
in England the intervention of local government officials was necess-
ary before the army could obtain some of its basic needs, for the
quartering of troops in inns and the hiring of horses, carts and wag-
ons from private citizens were only permitted on .the authority of the
civil magistrates, while local constables supervised the execution of
the arrangements under a scale of payments fixed by statute.3
Some further illustrations of the principles enun-
ciated above are to be found in the complex system by which the supp-
ly of the army was financed. The Crown on the advice of the Treasury
and other responsible ministers decided annually the numerical stren-
1. Ibid. pp.66 & 220.
2 Return of Forage Required for the Detachment of Artillery ...., 11
November 1758, Hotham S. DDHO 4/59, which contains a reference to
a 'Commissary and Pay Master', although such an appointment may
only have been made when parties of troops were detached from the
main army.
3 Clode, op. cit. Vol.1, pp.218 & 230. Jarvis, op. cit. pp.111 - 112.
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gths, rates of pay and contingent expenses of the various regiments.
The soldiers' pay included an allowance for clothing and uniform,
while the term 'contingency' covered many of their daily needs, in-
cluding bread, bread wagons, forage, wood and hospital services, as
well as a number of financial allowances made on these heads, 1 Es-
timates on these bases were drawn up and presented to Parliament by
the Secretary at War and the Paymaster-General. 2 These procedures
only covered the so-called ordinary expenditure of the army, and each
year additional sums were spent on provisions and services which
could not be detailed or costed in advance. They were known as ex-
traordinaries, and again included many items of a non-military nature.
In peace-time extraordinaries did not usually reach significant pro-
portions, but it was otherwise in war-time when they might fall, not
very far short of ordinary expenditure. As Parliament had made no
provision for such expenses they were financed by making advances
from the Exchequer to the Paymaster-General on the army's subsistence
account before payment became due, and by withholding pay for up to
a year, the deficit thus arising being made good by a retrospective
parliamentary vote for extraord.inaries . Such financial, contortions
were held to be necessary in view of the impossibility of making an
1 See below p.24.
2 Clode, op. cit. Vol.11, p.259. The Board of Ordnance again demon-
strated. its independence by formulating its own estimates which
were presented separately, although they were subject to Treasury
scrutiny and revision. Scouller, op. cit. p.31. Binney, op. cit.
p.160.
3 Clode, op. cit. Vol.1, p.131.
lj. The pay of the troops was divided into subsistence and offreckon-
ings. See below pp.22 - 23.
5 Binney, op. cit. p.153. H. Roseveare, The Treasury the Evolution
of a British Institution. (1969) p.93.
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accurate estimate in advance of the cost of the provisions and ser-
vices needed, but at the same time the government was encouraged to
underestimate the level of ordinary contingencies in order to avoid
political difficulties, knowing that there would be little effective
criticism of expenses already incurred. The result was paradoxically
to weaken parliamentary control of military expenditure, as the House
of Commons was obliged to recognize the fait accompli' of the pre-
vious year's extraordinaries often running into millions.1
The leading figure in the issue of money was the Pay-
master-General who acted as the 'sole domestic banker of the army'.2
He received mainly from the Exchequer the funds for ordinary expen-
diture, and issued them under the authority of sign manual warrants
to the regimental agents, from whom the money passed in turn to the
regimental paymasters, to the captains of companies and ultimately
to the troops themselves • The Paymaster-General 's issue of cash for
extraordinary expenditure was authorized by Treasury warrants, and
the funds forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief. The auditing of the
accounts of these transactions was undertaken by the Conrntrollers of
Army Accounts who acted under the orders of the Treasury. 5 The ord-
mary soldier was probably unaware of most of the intricacies of
this system, but he needed no reminding of the smallness of the sums
1. Roseveare, op. cit. p.93.
2 L.S.. Sutherland & J.E.D. Binney, Henry Fox as Paymaster General of
the Forces. 'The English Historical ReviewVol.LXX, 1955, p.230.
3 Ibid. Clode, op. cit. Vol.11, p.299.
Li. Sutherland & Binney, op. cit. p.230.
5 Curtis, op. cit. p,Li.6.
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which finally arrived in his pocket. Rates of pay had been fixed in
the reign of William III and remained unchanged throughout the eight-
eenth century,' and from his miserable pittance the soldier was cx-
pected to pay for all his daily needs. The major proportion of pay
was known as subsistence money, 2
 and from it deductions were made for
a part of the cost of the bread supplied by the Treasury, 3
 in cavalry
and dragoon regiments for each ration of forage which had been pro-
vided by government contract, and for whatever camp necessities were
purchased by the authorities. 5 Further deductions occurred if regi-
mental officers had made arrangements for the bulk supply of food-
stuffs to their men, 6 while as soon as the soldier entered hospital
the whole of his subsistence money could be made over to the medical
1 J. Williamson, A Treatise of Military Finance. .... (1782) p.7.
2 Fo a private foot soldier it was 6d out of 8d per day, for a cor-
poral 8c1 out of 1/Cd and for a sergeant 1/Cd out of l/6d. Scoufler,
op. cit. p.128.
3 For each 8d loaf provided Sd was deducted • State of what may be the
Monthly Expenses of the British Troops in Germany ...., 2 November
1758, T/l/385 No.112.
14 Lord George Sackville to T.O. Hunter, 26 July 1759, T/1/395 f.3.
Williamson, op. cit. p.53. The deduction was usually 6d per ration.
5 During war-time a deduction of kd per week could be made in winter
quarters towards the cost of providing tents and camp necessities
for the coming campaign, Standing Orders, 17 November 1758, Baker
Baker MSS. Vol.VI, 66/189, but the normal method was apparently to
withhold one day's subsistence money per week, and when it was acc-
ounted for every two months in arrears to claim that it had already
been expended on such items. Scouller, op. cit. pp.128 - 129.
6 Such arrangements might be made for the supply of meat, Journal of
Corporal Todd, f.91, 11 September 1761, while it was presumably us-
ual for an officer to pay an innkeeper's bill for feeding his men
and to recoup his expenditure from their pay. In theory the troops
should have benefitted from bulk purchases and general arrangements,
but the officers were no doubt largely engaged in such activities
for their own profit.
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authorities. 1
 From what remained after these numerous stoppages, and
frequently it cannot have been very much, the soldier paid personally
for whatever other provisions and articles he purchased from local
inhabitants or sutlers. 2 The difference between the whole of the sol-
dier's pay and his subsistence money was known as the offreckonings,
and these too were subject to a number of deductions. They incinded
sums for the services of the Paymaster-General, of the regimental ag-
ent and paymaster, and of the various officials concerned with must-
ering the troops and passing accounts, as well as for the upkeep of
Chelsea Hospital, 3 before the net offreckonings were transferred to
the regimental stock purse fund, to which was charged the cost of
clothing supplied by the colonel, and from which a further deduction
was made for the services of the surgeon.k
Thus in these ways there was practically no article
or service which the soldier received for which he was not charged
directly or indirectly, so that 'mirabile dictu' he supported himself
like any private citizen. And yet a closer examination reveals that
in significant respects this was a mere illusion, for the pay of the
1 This was a major source of income for the hospitals, and was prob-.
ably improperly used to cover medical expenses as well as the cost
of the patients' board and lodging. Declared Account of R. Cath-
cart, 20 June 1766, A0/l/l506/216.
2 Corporal Todd complained that the troops were often without money
to buy these extra comforts. Journal of Corporal Todd, f.4k, (1)
July 1761, ff.91 - 92, U September 1761.
3 ScouUer, op. cit. p.132. Williamson, op. cit. p.11.
14. The sum involved was 2d per month. Scoufler, op. cit. p.132.
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troops was quite inadequate to cover all their ex,enses. Consequently,
a number of items, for example the bread and bread wagons supplied by
the Treasury, were not and could not be paid for in full, 1 while in
the same way the deduction of sixpence for each ration of forage pro-
vided by the government was a purely nominal sum unrelated to the real
cost of the provisions. In addition, both commanding officers and the
government might on occasions find it necessary to grant bounties and
gratuities, usually in the form of free provisions, as morale-boost-
ers, charging the same to extraordinaries, 2 while regimental funds had
to be supplemented by such contingent allowances as wagon money, which
was paid to officers and was supposed to help meet the cost of trans-
porting their personal effects and camp necessitities, 3 and forage or
grass money to officers and regimental officials for similar purposes
at the rate of two hundred days per annum.k But perhaps the most orig-
inal, if not bizarre way of supplementing regimental funds was that
which allowed establishments to carry a certain number of fictitious
men, whose pay could be used to meet various necessary or urgent ex-
penses. 5 So, whatever the appearances, British soldiers were unable to
1 State of what may be the Monthly Expenses of the British Troops in
Germany ...., 2 November 1758, T/]./385 No.112. Scouller, op. cit.
p.221.
2 Hunter to S. Martin, Reod. 29 December 1759, T/6k/96 f.289(b). Stan-
ding Orders ...., 1.6 October 1761, Add. ?S. 28855 f.65. The allow-
ances made on these occasions for the Combined Army as requested by
Prince Ferdinand were presumably not unknown to the British army.
3 Scouller, op. cit. p.l1+7.
k Ibid. See below p.1k7. The allowance was calculated on the basis of
a certain number of rations which varied according to rank, and was
translated into cash at the rate of sixpence per ration.
5 Scouller, op. cit. p.].1l2.
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maintain themselves adequately on their pay alone, while regimental
funds also needed constant injections of capital to preserve a degree
of solvency. But neither the long overdue increase in basic wages,
nor the shouldering of a more complete responsibility for the army's
needs in the form of adequate parliamentary supply for all provisions
and services, was politically acceptable. Indeed, as late as 1828,
the Duke of Wellington could argue that an increase in soldiers' pay
would not be in the country's best interests as it would make the
people feel that the army was burdensome, and consequently might lead
to a reduction in its numbers.' The result was a system by which
token deductions from pay continued to be made to preserve the fiction
that the army supported itself, while at the same time its shaky f in-
ances were shored up by supplementary allowances. Political prejud-
ices were thus accommodated at the expense of both military and ad-
ministrative efficiency.
The fact that at various times and in various theatres
of war during the eighteenth century Britain employed military forces
from Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick to help fight her battles is
in itself a further illustration of the distrust of a standing army in
this country, and the supply of these mercenary contingents was organ-
ized on a similar basis to that of the British army. Under the heading
of 'extraordinaries • the Treasury might provide specific items and
services such as bread, forage, wood, straw and bread wagons, if need
1 C].ode, op. cit. Vol.1, p.107.
26.
be by making contracts with private merchants, and the supervision of
the execution of the necessary arrangements was entrusted to a comm-
issary appointed by the Board . But any of the above might be found
by the troops themselves, their officers and the German commissaries
and supply officials, who were responsible for providing all other
necessaries. 2 Thus once again the organization of supply involved a
number of different officials, exercising arbitrarily determined re-
sponsibilities and liable to tread on each other's toes. The finan-
cial arrangements for the maintenance of hired German troops usually
committed the British government to supply their pay and. to reim-
burse their extraordinary expenses, while the rulers of Hesse-Cassel
and. Brunswick received in addition an annual subsidy and an initial
payment of levy money with which the soldiers were recruited and
equipped ready for action. 3 The precise definition of the extraord-
inary expenses to be reimbursed could provide a bone of contention,
as Britain might maintain that a sum for the provisions and services
concerned was already included in the soldiers' ordinary rates of
1 Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, T/l/375 No.
23, f.5].
2 Payement d'un Corps de Trouppea Hessoises 6,672 Hommes ....,
(1759) Add. S. 32887 f.168, with reference to the establishment
of a commissariat and an 'Office des Vivres et des Provisions'.
3 Treaty between His Britannick Majesty and the Landgrave of Hesse-
Casse].l, 18 June 1755, in C. Jenkinson, A Collection of all the
Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce between_Great Britain
and Other Powers ...., (1785) Vol.111, pp.48 - 53. Points to be
Considered with my Lord Bute ...., 25 November 1761, Add. !S.
32931 ff.272 - 275. Britain might also promise to compensate her
allies for enemy damage to their territories in the course of war,
leaving the exact sum to be paid open to negotiation. Hessian
Treaty, Article Se'par, 1 April 1760, SP/108/2713.
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pay, 1
 but usually claims for marching expenses, hospitals, losses
and various 'douceurs' such as forage and baggage money to officers
were accepted. 2 An additional source of financial complexity derived
from the fact that when Britain provided bread and forage for her
mercenaries by means of contract, a deduction might be made from the
pay of the troops as a contribution towards the cost, 3
 so that what
waS given with one hand was partially taken away with the other. Levy
money and ordinary pay were calculated on the basis of estimates
drawn up by the German authorities, examined and approved by the Sec-
4
retary at War, and, together with subsidies were the subject of pail-
iainentary grants of supply, but similar grants for extraordinary ex-
penditure were usually made retrospectively after liability had been
accepted and accounts examined and. liquidated, a process initially
undertaken by the British commissary, and completed by the Treasury
or other officers to whom it delegated the task. 5
 Cash for all these
services was issued to the Paymaster-General, and either remitted
1 T. Pownall & C.W. Cornwall to C. Jenkinson, 26 March 1764, T/52/56
f.337, Article XI. Idem. 4 January 1765, T/l/ Li40 f.235.
2 In the Ebcpendlture of the £5)O,000 Granted by Parliament •...,
Pi/3o/8/89 f.13.
3 FRO/30/8/76. Hessian Bread, (1759), Add. NSS. 32887 f.176.
4 J. West to Secretary at War, 16 January 1759, T/27/27 f.41 ,5. W.
.lis to Martin, 9 Febrnary 1763, T/l/424 f.160. H. Walpole, Me
oirs of the Reign of King George III. (1894) Vol.1, p.79.
5 Dike of Newcastle to Viscount Barrington, 14 November 1761, Add.
?ISS. 32931 f. 25. At the end of the Seven Years War the Treasury app-
ointed a special body to examine such accounts, known as the Co3fllTh-
issioners for Ecainining German Demands.
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abroad by government contractors, 1
 or paid to the agents or bankers
of the foreign states in London.2
Such then were the arrangements by which the non-mu-
itary needs of. the British army and its auxiliaries were met. It was
a system which involved a peculiar admixture of official and unoff-
• icial sources of supply, which was directed and administered by num-
erous officials, owning different and frequently conflicting alleg-
iances, and in which the attempt to promote military efficiency while
at the same time providing obstacles to military oppression produced
an irreconcilable clash of interests. The result was a structure of
such labyrinthine complexity that even the parliamentary Commission
of Accounts set up in 1780 was said to have 'really abandoned in des-
pair the task of comprehending the methods of our military finance'.3
This study seeks to examine only one aspect of these affairs, the
role of the Treasury and its commissaries, in one field of action,
the Seven Years War in Germany.
Although this part of the conflict might seem to have
been peripheral to the major struggles between Britain and France on
the seas and in the colonies, and between Austria and Prussia in
southern Germany and central Europe, it was nevertheless an area of
1 PNG/2 passim. T/29/33 ff.12 - 13, 1 February 1758. The Memorial of
G. Amyand and N. Magens, l March 1758, Add. ?S. 32878 f.21L1..
2 N. de Feronce to Jenkinson, 7 January 1763, Bute ?S. No.21. T/29/
35 f.99, 8 June 1763.
3 Sir J. W.. Fortescue, A History of the British Army. (191 0 - 1911)
Vol. III, p.521.
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considerable strategic importance. For France and Austria it provided
an opportunity to threaten both Prussian and British territory, thus
preventing both powers from concentrating their efforts elsewhere, if
not offering the possibility of conquests to use as bargaining count-.
ers at the peace. Prussia's Rhenish provinces of Cleves, Mark, East
Friesland, Lingen and Tecklenbuig, small and isolated, were tempting
prizes, while Hanover, whose frontier was almost indefensib1e,' was
clearly Britain's Achilles' heel as well as the western gateway into
Prussia itself. Against these threats the roles of Britain, Prussia
and Hanover were largely defensive, due primarily to their numerical
inferiority, 2 although there were moments when it seemed possible
that they might carry the war into the Austrian Netherlands or even
into France itself. 3 The French had two possible routes for an attack
on Hanover; their capture of the Prussian fortress of Weed in 1757
offered the chance of advance along the river Lippe through the heart
of Westpha].ia, while the seizure of the free imperial city of Frank-
furt-am-Main on the first day of 1759 opened up the possibility of
progress through Hesse-Cassel. '
 Given their numerical superiority, a
two-pronged attack from both directions would probably have the opti-.
mum effect. For their opponents, therefore, the possession of such
1 Sir H. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the
Seven Years War. (1966) p.8.
2 One of Israel Mauduit's arguments in his pamphlet, Considerations on
the Present German War, 6th edition, (1761) pp.80 - 82, was that it
was pointless for Britain to fight in Germany because it was im-
practicable to follow up the victory by invading France,
3 Savory, op. cit. pp.182 - 183.
4 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol.11, pp. 1487 - 488.
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fortresses as Minster and Lipstadt was of crucial importance to pre-
vent the juncture of the French forces, and also to safeguard the
river Weser, so essential for supplies and. as a line of defence.1
The campaigns which were fought within this strateg-
ical framework involved an allied army which steadily grew in size,
and for whose maintenance and supply Britain became increasingly re-
sponsible as the war progressed. Known as the Army of Observation in
1757, it contained contingents from Hanover and its two allies, Saxe-
Gotha and Bckeburg, Wolfenbizttel, which was part of the possessions
of the Duke of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel and Prussia to a total stren-
gth of approximately 55,000 men. 2 Of this number only the 12,012
Hessians were both maintained and supplied with extraordinaries by
this country, although in February 1757 the House of Commons voted
£200,000 to help the Hanoverian authorities meet the ordinary and ex-
traordinary expenses of their troops, 3
 while the extraordinary supp-.
1 Ibid. pp.488 - 489.
2 A total of 42,672 for the troops of Hanover, Saxe-Gotha, Bickeburg
and Wolf enbitte1 may be an overestimate as it comes from 1758 when
they were mustered by a British commissary, J. Durand to Earl of
Holdernesse, 16 December 1758, SP/87/29 f.69, although at the end
of 1757 Newcastle referred to more than 42,000 men in 'The King's
Hanover Army', Newcastle to Mr. Page, 26 November 1757, Add. !S.
32876 f.136. The Hessians numbered 12,012, Hessian Treaty, 18 June
1755, Add. !'S. 38333 f,l22, and the Prussians early in 1757 had
six battalions and some small detachments, perhaps as many as 5,000
men, although they withdrew in April when Wesel was evacuated, Sav-
ory, op. cit. p.20 & Appendix II, p.45l.
3 A State of the Commissari.at of the Army in Germany ...., Add. ?S.
38333 f.6. The full cost of these troops was in excess of £1 mill-
ion per annum, Estimate of the Charge of 38,000 Men...., Journal
of the House of Commons, 13 April 1758, Vol.XXVIII, p.189.
3]..
lies and services of the 8ma11 corps of Prussians were provided by
the British commissary attached to the Hessians. 1 In 1758 , however,
by a resolution of the House of Commons of 20 April Britain assumed
full responsibility for the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of
38,124 troops of Hanover, Saxe-Gotha, Bickeburg and Wo1fenbttel,2
while the remaining 4,548 Hanoverians continued at the charge of the
electoral authorities. 3 With the arrival of 8,716 British soldiers to
join the Combined Army, as it was now called, in juiy, 1
 and Britain's
agreement in December to provide the extraordinaries of all the
troops, except the 4,48 Hanoverians, by means of her own commiss-.
aries, 5 the year ended with 63,400 men in arms without counting the
Prussians, and this country directly supplying the extraordinaries
of approximately 61,000 soldiers. 6 In 1759 a number of augmentations
1 Add. !'S. 38333 f.6.
2 Journal of the House of Commons, Vol.XXVIII, pp.209 - 210. The
commitment was back-dated to 28 November 1757.
3 Mmoire of Baron Minchausen, 12 December 1758, Add. ?S. 32886 f.
290. F.0.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzdge des Herzos
Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lineburg. (1859 - 18flj Vol.V, p.1,11k.
Westphalen's figure of L1. ,5L4.8 has been used in these calculations
rather than Minchausen's 4,546. This arrangement continued until
the end of the war.
Li. Martin to R. Boyd, 11 July 1758 , T/27/27 f.356.
5 Add. PUS. 32886 f.289. Until 25 December 1758 only the Hessian,
Prussian and British troops were supplied by British commissaries,
the Hanoverian commissariat being responsible for the rest of the
Combined Army.
6 42,672 Hanoverians and associates, 12,012 Hessians and 8,716 Brit-
ish. The Prussian contingent now consisted of only ten squadrons
of dragoons and five of hussars, Savory, op. cit. Appendix II,
p.451. Four squadrons of Hanoverian dragoons contained 714 men,
ibid. p.LI50, and on this basis fifteen squadrons of Prussl.ans
would have totalled 2,678 men. Thus 63, 400 + 2,678 - 4,48 -
61,530.
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extended this commitment, 6,992 Hessians 1 and 700 Hanoverians 2
ing added to the Army's establishment, which together with :3,869
Prussians brought its total strength to 74,961 men, 70,413 of whom
looked to Britain for their extraordinaries. The process continued
in 1760 with the formation of a British legion of 3,135 men, drawn
mostly from French deserters, the addition of 14,611 British troops,
Newcastle's so-called 'glorious reinforcement', 5 3,413 Brunswickers,6
3,392 Hessians and 1,001 Hanoverians, 8 80 giving a force of 100,513
soldiers with Britain supplying extraordinaries to 95,965 of them.
Finally, a convention with Brunswick in 1761 increased that country's
contingent by 36]. men, 9 while by 1762 the effective state of the
Prussians had risen to Lf,374,0 so that at the end of the war the
strength of the Combined Army had reached at least 101,379, and. Brit-
am had become responsible for providing extraord.inaries to no less
1 Hessian Treaty, Separate Article, 17 January 1759, Add. fS. 38333
f. 122.
2 Martin to Hunter, 19 January 1759, T/27/27 ff.419 - 420.
3 Westpha].en, op. cit. Vo]..V, p.1,114.
4 Savory, op. cit. p.202.
5 Westphalen states that 23,327 British troops served in Germany in
1760, op. cit. Vo1.V, p.1,116, although there seems to be no corr-
oborating evidence for his statement that the original contingent
of 8,716 had risen to 12,255 by 1759, ibid. p.1,114.
6 Brunswick Treaty, 14 January 1760, and Ulterior Convention, 5 March
].760 Add. ?S. 38333 f.l23.
7 Hessian Treaty, 1 Apr11 1760, ibid. f.122.
8 T/29/33 f.286, 13 February 1760.
9 Brunswick Convention, 10 August 1761, Add. MSS. 38333 f.123.
10 List of the Effective Men of the Allied Army, 1 October 1762, Add.
!S. 38334 f.186. No figures have been found for the complete est-
ablishment.
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than 96,831 men. This was a large force by contemporary standards,1
and its supply represented not only a far greater commitment than
Britain had previously undertaken, but also a task of considerable
complexity, deriving partly from the Amy's multi-national character.
As Colonel Richard Peirson, the Director of the British comntissäriat
between 1760 and. 1762, commented:- ".... I have seen sufficient to
convince me that content can never reign long in an allied army, was
it conducted by angels from heaven . .. .
The campaigns fought by this army produced no decis-
lye victory or momentous results, and in 1763 the 'status quo' was
perfectly restored. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of activity,
and. if at the end of the war the political map had not altered, the
military tide had ebbed and flowed over the territory with monotonous
regularity. In 1757 the French advance through Westphalia swept all
before it; the Army of Observation under the command of the Duke of
Cumberland lost the battle of Hastenbeck on 25 July, and by mid-Aug..
ust the enemy had occupied Hanover and Brunswick and sent detachments
into Emien and Cassel with little or no opposition. Cumberland re-
treated to Stade, where finding himself hemmed in, he accepted the
Convention of Kioster Zeven, a capitulation rather than an armist-
1 Eighteenth century commanders rarely operated with armies in excess
of 80,000 men, Howard, op. cit. p.99.
2 R. Peirson to Newcastle, 6 February 1761, Add. ?'S. 32918 f.305.
3 The following account Is based on Savory, op. cit. and Fortescue's
A_History of the British Ary, together with Sir J.S. Corbett,
England in the Seven Years' War •... (1907) and LP, WadxIington, La
Guerre de Sept Ans ,... (1899 - 1904).
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ice, 1 on 8 September. Such was the inauspicious military situation
inherited by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, one of Frederick the
Great 's ablest generals, when he assumed command of the Army in Nov-
ember, and few can have anticipated the rapid change of fortune
which now occurred. By May 1758 the French had been driven back ac-
ross the Rhine, a British expeditionary force had occupied Emden,
and Casse]. had been retaken by a detachment under the Hessian gen-
eral, Prince Isenberg.
With the enemy's advance successfully repelled Ferd-
inand now took the offensive, and crossing the Rhine he defeated the
French army under the Comte d.e Clermont at Crefeld on 23 June, a
victory which opened up the possibility of an attack on the Nether-
lands • To prevent this the French sent a large army under the Prince
de Soubise to create a diversion in Hesse-Cassel, and when Isenberg
was defeated at Sanderhausen on 23 July, so posing a new threat to
Hanover, Ferdinand was obliged to recross the Rhine. The rest of the
year saw attempted French movements along the river Lippe and. north-
wards from Cased, and the largely successful efforts of the Combined
Army and its detachments to contain this activity. The campaign of
1759 opened with a bold attempt by Ferdinand to dislodge the French
from Frankfurt-am-Main, which they had taken on New Year's Day, while
at the same time guarding Westpha].ia with a corps under General Spir-
cken. On 13 April, however, Ferdinand was defeated at the battle of
1. W.L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 17 40 -1763. (1963) p.320.
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Bergen, and. compelled to withdraw his main army to Westphalia, leav-
ing a detachment under Lieutenant-General Imhoff to protect Hesse-
Cassel, although the latter was forced to abandon Cased in June.
The twin French armies under the Marquis de Contades and the Duc de
Brogue now began to close in on Ferdinand 's forces threatening his
positions on the Weser. On 10 July Minden fell, and Lipstadt and
Hame].n were besieged as French troops began to cross the river and
move into Hanover. Fortunately for the allies, the timely victory at
Minden on 1 August relieved the pressure, and forced the French to
retreat south in Ifesse-Cassel, abandoning Cassel and Marburg. Mean-
while a detachment of the Combined Army under Imhoff laid siege to
the French garrison in the city of Mnster, and forced it to capit-
uate on 22 November. Ferdinand had thus completely turned back the
French advance, and could again envisage the extension of the war
outside Germany.
It was hoped that a decisive blow in Westphalia in
1.760 would be the quickest way to peace, but as a result of the pre-
vious year 's exertions the campaigning started late, and it was the
French who first began to push northwards in Hesse-Cassel and east-
wards in Westphalia in late June and early July. To counteract their
movements Ferdinand found it increasingly necessary to divide h.s
army into separate corps, of which the most important was under the
command of the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who won a significant
victory at Warburg on 3]. July. But the main army was unable to pre-
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vent Cased falling into enemy hands once again, 1
 and to discourage
further French advances into Westphalia or Hanover Ferdinand resol-
ved on diversionary tactics in the form of an attack on Weed, the
important French base on the Rhine. A large detachment under the Her-
editary Prince appeared before the fortress in late September, but
the unsuccessful battle of laoster Camp on 16 October sealed the fate
of the expedition. The year closed with the French still poised to
attack Hanover, and to relieve this pressure Ferdinand decided to
engage in a winter campaign to drive them out of Hesse-Cassel with
his army divided into three columns. By March 1761, however, the att-
empt had failed, and the Combined Army had taken up positions between
the rivers Lippe, Diemel and Leine.
This situation encouraged the French to make an all-
out effort to produce a decisive result, and with the size of both
their armies considerably increased Soubise was to move along the
Lippe, while Brog].ie was to cross the Diemel and threaten Hanover. By
June these moves had begun, and Ferdinand detached the Hereditary
Prince to a position west of Mmster, while Sporeken was on the Die-
mel and the main army at Paderborn. The battle of Vellinghausen on 16
July was an allied victory, but it did not prevent Broglie advancing
to the Weser, invading Brunswick and capturing Wolfenb1ittel in Oct..
ober, while Soubise was able to take EBien again in September. But
the last year of the war saw the threat to Hanover relieved by the
allied victory at WiThelmsthal in Hesse-Cassel on 2k June 1762, the
1 After its capture by the French in June 1759 the Iandgrave 's cap-
ital had been abandoned in August.
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French retreat from the latter in August, and Ferdinand 's recapture
of Casse]. on 1. November, soon after which hostilities came to an end.
There were a number of features of these lengthy and
complex campaigns which created problems for the supply of an army.
Firstly, the war was sustained within the same relatively small area
for six years, and the longer it lasted the more difficult did it be-
come for the rival armies to find their livelihood, especially as it
was a recognized part of military tactics to exhaust territories or
to destroy provisions deliberately. 1 Indeed, such aims could even be
put top of the list of military objectives, for as one expert wrote:-
"The main and principal point in war, is to procure plenty of provis-
ions, and to destroy the enemy by famine". 2 In these ways the cumul-
ative effects of heavy demand, destruction and the inevitable dis-
ruption of ordered agrarian life were bound to create increasingly
severe problems of sustenance as the war went on. Secondly, despite
the fact that eighteenth century armies usually went into winter quar-
ters before the end. of the year, in 1759 - 1760 campaigning continued
until January and. February, while in 1760 - 1761 the extensive oper-
ations in Messe-Cassel meant practically no respite at all. Such man-
oeuvres undertaken in the very worst weather could wreak havoc and.
destruction in an army's transport services, and. had the additional
drawback of making it impossible to lay in provisions in magazines
-
1 Prince Ferdinand to Holdernesse, 8 August 1759, S P/87135 f.121.
2 T. Simes, A Treatise on the Military Science, which Comorehends the
Grand Operations of War .... (1780) pp.6 - 7.
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for the forthcoming campaigning season. Thirdly, 8Upply problems were
exacerbated by the fact that the Combined Army rarely acted as one
unit. In 1760 - 1761 there were large-scale diversionary siege exped-
itions to Wese]. and Casse]., while in the early months of 1761 Prince
Ferdinand's forces were separated into no less than five different
corps. 1 In this way it was difficult to concentrate resources and
personnel, and much duplication of effort was necessary. Finally, des-
pite the popular belief that mid-eighteenth century warfare was a lei-
surely affair, the campaigns in north-west Germany were characterized
by much rapid movement. As Ferdinand himself wrote:-".... la nature
de cette guerre, oi ii s'agit de faire face . plus d'un Endroit, avec
des forces inegales, exige fort souvent de marches subites, quelque-
fois secretes, et souvent de longue Traite • It is true that much of
the manoeuvring for position resulted in no engagement, but it nevei-
theless threw a considerable strain on transport services which were
kept constantly active, shifting stores and provisions to correspond
with the positions occupied by the troops, or removing them to safety
from the advances of the enemy.
In addition to problems deriving from the nature of
the war further difficulties arose from the nature of the campaigning
area, The latter extended for over two hundred miles from the Baltic
Sea to the river Main, and for distances of between one hundred and
1 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Geriiny ...., Add. ?'S.
38333 f.20.
2 ThId. f.8.
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fifty and one hundred and eighty miles from the Dutch frontier and the
river Rhine in the west towards the river E].be, the Harm mountains and
the Thuringian forest in the east • The area is one of contrasting ty-
steal features, its southern half composed largely of upland plateau,
mostly iore than a thousand feet above sea level and partially en-
closed by a range of higher massifs, while the northern half is dom-
inated by the great plain, which stretches from the Netherlands to
Poland. From the point of view of an army seeking food the terrain is
not particularly hospitable, for the damp soils and raw climate of
the higher parts of the plateau are unsuitable for arable farming, as
are the heavy clay or poor sandy soil and moist climate of many parts
of the plain. Nevertheless, rye for bread together with oats and oth-
er fodder crops for animals may be grown on the lower reaches of the
upland area and on some parts of the plain, while wide tracts of land
can support cattle and sheep and provide hay, meat and dairy pro-
duce. In the eighteenth century, compared with the Netherlands and
England, the agriculture of the area was underdeveloped. Much land
remained unexploited, melding the famous Lüneburg Heath on the west
side of the Elbe, described in 1751 as a sandy desert 
,2 
while further
south many areas of the uplands were still covered with forests and
woods. In the early part of the century Hanover was economically
). There is one small strip of highly fertile soil, the Loses belt,
stretching from the Dutch frontier towards the rivers Ruhr and
Lippe. The above account is based on chapters II and III in N.J.G.
Pounds, The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany. (1963).
2 Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 175]. -
1772, by Henry Hulton, f.38. The author also described the area be-
tween Bremen and West Fries].and as barren and disagreeable, ibid.
f. 5.
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backward and sparsely populated, 1
 while even at the end of the cen-
tury two-fifths of its land was uncultivated. 2 Everywhere simple crop
rotations necessitated the leaving of much unproductive fallow land
each year, 3 and. there is little evidence that the new food and fodder
cro:ps, which were already proving their value in other parts of Eur-
ope, were to be found. to any significant extent in the area before
4.1750 . Moreover, as opposed to Germany east of the Elbe, which was a
land of aristocratic estates intensively cultivated by serf labour,
the north-west of the country was characterized by fragmented peasant
holdings, with the lords more interested in extracting rents and
fines from their tenants than in directly exploiting the land for
commercial purposes.5
Yet it is easy to overemphasize the agrarian backward-
1 C.T. Atkinson, A History of Germany, 1715 - 1815. (1908) pp.47 - 4.8,
2 H. Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 164.8 - 1840. (1965) p.296.
3 B.H. Slicher Van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Euroi,e, A.D.500 - 1850. (196:3) pp.24'l. - 2+5, The author finds evidence of more
frequent fallow in north Germany in the eighteenth century than in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
4. The potato had made little headway even in Prussia by mid-century
despite the efforts of Frederick William I and Frederick II to pro-
mote it, and its use by the troops in the Bavarian Succession War
of 1778 - 1779 was sufficiently novel to win for that conflict the
peculiar title of 'Xartoffelkrieg', while red clover, sainfoin and
lucerne were not in general use before the second half of the cen-
tury. W.G. East, An Historical Geography of Europe. (1950) p.401.
E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson, Eds., The Cambridge Economic History of
Europe, Vol.IV, the Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries. (1967) p.300. Slicher Van Bath, op. cit.
pp.Z79 - bU.
5 H. See, Esp4sse d'une Histoire du Regime Agraire en Europe aux
XVflIme et XIXme Sic1es. (1921) p.79.
ness of the campaigning area and to paint an oversimplified picture
of subsistence-level farming. The larger free inrperial cities such as
Hamburg and Frankfurt-am-Main, which were growing in size in the
eighteenth century, 1 must have acted as stimuli to agricultural pro-
duction in the surrounding countryside, while important capitals like
Cassel, Hanover and Brunswick presumably exerted a similar influence.
In addition, although there is evidence to suggest that many smaller
towns in the area were stagnating or even declining, 2
 modern research
has clearly demonstrated the growing importance of various forms of
rural industry, 3 a development which may well have encouraged food
production over a wide area. Nor was production for the market un-
possible under a system of landholding, in which the typical peasant,
the 'Meier', could possess as much as sixty acres of land and enroloy
inferior classes of peasant to work for him. Thus if north-west Ger-
many was not a land overflowing with milk and honey, it was far from
completely barren, although its resources were limited and might eas-
ily be exhausted by constant and heavy demands from rival armies,
1 Hamburg had a population of about 40,000 in 1650 and this had. risen
steadily to 100,000 by 1800, whenit was surpassed in Germany only
by Vienna and Berlin. Holborn, op. cit. p.30.
2 C. Benecke, Society and Politics in Germany, 1500 - 1750 . (1974)
pp.68, 93 & 107 - 108.
3 H. Ke].lenbenz, Rural Industries in the West from the End of the Mid-
dle Ares to the Eighteenth Century. in P. Earle. Fd.. Essays in Eur-
i8Oó. (197k) pp.61 - 62. N. Barkha
en,	 es Enterprise in Western Germany and
feenth Century, in ibid. pp.218 - 22
-
4 Two 'Huf en' of thirty 'arpents' each, an 'arpent' being roughly an
acre. The holding could, however, be scattered. See, op. cit. pp.
73 - 75.
Vol.IV, p.216.
ntury: the Social Back-
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while production by means of relatively small scattered units nec-
essitated a high level of efficiency in the amassing of provisions.
Such efficiency was not easy to attain in view of the
various limitations and obstacles presented by the means of transport
and. communication. Contour variations provided basic problems for the
unmechanized transport of bulky materials in the centre and the south
of the campaigning area, while the regular and well-distributed rain-
fall, much of which falls as snow in the winter especially in the up-.
land regions, 1 created far from ideal conditions for carriage on the
crtdely constructed and badly maintained roads of the eighteenth cen-
tury. For although contemporary postal maps seem to show a reasonably
developed road network, it has to be remembered that they mark rights
of passage rather than prepared or constructed highways, 2 and few of
the major routes were classified as 'chausses', or metalled roads,
even at the end of the century. 3 The• improvements already being made
in England by the turnpike trusts, and in France by the 'Ecole des
Ingnieurs des Ponts et Chausses', founded as recently as 1747, but
continuing a tradition deriving from Sully and Co].bert, were seldom
found in Germany. 4 The roads of Hanover were said to be either so
rocky or 80 boggy that wagons could only take two-thirds of the loads
1 Pounds, op. cit. p.32.
2 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,
3 W.H. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth C€
ground of the Literary Revival. (1965) pp.
4 S.B. Clough & C.W. Cole, Economic History of Europe. (1952 ) pp.L43
k3.
which they were able to carry in the Low Countries, while it has
been estimated that wood for fuel could not be carried economically
for more than twelve miles in the area. 2 Water transport was of
course preferable for the carriage of bulk supplies, and north-west
Germany is amply provided with natural waterways. Today most of the
rivers have been improved out of all recognition as channels of comin-
unication, but few offered unbroken or straightforward navigation in
the mid-eighteenth century. Even the great river Rhine presented con-
siderable hazards above Bonn, for it was only in 18:3k that a proper
passage was blasted through its famous gorge , and it was not always
possible to sail between the river and its tributaries such. as the
Ruhr. ' The estuary of the Weser, which was a vital artery of supply
for the Combined Army, was subject to extensive silting, 5
 and as
goods proceeded upstream and into its tributaries they often had. to
be transferred to progressively smaller and shallower craft, while
at the junction with the Fulda this exercise involved carrying the
cargoes overland. 6 Climatic conditions, either drought or flood,
could bring transport on both the Weser and the Ems to a total stand-
still for as much as three-quarters of the year. 7 Artificial water-
1 An Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishing an Army
of LfO,000 Men ...., 23 January 1758, Add. !S. 32878 f.191.
2 East, op. cit. p.k06.
3 IC.A. Sinnhuber, Germany: its Geography and Growth. (1970) p.66.
+ East, op. cit. p.1+06.
5 T.H. Elkins, Germany. (1960) p.225.
6 Peirson to Martin, 2 & 21 June 1760, T/l/1+05 ff.62 & 67.
7 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. ?'S. 32922 f.76. F. Hal-
sey to Magens, 20 February 1762, Halsey ZS. 15039.
ways whIch might have eliminated many of these obstacles were con-
spicuous only by their absence, except for a solitary canal which cx-
tended for some twenty miles north of M&nster, by-passing a section
of the upper Ems. 1 The campaigning area could certainly not compete
with the comprehensive system of readily navigable waterways to be
found in the Dutch Republic and the Netherlands. To natural obstacles
were added other artificial ones, notably customs barriers and tolls,
which have been called 'the curse of the German economy'. 2 There were
reputedly thirty-two toll-gates on the Weser between Elsfleth and
Mnden, 3
 and other rivers were presumably no less liberally endowed.
Finally, against these disadvantages should be set
the fact that, despite the generally low economic development of the
area, there must have been, as in any largely agrarian society of
small farmers, moderate resources of wagons, carts, horses and oxen.
Moreover, the importance of rural industry in many places implies
the existence of considerable supplementary traffic in raw materials
and finished products, and consequently the availability of addit-.
lona]. means of transport on both land and water. Thus it may be
concluded that while north-west Germany was by no means devoid of
the means of internal communication so essential for the carriage of
1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, Halsey !'S. 150,0.
2 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.IV, p.55L1..
3 East, op. cit. p. 14'07. The author presumably means 'Nnden' and not
'Minden' as he states that some of the toll-gates were in Reese-
Cased.
k Some villages actually specialized in haulage. Kel].enbenz, op. cit.
p.78.
an army's supplies and. provisions, and while it offered more facil-
ities and fewer obstacles than, for example, the wilds of North Amer-
ica, the transport system of the area was subject to significant lim-
itations, which would clearly hinder the movement of vital contmodit-
lea, especially if the war lasted any length of time.
Had the campaigning area enjoyed any degree of pout-
ical unity its communications might have been more adequate, 1 but a
cursory glance at the map is sufficient to show its fragmented nat-
ure, although no map can do full, justice to the intricate overlapp-
ing of 'feudal jurisdictions, overlordehips, inheritances, partit-
Ions and alienations'. 2 Despite the fact that there were fewer pol-
itical authorities in the north-west than in other parts of Germany,
there were nevertheless more than fifty, ranging from the approxiin-
ately 8,500 square miles of Hanover to the tiny enclaves of free
imperial cities such as Goslar, ' and the inhabitants of the various
states hardly thought of themselves as Germans, regarding even their
close neighbours In the same light as Frenchmen or Dutchmen. 5
 The
area was one of great administrative complexity, which derived not
only from the multiplicity of political units, but also from the
1 E.A.W. Zimmermann, A Political Survey of the Present State of Fur-
2 • (1787) p.108.
2 Benecke, op. cit. p.7.
3 Atkinson, op. cit. p.47.
14. Other free imperial cities such as Bremen, Frankfurt-am-?Mn and
Hamburg had somewhat larger areas.
5 Benecke, op. cit. p.7.
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fact that several of the larger states were composed of a number of
separate territories scattered over a wide area, 1' and controlled by
local governments or 'regencies' with an inevitable augmentation of
bureaucratic personnel. Another reason for the proliferation of off-
icials, who might perform useful functions or merely possess an hon-
orary title, was the continuing effort of every prince, however
petty, to turn himself into an absolute ruler, extending the influ-
ence of his government over provinces, towns and country districts.
In places where this process had not enjoyed complete success the
provincial estates, municipal councils and seigneurial administrators
still vied with the representatives of central government, and the
resultant conflict of interests did nothing to increase efficiency.2
And even in Prussia, which was in the vanguard, of the movement to-
wards centralized absolutism, Frederick William I's 'predilection
for collegiate organization' encouraged an increase in personnel
at all levels of government and in all areas • It is not therefore
surprising that contemporaries believed that it was necessary for
the happiness of every German that he should have some title, office
or character.'
1. This was especially noticeable in the case of Prussia, whose poss-
essions were strung out across the whole of north Germany.
2 It was not until 177k that the Landgrave of Hesee-Cassel was able
to appoint ten permanent officials, or 'Landrte' to administer
the various parts of his domains, F.L. Carsten, Princes and Parl-
iaments in Germany
 from the Fifteenth to the Ei ghteenth Century.
3 Dorwart, op. cit. p.190.
4 Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 -
1772, by Henry Hulton, f.156. The demand arose less from the char..
acter of the people than from the nature of their political system.
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The political and administrative structure of north-
west Germany clearly created problems for the supply of an army cam-
paigning there. Goods and services could only be provided on a
piecemeal basis after negotiations and arrangements with many diff-
erent authorities and officials, a process which automatically in-
volved duplication of effort and waste of time. Moreover, co-oper-
ation and co-ordination between organizers and suppliers belonging
to different states could not be counted on, for the latter would
almost certainly regard each other with jealousy and suspicion, while
similar clashes of interest might be anticipated between the agents
of princely power and those of the localities, or even between rival
members of the administrative boards or chambers within the same
state. In all these ways the Combined Army's broth stood in danger of
being spoiled by too many cooks.
L8.
CHAPTER II
THE COM!1ISSARIAT
an Institution so various and yet so new in this Country •••• 1
The success with which Great Britain supplied the
troops for whom she was responsible in Germany during the Seven Years
War may be measured firstly in the suitability and effectiveness of
the administrative structure, which was called into existence to deal
with the task in hand. Was the Treasury prepared to provide or allow
staffing levels which were numerically adequate? In a service char-
acterized by multifarious duties and. responsibilities were the mdiv-
idual commissaries given functions which were sufficiently limited
and specialized? Were they accorded an appropriate degree of power
and independence to enable them to take the requisite actions with
the necessary promptitude? And finally, were the conditions of ser-
vice such as to encourage the employment of the most suitable and.
best qualified personnel?
At the outset of the war the Treasury's attitude to
the numbers of staff it was prepared to employ seems to have been
hardly generous, or even realistic. In 1757 and 1758 the supply of
the 12,012 1{essian troops and the small corps of Prussians was en-
trusted to a single commissary, who in addition to carrying out his
everyday duties was also expected to deal with various other complex
1 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany ...., Add • S.
3833 f.30.
50,
matters, 1
 and to act as commissary of musters to the Hessian troops.2
And yet despite this heavy burden of work the Treasury disregarded a
strong plea for the appointment of deputy commissaries. 3 Even more
surprising was the Board 'a original intention that the supply of the
8,716 British troops, who arrived in Germany in July 1758, should
simply be added to the responsibilities of the one commissary, 5 and
when after indignant complaints at this attempt to pile Pelion on
Ossa a second commissary was appointed to look after the British con-
tingent, the Duke of Newcastle could still protest that the arrange-
ment was uneconomical, and argue that if one man could be persuaded
to do the job on his own the public would be saved much unnecessary
6
expense.
At the end of 1758 Britain accepted responsibility
1 Robert Boyd, who acted as commissary in 1758, was ordered by the
Treasury to make up his predecessor's accounts from 1757, Boyd. to
Treasury, 30 March 1758 , T/1/386 No.14, to obtain details of the
quantities of forage captured from the enemy, Boyd to Treasury, 2
Apr11 1758, ibid. No.16, and to formulate his considered opinions
on the respective merits of the different methods of supplying the
troops, Treasury to Boyd, 1 August 1758, T/27/27 f.371.
2 Jeffrey Amherst acted in this capacity in 1757, T/1/375 No.29, f.63,
and it is assumed that his successor, Boyd, was similarly employed
in 1758. Mustering troops involved a full-scale parade twice a year
and the submission of detailed returns.
3 Boyd to Treasury, 9 April 1758, T/l/386 No.22. Pye & Cruickshanks
to (Treasury), 2 June 1758 , T/1/385 No.45. The contractors had to
send their own employees to receive and store forage being delivered
on their account.
4 See above p.31.
5 S. Martin to M. Hatton, 1 September 1758 , T/27/27 ff.378 - 379.
6 Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Marlborough, 20 September 1758, ibid.
f.38&1.
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for the direct supply of extraordinaries to approximately 6]., 000 sol-
dIers In the Combined Army, 1 thus making It impossible to avol.d a
considerable augmentation in personnel, and in appointing Thomas Orby
Hunter Superintendent of Extraordinaries, the Treasury granted him
full powers to employ as many deputies as he judged necessary to
carry on the service efficiently. 2 At first, Hunter seems to have
been unsure whether he would be allowed to make all the requisite app-
ointments, and on 11 February he wrote to the Board:-
a .... what I have to do, already in these parts, Is
beyond the power or Capacity of any one Plan to go thro', with any
Chance of doing justice to the Publick, the overlooking Direction and
Controu]. of the whole is full Employment for one Man, the Execution
& Detail must be In other hands this must be the Plan, or their Ldps
good Intentions for the Publick in sending me hither will I fear be
frustrated •..."
But his fears were unfounded, for the Treasury had only wished to
make clear that It did not Intend itself to nominate any commissar-
ies, 4 and before long even this policy was modified in two cases. 5 By
1 See above p.31.
2 T.0. Hunter Patent, 6 January 1759, Howard Vyse S. D/HV/B/4/1.
3 T/61+/96 f.28.
L1. Martin to Hunter, 13 February 1759, ibId. f.19. Boyd and Hatton,
the two commissaries who had been responsible for the Hessian and
British troops respectively, had been recalled by the Board in or-
der to allow Hunter to make a fresh start,
5 Hatton was reappointed, Martin to Hunter, 23 March 1759, ibid. f.
56, and Richard Oswald, who had been employed by Hunter on a temp- -
orary basIs to take care of the army In Hesse-Cassel, was given a
permanent responsibility, Martin to Hunter, 30 March 1759, ibid. f.
73, Hunter to Martin, 29 April 1759, ibid. f.102, and also a Trea-
sury commission, as proved by the declaration of hIs account at the
Exchequer at the end of the war, A0/l/5l9/223.
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the end of the year the iperintendent had. appointed seven other comm
issaries, 1 and had. employed two more on what may have been a semi-off-
Icia]. basis, 2 without the raising of any objections or the expression
of any reservations in Whitehall. This brought the commissariat' s per-
manent establishment of senior officers at the end of the year to
thirteen, including two commissaries of musters, and gave a ratio of
one commissary for 5, Ll'16 troops, a dramatic improvement on the pre-
vious figure of one for approximately 11,000 troops.
At the beginning of December 1759 Hunter was granted
leave of absence to come to England, and ordered to instruct Michael
Hatton to act in his place. 5 By the end of March 1760 it was known
1 Bilgen, Bishop, Faber, Pthr, Ramberg, Roden and. Trotter. Not all
were accorded the title of commissary; Bilgen became inspector and
controller of the foreign artillery train, Fuhr acted as an acc-
ountant, and Bishop, Faber and Rainberg as directors of various ser-
vices. See Appendix I.
2 Massow and Meyen, for whom no details of salary have been found,
ibid.
-
3 Bilgen, Bishop, Boyd, Th.rand, Faber, FUhr, Hatton, Hunter, Massow,
Meyen, Oswald, Raznberg and Roden. Trotter is not included as he ser-
ved for only three weeks in June 1759, ibid. The commissaries of
musters are included as their functions had previously been carried
out by commissaries for the supply of extraordinaries.
L. By the end of 1759 Britain fully maintained 70, L1l3 men in the Com-
bined Army. In 1758 two commissaries had supplied extraordinaries
to 12,012 Hessians, 8,716 British and approximately 2,678 Prussians,
see above pp .30 - 32. A third commissary, who mustered the Hanover- -
ians in 1758, is omitted as Britain did not at this time provide the
electoral troops with extraordinaries
5 Martin to Hunter, 7 December 1759, T/64/96 f.270. Instructions for
Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.147 - 15k. Although bound
under 1760 these instructions were left by Hunter on his departure
from Germany in December 1759.
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that the Superintendent would not be returning to Germany, 1 but it
was not until 6 May that the name of Richard Peirson was first men-
tioned as a successor, and he did. not begin his work until 24 Nay.2
Thus during this long interval, when Prince Ferdinand 's orders for
the formation of a large magazine of provisions at Cassel for the
forthcoming campaign really required an augmentation of personnel,
the commissariat was not only understaffed but deprived of the ser-
vices of its permanent director. And yet, despite Hatton's complaints
that he was desperately short of responsible assistants, and his
warning that serious arrears of business were accumulating especially
in connection with the settlement of accounts, 4
 the Treasury did
practically nothing to help. 5 The delay was partly due to the Board's
attempt to dissuade Hunter from resigning, and partly to its inabil-
ity to find a successor of sufficient standing to be entrusted with
the powers he had exercised, 6 but when matters dragged on for nearly
six months a search for a temporary replacement should have been made
- -
	 1 Newcastle to Prince Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. ?S. 32904 if.
2 - 3.
2 Newcastle to Marquis of Granby, 6 May 1760, Add. NSS. 32905 f.294.
R. Peirson to Martin, 25 Nay 1760, T/l/405 f57.
3 Extracts of the Correspondence between Hunter and Hatton ....,
1760, T/l/405 f.330.
4 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/64/96 ff.3144 - 345.
5 The appointment of James Browne to settle the expenses of maintain-
ing prisoners of war slightly eased the burden of work on Granby,
the British Commander-in-Chief, who had been given financial re-
sponsibilities on Hunter's departure from Germany. See below p.77.
6 A S.ate of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany ...., Add. !'S.
38333 ff.9 - 10 & 13.
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a priority. Nevertheless, if the Treasury had failed to deal with the 	 -
immediate problem, it had still recognized the necessity of a further
strengthening of the coinmissariat's establishment, for in May and
June 1760 four new commissaries were appointed in London, 1 while the
power of granting warrants for the payment of goods and services pro-
vided was now given to the British Coimnander-i.n .-Chief, the Marquis of
Granby, an arrangement which, albeit unintentionally, took some wei-
ght off Peirson's shoulders. 2 These and other changes brought the
total strength of the commissariat's senior staff at the end of the
year to eighteen, 3
 which for an army now containing 95,965 men supp-.
lied by Britain meant a ratio of one commissary for 5.331 troops.
Yet a closer examination of the situation reveals
that this slight statistical improvement may well have been nullified
by other unfavourable factors. For example, both Granby and Peirson
had onerous military duties to perform, and were quite unable to give
their undivided attention to cominissariat affairs. 5 Newcastle claimed
1 Blakeney, Cockburn, Frederick Halsey and Thomas Halsey. See Appen-
dlxi.
2 Add. S 38333 ff.9 - 10. Instructions to Peirson, 9 May 1760,
Howard Vyse !'S. D/HV/B/Ll./3. The Treasury was not prepared to grant
full financial powers to a man of Peirson 'S rank and standing.
Granby had temporarily exercised these powers since Hunter's dep-.
arture in December 1759. See below p.77.
3 Bilgen, Bishop, Blakeney, Boyd, Browne, Cockburn, Faber, Fuhr, F.
Halsey, T. Halsey, Hatton, Massow, Meyen, Peirson, Redecker, Roden,
Scheedler and Voss • .Durand, Oswald and Ramberg had withdrawn from
the service in the course of 1760. See Appendix I.
+ See above p.32.
5 Peirson commanded a battalion of Guards, Newcastle to Cranby, 7
October 1760, Add. MSS. 32912 f.L132.
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that he had always feared that Peirson 's dual responsibility would
lead to a neglect of supply matters, and yet in August 17 the
Treasury burdened him with further duties, when jointly with Boyd he
was ordered to undertake the mustering of the Hanoverian troops,2
while at the same time Granby announced that the pressure of camp-
aigning had. obliged him to ask Peirson to carry out his coinmissariat
functions. 3 It can hardly have come as a surprise, therefore, when
in September Peirson informed Newcastle that his 'military and civil
capacities do in some measure jarr', and by early 1761 he was putt-
ing matters more forcefully to the Treasury by pointing out 'pretty
strongly' the impossibility of attending to both tasks, 5 although
nothing was done to ease the situation. Equally significant was the
recognition from the very beginning on the part of at least one comm-
issary that.the establishment of May 1760 was inadequate for Ferdin-
and 's plan to campaign with several corps and detachments acting sep..
arately from the main army, a view which was communicated to the
Treasury, 6
 and. later confirmed by experience. As Peirson wrote in the
first days of 1761:- "Your Grace made provision for commissaries last
1 Ibid.
2 Newcastle to Peirson, 12 August 1760, Add. ?S. 32909 f. L132. Peir-
son was specifically informed that he was to have no increase in
salary for these additional duties, which had to be undertaken be-
cause of the resignation of James Durand.
3 Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, ibid. f.300.
4 Peirson to Newcastle, 23 September 1760, Add. ?S. 32912 f.38.
5 Peirson to Martin, 21 February 1761, T/1/4l0 f.52.
6 F. Halsey to Martin, 19 May 1760, T/64/96 f.370.
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had failed to inform it promptly of the problem 1 must be rejected in
the light of the evidence of its own correspondence. In fact the
Board had been held back by the belief that it did not know where or
how to find prospective employees possessing the qualifications it
demanded, 2 and it seems to have expected a high-ranking commissary to
recommend suitable candidates,' although as long as such officers
were permanently stationed in Germany and in touch with few of their
compatriots, this was a somewhat unrealistic hope. The result was
that the coinmissariat had waited for the Treasury to make appoint-
ments, while the Treasury had waited for the commissariat to forward
names, and nothing had been done until complaints from the Commander-
in-Chief could no longer be ignored. Thus while there had been no un-
willingness to allow improved staffing levels, there had been some
inefficiency in translating intention into practice.
The work of the new commissariat, which was better
equipped than any of its predecessors to perform its tasks, was un- -
fortunately clouded from the beginning by accusations and revelations
of irregularity and fraud, which eventually persuaded the Treasury
to establish a commission of enquiry to make a full investigation of
the charges. 5
 That the Board had even now not completely learned the
1 Draught Treasury Letter to Earl of Thite, (!'.y 1761) Add. !S.
32923 f.]96.
2 Ibid. f.178.
3 Newcastle to Peirson, (1761) Add, !'5S. 32916 f.413.
1+ Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities ....,
5 October 1761, Add. !S. 32922 ff.k26 - L3O.
5 State of the Coinmissariat ...., Add.. !S. 38335 f.176.
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lesson of past experience is seen in the fact that the three comm-
issaries appointed to conduct the enquiry were expected to continue
to carry out their normal duties, 1
 with the result that the latter
were almost certainly seriously neglected. The Commissioners' find-
ings, coupled with other information, revealed a most unsatisfact-
ory state of affairs, which early in 1762 led to the dismissal of
one commissary, 2
 while at approximately the same time Peirson and
three others resigned or withdrew from the service, 3 and the employ-
ment of German officials, who were held responsible for many of the
abuses, was discontinued with the probable loss of four commissaru.
ies. 1 But these nine vacancies in the commissariat 'S establishment
1 Martin to Peirson, 3 November 1761, Add. l'S. 32930 f.296. Only
two commissaries, Cuthbert and Hulton, eventually undertook the
work.
2 Frederick Halsey, T/29/y1. f.235, 2 March 1762.
3 EllIOt, Hatton and Thomas Halsey, see Appendix I. Peirson's salary
was raid until the end of June, although his successor, George
Howard, had taken up his duties a month earlier, Howard to Treasury,
28 May 1762, T/1/Ll.].7 f.L30. Although Thomas Halsey's commission was
not revoked until the end of 1762, he had apparently not carried
out his functions since the beginning of the year, Howard to Martin,
27 November 1762, ibid. f.173.
If Ammon, Massow, Meyen and. Roden. It is not possible to give precise
dates for the ending of the employment of these commissaries, but
on 27 January 1762 the Treasury had ordered that Massow be deprived
of all effective power in matters of supply and be permitted to act
only in an advisory capacity, A Relation of the Most Material Parts
of the Treasury 's Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany
...., Dashwood 1S. D/D/19/6 ff.3 - If, and it is probable that the
others ceased to exercise any real influence at the same time, if
in fact they had not already withdrawn from the service • See App-
endix I.
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were more than adequately filled by twenty-three new appointnients,1
bringing the total number of 8enior commissaries on 25 December 1762
to forty-one, which for 96,831 troops 2 represented one commissary
for 2,362 men, and reflected a further significant improvement in
staff ing ratios.
While it is possible to speak with some degree of
mathematical accuracy about the numerical levels of senior commiss-
ariat staff, such specific conclusions can obviously not be drawn
about the myriads of subordinate and inferior employees, ranging from
deputy and assistant commissaries and magazine inspectors, through
book-keepers, secretaries and. clerks, down to magazine keepers, crafts-
men aid general labourers, many of whom were employed on a temporary
basis and amongst whom there was a high turnover rate • Yet despite
this limitation, there can be little doubt that there was a marked in-
crease in the numbers of minor personnel in the course of the war.
Whereas in 1759 Hunter was assisted by no more than sixty' magazine
keepers and other subordinate officials attending the Army in various
caracit lee , two years later Thomas Pownall referred to between four
1 The Treasury appointed Bromfield, Clark, Colsworthy, Cosne, Paw-
cett, Howard, Kyd, Leach, Legh, Mudie, Oswald, Webb and Weir. Al-
though it cannot be proved that Kyd 'S appointment dated from this
time, no reference to his acting before 1762 has been traced. Thom-
as Pownail, as director of the department of control, nominated
Boyve, Collins, Crawford, Meyer, Ross, Stanton and Tozer, while
Howard engaged Gunn and Turton, and presumably Smith, whose app..
ointment does not appear in the Treasury 's warrant books • See App-
endixl.
2 See above pp.32 - 33.
3 An Account of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany ...., 1759, T/l/397 f.67.
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and five hundred employees involved in the running of the magazines,1
while at the end of the war he described the control branch of the
commissariat alone as such that in 'Variety & Extent of Business &
Number of Persons employed was equal to the office of Excise' rn
much the same way Hunter listed a mere ten clerks on the commissar-
iat 's establishment, less than the number found in the office of the
Commissioners of Enquiry alone in l762.I Nevertheless, the records do
contain some complaints about staff shortages in the lower ranks .5
although there is no suggestion that this was the result of parsim-
onious policies on the part of the Treasury, which not only endowed
the directors of the commissariat with the power to appoint as many
subordinate employees as they judged necessary for the efficient fun-
ctioning of the service, but urged them not to neglect this important
1 T/29/311. ±205, 17 December 1761. The increase may have been some-
what less dramatic than these figures suggest, for while Hunter's
estimate was confined to magazine keepers and their administrative
assistants, that of Pownafl probably included ordinary labourers.
Nevertheless, in 1762 there were fifty-four magazine keepers in
one of the two districts into which Pownall had divided the field
of operations, List of AU the Magazines, Magazine Keepers & Con-
trol Officers ...., 15 July 1762, T/l/k17 ff.32 - 33, and assuming
that there was an equivalent number in the other, and that each
keeper had two administrative assistants, the total staff would be
in excess of three hundred without counting workmen.
2 Memorial of T. Pownall, 22 April 1766, T/l,fl+51 f.247.
3 T/l/397 ff.66 - 67. The list does not, however, take account of
clerical assistants employed by Oswald in Hesse-Cassel, Hunter's
Answer to the Memorial of Mtnchausen, 22 April 1759, Tf1/395 f.3l.
k The Commissioners employed twelve clerks, Journal and Copy Book of
Henry Hulton, f.188.
5 Hatton to Martin, 21 August 1758 , T/11381+ No.51. Memorial of JD.
Schroder, 16 July 1763, SP/9/228, complaining that he had had to
supervise several scattered magazines on his own.
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responsibility) Nor apparently did the directors of the counissariat,
or those to whom they delegated the task of making appointments at
the lowest levels, 2 fail to exercise their powers; indeed there is
some suggestion that by the end of the war officials had been allowed
such freedom of action that over-staffing had occurred. 3 When staff
shortages did exist they seem once again to have been the result of
an inability to find personnel, whose qualifications and characters
fitted them for employment in the coBuIissariat, rather than of the
imposition of any system of fixed and arbitrary quotas. Altogether,
the Treasury 'a attitude to the appointment of minor officials was as
generous as it could have been, and the commissariat found itself in
the enviable position of being theoretically able to engage as many
assistants as the efficiency of the service seemed to demand.
The substantial increases in the numbers of all kinds
of comiaissariat employees as the war progressed derived partly from
a recognition that the growth in the size of the Army supplied by
1 Newcastle to Hunter, 16 February 1759, Add. S. 32888 f.139.
T/29/3k	23 April 1761.
2 Until the last year of the war, when the department of control took
over responsibility for such matters, see below p.193, magazine keep..
era were usually appointed by commissaries of supply, and secretar-
ies, clerks, book-keepers and workmen by commissaries, directors of
services and magazine keepers, in all cases subject to the approval
of the head of the commissariat and the Treasury.
3 Such seems to be the implication of Pownall's Circular Letter to
Magazine Keepers, T/l/Ll.20 f.123, enclosed in his own letter to the
Treasury of 16 July 1762, and stressing that in future all appoint-
ments by magazine keepers were to be approved by him as necessary
for the service, and. of his Standing Instructions to Magazine Keep..
era, (l761),T/1/4.l3 f.36+, ordering that their employment must auto-
matically terminate with the exhaustion of their depots.
Lf F. Halsey to N. Magens, 16 April 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Peirson's
Answer to Complaints relating to the Commissariat, 6 June 1761,
Add. ?S. 32923 f.393.
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Britain, and the more complex nature of its operations, necessitated
extra hands, and partly front the deepening realization that the in-
tricacy and difficulty of the task of supply itself should not be
under-estimated, and that greater efficiency demanded more generous
allocations of staff. But the translation of these principles into
practice was not always achieved promptly and comprehensively, a fact
which might lead one to deduce a certain degree of administrative
short-sightedness or rigidity, perhaps deriving from notions of false
economy. If such an element was present in the Treasury's attitude,
it probably owed something to the fact that no eighteenth century
ministry could afford to ignore the political implications of the
creation of large numbers of government places, and the hue and cry
inevitably raised by the anti-patronage brigade. Indeed, this con-
sideration may well explain why the Board was more liberal in its
policies relating to the appointment of minor employees, for such
nominations made in Germany caine less easily to the notice of poten-
tial critics. Nevertheless, an equally important factor militating
against the provision of adequate numbers of personnel was the in-.
ability to find suitable candidates, and although on some occasions
standards may have been set somewhat too high, 2 and insufficient
efforts made to seek out prospective employees, considerations of
1. I.Mauduit, Considerations on the Present German War, Additions for
the Sixth Edition. T1761) pp
.36 - 37.
2 To head the comaissariat the Treasury sought a man of 'authority,
ability, and activity', but on one occasion lamented that the
country could not perhaps provide a person who measured up exactly
to these standards, Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761),
Add. ?S. 32923 f.198.
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quality were quite rightly never completely subjected to those of
quantity.
As the Treasury came to recognize the need for more
commissaries, so it also began to show a greater appreciation of the
importance of assigning its employees to specialized and clearly def-
ined branches of the service. The major responsibilities of the comm-
issariat were the planning and organization of supply, the control
and supervision of its execution and the process of settlement and
account, and there were obvious difficulties in one person exercising
all three functions. For example, the supervisory branch was a pen .
-patetic occupation, demanding a minute attention to all the details
of deliveries and services in many different places, and thus could
hardly be combined with the thorough examination of extensive and
complicated accounts, which bound a commissary permanently to his
desk. Quite apart from these practical considerations, the hallmark
of any mature administrative structure is a certain degree of spec-
ialized expertise, and there was room for the development of this
quality within the commissariat. In 1757 and 1758 these considerat-.
ions seem to have been far from the Treasury's thoughts, for its
commissaries were expected to act as jacks of all trades, and fre-
quently found their situation difficult, if not impossible, 1 but
1 Matton complained that the settlement of forage accounts alone was
more than enough work for one person. Matton to J. West, 7 October
1758, T/l/384 No.61.
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Hunter's establishment of 1759 Incorporated a measure of specializ-
ation, for it Included two full-time Inspectors of magazines and
transport services, each assisted by an under-commissary, and one
full-time accountant, assisted by three clerks. 1 Nevertheless, the
fact that these important responsibilities were entrusted to relat-
ively minor officials, 2 suggests that they were regarded as of lesser
significance than other aspects of the coitmissariat's work, while It
is also clear that the number of inspectors was insufficient to un-
dertake the supervision of all branches of the service. 3 Poreover,
when Hunter wrote in June 1759:- "It is impossible for me to describe
to their Lordships the immense extent of business, that I labour
under for every thing is thrown upon me; and for the regular Conduct-.
Ing of the same It would require £4. or 5 distinct Offices ••••
	
he
had already realized that the concentration of overall responsibility
for supply, control and account in the hands of the Superintendent
meant too much work for one man, and that this situation could only
be relieved by the creation of semi-autonomous departments.
The reconstruction of the coainissariat in Nay 1760 did
1 T/1/397 11.66 - 67.
2 Chest and Ross, the two inspectors, were granted salaries of only
lO/Od per day, while Fuhr, the accountant, had £1 per day, ibid.
This compared unfavourably with the £3 per day allowed to Hatton
and Oswald, the two commissaries of supply. See Appendix I.
3 There is no evidence, for example, that they were able to supervise
the administration of the foreign hospitals, whose director, Bishop,
reported monthly to Hunter. Add. PBS. 38335 f.l76.
£4. Hunter to Martin, 9 June 1759, T/6k196 1.177.
.5 This was the normal word used by contemporaries to describe the
supervision of the execution of supply arrangements.
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nothing to put this suggestion into practice, 1 but in appointing two
commissaries general to organize supply, two commissaries of control
and one commissary of accounts, all with salaries of at least £3 per
day, 2
 the Treasury showed a growing recognition of the need for spec-
ialization, and of the importance of the supervisory and accounting
branches. This may indeed have been the first occasion oi, which the
Board directly nominated officials to particular responsibilities
other than supply, 3
 but unfortunately this significant development
was not carried effectively into practice, for such was the urgency
of the Army 's needs that both the commissaries of control were ass-
igned by Peirson and Granby to other branches of the service and
never acted in their intended capacities. ' The Treasury was not un-
1 Although the British Commander-in-Chief was now given the task of
granting money warrants, see below pp.77 - 78, Peirson was charged
with the great bulk of the cominissariat 's work in all its diversity.
2 The commissaries general were Hatton and Fdward Blakeney, the comm-
issaries of control Sir James Cockburn and Thomas Halsey, and the
commissary of accounts Frederick Halsey. See Appendix I.
3 The usual practice was for the Treasury to appoint commissaries
general, and to leave them to find deputies and assistants, who
could be assigned to the non-supply branches of the service. Such
had been the basic pattern of appointment under Hunter in 1759.
Lf Cockburn at first replaced Oswald, who had. refused the Treasury 's
commission, as commissary of supply to the army in Westphalia,
Peirson to ?rtin, 2 June 1760, T/l/o5 f.6l. He then undertook the
examination of the accounts of the foreign hospitals and of the
artillery and provision trains, Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760,
Add. ?S.329O9 f . 300 , and throughout the winter of 1760 - 176].
again acted as a commissary of supply, this time with General Kiel-
mansegg's corps, List of Contracts made by Sir J. Cockburn ....,
November 1760 - 1rch 1761, Halsey MSS. l5O6Lf(A). Thorns Halsey was
transferred to accounts immediately on his arrival in Germany,
Peirson to ?rtin, 2]. June 1760, T/l/405 f.67, while Frederick Hal-
sey acted as a commissary of accounts until September 1760, when he
was ordered to function as a commissary of supply, P. Halsey to ?r-
tin, 25 September 1760, Halsey ?!SS. 15030. Thus although no one act-
ed as a commissary of control, there were at times three cominissar'.
lee of account.
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aware of the frustration of its intentions, 1 and yet it appointed no
additional staff, probably hoping that both the officials concerned
could be restored to their intended sphere of action before too much
time had elapsed. But if such was the attitude in Whitehall it sugg-
ests that the existence of specialist commissaries of control was
still regarded as a luxury rather than as a necessity, an impression
confirmed by the fact that the anticipated temporary redeployment
lasted for a whole year without any action being taken to find re-
placements.
Early in 1761, after Prince Ferdinand's severe str-
ictures on the coiitmissariat, the Treasury realized that matters had
been allowed to get out of hand, and admitted that as the Combined
Army had recently been divided into four or five separate corps:-
"The several Commissaries assign'd to different dep-
artments all essentially necessary for carrying on the Service &
prevention of frauds, could no longer be confin'd to those depart-
ments; Commissaries of Contrail & of Accompts, became all Coirtmissar-
lee of Contracts, and then began that confusion, those neglects those
disappointments, those frauds that necessity of employing improper
persons in the subordinate Stations, that want of inspection, that
1 Surviving letters prove that all the above changes, with the ex-
ception of Cockburn's activities with Kielmansegg's corps, were
communicated to the Board, and it is hardly possible that the
latter could have remained ignorant of the doings of one of its
nominees for as long as five months.
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irregularity of payment, which is so well described in P • Ferdinand '5
I,].paper.
The new establishment of May of that year thus sought to retrieve the
situation by increasing the numbers of commissaries of control and
account to three of the former and two of the latter, 2 and by issuing
strict instructions that commissaries of control were only to be
given other responsibilities in cases of unavoidable necessity, of
which immediate notice was to be sent to the Treasury. 3
 Moreover, in
appointing a number of deputy commissaries at the same time, the
Board, hoped to provide a pool of lesser officials, who could be ass-
igned to the different branches of the service as the need arose,
without disturbing the commissaries of control and account from their
proper business. These moves, together with Peirson's nomination of
a third magazine inspector, 4' mark a further development in the tin..
portance attached to the non-supply aspects of the coinmissariat 'S
work, although by staffing the commission of enquiry at the end of
1761 with a commissary of control and a commissary of accounts, who
were thus unable to give their full attention to their normal duties,
1 Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761), Add. ?S. 32923 f.196,
Although this letter seems to suggest that there were fewer commiss-
aries of account than there should have been, the Board had nominat-
ed only one such official, Frederick Halsey, and his functions had
been assumed by his brother. It could also have been added that
commissaries of supply had been obliged to act as commissaries of
accounts, a task for which they rarely had sufficient time, Cockburn
to Granby, 7 February 1761, Rutland !S. Granby Letter Book I.
2 The three commissaries of control were Cuthbert, Levett and Pownall,
see Appendix I. Thomas Halsey continued to act as commissary of acc-
ounts, and was joined by Hulton. Peirson & Hatton to Ferdinand • 13
April 1761, F.O.W.H. von Westphaien, Geschichte der Feidzige des
p.9.
3 T/29/311 f.73, 13 May 1761.
4' Peirson to (Treasury), 16 June 1761, T/1/k1O f.72.
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the Treasury showed that it was still not completely true to its dec-
lazed principles?
The final stage in the evolution of specialization
within the commissariat occurred in April 1762, when Thomas Pownall
was named director of a separate department of control. Although he
remained subject to the orders of the Commandei'-in-Chief and other
superior officials appointed by the Treasury, he was granted a con-
siderable measure of autonomy, with powers to direct all coinmissax-.
ies of control and account and other subordinate staff operating in
the spheres of his responsibility, 2 and consequently to influence
the forms and procedures of these branches of the service. The bene-.
ficia]. effects of these changes were soon apparent, for with as many
3	 4.as nine commissaries of control and numerous minor officials at
1 The Board claimed that it had thought of sending officials from big-
land. to conduct the enquiry, but had rejected this idea because such
persons would, have lacked experience, Draught Treasury Letter to
Bute, (Nay 1761), Add. MSS. 32923 f.18].. This does not explain, how-
ever, 'why no attempt was made to find replacements to carry out the
normal duties of Cuthbert and Hulton. Moreover, it is symptomatic of
the greater importance attached to the supply branch, that the orig-
inal intention to appoint a commissary of supply to serve on the
commission of enquiry was abandoned, when Cockburn, the official
concerned, had. to undertake the temporary direction of the cominiss-
ariat on Peirson's resignation. T/29/34 f.251 , 25 March 1762.
2 T/52/53 f.349, 7 April 1762.
3 Seven of these, Boyve, Collins, Leach, Levett, Meyer, Stanton and
Aaron Ibzer, with salaries of at least £1 per day, counted as offic-
ials of the first rank, see Appendix I. Frederick Vaudriancy had
15/Od per day, Pownal]. & Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 17 March 1764,
T/52/56 f.274. No details have been found on the salary of John Ibm-
er, Letter of Pownau, 21+ June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.l07.
1+ For one of the two districts into which Powna.0 had originally div..
ided the campaigning area in July 1762 he listed over forty control
officers attached to individual magazines, List of a].]. the Magaz-
ines •..., 15 July 1762, T/l/417 ff.32 - 33.
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his disposal, Pownall initiated a fully comprehensive system of
supervision, covering every aspect of army supply. Moreover, he was
able to assign individual commissaries to limited and clearly def-
ined responsibilities, so that some for example concerned themselves
with transport services, others with the bakery, while five separate
districts, each administered by a deputy commissary, were created to
deal with the provision of forage and its issue to the troops from
magazines. 1
 In a similar way the accounts branch was divided into
three departments, staffed by a total of four commissaries, one keep-
ing a detailed record of all accounts settled and dealing with reg-
imental demands and charges, two others examining the vouchers pre-
sented in justification of claims, and the fourth verifying and liqu-.
idating accounts on the basis of the vouchers allowed. 2
 These arx'-
angements not only extended the range of supervisory activities and
introduced a more thorough and accurate examination of accounts, so
that these departments were no longer the poor relations of the ser-
vice, but they also enabled commissaries and other officials to fam-
iliarize themselves with limited areas of responsibility, and thus in
theory at least to increase their competence and, to execute their
tasks more efficiently. Such were the important benefits conferred
by Pownall 'a work in the last year of the war.
The appointment of commissaries of control and ace-
1 Add. 1S. 38:3:35 ff.106 - 109.
2 Webb acted as accountant general, Dyer and Bromfield as commissar-
ies of check and Legh as commissary of accounts, ibid. ff.11O -
111. Pownall 'a original plan had assigned five commissaries to the
accounts branch, State of the Office of Control, (27 June) 1762,Tf1f'+17 f.351.
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ounts with a status equal to that of commissaries of supply, the con-
siderable increases in their numbs is, and above all their organizat-
ion in a separate and semi-autonomous department, containing subord-
inate offices each charged with a recognizable area of responsibility,
were reflections of the growing realization that army supply could not
be properly administered by officials who were burdened with a range
of varied and frequently incompatible duties. Although the Treasury
only groped slowly and hesitantly towards the goal of greater special-
ization, and somewhat tamely allowed its early moves in this direction
to be rendered nugatory, it ultimately introduced significant changes,
for which, however, it owed a considerable debt to the understanding
and determination of Pownafl. These developments make it possible to
speak or the first time in a Meaningful sense of the 'commissariat
as an institutional structure, for previously British troops had been
served by a mere collection of individual commissaries.
Nothing would have been more fatal to the efficiency
of the supply of the Combined Army than an attempt to direct and con-
trol affairs in all their complex detail from London. Adequate and re-
sponsible delegation of authority is another hallmark of successful
administration, never more so than when communications between sup-
eriors and subordinates are normally ten days or two weeks in trans.-
The coamissariat in Germany needed considerable independence in
-
1 Inclement weather could cause even longer delays, for on 6 March
1759 five mails, despatched from London at weekly intervals, arr
ived in Germany simultaneously, and Hunter received a reply to a
letter written on 31 January. Hunter to (Martin), 25 February 1759,
T/6/96 f.37. Hunter to Newcastle, 2 & 7 March 1759, ibid. ff.k9 &
57.
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respect of two particular powers, which were exercised by the Treas..
ury when it undertook the supply of the British army at home • The
first was that of formulating and concluding contractual agreements
for provisions and services, in which connection promptness of action
was of vital importance, and the second was that of issuing and dis-
posing of cash, for effective control of the purse-strings offered a
potent means of influencing the process of supply in the best inter-
ests of the Army. At the outset of the war the Board accepted the
principle that its commissaries could not submit the terms of every
proposed contract for approval without jeopardizing efficiency, and
that as it had few means at its disposal to judge the reliability of
the entrepreneurs to be employed and the fairness of the prices to be
allowed, little purpose would be served by insisting on such a rule
of action. Thus in 1757 Amherst was given the power to conclude
supply arrangements independently, although the Treasury expected to
be kept informed of the steps which he had taken) A year later, how-
ever, this theory broke down in practice, when the Board expressed
its disenchantment with the contracting policy adopted, and ordered
that no further agreements be concluded without its specific approval
except on a temporary basis in an emergency. 2 This change in policy
was probably an over-reaction to the Treasury 's recognition of its
own negligence, which had caused it to mislay Amherst's letter in-
1. Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, Tfl/375 No.
2:3, ff.5]. - 52.
2 West to Boyd, 11 March 1758, T/27/27 f.322. Martin to Hatton, 1
September 1758, ibid. f.:378. The Treasury had been shocked to learn
that the Hanoverian Chancery of War had supplied large quantities
of forage to the Hessian troops without any advance agreement on
price, T/29/33 ff.21 - 22 & 25 - 26, 1 & 8 March 1758.
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forming it of his arrangements for over a year, 1 and before long de-
lays in communication and the exigency of the service had made it
clear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the
business of supply on such a footing.2
The appointment of Hunter ended this confusion, for
although the new Superintendent was instructed to seek the advice of
the Commander-in-Chief, and if there was time to consult the Treasury,
his power to concinde contractual agreements on his own initiative
was fully recognized. 3 In the course of 1759 he consulted Whitehall
on more than one occasion, but the Board's usual reaction was to con-
fess its ignorance of the details of such matters, and either submit
entirely to his jñgment, or approve his arrangements with certain
L.
riders or recommendations. Nor did the Treasury see any reason to
question the introduction of fundamental changes in the methods of
supply, and when for example Hunter took the provision of bread to
the foreign troops out of the hands of the private contractor and
put it under a system of public management, the Board simply deferred
to his opinion that the new arrangements would be more efficient.5
1 See below p.162.
2 Boyd to Treasury, 29 April 1758, T/l/386 No.29. The Board was ob-
liged to accept a contract between Marlborough, the British Comm-
ander-in-Chief, and Abraham Prado despite the exorbitance of its
terms, and lamented. that it was unable to annul it, Treasury to
Duke of Marlborough, 30 October 1758 , T/27f27 f.394.
3 Hunter's Instructions, 8 January 1759, Howard Vyse !'S. D/HV/B/Ll./2.
i4 Martin to Hunter, 2 February 1759, T/6 L1/96 f.9. T/29/33 ff.,170 -
171, 11 April 1759.
5 West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, T/6k/96 f.222. There had been
justified complaints about the performance of the bread contractor.
See below pp.229 - 230.
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On the other hand, there were a number of occasions when the Super-
intendent felt himself unauthorized to accept financial liability for
certain charges, 1 and the process of referring these knotty problems
to London tended to produce delays and dissatisfactions. But although
it might sometimes seem in Germany that the applications for direct-
ions were unnecessary, and that the Board showed a reluctance to make
up its mind on some issues, the business of supplying a multi-nation-
al army inevitably required the resolution of certain complex matters
at the highest leve]. of central government.2
In appointing Peirson to replace Hunter in May 1760,
the Treasury oriered that it be kept regularly informed of all steps
taken for the supply of the Army, and although it also seems to have
implied that no contracts were to be.finalized without its approval,4
the coininissariat was allowed a free hand in making the necessary arr
angements for a period of some eighteen months, during which the
Board's interventions were confined to drawing attention to what it
considered were minor blemishes in the terms of agreements. 5
 Once
1 Among the examples were the provision of bread and forage to troops
not maintained by Britain, the payment of aides-de-camp out of ex-
traordinaries, Hunter to Newcastle, 2 March 1759, T/64/96 ff. L18 -
49, and the granting of an allowance of meat money, Martin to Hun-
ter, 18 May 1759, ibid. f.l11.
2 On some issues, however, there does seem to have been unnecessary
procrastination, see below pp.226 - 227.
3 Instructions to Peirson, 9 May 1760, Howard Vyse S. D/HV/B/4/3.
4 Considerations relating to Prince Ferdinand's Army ...., 6 February
1762, Add. 1S. 32999 f.399.
5 As for example when a contractor was allowed to deliver forage dir.-
ectly to the troops instead of into a magazine, T/ 29734 1.75, 19
May 1761.
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again the officials in Germany were even permitted to initiate a fun-
damental change in the framework of supply, when at the end of 1760
the foreign artillery and provision trains were transferred from pub-
lic management to private contract, a change which somewhat mystified
the Treasury at first, but which was none the less accepted. Indeed,
in this affair the cominissariat may ha y e been accorded too much rather
than too little freedom of action. 1 At the beginning of 1762, however,
as a result of the lurid revelations of fraud emanating from Germany,
the Board was led to take two actions which compromised the commiss-
ariat 'a independence. The first was the dramatic cancellation of an
immense contract for six million rations of forage on the grounds that
the prices agreed were exorbitant. 2 This intervention, which caused
considerable disruption and confusion in supply arrangements, seems
to have been based on an imperfect understanding of the real costs in-
volved, and the Treasury's belief that large sums of money could be
saved by engaging the subcontractors to deliver on its own account
proved to be illusory. 3 The incident demonstrates that in the matter
of prices the usual decision to defer to the judgment of the commiss-
aries in Germany was the only effective basis on which the supply of
the Army could be organized. Secondly, the establishment of the comm-
ission of enquiry resulted in a stop of payments due to contractors
suspected of fraud, and the assumption that those involved were not
1 See below pp.268 - 269.
2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f. 83. Newcastle to Sir J.
Yorke, 19 February 1762, Add. 1S. 3293k ff.436 - 37.
3 See below pp.178 - 181.
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to be further employed in the business of supply. This developnent
brought protests from Ferdinand and Cockburn, who feared the effects
of the withdrawal of so many important and experienced suppliers,1
and was probably not unrelated with the difficulties and shortages
which occurred later in the year. 2 Nevertheless, even if a case could
be made out for continuing the employment of the suspected contractors
with more stringent safeguards against fraud, the Treasury's inflex-
ibility on this issue may well have reflected the views of a number
of influential commissaries.3
An even more thorny problem relating to the commissar-
iat 's independence concerned its control over the issue of money in
payment for goods provided and services rendered, for which British
financial traditions insisted on a lengthy and somewhat leisurely
process, not at all geared to the urgency of war. The various stages
were the liquidation of accounts by means of a thorough examination
of the figures and calculations of which they were composed, and. a
check of the vouchers presented in justification of the charges, the
issue of a certificate or debenture for the sum found justly due, the
granting of a warrant which authorized payment and. finally, the latt-.
er's encashment. The role of the Treasury's commissaries was confined
to liquidating accounts and issuing certificates, for the power of
1 Granby to (Commissioners of Enquiry), 21 July 1762, TJl/ L.l7 f.85.
?rtin to Howard, 31 May 1762, Howard Vyse 1'S. D/RV/B/11./7.
2 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse JS. D/'HV/B/9/7.
3 Pownall, with his responsibilities for the elimination of fraud as
director of the department of control, must have approved of the
decision, and while Howard reported Cockburn 's views to the Trea..
sury, he apparently made no effort to support them.
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granting warrants was before the Seven Years War only delegated to
the armys Commander-in-thief, 1 while the funds from which cash pay-
ments were iiade were entrusted to the Paymaster-General or to his
deputy who attended the troops • When the army served in Europe it
was also the Commander-in-chief who was empowered to draw bills of
exchange, usually on the Paymaster-General or on government bankers
in the United Provinces, for exceptional and urgent payments which
could not be met from the normal remittances of money. To these gen-
eral rules there was one exception: a commissary attending foreign
troops in British pay on the Continent was permitted in the absence
of a British military commander and deputy paymaster to draw bills
of exchange, although the fact that he could only do so for an auth-
orized amount in payment for provisions and services which had. been
specifically approved by the Treasury, 2 meant that he had little
freedom of action in such matters • This system was inevitably re-
garded as strange and, inefficient by those accustomed to the more
direct and centralized methods prevalent under absolute monarchy.
It meant firstly, that the officials who supplied the army exercised
no real. control over the issue of money, and so were unable to reg-
ulate payments in the manner which they considered to be in the best
interests of the service, and secondly, that cash could not be made
available except by official authorization at the culmination of a
laborious process of account. Such measures were designed to safe-
guard the British taxpayers' money, but did little to facilitate
1 Martin to Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/6k/96 f.339.
2 (Amherst) to Treasury, 10 April 1757, T/l/ 375 No.31, f.66.
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the supply of the army. In the course of the Seven Years War in Ger-
many, however, these traditional forms underwent significant modif-
ication, involving an important increase in the powers of the comm-
issariat.
In 1759 Hunter was authorized to issue his warrants
on the deputy paymaster for the payment of the extraordinary supplies
and services of the Combined Army, the first commissary to be en-
trusted with this responsibility. 1' The change was a reflection both
of the increased importance of the commissariat 'a role in looking
after the needs of such a large number of troops, and equally of the
great trust conferred on Hunter personally, but it was also a sound
move on administrative grounds, for it relieved the Commander-in-
Chief of burdensome duties for which he had little time and perhaps
little inclination, and confided them to an official who was fully
conversant with all the details of supply. Nevertheless, the new
arrangement went so much against the grain of established practice
that one member of the ministry was reported to have withheld his
consent, 2 perhaps afraid that with the fingers of an ordinary
issary on the purse-strings a nightmare of uncontrolled expenditure
was about to begin. On Hunter's departure from Germany in December
1759 the Treasury decided temporarily to restore the granting of
warrants to the British Commander-in-Chief, 3 and when Peirson was
1 Martin to Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/64/96 f.339.
2 Peirson and Hatton to Ferdinand, 13 April 1761, Westphalen, op.
cit. Vol.V, p.288.
3 Tf 29/33 f.26]., 18 December 1759. Considerable confusion arose in
the early months of 1760, because in his absence Hunter had author- -
ized Hatton to grant warrants for certain essential services and
the deputy paymaster refused to accept them. Hatton to Martin, 9
April 1760, T/1/4.05 ff.170 - 171.
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appointed in May 1760 this reversion to traditional arrangements was
confirmed. 3 The change was largely the result of the failure to find
a successor of sufficient standing to be entrusted with plenary fin-
ancial powers, but it was a retrograde step and, despite the Board's
belief that the service would not suffer as a result, 2 proved in the
course of the next year to be quite unsatisfactory. Granby's preocc-
upatioñ with military affairs did. not allow him to devote adequate
attention to commissariat business, 3 so that the granting of warrants
and the payment of accounts were subject to much de1ay. Thus early
in 1761 Prince Ferdinand complained that difficulties were arising
not because of lack of money but as a result of faulty methods of
payment, 5 and in June the Treasury issued a new commission to Peirson,
authorizing him to make draughts on the deputy paymaster, 6 a power
which was continued to his successor, Howard, in l762. The bold ad-.
ininistrative change of 1759 was thus reintroduced, and although the
Treasury must be criticized for its failure to adhere to its original
1 A Short Narrative ...., 1761, Tf1/LI.10 f.328. Peirson was allowed to
grant warrants in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief.
2 Newcastle to Granby, 29 April 1760, Add. !S. 32905 f,138.
3 Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, Add. ?S. 32909 f.300.
k There was, however, a more particular difficulty in that Hunter's
accountant, Fuhr, being a German national, could not hold a Treasury
commission, and Granby therefore doubted whether he was authorized
to grant warrants on his certificates. Peirson to Newcastle, 9 Aug-
ust 1760, ibid. f.362.
5 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 f.77.
6 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse !S.
D/HV/B/4/k.
7 Martin to Howard, 2 July 1762, ibid. D/HV/B/Ll./10.
,1971, pp.28 - 30.
79.
plan, the war ended with the head of the commissariat in a position
to exercise effective control and co-ordination over the ocess of
paying accounts.
Although the granting of warrants was a far from neg-
ligible power, it was limited by the amount of cash which the deputy
paymaster had at his disposal, which in turn depended on the size and
regularity of the Treasury's monthly remittances. Consequently, the
right to draw bills of exchange outside these limits was a matter of
some importance, and this responsibility was usually entrusted to the
same official who granted warrants. 1
 Thus between December 1759 and
June 176]. it was exercised by the British Commander-in-Chief with the
same deleterious results as have been described above. The Board's
attitude was not completely rigid, however, for when early in 1760,
after the rejection of his warrants by the deputy paymaster, Hatton
ventured to draw some bills without specific permission from London,
the Treasury not only accepted them but permitted him to draw others
in cases of urgent necessity. 2
 It has been suggested that by imposing
monthly quotas on the amount of money which could be drawn by means
of bills of exchange, and by refusing to grant wide discretionary
powers to draw on government funds through continental money centres,
the Treasury unwisely restricted the financial authority of its rep.'
resentatives in Germany. 3 Such criticisms may apply to the period of
1 Hunter, Granby, Peirson and Howard. See the accounts of bills drawn
under the heading of 'Extraordinarye' in P1/2/3 - 6.
2 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany ..,., Add. !S.
38333 f.l0.
3 R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial Management of
80.
Hunter's administration, but in 1760 the Board specifically permitted
Its officials to draw bills without limit, 1 and Newcastle stated that
if the credit of Pye and Cruickshanks of Amsterdam, who until that
time had been the sole negotiators of bills, was insufficient, then
recourse should be had. to Cliffords of the same city. 2 Somewhat later
Peirson seems to have been subject to little restriction in this sphere,
and by early 1762 such considerable sums were involved that the dis-
count on bills had been forced up to between six and eight per cent,3
another illustration of the danger involved in allowing the commissar-
iat too much freedom of action. In fact, in the last part of the war
the only restrictions which the Treasury seems to have imposed were
an insistence that it must be notified of draughts made and of the
particular services to which they were	 , and in August 1762 to
prohibit the drawing of bills payable before 1 December 1762 in order
to provide more breathing-space at a time of year when the cash avail-
able to meet such commitments tended to be rather low. 5
 Altogether
therefore, there is little evidence after 1759 that the cominissariat's
access to financial reserves was arbitrarily or artificially limited
in respect of the amounts of money involved.
1 Draught Treasury Letter to Hatton, 29 April 1760, Add. S. 32905
f.]57. Newcastle to Granby, 2 May 1760, ibid. f.2ll, & 12 Nay 1760,
Add. ?S. 32906 f.l2.
2 Newcastle to Granby, 2 Nay 1760, Add. ?S. 329 05 ff.2U - 212.
3 P. Taylor to J. Powell, 27 April 1762, W0/79/25. Taylor to Cockburn,
21 May 1762, ibid.
1+ Newcastle to Peirson, 2L February 1761, Add. J'S, 32919 f.2L12+.
5 Martin to Howard, 27 August 1762, T/1/417 ff.112 - 113.
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The developments described above had no effect on the
actual issue of hard cash to the government 's creditors, and although
throughout the war the ultimate responsibility for such matters lay
with the Paymaster-General and his deputy, the commissariat 's author-
ity in this area underwent a significant increase as a result of the
modification of traditional financial forms • In 1759 a second deputy
paymaster, entrusted with considerable funds, was attached to the
troops operating in Hesse-Cassel at the beginning of the year and in
Saxony at its end, and the latter was authorized to issue money on
the warrants of the commissary of supply accompanying the detachment.1
This decentralization of payments was obviously a sensible arrange-
ment, for it prevented creditors having to travel long distances to
seek what might be very small sums of money, but the powers thereby
given to a subordinate commissary were unusual, and in justifying his
action Hunter also described it as 'Inconsistent with the English
method System & Oeconoiny'. 2
 The Treasury, however, approved of the
steps he had taken without comment and permitted similar arrangements
the following year. 3 At approximately the same time in another con-
cession to easier and speedier payments, the Board permitted comm-
issaries of supply to order advances of cash on account to those
holding large contracts, who could hardly be expected to wait for
1 Hunter to Oswald, 30 March 1759, T/l/395 f.381. Hunter to Martin,
December 1759, T/6L1/96 f.289(a).
2 Hunter to Newcastle, 6 December 1759, Add. MSS. 32899 f.331.
3 Martin to Hunter, 11+ December 1759, Add. IES. 32900 f.74. Treasury
to Granby, 2 May 1760, T/l/405 ff.352 - 353. Extracts from the
Treasury's Orders and Instructions to Blakeney, 10 June 1760, Hot-
ham ?S. DDHO/L1J21LF.
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several months, while their deliveries were being coinileted, before
receiving any money) Again this was a sensible arrangement which gave
additional authority to the commissaries, and enabled them to assist
those contractors whose services seemed to be the most essential, or
whose problems of liquidity seemed to be the most acute.
These arrangements did not, however, satisfy Prince
Ferdinand, who in coimlaining of unnecessary and damaging delays in
the payment of many accounts at the beginning of 1761, recommended
the introduction of the Prussian system, whereby all commissaries were
entrusted with the disDosition of cash and were acconmanied by cash-
iers with funds which could be expended without lengthy formalities.2
At first the Treasury shrank from this prospect, believing that it
would lead to the exenditure of large sums of money without reason-
able check and control:- ".,. if the alteration desired should take
place; Money must be advanced to a Number of inferior Persons, who
cannot be known to be equal to so great a Trust. This might open a way
to fraud, & at the same time render a discovery of It, extremely diff-
icult". 3
 Nevertheless, after some discussion the Board abruptly chang.-
ed its mind, and decided that with full authority for ordering the
1 Draught Treasury Letter to Hatton, 29 April 1760, Add. S. 32905
f.158. Treasury to Granby, 2 May 1760, T/l/ L1.05 f.352.
2 Add. !'S. 38333 f.21. T/29f3k ff.52 & 58, 28 & 30 April 1761.
3 Add. 1'S. 38333 f.25. The Paymaster-General was also reluctant to
make his deputy liable for the sums entrusted to such cashiers,
T/29/3M. f.138, lLf July 1761.
k T/29/311. ff.75 & 86, 19 & 28 May 1761. Draught Treasury Letter to
Bute, (May 1761), Add. ?3S. 32923 f.199.
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issue of money now to be restored to the head of the cominissariat, the
latter could be made responsible for defining the precise terms on
which the money was to be received and expended, and. for supervising
its administration by the commissaries and cashiers concerned. 1 This
system continued to operate in the last part of the war, when the Pay-
master-General was asked to appoint a proper number of deputies to act
as cashiers with small military chests subject to the direction of
British commissaries responsible for the supply of detachments of the
2Combined Army, and it became the means of making immediate payment on
the spot without complicated paper work for the multit.inous deliver-
ies of small quantities of provisions by country people. Despite its
initial misgivings, the Treasury had thus given the officials charged
with the organization of supply control over the issue of cash, and.
thereby provided them for the first time with an essential means of
encouraging deliveries.
The Board 's record in providing its commissaries with
adequate powers and in allowing them a sufficient degree of freedom of
action is clearly a mixed one. In 1758 and. 1762 there were misguided
interventions in supply arrangements which caused much confusion, al-
though for most of the war the conunissariat did not suffer from irrit-
ating interference in the running of its daily affairs, and. was free
both to formulate and execute its policies. In the sphere of finance
the war ended with the Superintendent in possession of new and. exten-
1 Treasury to Bute, 27 May 1761, T/1/klO f.337.
2 T/29/3L1. f.3l 8 , 7 July 1762.
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sive powers over the supply and issue of money, and commissaries of
supply exercising novel responsibilities in connection with cash pay
inents. The Treasury had, however, failed to adhere consistently to the
first, and had shown little initiative in introducing the second, and
both factors had been contributory causes of a serious back-log in
the settlement of accounts. Nevertheless, the ove iall picture which
emerges from the period is of a commissariat with increased authority
and independence, further reflections of its emergence as an instit-
ution.
In turning finally to a discussion of whether the
conditions of employment encouraged suitable applicants for posts in
the commissariat, the major consideration is salary levels. A comm-
issary worked under considerable pressures, for military success often
depended on speed in finding large quantities of provisions, in amass-
ing and distributing them, in moving them to positions of safety when
the enemy made unexpected advances, and in dealing with the intermin-
able reams of paper-work. Moreover, such tasks had to be performed
amidst the confusion and chaos of war, involving at the worst a real
threat to life and limb and at the best a very low standard of mater- -
ial comfort • As Frederick Halsey wrote :- ".... ye. village that is
ye. headquarters is worse than the most ragged village in Northamp-
tonshire .... (The Hereditary Prince) has a little hole for his bed,
& he dines in ye. Stable wth. Horses & Cows; We Commissaries pig to-
gether in a Smiths forge". 1
 To all this had to added separation
1 F. Halsey to TH. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.
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from family, friends and personal affairs, with little prospect of
regular leave or holidays. 1 It was therefore essential to offer coinin-
issaries financial rewards which were commensurate with a difficult,
frustrating and frequently dangerous job, performed under harsh con-
ditions, and possessing some of the characteristics of a sentence of
transportation as well as those of government service.
There can be little doubt that the officials in the
upper ranks of the coinmissariat were granted a generous remuneration,
which compared very favourably with what could be gained in other
walks of life. The three superintendents or directors who served in
the course of the war enjoyed salaries of between £5 and £10 per day,
Peirson being allowed £5 in 1760 and £8 in 1761, while both Hunter
and Howard were paid £10 throughout their administrations. 2 All were
given lump aunts of money on appointment of either £500 or £800 to
provide themselves with equipment and cover travelling expenses. 3 In
addition both Peirson and Howard continued to enjoy their military pay
1 Some commissaries were, however, accompanied by their wives in Ger-
many, C. Mason to Pownall, 17 November 1761, T/l/k13 f.9l, and there
were also moments for relaxation, for Hulton described how he was
able to enjoy tea, coffee and cards twice a week at certain times,
and even indulge in hunting. Observations in the Course of Sundry
Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772, by Henry Hulton, ff.172 - 173 &
176.
2 See Appendix I. The payment of only £5 to Peirson on his first app..
ointment reflected the fact that he was a person of less standing
than Hunter and was not entrusted with the granting of warrants.
When he was given the latter power in 1761, his salary was still not
raised to the level of that of his predecessor, but in reverting to
the former payment on the appointment of Howard the Treasury was seen
to have showed a certain lack of generosity to Peirson.
3 £500 in the case of Peirson, T/52/50 f. 1192, iLl. May 1760, and £800 in
those of Hunter and Howard, F. Halsey to Magens, 29 April 1760, Hal-
sey S. 15029. Martin to Howard, 2 July 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. t)/HV/
B/4/iO.
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and perquisites such as allowances for forage and transport, and Hun .-
ter although a civilian, also possessed the latter as he was accorded
the honours of war usually paid. to a major-general. 1 Finally, the sup-
erintendent 's secretarial and clerical assistance was provided at the
Treasury's expense as part of the contingent expenses of his office.2
A superficial comparison shows that Hunter and. Howard. had salaries
which were only slightly less than that of the Lord Chief Justice, 3 on
approximately the same level as that of the Chancellor of the Exehequ-
er,4
 and superior to those of every British soldier serving in Germany
with the exception of the Commander_in_Chief, 5 and to those of high-
ranking officials such as the Commissioners of the Council of Trade
and Plantations and the Commissioners of the Treasury.6 By exchanging
the office of junior Lord of the Admiralty for that of Superintendent
of Extraord.inartes Hunter received a theoretical salary increase of no
ieee than	 In practice, of course, the head of the commissariat
1 T.0. Hunter, Patent, 6 January 1759, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HVIB/4/1.
2 Newcastle to Hunter, 16 February 1759, Add. ?'S. 32888 f.139.
3 £14, 000 per annum. The Court and City Kalendar or Gentleman 's Regi
ter for the Year 1762. t,.120.
14. £3,400 per annum, made up of £200 patent salaries, £1,600 additional
salary and £1,600 salary of a Treasury Lord. J.C. Sainty, Office-
.
'.'7('/ P.Wf
5 £10 per day. Establishment of General and Staff Officers ...., 28
February 1759, T/l/391 f.77.
6 £2,500 per annum until 1761, whereafter £2,000 per annum for the
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, and £1,600 for the Conimiss-
ioners of the Treasury. Sainty, op. cit. Vol.111, Officials of the
Boards of Trade, 1660 - 1870. (1974) p . 28 . Ibid. Vol.1, p.17.
7 A junior Lord of the Admiralty received £1,000 per annum. The Court
and City Kalendar ...., 1762, pp.209 - 210.
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was in a less favourable situation than some of the officers cited,
for he enjoyed no fees or unofficial profits, and it is possible that
one reason for the high level of his remuneration was an attempt to
compensate for this disadvantage. Nevertheless, it would be difficult
to argue that the commissariat 's directors were in any sense underpaid,
and although Peirson might well feel a personal grievance, the salary
awarded to the other two superintendents represented a more than ad-
equate wage for the job.1
A small proportion of commissaries with major respon-
sibilities received salaries of £5 per day, 2 a figure well in excess
of the £3 per day previously allowed to senior commissaries, 3 and as
Newcastle pointed out the equivalent of the pey of an envoy extraord-
inary. For Pownall. this represented an increase of L on what he had
received as Governor of Massachusetts Bay, 5 and for Hatton It was an
even more significant improvement on the mere £200 he earned as Brit-
1 Although Hunter frequently complained about overwork, no statement
has been found to justify the claim that he regarded himself as in-
sufficiently remunerated. Browning, op. cit. p.31.
2 There were four a1together Cockburn, Fawcett, Hatton and Pownall.
See Appendix I.
3 While there are possibly examples of commissaries paid more than
this before the Seven Years War, it is significant that Abraham Huine,
the Commissary to the Forces Abroad during the Austrian Succession
War, had, this allowance, and continued to draw it as Commissary Gen-
eral to the Troops at Home and Abroad in 1757. Ca1ndar of Treasury
Books and Paprs, 1742 - 1745, Preserved in the Public Record Office.
(1903) p.421. T/52/4ff 1.128, 3 June 1757.
4 Newcastle to Granby, 25 April 1760, Add. !'ES. 32905 1.78.
5 £1 , 300 per annum. J.A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall .... (1951) p.1 140. It
should be pointed out, however, that in transferring to Germany In
1761 at £3 per day Pownall accepted a cut in salary.
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I sh consul in Flanders from 1749 onwards , and the £2 per day he gain.-
ed as Secretary to the Commissioners for Negotiations relating to the
Barrier Treaties In 1752.2 ordinary commissaries drew £3 per day,
which put them on a par with the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance,
junior Lords of the Admiralty and the Commissioners of Ctistoins and Ex-
cise. 3 Among the officials for whom this represented a. significant In-
crease in salary were William Fraser, who had. earned approximately
£500 per annum as Assistant Under-Secretary to the Secretary of State,4
and Hulton, whose employment as Comptroller of the Customs in Antigua
brought him only £350 per annum, 5 and who at the end of the war accept-.
ed the post of Plantation Clerk with the Commissioners of Customs at
£500 per annum. 6 Lower down the scale, assistant and deputy commissar..
ies received £1 or £2 per day, a more modest remuneration, but one
which probably represented more than they would have earned In a normal
secretarial capacity with the government or a private employer.7
1 T/53/ 46 f.49, 12 January 1757.
2 T/53/ f.374, 6 December 1752. T/53/146 f.Lf02, 10 January 1759. He
continued to draw both salaries while acting as a commissary in Ger--
many.
3 The_Court and City Kalendar ...., 1762, pp.127, 13 0 , 177 & 209 - 210.
The Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance had a salary of £1,100 per
annum and all the rest £1,000 per annum.
4 Although Fraser was paid by fees at this time, £500 was the salary
allowed to the holder of the office in 1770 when a fixed remuneration
was introduced. Sainty, op. cit. Vol.11, Officials of the Secretaries
of State, 1660 - 1782. (1973) pp.26 - 27.
5 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.187. Nemorial of Hulton,
December 1765, Add. 1SS. 32972 f.261.
6 ThId. Hulton to Newcastle, 31 January 1766, Add. ?S. 32973 f.325.
7 A number of assistant commissaries accepted employment as clerks with
the Commissioners for Examining German Demands at the end of the war,
and were paid a maximum of 12/6d per day. The officials concerned
were Boyve, Higgins, Leach, Stanton and Aaron Tozer, see Appendix I.
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In addition to their ordinary salaries commissaries
of all ranks might enjoy supplementary benefits. Those who held mil-
itary commissions were often granted equipage money or other allow-
ances on taking up their commissariat appointments, 1 while Pownall,
who received the honorary title of 'Colonel', enjoyed the various per-
quisites to which such an officer was entitled. 2
 Other commissaries
were given 'ex gratia' payments on the successful completion of esp-
ecially onerous tasks, 3 while compensation was also paid to those for
whom appointment to the service in Germany had involved financial
1oss.1 With specific Treasury approval some officials continued to
draw the salaries of other government posts from which they had been
seconded to the commissariat, 5 although in such cases they were pre-
sumably expected to pay for the deputy who replaced them. Finally, it
must be remembered that a commissary's personal expenses might be
lessened by the provision of free quarters, 6 and that he did not have
1. Boyd to Martin, 28 February 1759, T/1f395 f.429. T/29/33 f •Ll7, 10
May 1758. T/29/35 f.67, 12 April 1763. Despite Frederick Halsey's
belief that he should have received such allowances, F. Halsey to
Magens, 29 Aprl.1 1760 & 5 December 1760, Halsey ?S. 15029, there
is no evidence that it was granted to all commissaries as he claimed.
2 C.A.W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall ..... (1908) p.167.
3 The two Commissioners of Enquiry for example were granted £200 each,
Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.174 - 175, although both
complained that the reward was inadequate.
4. Weir was granted a pension of £200 per annum because of the loss and
damage he suffered in having to leave North America for Germany, T/
52/57 ff.346 - 34.7, 5 February 1766.
5 See above p.88 n • 2,
6 Various commissaries talked of having quarters assigned to them or
taken away from them by the military authorities, for example Jour
nal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.l30, and it is assumed that
they had the same rights as magazine officers, who were allowed
'quartier franc', General Report on Depots, 26 October 1762, T/l/1f17
f.3l7.
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to foot the bill for such items as travelling expenses incurred in the
execution of his duties, stationery, postal charges, salaries and ex-
penses of clerks and the hire of office accoiuiodation, 1 this expendit-
ure being reimbursed under the heading of contingencies. In connection
with the latter the Treasury 'a attitude was ungrudging, for when in
1762 Howard expressed some concern at the size of the sums being char-
ged, the Board replied that '.... it is uitt to give all reasonable
encouragement to Gentlemen, imployed in affairs of so much consequence
to the PubUck', 2
 although the Superintendent still felt it necessary
to add that '.... the demand of such large Contingencies makes the
appointment of these Gentlemen equal, if not greater than many of the
first Offices in Government'
And yet there were some less favourable aspects of
the commissaries' financial situation. Large as their salaries were,
they did not last for more than the duration of the war, and the Trea-
sury stoutly resisted any claim to the right to half pay on the cess-
ation of hostilities. 14 Employment in the commissariat was thus a
temporary affair, and did not offer any long-term financial security.
There were a.lso disadvantages in the methods by which salaries were
1 F. Halsey to Magens, 5 December 1760, Halsey ?S. 15029. Contingent
Account of J. Levett, 214. August 1762, T/1/Ll.l7 f.l67.
2 Martin to Howard, 8 July 1762, Howard Vyse S. D/HV/B/4112.
3 Howard to (Treasury), 14. September 1762, T/1/Z4.17 f.152.
14. Memorial of A. Ross, 17 September 1765, T/1/L#44 f.85. T/29/37 f.1314.,
17 September 1765. Some commissaries appointed by the Board of Ord-
nance or the War Office were entitled to half pay, for example Mason,
who had acted as commissary of stores at Guadeloupe, Martin to Mason,
25 Nay 1761, T/27/28 f.163.
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paid. The wages of officials with Treasury commissions were issued in
London, a practice which in itself was somewhat inconvenient, necess-
itating the employment of an agent and banker, whose services in re-
mitting the money to Germany had. to be paid for. Boyd complained that
a 'friend', who received and forwarded his £500 equipage money, only
allowed him £Ll53/1LI./6, 2
 a deduction of over nine per cent. Another
disadvantage of payment in London was the loss of one shilling in the
pound for the Place Tax, 3
 and the payment of Treasury fees on the issue
of salary warrants, all of which Frederick Halsey was told brought the
total deductions from pay to twelve per cent or more. 4. Commissaries
without Treasury commissions were paid in Germany by warrant of a sup-.
erior officer on the deputy paymaster, but this too had the disadvant-
age of being subject to a deduction of 2/6d in the pound and one day's
pay per annum, as ordered by the Paymaster-General. 5 In the case of
one commissary, Fuhr, the Treasury intervened to cancel the latter
deductions and substitute that of one shilling in the pound, 6 but this
may have been a special favour on account of his revelations in conn-
ection with fraud, and others were probably not so fortunate. Another
I Cosne was given the choice of receiving his salary in Germany or in
London, but his case was exceptional. T/29/34. f.259, 1 April 1762.
2 Boyd to Treasury, 26 February 1759, T/l/395 f.4.29.
3 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/]./417 f.124.
4. F. Halsey to Magens, 5 November 1760, Halsey !'S. 15029.
5 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, Tf1/1f17 f.l24.
6 Ibid. As a German Fuhr could not be given a royal commission, and so
the allowance of his salary with the lesser deduction was unusual.
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drawback of payment in Germany was that if the salary was fixed in
dollars the depreciation of the currency could cause considerable
losses. Casimir Bilgen, the director of the foreign artillery train,
was allowed 200 dollars per month in 1759, when it was reported that
less than three dollars were exchanged for a ducat, but a year later,
with the ducat worth more than four dollars, the real value of the
salary had sadly declined. 1 Delays in the payment of salaries were
by no means an infrequent occurrence. Commissaries with Treasury
commissions were supposed to be paid quarterly, 2 but the reality was
often far removed from the theory. Hatton only received his wages for
the first four months of 1760 at the end of April l761, although
this was nothing compared to: the situation of Fuhr, who claimed at
the end of the war that he had received only one year's salary out of
four, and Joseph Trotter, evidently a man of some patience, who pet-
itioned for his salary six years after it was due. 5 But the hardship
caused by such delays should not be exaggerated, for if commissaries
did not always bother to press the Treasury to pay their arrears, it
was presumably because they were able to meet their expenses from the
public money in their hands, for which they were not called to account
6for many years.
1 Peirson to Martin, 2]. June 1760, T/l/O5 f.67.
2 F. Halsey to ?kgene, 10 August 1760, Halsey 1'S. 15029.
3 T/52/52 ff.ZlO - 211, 28 April 1761.
k Draught Treasury Letter to Cockburn, 15 February 1763, T/l/LI.27 f.
330.
5 Memorial of J. Trotter, 10 July 1765, T/l/41 4 f.241. He had, however,
only served for three weeks in 1759.
6 Memorial of J. Leach, (March 1765), T/)JL7 f.2011.
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The salary levels of the lesser cominissariat offic-
tale, who were mostly Germans, must obviously be discussed in more
general terms. Until the last year of the war magazine officers and
other supply assistants were paid in the range of 15/16 - 25/26 doll-
are per month, 1 which in 1759 represented a remuneration of approx-
imately £29 - £50 per	 By 1760 - 1761, however, with the fall
in the value of silver money, there had been a serious erosion of
real wages, and Frederick Halsey was of the opinion that 25 dollars
per month was insufficient to live on in the vicinity of the Army,
where prices tended to be artificially high. By 1762 magazine keepers
at least seem to have benefitted from wage increases resulting from
Pownall's reorganization of the control branch of the service, for
forty-nine such officials were paid between 24 and 50 dollars per
month, ' although Halsey could still write:- '.... where can we find a
Man of Capacity & honesty, & capable to undertake Such an Employ,
quit his own business, & at the End of a War, hire himself for 30
Ms. pr, Month, & liable every day to be turnd. adrift to the wild
]. An Account of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany •..., 1759, T/l/397 f.67. A List of Proviant Ver-
waiters and Proviant Schriebers, 18 November 1760, Halsey ?S.
15105. F. Halsey to General Elliot, 20 December 1760, ibid. 15030.
F. Halsey to Hatton, 2 February 1761, ibid.
2 Hunter quoted a salary range of 15 - 25 dollars per month, and said
that the higher figure was worth about £4. T/1/397 f.67.
3 F. Halsey to Magens, 16 April 1760, Halsey !'S.l5029.
Li. At different times in 1759 the ducat was worth 3, 3+ and 3* dollars,
an average of 3-k dollars, while in 1762 it was worth k dollars, De-.
dared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/1/1507/218. This re-
presents a decrease in the value of the dollar of 32.1Li%. A rise in
the minimum salary from 15 to 25 dollars is an increase of 66.67%,
and, in the maximum from 25 to 50 dollars one of 100%, List of all
the Magazines, Magazine Keepers and. Control Officers ...., 15 July
1762, T/l/La7 ff.32 - 33.
world without any means of Subsisting?' The salaries of clerical
assistants were on the whole little better. Many of those employed in
Hunter's office received only 3/Ci per day, 2 while in 1760 the normal
salary for a secretary was reported to be no more than 25 dollars per
month. 3 These earnings compare unfavourably with the 5/Oi per day all-
owed to assistant magazine clerks in Britain,1 and the minimum salary
of the same figure granted to clerks employed by the Commissioners for
Examining German Demands in London at the end of the war. 5 Inferior
officers did of course benefit from various small perquisites such as
bread and food allowances and free quarters , 6 but against this has to
be set the fact that their wages were often seriously in arrears, a
situation which was far more embarrassing for them than for the conim-
issaries, and reduced some of them to offer their pay certificates for
sale at as much as 2( discount.7
No doubt the salaries and allowances fixed by super
ior officers in the commissariat represented the customary rates for
1 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey ?S. 15038.
2 Approximately £55 per annum. T/l/397 f.66.
3 F. Halsey to Magens, 16 April 1760, Halsey !'S.l5029.
4. Approximately £92 per annum. T/29/32 f.:386, 5 May 1756.
5 T/29/35 f.l85, 10 October 1763.
6 List of all the Magazines, Magazine Keepers and Control Officers ...,
15 July 1762, T/l/kl7 if • 32 - 33. General Report on Depots, 26 Oct...
ober 1762, ibid. f,317. Peirson to Martin, 21 June 1760, T/l/1405
f.67.
7 A. Tozer to Pownall, 21 January 1763, T/l/427 f.506.
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the job in Germany, 1
 but the fact that their recipients, while OCC-
upying positions of great trust and responsibility, had no inherent
obligation or loyalty to Great Britain would have made above-average
wages a sensible investment. Frederick Halsey traced a direct connect-
ion between low wages on the one hand and fraud and peculation on the
other, and argued that some of the posts should have been filled by
people sent from England , 2 a point also taken up by Pownall on more
than one occasion. 3 But the Treasury never acted on this advice, which
would have involved the payment of higher salaries, and despite being
warned of the bad effects of the situation, it never encouraged its
commissaries to introduce reforms
In conclusion, it appears that senior commissaries in
Germany during the Seven Years War received favourable if not generous
financial rewards, and in its treatment of them the Treasury showed no
trace of a narrow, parsimonious outlook, which would have fatally com-
promised the commissariat 'a efficiency by failing to attract suitable
employees into the service. There is less evidence of a comparable
situation in connection with minor officials, amongst whom average and
in a sense inadequate salaries were the order of the day, a state of
1 Minor German officials could be paid as little as £16 per annum.
W.H. Bruford, Germafly in the Eighteenth Century: the Social Back
Ground of the Literary Revival. (1965) p.265.
2 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey 1'$S. 15038.
3 T/29/3A' ff.204 - 205, 17 December 1761. Pownall to Martin, 9 Feb-
ruary 1762, T/l/418 f.310.
4 A Short Sketch of the Evils Arising under the Commissariat in Cer.
many ...., 8 February 1762, Add. 1. S. 3293k ff.235 - 236 . The
Board 'a insistence throughout the war that minor officials must be
found in Germany also made administrative sense, in that those app-
ointed knew the country and its language.
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affairs accurately described as 'the worst Oeconnomy that England can
practice . This rattern no doubt reflects the bias inherent in eight-.
eenth century society itself, from which it was difficult to escape
even for reasons of administrative efficiency.
1 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey !S. 15058.
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CHAPFER III
THE COMMISSABS
98.
"C 'est dominage qu 'U est Comntissaire. Car ce jitaudit nom me cause tou-
jours mal au coeur. 1
No adiiinistrative machine, however carefully designed.
and constructed, can function effectively without the motive force of
adequate staff. Eighteenth century commissaries, constantly reviled in
their own day by long-suffering soldiers on the one hand and by crit-
ics of government expenditure on the other, have not on the whole had
a more favourable press from historians • Those who served in Germany
during the Seven Years War are described by one authority as 'rascally
and ignorant' ,2 and, by another as a 'shady crew'. 3 This chapter att-
empts to demonstrate that amongst fifty-nine superior commissariat
officers there is more evidence of experience, ability and. integrity
than of the amateurism, incompetence and. dishonesty, which have fre-
quently been uncritically accepted as the hallmarks of commissaries in
this period.
An investigation of the professional background of
commissariat officials reveals that a significant number had enjoyed
the beet possible experience of service in other wars or in other
I Letter to C.LP.E. von Westphalen, 3 June 1761, F.O.W.H. von West-
phalen, Geschichte der ?eldie des Hersogs Ferdinand von Braunsch
weig-I$ineburg, (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, p.359.
2 R. Whitworth, Field ?rsha1 Lord Ligonier: a	 of the British
Army, 1702 - 1770. ( 1958 ) p.32L.
3 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Eds,, The History of 'Parliament: the
House of Commons, 1754 - 1790. (l962i) Vol.11, p.656.
# See Appendix I.
99.
fields. Thomas Orby Hunter and Michael Hatton had both been closely 	 -
connected with army supply in Flanders during the Austrian Succession
War, the former as deputy paymaster of the forces,1 and the latter as
a commissary of supply. 2 Thomas Pownall, as Governor of Massachusetts
Bay, had been directly and actively involved in military administrat-
ion inclñing commissariat affairs in America in 1758 and 1759 be-
fore his arrival in Germany in 1761, as had Daniel Weir, who had ser-
ved as commissary general at the conquests of Louisberg and Quebec,1
before taking up his post with the Combined Army in 1762. Josei*
Leach, 5 Charles Mason 6 and Alexander Ross had all been imder-dep-
uty commissaries in g1and, while Leach had acted in the same cap-
acity on the Belle Isle expedition, 8 and Mason had held the post of
deputy commissary of stores and provisions at Guadeloupe. 9
 In addit-
ion, Ross served as a minor commissariat officer in Germany for over
1 Namier & Broolce, op. cit. ibid. Although the deputy paymaster was
not directly involved in army supply, he came into daily contact
with its problems.
2 Accounts of N. Hatton, 17k5 - 1711.8, Orlebar S. OR/l868.
3 J.A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall .... (195].) pp.133 - 139 & i611 - 165.
1 T/52/57 ff.311.6 - 311.7 , 5 February 1766.
5 T/52/k8 f.73, 2 February 1757.
6 A. Hume to Viscount Barrington, 11+ October 1758 , W0111976 ff.613 -
61k.
7 T/52/LI8 f.713, 2 February 1757. As Alexander Rose, the commissary in
Germany, was also an official of the Board of Taxes on leave of ab-
sence, his identification with the commissary in England in 1757
cannot be certain. See below p.106.
8 C. Howard to S. Martin, 9 June 1762, T/l/k17 f.14'l.
9 Hums to Barrington, 1k October 1758, wofl/976 ff.613 - 61k. Martin
to C. Mason, 25 May 1761, T/27/28 f.163.
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three years before being promoted to a post of responsibility, 1 and
Thomas Bishop, 2 Jerome Boyve , 3 John Crawford, and Cornet Gunn an
underwent similar apprenticeships, while the title of 'OverSta].-
meister' given to Ramberg, the director of the great provision train,6
suggests, without positively proving, that he was promoted from the
ranks of the service • Among the German commissaries Meyen and Roden
had been attached to the Hanoverian commissariat before entering Brit-
ish employment, 7 while few could rival the experience of President von
Massow of the Prussian Chamber of War of Minden, who not only held an
important permanent post directly concerned with all aspects of mil-
itary finance and supply, but had had responsibility for the provis-
ioning of armies in the field during the Austrian Succession War.8
AU the military officers who acted as commissaries
1 R. Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/l/klO f.l5l. He had been
employed as an inspector of magazines.
2 J. Parker to C. Hotham, 6 November 1758, Hotham ?S. DDHO/4/8.
3 Memorial of J. Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/l/LJ44 f.222. He had acted
as Pbwnall 's chief secretary.
4 An Account of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany •..., 1759, T/l/397 f.66. He acted as a book-keeper.
5 Peirson to Martin, 5 May 1761, T/1/410 f.64.
6 Instructions for N. Hatton ...., (1759), Add. ?S. 52905 fl50.
7 T.0. Hunter to R. Oswald, 20 April 1759, T/1/394 f.l02. Hunter to
Martin, Recd. 29 December 1759, T/64/96 f.289. Both men were Pruss-
ian officials, Meyen being Director of the Chamber (of War) of
Cleves, although Roden 's title was said to be honorary, Pro Nemoria
and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. S. 33048 f.149.
8 Hatton to Martin, 30 January 1761, T/1/410 ff,l112 - 143.
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were, as serving soldiers, no strangers to the business of army sup-
ply, although a number of them had more than a passing acquaintance
with commissariat affairs. Colonel Robert Boyd had spent twenty-six
years (1730 - 1756 ) in Minorca, where he had acted as storekeeper for
the Board of Ordnance and commissary to the troops in the island. In
1757 he was appointed deputy Commissary General in England 2 before
being transferred to Germany the following year. In 1756 Colonel Jeff-
rey Amherst had been given the task of transporting 8,000 Hessian
troops to England and providing for them on the march, 3 a major supply
operation, and Colonel James Durand had acted in a similar capacity
for a contingent of Dutch troops in the same year.L4 Lieutenant-General
George Howard, in addition to commanding a regiment, had been respon-
sible for organizing the foraging of the Combined Army in l76l, while
a somewhat more specialized experience was that of Colonel Ruvigny d.c
Cosne, who as a more junior officer had been a commissary for the cx.-
change of French prisoners of war in 1747,6 a task which no doubt in-
volved the examination and settlement of the accounts of provisions
supplied. Lieutenant-Colonels James Browne and William Fawcett, who
had both been secretaries to the Marquis of Granby, 7 must have been
1 Memorial of H. Boyd to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, (1764),
Add. t'S. 38202 f.l31. Earl of Holdernesse to J. Amherst, 3 January
1758, SP/87/27 f.l92.
2 T/29/32 f. 1462, 12 May 1757.
3 Amherst's Instructions, (1756), SP/87/27 ff.1 - 2.
4 Holdernesse to Treasury, 23 July 1756, SP/L4/l314. f.374.
5 Standing Orders ...., 8 September 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 f.60.
6 T/52/L44 f.44, 11 April 1747.
7 Duke of Newcastle to Prince Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. !S. 32904
f.3. The Dictionary of National Biograthy, Vol.1(1, p.1,126.
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constantly involved with general military administration, especially
in view of the British Commander-in-Chief's profound dislike of such
matters, 1 while Fawcett had the additional experience of having acted
as Deputy Adjutant-General. 2 Casimir Bilgen, although not a military
officer, had assisted the operations and movements of the British
troops in 1758 in his capacity of 'engineer' before leing appointec
inspector and controller of the foreign artillery train. Finally, five
other commissaries, Colonels James Johnston, Richard Peirson and Rich-
mond Webb, Ensign Thomas Turton and Cornet Gunn, 4 had apparently only
general military experience to offer, although this in itself inevit-
ably meant a direct acquaintance with the methods and problems of sup-
ply . In a number of the cases cited above the combination of active
military service and some specialized administrative or financial post
in the army formed a perfectly adequate background and training for the
tasks undertaken in Germany, while Boyd 's experience was as comprehen-
sive as could have been realistically demanded for any prospective
commissary. On the other hand, although Peirson cannot have been ignor-
ant of commissariat affairs, there was nothing in his previous career
to justify his going straight to the top as Director of Commissaries,
while Howard's elevation to the same position was based on a somewhat
limited connection with matters of supply.
1 T. Thoroton to Marquess of Granby, 30 May 1760, Historical Manu-
scripts Commission. Twelfth Report s
 Appendix. Part V. Rutland MSS.
Vol.11, (1889) p.214.
2 Th Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126.
3 Hunter to (Martin), 11 February 1759, T/64/96 f.26.
4 Turton had acted as an aide-de-camp to Granby, Howard to Martin, 24
September 1762, T/l/Ll.17 ff.464 - 1462 (sic), while Webb retired from
the army in 1758, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XX,
p.1,01k.
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One other form of direct experience of commissariat
affairs arose from involvement in contracts for the supply of the
army. Richard Oswald, a West India merchant , 1 had acted as a contract-
or for bread, bread wagons and forage to the Hessian troops in England
in 1756,2 and for the supply of bread and bread wagons to the British
troops in the Combined Army from 1758 onwards • He was a commissary to
that Army in 1759 aM 1760, but in the latter year ref'ased to act as
commissary general to the troops in
	 a post of responsib-
ility for which his contracting activities would have provided a solid
basis of experience. Of lesser standing than Oswald was his principal
agent, Peter Pauntier, who was appointed a deputy commissary at the beg-
inning of 1763 for the sale of the various trains which Oswald had sup-
plied, 5 and with whose affairs he was obviously well acquainted. Simil-
arly, the appointment of Andrew Clark as deputy commissary to manage
the provision train in 1762 was simply a continuation of the role
which he had already played as agent to Sir Lawrence Dundas, who had
been the contractor for the train. 6
 Finally, Thilip Faber, the director
of the foreign bakery, had at least been held in readiness to act as
a bread contractor to the Army, 7 and Councillor Voss was reported to
1 The Universal Director .... by Mr. ?4ortimer, (1763), Part III, p.5.
2 1/29/32 f.385, 28 April 1756. Martin to Oswald, 17 March 1757, 1/27/
27 f.279.
3 Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 11 February 1759,
1/1/395 ff.387 - 394.
4 Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61.
5 Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225.
6 Howard to (rreasury), 10 August 1762, 1/1/417 f.490.
7 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, 1/1/396 f.28. The fact that Faber was
sent to the Army to forestall the threatened emergency of the exist-
ing bread contractor quitting his agreement strongly suggests that he
already had experience of the work involved, although he ray have gain-
ed it in the service of the coininissariat of one of the German states,
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have been an entrepreneur before becoming a commissary.1
The thirtytwo commissaries mentioned above all had
some measure of direct experience of army supply, and a number of
others came from backgrounds which had some relevance to the tasks
which they were called upon to perform in Germany. Seven had held ad-
ministrative posts in central or local government in Britain or Ger-.
many. Both David Cuthbert and Charles Arnold were excise off icere,
the former having lost the post which he had held in Scotland, 2 and
the latter having been granted leave of absence from the Excise Office
on his appointment to the commissariat. 3 Henry Hulton had served for
five years (1756 - 1761) as Comptroller of the Customs in Antigua,1
and Charles Bromfield had acted as a revenue officer in Jamaica.5
William Fraser was a clerk in the Secretary of State's office from
175]. - 1759, and Assistant Under-Secretary from 1759 - 1761.6
Blakeney had been appointed British consul at Nice in 1759, although
1 Pro Nemoria and Rapport, Reed. 29 September 1761, Add. !'S. 33048
f.150. There is no specific indication that Voss had been engaged
in army supply, although this seems to be the implication of the
statement that he had been an entrepreneur before becoming a comm-
issary.
2 T/29/32 ff.158 & 196, 17 October 1753 & 15 May 1754. Petition of I).
Cuthbert, 4 June 1755, Add. )S. 34736 f.l97.
3 T/29/34 f.71, 7 May 1761. Martin to Commissioners of the Excise,
20 May 1761, T/27/28 f.163.
4 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.187.
5 Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from January
...., i9jj) pp.	 & 4'44.
6 J.C. Sainty, Office- 	 in Mod	 tam: Vol.11, Officials of
the Secretaries of
	
60 - 1	 973) p.78.
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he apparently never took up this post, 1 and most of his career had
been spent as secretary to his relative, Lord Blakeney, the Governor
of Mlnorca. 2 Among the German officials who served in the commissar.
iat Redecker probably exercised some administrative responsibility as
he described himself as 'Bailiff', 3
 although his designation as Pruss-
ian Councillor of War was said to have been merely titulary, 1 while
Ammon had held. an important diplomatic post as the Prussian resident
at Cologne.5
General administrative and diplomatic experience also
enhanced the qualifications of some of the commissaries who had had a
more direct contact with army supply. Pownall had spent eleven years
as a clerk at the Board of Trade, 6 where his brother, John, was to be-
come an important 'subminister' of the period, 7 and in 1753 had enters-
ed the American service as secretary to the Governor of New York, be-
coming Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey in 1755 and Governor of South
1 Irvine to J. Wallace, 30 May 1759, SP/87/31 f.146. Irvine to (Hold-
ernesse), 13 March 1760, ibid. ff.247 - 2'+8. On his way to Nice
Blakeney was unfortunate enough to be captured by French troops at
Cologne, and was imprisoned for nearly a year amongst felons in a
common gaol.
2 Newcastle to Peirson, 3 June 1760, Add. ?S. 32906 f. II514. Edward
Blakeney s grandfather was a first cousin of Lord Blakeney, Burke 'a
Irish Family Records, (1976) pp.123 - 124. R. Browning in The Duke
of Newcastle and the Financial Manazement of the Seven Years War in
Germany, 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research', Vol.
49, 1971, p.27 n.36, states incorrectly that Edward Blakeney was the
son of Lord Blakeney.
3 Memorial of F. Redecker, Read 31 March 1763, T/l/427 f.237.
4 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Reed. 29 September 1761, Add. PS. ff.149 -
150.
5 Ibid.
6 Namier & Brooke, Ms. op. cit. Vol.111, p.316.
7 F.B. Wickwl.re, British Subministera and Colonial America, 1763 -
1783. (1966) p.71.
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Carolina in 1760.1 He did not, however, take up the last appointment,
transferring to Germany as a commissary of control. 2 Hunter, who is
described as a man of business rather than a politician, had been a
commissary to treat with France in 1748, and at the time of his app-.
ointment to the commissariat in December 17.58 had spent the previous
two years as a Lord of the Admiralty. 3 In 1752 Hatton had been nomin-
ated secretary to the commissaries who negotiated with Austria and the
United Provinces on the problem of the barrier treaties, 4 and through-
out the 1750s had acted as consul at Ostend, Nieuport and Bruges, a
post which was largely concerned with the protection of British mer-
chants in those ports. 5
 In addition to his military service Cosne had
pursued a diplomatic career of some distinction, having been secretary
to the embassy in France from 1751. to 1755, and then holding the same
post in Stain from 1757 to 1760, both appointments including a brief
period when he was in charge of the mission. 6 Finally, Ross was an
officer of the Board of Taxes who was given leave of absence to serve
in Germany, 7 and Bilgen, who is variously described as an 'engineer'
or director of dykes in the Prussian province of Cleves, 8 was also
1 Namier & Brooke, Ens. op. cit. Vol.111, p.316.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Vol.11, p.656.
4 T/52/116 f.31, 6 March 1752.
5 T752/45 f.92, 19 December 1749.
6 D.B. Morn, British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689 - 1789. Camden
Miscellany, Third Series, Vol.XLVI, ( 1922) pp.21 & 135.
7 Peirson to Martin, 11 April 1761, T/l/410 f.57. T/29/34 f.44, 23
April 1761.
8 Hunter to (MartiA), ii. February 1759, T/6 Lf/96 f.26. Pro Memoria and
Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33011.8 f.150.
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referred to as an 'amtniann' or district administrator.1
The relevance of these different forms of administ-
rative and diplomatic experience as a training-ground for commissariat
employees varied from case to case. A familiarity with book-keeping
and accounts through employment in the customs, excise or revenue dep-
artments was clearly of particular use to commissaries of account and
control such as Cuthbert, Rulton and Ross, and not irrelevant to comm-
issaries of supply such as Arnold and Bromfield. A knowledge of mer-
cantile practice and problems, gained through work in the customs and
excise services or through the exercise of consular responsibilities,
obviously helped commissaries in their dealings with contractors. More-
over, both Cuthbert and Hulton must have enjoyed more than a passing
acquaintance with fraud and peculation, which was an effective prep-
aration for their work as Commissioners of q'Lry. 2 Cosne 'a diplom-
atic experience was pertinent to his task of negotiating the settle.-
iitent of accounts with the authorities of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel,3
while the executive responsibilities exercised by Pownall in America
must have helped him to establish the department of control, delimit-
ing the functions of the various officers and. providing them with full
and lucid instructions. On the other hand, the general administrative
experience gained by Fraser in the Secretary of State's office and by
Blakeney as the amanuensis of the Governor of Minorca was of less sig-
-
1. C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 6 July 1762, Westpha].en, op.
cit. Vol.VI, p.221. Such titles tended to be used rather loosely.
2 See below 205 - 2O.
3 See Appendix I.
14 See below l92 - 19'+ & 201 - 203.
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nificance for their work in the commissariat, although both employ-
ments probably brought other advantages, namely an acquaintance with
German affairs in the case of the former, and with military matters in
the case of the latter. 1 Thus although an administrative background
did. not offer a completely appropriate training for a commissary, it
seems in a number of cases to have furnished experience which was not
irrelevant to both the general and particular aspects of commissariat
business.
At least three commissaries came from mercantile
backgrounds, which did not involve direct experience of army supply.
Sir James Cockburn lost his hereditary estates in Scotland as a res-
ult of legal jixigments, and entered business in London with Henry
Douglas, a wealthy West India merchant, whose daughter he married.2
Douglas and Cockburn also acted as London correspondents of the Rec-
eivers General of Scotland, 3 and Cockburn himself was associated with
a number of prominent City merchants, inclixling Sir George and Sir
James Colebrooke, Nicholas Linwood and John Sargent, as well as with
John Caicraft, the regimental agent and proUg of Henry Fox. It was
on behalf of himself and these five gentlemen that he had originally
1. For further details on Faser's knowledge of German see below p.112,
fl.8.
2 T.H.C. Hood, The House of Cockburn of That Ilk. (1888) pp.102 - 103.
Naaier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.11, p.229.
3 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 177L$. -
(1958) p.63.
Lf Case for Counsel's Opinion, (l76), Zetland (Duas) Archive ZNK X
1/1/139 f.].
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gone to Germany in January 1760, seeking a contract to supply the Coin..
bined Army, but disappointed in this hope he joined the commissariat a
few Months later. 1 Sir Janice was thus a man of some standing and conn-
ection in the business world, and his knowledge arid experience of its
techniques and practices must have been considerable. A similar con-
clusion applies to the Halsey brothers, Thomas arid Frederick. They were
the sons of Charles Halsey, who was engaged in the Hamburg trade and
had resided in Germany until inheriting the estates of his elder broth-
er at Great Gaddesd.en in Hertfordshire in 1739.2 Thomas Halsey was
brought up as a merchant at Hamburg, 3 although it is probable that
Frederick, while not severing his German connections, was mainly con-
cerned with the English estates after the death of his father in 1748.
The Halseys also had commercial and financial connections by marriage,
for Nicholas Magens, a German merchant and prominent London financier,
was their unc1e. 1 The two commissaries thus came from a solid mercant-
ile background, arid their close contacts with Germany were especially
relevant for service in that country, with whose officials and busin-
ess men they must have had many dealings. It may be assumed that John
Levett came from a commercial background front the fact that he was
1 Ibid. He perhaps hoped to put business in the way of his associates
from inside the comaissariat.
-
2 Indenture ...., 14 November 1747, Halsey ?S. 148144. Namier & Brooke,
Ed.s. op. cit. Vol.11, p.568.
3 Newcastle to Granby, 29 April 1760, Add. ?S. 32905 f.139. Journal
arid Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.7.
4 Newcastle to Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.3. Charles
Halsey and Nicholas Magens married daughters of Frederick Dorrien,
Will of N. l4agens, 1764, PROB/ll/901 f.319. Will of Elizabeth Magens,
1779, PROB/ll/1057 f.384. W. Berry, County Genealogiesi Pedi'reesof
Hertfordshire Families. (1842) p.89.
110.
warmly recommended by many people in the City, 1
 although no precise
information on his activities and connections has come to light. 2 Fin..
ally, in the cases of two commissaries already mentioned in another
context there is a possibility of mercantile or financial origins:
Turton had reputedly 'been brought up to business' before entering the
army, 3
 while Crawford may well have been related to the British bank-
ing family of that name established at Rotterdam.4
How appropriate was this sort of experience for the
work of a commissary? All six officers were appointed as commissaries
of account or control, 5 for which branches of the service a working
knowledge of book-keeping and accounts was the essential qualification,
while in addition a commissary of control needed to be familiar with
such matters of general business practice as the rights and obligat-
ions of parties under contract. It seems unlikely that these officials
could have been ignorant of such basic concerns Cockburn and Freder-
ick Halsey also worked as commissaries of supply, a position which re-
1 Barrington to (Newcastle), 18 June 1761, Add. ?S. 32924 f.155.
2 A number of merchants named Levett appear in London business direct-
ories; e.g. Francis Levett, 'Assurance Director and Turkey Merchant',
The Universal Director .... by Mr. Nortimer, (1763) Part III, p.44,
and Thomas Levett of Warwick Street, Golden Square, A Complete Guide
to all Persons who have any Trade or Connection with the CIty of Lon-
don .... (1758) p.136.
3 Howard to Martin, 24 September 1762, T/l/417 ff. L 64 - 462 (sic).
LI. James Crawford or Craufurd of Rotterdam was the correspondent of the
deputy paymaster of the forces for the purchase of German currency.
See their correspondence in Add. !S. 54485.
5 See Appendix I.
6 Crawford, whose origins are uncertain, had in any case served a comm-
issariat apprenticeship as a book-keeper, see above p100, n.Lf.
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quired a more specialized knowledge of the purchase and transportation
of bulk food-stuffs and provisions. It is impossible to say whether
Cockburn had any such experience prior to his arrival in Germany in
January 1760, but his search for contracts must have led him to inform
himself on the details of supply before his appointment to the comm.-
issariat, 1 and that these were matters not completely outside Halsey's
orbit is proved by the fact that Hunter had used the family firm' f or
the purchase of large quantities of forage in 1759.2 Clearly neither
commissary could claim Oswald 's intimate experience of army supply,
but like all their colleagues with a mercantile background they did
not come to their tasks as total strangers.
One other aspect of the British commissaries' experi-.
ence is worth investigating as of significance for their work: their
knowledge of the country where they served and of its language. West-
phalen claimed that .none of them knew the territory and that practic-
ally all of them had a poor command of German. 3 Neither of theBe crit-
4.icisms, however, could apply to the Halsey brothers, nor to Fawcett,
who had travelled widely in Germany, translated complex Prussian mu-.
itary treatises, and was reputedly granted an immediate promotion by
1 The proposals of Cockburn and Linwood for the supply of the Hanover-
ian artillery and provision trains must have been based on a detail-
ed investigation of these aspects of the service. Memorials of Cock-
burn and Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/l/4.05 ff.38Lf & 386.
2 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 Nay 1759, T/l/396 f.29. Hunter to Martin, 22
November 1759, T/64/96 f.273.
3 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.1, pp.119 - 120.
4 F. Halsey to Mrs. Halsey, 30 June 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Nagens to
Newcastle, 27 April 1761, Add. S. 32922 f.233. Journal and Copy
Book of Henry Hulton, f7.
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George II for his fluent account of the battle of Warburg in the
King's native tongue.' Hulton had paid at least one extensive visit
to Germany, keeping a journal which clearly demonstrates his interest
in, and knowledge of the country, 2 while the area can hardly have
been unknown to Amherst, who had previously campaigned there and,
as already noted, had accompanied the Hessian troops from their home-
land to England in 1756." Such activities had presumably brought to
both commissaries at least a passing acquaintance with the German
language, 5
 and there is evidence to suggest, although not to prove,
that Bishop, 6
 Cosne, 7 Fraser, 8 Thomas Higgins and Frederick Stanton
were not ignorant of it either. On the other hand, three high-ranking
commissaries, Pownall, Hatton and Blakeney, seem to have had no such
1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126. The British
Library Catalogue of Printed Books contains his translations of Reg-
ulations for the Prussian Infantry, 1754, and Regulations for the
Prussian Cavalry, 1757.
2 Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772,
by Henry Hulton.
3 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. I, p.357.
Li. See above p.101.
5 Hulton would hardly have made unfavourable comments on other commiss-
aries' ignorance of German had he been open to tarring with the same
brush. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.25.
6 R. Mair to Barrington, 12 October 1758 , WO/l/976 f. 1113. Bishop is
reported as being able to speak 'the modern Languages'.
7 His selection for the special mission to settle the demands of Bruns-
wick and Hesse-Cassel in 1762, see Appendix I, points to some know-
ledge of German.
8 In 1773 he became the official translator of German in the Secretary
of State's office, Sainty, op. cit. p.79. It is possible, although
not probable, that he was ignorant of the language in 1761.
9 Both men owed their appointments as clerks to the Commissioners for
Examining German Demands to their understanding of French and German,
T/29/35 f.313, 23 February 176k, but they may have obtained this
knowledge after entering the service of the cominissariat.
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knowledge.1
On the basis of information, admittedly limited and
incomplete, about the backgrounds and experience of forty-six of the
fifty-nine superior commissariat officers, or over three-quarters of
the total, 2
 some tentative conclusions as correctives to commonly held
assumptions seem warranted. Firstly, while the service always contain-.
ed a majority of civilians, the place occupied by military officers,
of whom there were twelve altogether, 3
 was never insignificant, and
even though they were a distinct numerical minority some of them held
critically important posts. In 1757 and 1758 Amherst and Boyd executed
all British supply responsibilities to the Hessians on their own,
while Peirson and Howard, two of the three directors of the commissar-
iat during the last four years of the war, were in charge of the Brit-
ish supply operation to the Combined Army at its most extensive. It is
therefore wrong to interpret the problems which arose in terms of a
completely civilian commissariat, which by definition could not under-
stand or was unsympathetic to military necessities. 4 Such a rigid dich-
1 Powna].l did not contradict J.J. Uckerman's statement that he could
not understand German, Add. PS. 38339 f .231, (1766). Hatton on his
own admission could not write German, Hatton to Granby, 3 February
1761, Rutland ?S. Granby Letter Book I. Frederick Halsey commented
on Blakeney's ignorance, although it should be remembered that Hal-
sey was jealous of his superior, F. Halsey to Peirson, 5 November
1760, Halsey 1S. 15030.
2 Some further uncertain information on the backgrounds of other comin-
issaries is found in Appendix II.
3 Amherst • Boyd, Browne, Cosne, Durand, Fawcett, Gunn, Howard, John-
ston, Peirson, Turton and Webb. Bilgen could possibly be added to
this list as he had military experience, see above p.102.
4 B. Hargreaves, The Coinmissarl.at in the Seven Years War.Review of
the Royal Army Service Corp&, Vol.2, 	 1961, p62.
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otomy was not reflected in staffing arrangements. Nor, secondly, is
there any 'prima fade' evidence that conunissaries tended to come from
the worst elements of the commercial world, or were men of experience
in business who had fallen on ill-luck. 1 On the contrary the total
number of commissaries from a mercantile or financial background am-
ounted to only eleven, 2 and of these Cockburn, the Halseys and Oswald
were all men of standing, whom it would be difficult to describe in
the above terms . In fact, commissaries amongst whose significant
qualifications was administrative experience in central or local gov-
ernntent composed a larger numerical group of seventeen, 1 thus suggest-
trig that such a background was more highly esteemed than one rooted
in the private business world, and that mid-eighteenth century admin-
istration was less devoid of a bureaucratic ethos than is sometimes
imagined.5
A third commonly-held. belief about the commissariat
1 S.C.P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administrat-
ive Problems in the Peninsula, 1809 - 1811+. (1957) pp.71 - 72.
2 Clark, Cockburn, Crawford, Faber, Frederick and Thomas Halsey, Lev-
ett, Oswald, Paumier, Turton and Voss. Two other commissaries, John
Colsworthy and Johann Fuhr, possibly came from mercantile or finan- -
cial backgrounds, see Appendix II.
3 Cockburn's later business career was less distinguished, see below
P.120.
4 Ainmon, Arnold, Bilgen, Blakeney, Bromfield, Cosne, Cuthbert, Fraser,
Hatton, Hulton, Hunter, !ssow, fleyen, Pownall, Redecker, Roden and
Ross. Blakeney 'a connections with this group were admittedly some-
what tenuous, although Bishop may have belonged to it through em-
ployment in the customs service. See Appendix II.
5 The secoridment of able British officials to coinmissariat service ob-
viously created staffing problems in the departments and. services
which they left, and. the fact that the government was prepared to
pay this price suggests that such people were preferred to those
from the world of private affairs.
1 H. I.e Mesurier, A
ted. in R. Glover,
Army, 1795 — 1809.
'R•p'4+4ai. 	mi4ae,.4+ (1796 ) prin-
7.
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is that it was staffed by officials who had little or no experience
of the service, or training relevant to the tasks which they were
called upon to perform. Such a view receives contemporary corroborat-
ion from Havilland I.e Mesurier who wrote in 1796:- ",... notwith-
standing Commissariat Expenses have been commented upon in and out of
Parliament from the Duke of !rlborough 's time to this day, no one
has attempted to bring a System forward which would obviate the in-
convenience of sending Men abroad to exercise functions which are per-
fectly new to them." 1 It is difficult to apply this criticism to the
commissariat in Germany during the Seven Years War without substantial
reservations. Thirty-two of the fifty-nine commissaries were not un-
familiar with their work as a result of previous experience in the
commissariat or allied services, involvement in army supply contracts
or active service as military officers or technicians. Moreover, a
number of these commissaries brought additional experience from the
wider business and administrative world, which probably endowed them
with a less rigid and stereotyped conception of problems than that of
officials, who spending a lifetime in the same service, could easily
lack adaptability and diversity of outlook. The remaining commissaries
whose backgrounds have been traced had general mercantile or adininist-•
rative experience alone, which if it bore no direct relationship to
commissa.riat affairs, was rarely irrelevant to the work. Le Mesurier
rightly lamented the lack of a permanent system for training commiss-.
aries, a limitation which no doubt had untoward effects on the quality
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of staff in the lower ranks of the service, but the evidence quoted
above shows that to fill the vitally Important senior positions the
authorities could draw on a reservoir of personnel, who in some cases
had minimal, and. in others more than adequate qualifications for their
work, and whose collective personality bore no resemblance to that of
a blundering novice • To this general conclusion may be added a post-
script. Although there were some and. perhaps many British commissaries
'who had no acquaintance with Germany and its language, there are cert-
ain clear and significant exceptions to Westphalen's theory that as a
body they were ignorant of such matters. Moreover, when to such off-
icials as the Halseys and Fawcett are added the group of native Germans
employed in the service, 1 it becomes impossible to describe the coinm-
issariat as entirely composed of bewildered strangers, severely handi-
capped in trying to exercise their functions in 'terra incognita'.
Where commissaries with geographical and linguistic knowledge as well
as professional experience could be found they were chosen, 2
 but as
long as armies needed. to be supplied in any country or area of the
world familiarity with the relevant locality could not be made a 'sine
qua non' for appointment.
From this discussion of the qualifications and ex-
perience of the commissaries it is necessary- to turn, secondly, to
1 Ammon, Bilgen, Faber, Fuhr, Massow, Meyen, Meyer, Ramberg, Redecker,
Roden, Scheedler and. Voss. Boyve, who was Swiss, was presumably no
stranger to Germany and. its language. See Appendix I.
2 The Treasury sometimes approached men with a German background only
to find that they declined the offer of commissariat employment. This
seems to have happened in the case of Nicholas Magens, Newcastle's
Memoranda for the King, 19 March 1760, Add. ?S. 32903 f.373.
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a consideration of their abilities, using evidence from their past
and future careers as well as from their period of service in Germany.
A number of the army officers who held conunissariat appointments went
on to occupy military posts of great responsibility. Amherst rose to
be Field !.rshal and Commander-in-Chief of the British army, and. al-
though neither a great general nor a brilliant administrator displayed
qualities which were hardly mediocre. Boyd became Governor of Gibral-
tar in 1790, having been second in command during the famous siege,
and was promoted to the rank of General in 1793.2 Howard held the Gov-
ernorships of Minorca and Jersey and ended his career as a Field Mar'.
shal and Privy Councillor. 3
 Fawcett, after having been responsible
for raising mercenaries in various German states during the American
War of Independence , became a very influential officer on headquart-
ers staff and his elevation to the Privy Council in 1799 was described
as a rare honour for a man in his position.5
Other commissaries made important contributions to
the world of politics and administration. Hunter sat in Parliament for
twenty-seven years and in 1763 became a Lord of the Treasury, an app-
ointment which reflected his talents as well as his readiness to change
his political allegiance from Bute to Grenville. 6 Howard was a member
1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.1, p.359.
2 Ibid. Vol.11, p.1,008.
3 Ibid. Vol.X, pp.17 - 18. Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.11, p.645.
4 Horn, op. cit. pp.43, 47, 57 - 58 & 67.
5 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126.
6 M.P. Winchelsea, 1741 - 1759 & 1760 - 1769. Namier & Brooke, Eds.
op. cit. Vol.11, pp.656 - 6.57.
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of the House of Commons for even longer and is said to have spoken
sensibly there on matters of military administration, 1 while although
Pownal]. 's parliamentary career is described as disappointing, he was
always an informed contributor to American debates. 2 Oswald played an
important political and diplomatic role at the end of the American
War, when he was chosen by She]burne, who is said to have had a high
opinion of his 'moderation, prudence, - and judgment', to ascertain the
nature of the American terms of peace at Paris in 1782, while Faw-
cett was selected for another delicate diplomatic mission, that of
trying to reconcile Great Britain and. Prussia in 1765,k Significant
promotions were received by Fraser, who rose to be Writer of the Gaz-.
ette and Clerk of the Signet in the Secretary of State's office,5
Cuthbert, who was appointed a Commissioner of Excise in Scotland in
1768 but died in the same year, 6 and Hulton, who became Plantation
Clerk in the Customs department, 7 before transferring to America as a
Commissioner of Customs. 8 Perhaps less importance should be attached
to Boyve's appointment as Councillor of State for the Regency of the
1 M.P. Loetwithiel, 1761 - 1766, Stamford, 1768 - 1796, ibid. Vol.11,
pp.6k5 - 6246.
2 LP. Tiegony, 1767 - 1774, ?linehead, 1774 - 1780, ibid. Vol.111, pp.
316 - 318. Neither Cockburn nor Thomas Halsey seems to have made
much impact on the House of Commons.
3 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.
1+ Horn, op. cit. p.5:3.
5 Sainty, op. cit. p.79.
6 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.l77. Appendix I.
7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.191.
8 Gentleman's MagazIne, 1790, Vol.LX, p.185.
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Principality of Neuchatel and Vallangin as this was probably an hered-
itaiy office.1
Nor was the commissariat devoid of men of intellect-
ual and literary attainments • By the end of his life Pownall 'S output
of books, pamphlets and articles had reached significant proportions,
and in addition to his most celebrated work, 'The Mainistration of
the Colonies', included writings on subjects as diverse as politics,
economics, geography, archaeology, philosophy and physics. 2
 By defin-
ition therefore a dilettante he was also a man of considerable intell-
ectual capacity. So too was Oswald, whom no less an authority than
Thomas Carlyle called 'a man of great knowledge', 3
 and who wrote one
treatise on politico-military affairs. 1 On the other hand, Boyve 's
contribution to the history of his native provinces, 5 and Fawcett's
translation of French and German military manuals 6 were probably
somewhat less intellectually demanding. Finally, although Iobert Kyd,
who entered the service of the East India Company after leaving Ger-
1 Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/l/&1.51 f.292. Both his
great uncle and father had held official positions in the Principal-
ity,J. Boyve, Recherches sur l'Indinat Helvetigue de la Princip-.
aute de Neuchatel et Vallangin. (1778) pp.iv - v.
2 British Library Catalogue of Printed Books • It has been claimed that
Pownal]. was Junius, F. Griffin, Junius Discovered. (18511).
3 The Dictionary of NatIonal Biogrphy, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.
Memorandum on the Folly of Invading Virginia, the Strategic Im port-
ance of Portsmouth, and the Need for Civilian Control of the Milit-
. (1781),
5 Boyve, op. cit.
6 See above p.U2,n.1. He also translated Maurice de Saxe's RAeveries
or Memoirs upon the Art of War in 1757.
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many, does not seem to have left any published works, he became in
later life an acknowledged expert on botany and horticulture and the
founder of the botanical gardens of Calcutta.1
In some respects the later careers of two commissar-
lea shed unfavourable light on their general abilities. Firstly, Cook-
burn 'a involvement in East India affairs and. the shady dealings of
Lauchlin Macleane and John Macpherson with the Nawab of Arcot, in
which Henry Dundas felt that he had. been the dupe of others, and which
resulted in his bankruptcy and some unworthy attempts to extricate
himself from his plight, 2 suggest a lack of prudence and judgment, al-
though even the ablest men are not immune from errors made in the pur-
suit of easy money. Secondly, although Peirson was eventually raised
to the rank of Lieutenant-General and created a Knight of the Bath in
1780, he was never accorded the military governorship to which he as-
pired, and while his failure may have derived pertly from political
factors, there remains some suspicion that lack of any outstanding
talent made it easier to pass him over on a number of occasions.
The past and future careers of the commissaries are
1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XI, p.314'8. Cuthbert to C.
Jenkinson, 20 March 17&1, Add. MSS. 38202 f.176. Although five comm-
issaries, Boyve, Howard, Pownall, Blakeney and. Frederick Halsey,
attended university and the first three received degrees, reliable
conclusions about their abilities cannot be drawn from this inform-
ation.
2 Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.11, p.230.
3 Peirson to Earl of Lincoln, 13 November 1780, Newcastle ?S. NeC
2q36
L Peirson to Lincoln, 27 July 1765, ibid. NeC 3447. Peirson to Duke of
Newcastle, 28 February 1778, ibid. NeC 2777.
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not without relevance to the argument of this section, but the acid
test of their abilities lies in the effectiveness of their adininistr-
ative performance in Germany, which fortunately in a number of cases
is sufficiently well-documented to permit detailed examination. Of the
three directors of the comntissariat Hunter was the most able. His mea..
cures for keeping the Army provided were generally effective, not
least because he was sufficiently adaptable to be able to break with
traditional methods of supply when they proved to be unsatisfactory.1
He also kept a constantly watchful eye on expenditure, pointing out
errors in the Treasury 's instructions which had they been carried into
effect would have wasted money, 2 and persuading the military command
to eliminate unnecessary expenses. 3 No doubt his success in the latter
sphere explains some of the criticism of his administration emanating
from German sources, a consideration which played some part in per
suading him to resign. Nevertheless, Hunter was a superintendent of
initiative, who was not afraid to shoulder responsibility and who
possessed the necessary organizing ability to put his plans effective-.
ly into practice.5
I Faced with unreliable bread supplies from the contractor he took the
foreign bakery into public ownership. See below pp.229 - 230.
2 Hunter to (I'lartin), 30 I'!ay 1759 & 7 November 1759, T/614/96 ff.l 144 -
1I'5 & 263 - 2611.
3 Hunter to Treasury, 31 January 1759, ibid. ff.12(a) - 12(b). Hunter
to Martin, 1]. March 1759, Add. ?S. 32889 f.2.
l' Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, fLJ•
5 Hunter enjoyed some advantages in exercising his responsibilities at
a time when the Combined Army had not reached its maximum numerical
strength and when shortages of provisions and difficulties of trans-
port had not yet become acute, although even in 1759 his task was
far from easy and straightforward.
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Amongst those officials who acted as commissaries
general or at a commensurate level of responsibility Powall stands
out as one of the ablest administrators to serve in Germany. While his
task was easier than that of the head of the coinnissariat in that he
did not have to balance the frequently conflicting claims of supply
and control, he none the less showed evidence of considerable talent
in his clear recognition of the many loop-holes which made fraudulent
practices possible, 1 in his comprehensive and detailed proposals for
remedying the situation and in his success, despite much opposition,
in putting reforms into effect. 2 Critical statements from German sou-
rces, one to the effect that he was ignorant, incapable of filling the
post he had been given and possessed of 'le Cerveau detraqu', 3 re-
flect the antagonism felt towards his determined efforts to eradicate
laxity and fraud, and cannot be accepted in the light of positive ev-
idence about his work and achievement. In Hatton the Army had an able
commissary general of supply, constantly resourceful in his search for
provisions, and one who was complimented by the Duke of Marlborough
for his quickness and understanding, 5 a judgment confirmed by others
who knew him. 6 As temporary director of the commissariat during the
1 Pownal]. to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. 13S. 32928 ff.286 - 292.
2 Pownall's work is dealt with in greater detail below pp.192 - 20k.
3 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. ?S. 32938 f.2l4.
4 T/29/3L4. f.66, 6 May 1761.
5 Duke of Marlborough to Holdernesse, 15 August 1758, SP/87/32 f.61.
Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. MSS. 32883 f.31. The
British Commander-in-Chief 'S opinion must have been sincerely held.
as he can have had no interest in saddling himself with an incompet-
ent commissary.
6 Baron Minchausen to Newcastle, 1 November 1758 , Add • PS. 32885 f.
162. Peirson to Newcastle, 10 November 1761, Add. S. 32930 f.381.
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interregnurn of early 1760 he was less successful, admitting that he
was incapable of managing affairs of such consequence , and some of
the reasons for this may well, have been connected with a tendency to
lack order in his work, 2 and a certain inability to distinguish the
trivial from the important .
From the ranks of the ordinary commissaries Frederick
Halsey was not only alert and resourceful in matters of supply, in
which connection the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick thought suffic-
iently highly of his work to make him an honorary aide-de-camp, 5
 but a
perspicacious critic of the many slack practices which were allowed to
flourish before the appointment of Pownall. 6 The abilities of Cuthbert
and Hulton are clearly enough reflected in their work as the Commiss-
ioners of Enquiry, which they pursued with great thoroughness and att-
ention to detail, although their enthusiasm often led them to make re-
commendations which could not in fairness be upheld. 7 Similar talents
for detective work were displayed by Fuhr, who made many of the mit-
1 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/l/405 f.179.
2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hu].ton, f.6.
3 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. tS. 32938 f.215.
4 See below pp.167 & 290.
5 F. Halsey to W. Haailton,.1 July 1762, Halsey 1S. 15029.
6 He was one of the first to draw attention to the evils arising from
the practice of purchasing forage receipts, F. Halsey to Howard, 23
January 1761, Halsey ?S. 15030, although he was eventually dismissed
for irregularity himself. See below pp.133 - 135.
7 See below pp.204 - 208. Both Peirson and Pownall commented on Hul-
ton's talents and ability, Peirson to Martin, 30 November 1761, Add.
?S. 32931 f.337. Pownall to J. West, 18 November 1761, T/1/l+13 f.
:359.
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lal revelations of fraud to the Treasury and displayed considerable in-
genuity in obtaining proofs of his allegations.1 Levett's investigat..
ion of the state of the Army's regular means of transport was thorough
and competent, and included perceptive recommendations for the cumin-
2
ation of the worst abuses in one branch of the service, while other
commissaries who impressed their superiors or colleagues as able men
3	 4were Thomas Halsey and Mason.
Not surprisingly there were also commissaries whose
talents are more the subject of uncertainty and doubt. As head of the
commissariat Peirson was not nearly so successful as his predecessor,
and for various reasons allowed the direction of important aspects of
the supply operation to slip more and more out of his grasp. 5
 Moreover,
he continued to rely on contractors who were strongly suspected of
fraud, 6 and failed to introduce essential measures of control which
were strongly urged on him. 7 He certainly had, major problems with
1 Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and. Irregularities ....,
5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 If .426 - 430. Memoranda resulting
from Fuhr 's Examination etc. before the Treasury, 27 October 1761,
Add.	 32930 ff.96 - 103.
2 Plan for the Control of the Manoverian Artillery Train, 25 Nay 1762,
T/l/420 If .128 - 132.
3 Journal and. Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.7. Hunter to (Oswald), 3
Nay 1759, T/l/396 f.30/31.
4 Huine to Barrington, 111. October 1758, W0/1/976 ff.613 - 6i4. T. Pow-
nafl to Martin, 23 October 1762, T/l/420 f.253.
5 During his administration Massow and other Prussian officials came
to play an increasingly dominant role in commissariat affairs. In-
telligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32922
1.420.
6 Materials for a Letter to Prince Ferdinand, 19 February 1762, Add.
16S. 329314 f.442.
7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.27.
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which to cope, including increasing shortages of provisions, diff Ic-
ulties of raportai, rising prices, inadequate and tardy remitt-
ances of cash and until 1761 his own onerous military duties, and
there is no reason to suppose that he was totally unsuited to his high
offièe, but at the same time he seems to have lacked those powers of
discernment and of effective direction and co-ordination which were
essential attributes for a man in his position. Hulton concluded that
he was a man led into a business outside his sphere, 1
 and the comment
may well be justified. There is again no evidence of incompetence in
the case of Howard, the comaissariat 's third director, although one of
the major features of his short administration was bitter criticism by
Prince Ferdinand that he had not secured the necessary quantities of
provisions in the right places at the right times. 2 Like Peirson, How-
ard had difficulties which were not of his making, 3 but he showed un-
willingness to accept full responsibility for some aspects of commiss-
ariat affairs, 1
 and thus although his supply arrangements seem on the
whole to have been adequate, he did not always appreciate the need to
pay meticulous attention to the details of their practical execution.5
Nevertheless, the anonymous German commentator, who tended to be hyper-
critical of British commissaries, made a favourable judgment on his ab-
1 Ibid. f.6.
2 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse S. D/HV/B19f7.
3 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/AI.17 f.35.
ti. On the particular issue of granting warrants for services incurred
before the beginning of his administration Howard eventually admitt-
ed that he had interpreted his instructions somewhat too narrowly.
Howard to (Treasury), 21 July 1762, T/1ILI.l7 f.21I.
5 Ferdinand to Howard, 15 October 1762, Howard Vyse 1'S. DfHV/B/9f6.
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ilities 1 The same writer was far from complimentary about Blakeney,
whom he described, as very incapable, 2 while one of the commissary 'a
own colleagues dismissed his activities as wrong-headed derangements.3
The sparseness of his surviving correspondence makes it difficult to
test the veracity of these statements, but It is probable that his fail-
ings were more those of character than of ability.k
It has not been the purpose of this section to prove
that every commissary who served in Germany was a man of unqualified
ability, but rather to contest the view that a commissary was by def-
inition an official of negligible or even non-existent talents. The
service was able to attract men of a high general level of intellig-
ence, and some who had already, or were in the future, to exercise
important military, political and administrative responsibilities with
success and even distinction. Where it is possible to trace the det-
ails of their work during the Seven Years War and to find jticIous
est,imates of their performance from contemporaries, little evidence of
incompetence emerges. Inadequacies and failings certainly existed, and
it was especially unfortunate that they were present in two of the
three directors of the contaissariat. But the idea that Newcastle fill-
ed the service with 'old. men of proven mediocrity' is impossible to
sustain. 5 The welfare of the Combined Army and the interests of the
1 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 Nay 1762, Add. JS. 32938 f.2114.
2 Ibid.
3 F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 November 1760, Halsey ?S. 15030.
14 See below pp.128 - 129.
5 R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial
the Seven Years War in Germany. 'Journal of the Soeje
, p.27.
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British Treasury and taxpayer frequently lay in competent if not cap-
able hands.
Erperienced and. able men may still, lack those qual-
ities of character which are equally essential for effective adinin-
istrative performance, and it is therefore necessary to investigate
the extent to which the commissaries showed diligence, devotion and
integrity in carrying out their functions. Hard work and Dertinacity
were never lacking if the comments on excessively long hours are to
be believed. Hatton wrote in 1760:- ".... I have had a pen in my hand
from day Light till now 12 o'Clock: I have hardly an Eye left: and
yet a hundred papers are Copying for my Signing so that I cant go to
bed	 and. his sentiments were echoed by Hunter, 2 Howard and.
Frederick Halsey.u1 Personal protestations of hard work should always
be treated with a degree of scepticism even when constantly reiteri.
ated, and more objective are the comments of superiors and colleagues
which were frequently based on first-hand experience. A strong con-.
sensus of opinion existed on the subject of Hatton's untiring eff-
orts, 5 in which even the anonymous German commentator concurred, 6 and
1 Matton to (F. Halsey), 18 September 1760, Halsey ?S. 15121.
2 Hunter to Newcastle, 31 January 1759, Add. ?S. 32887 f.LIlk.
3 Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/l/Lf17 f.393.
Lf F. Halsey to C. Halsey, 26 December 1760, Halsey IS. 15029. F. Hal-
sey to N. Magens, 13 March 1761, ibid.
5 Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. ?S. 52883 f .31. lEin-
chausen to Newcastle, 1 November 1758, Add. MSS. 32885 f.162. Granby
to Newcastle, 25 January 1759, Add. PS. 32887 f.33l. Ferdinand to
Newcastle, iLl. May 1760, Add. MSS. 32906 f.60. Peirson to Treasury, 7
June 1760, T/1/ i405 f.63.
6 Add. S. 32938 f.2i5.
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Cockburn's activity was also the subject of a number of favourable
comments.' Massow's diligence was recommended by both Prince Ferdin-.
and, and Hatton, 2 whose strong desire to see him brought into the comm-
issariat perhaps coloured their judgment, but Hulton, who suspected
the honesty of his dealings, still recognized his marked capacity for
hard work. 3 Among commissaries whose application received more limited
commendation were Gunn, Thomas Halsey, Higgins and Mason, 4 while the
fact that Cuthbert, Fuhr, Frederick Halsey, Hulton, Hunter and Pow-
nail gave themselves unstintingly to their tasks appears in similar
comments or in the actual record of their work. 5 Positive complaints
were made about some commissaries and Blakeney in particular was acc-
used of lethargy. 6 Whatever the truth of the matter, he behaved as if
his health was precarious and his refusal to travel created a number
of' awkward problems, 7 but the parts of his correspondence which
1 Ibid. f.214. Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/l/k17 f.393.
Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.6 - 7.
2 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.32. Hatton
to Martin, 30 January 1761, T/l/410 f.143.
3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.il.
4 Peirson to Martin, 5 May 1761, T/l/ LI.10 f.65 (Gunn). Journal and Copy
Book of Henry Hulton, f.7 CT. Halse'). Pownall to T. Higgins, 17 May
1763, Halsey ?S. 15293(A) (Higgins). Pownall to Martin, 23 October
1762, T/l/420 f253 (Mason).
5 Peirson to Martin, 22 August 1761, T/1/klO f.82 (Hulton). Ferdinand
to ?!inchausen, 8 July 1759, Westphaien, op. cit. Vol.111, p.338,
Lord George Sackville to Newcastle, 8 April 1759, Add. ?S. 32889
f.4l2 (Hunter). See above pp.123 - 124.
6 F. Halsey to T. Halsey, 17 April 1761, Halsey !S. 15029. Blakeney
is referred to as 'B'.
7 F. Halsey to Hatton, 9 December 1760, Halsey ?S. 15030. Blakeney's
usual excuse was that he could not make winter journeys.
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vive 1 seem to indicate that if not physically active he was not gen-
erally indolent. Amherst was not always as ready a correspondent in
matters of army supply as he might have been, but on the one occasion
that the Treasury accused him of failing to send details of contract
negotiations, 2 there were some red faces in Whitehall when it was even-
tually found that he had given ample notice but that his letter had
been inislaid. 3 A number of other examples of lack of effort could be
cited, but there seems to be no evidence that any commissary ever be-
came a serious liability to the service as a result of inveterate laz.-
mess.
The fact that some commissaries stayed at their posts
for the whole or most of the period during which Britain supplied the
Combined Army suggests the existence of some degree of professional
loyalty and devotion to the service. Bilgen, Bishop, Boyd, Crawford,
Fuhr and Ross served throughout the four years, and Browne, Cockburii,
4
Faber and Hatton for over three of them. In view of the harshness of
the life and work in Germany the surprisingly small number of seven-
teen commissaries left the service before the end of the war, 5 and of
6these some did not make the decision themselves. Among the others
-
1 There are a number of his letters in T/l/O5, 410 & 420.
2 Treasury to Amherst, 3 January 1758, T/27127 f.3l3.
3 T/29/33 f.1l, 1 February 1758.
4 See Appendix 1.
5 Amherst, Ammon, Durand, Elliot, F. Halsey, T. Halsey, Hatton, Hunter,
1iassow, Meyen, Peirson, Ramberg, Redecker, Roden, Scheedler, Trotter
and Voss. See Appendix I.
6 Amherst was promoted and sent to North America, The Dictionary of Nat..
ional Biography, Vol.1, pp
.357 - 358, Frederick Halsey dismissed, see
below p.133, and Scheedler made redundant when the provision train
was put under contract, see below p.265. The services of Massow and
some of the other German officials were also dispensed with, see ab-.
ove p.58.
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Redecker resigned because he felt he could no longer be of any use to
the commissariat, 1 while in the oases of Durand and. Elliot bad health
seems to have been the governing factor. 2 But although Hatton, Hunter
and Peirson all cited the latter reason in their requests to be rel-
ieved of their posts, it is probable that disillusion with the service
was equally or more influential in binging about their decisions, 3 as
it was presumably with Thomas Halsey after his brother's dismissal and
death • Yet there is no evidence of any wide-spread tendency among the
commissaries t&.abandon a difficult task at the first opportunity, and
although the Treasury sometimes had to put pressure on its employees
to dissuade them from resignation,4
 there was still a marked sense of
responsibility, voiced by Frederick Halsey when he wrote:- '.... I
have too much spirit to quit in time of difficulty ..... Indeed, Hal-
sey's devotion and public spirit were even more clearly demonstrated
when, after what he considered an unjust dismissal, he stayed at his
post to initiate his successor:- ".... notwithstandg. what my private
feelings may be at so abrupt a dismission; I am determined to contrib-
ute all the little assistance I am able for the publick Service, tho'
not as a publick Officer, yet as a Subject of Great Britain." 6
1 Expose of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham 1'S. DDHO/
4/313 f.285.
2 Holdernesse to Peirson & Boyd, 15 August 1760, SP/87/30 f.l55.
T/29/311. f.247, 24 March 1762.
3 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1761, Tf1/410 f.11414. Hunter to Newcastle,
10 October 1759, Add. MSS. 32896 ff.420 - 421. Peirson to Newcastle,
21 September 1761, Add. hISS. 32928 f.272.
4 T/29/5k f.182, 14 October 1761.
5 F. Halsey to Peirson, 25 January 1761, Halsey hISS. 15050.
6 F. Halsey to W. Hamilton, 18 March 1762, ibid. 15049.
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Less helpful, however, was the attitude of some comm-
issaries at the end of the war, when no doubt anxious to get home and
determined to avoid, complicated financial eabroilments, they refused
to undertake the sales of government magazines and property, so lead -
ing Pownafl to complain of a lack of co-operation in this vital inatt-
er. 1
 But perhaps the chief criticism of the commissaries' attitude
lies in their propensity, if not their eagerness, to engage in acri-
inonious disputes with their colleagues, which occasionally verged on
personal vendettas and inevitably reduced the efficiency of the ser-
vice. Few commissaries can have been involved in more quarrels than
Pownall, who clashed with Massow over the control of minor officials,2
with Howard over the best means of supervising the trains , with Cuth-
bert and Hulton over their alleged unwillingness to co-operate with
him, 1 and with Fraser whose sealed boxes he opened in order to extract
certain papers. 5
 He was certainly a rather touchy man, who frequently
over-reacted to what he considered to be encroachments on his sphere
of influence. Fuhr for his part showed a definite lack of cordiality
in his relations with Peirson, 6
 and a degree of malevolence towards
the Commissioners of Enquiry. 7 Such animosities were therefore partly
I Pownall to Martin, 31 December 1762 & 11 January 1763, T/l/k19 f.
166 & Tf1/Lf 27 f.232.
2 Pownall to Massow, 28 October 1761, T/1,fl I.12 ff.246 - 2k7.
3 Pownall to Howard, 3 October 1762, T/l/LI.17 f.288.
Lê. Pownall to Treasury, 6 July 1762, ibid. f.611.
5 Pownafl to W. Fraser, 16 July 1762, Add. IS. 38199 f.99. Fraser to
Jenkinson, 27 July 1762, ibid. f.95.
6 J.P. Fuhr to Peirson, 6 September 1761, Add. ?'S. 32928 f,90.
7 Peirson to Martin, 11 September 1761, ibid. f.97. Draught Treasury
Letter to Cockburn, 15 February 1763, T/1/k27 f.332. Fuhr was jeal-
ous of Hulton, to whom Peirson had given the post to which he aspired.
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the result of failings of character, of irrational suspicions, jeal-
ousy and pride, although the work of both Pownall and Fuhr, who acted
as bulwarks against fraud, was bound to create a certain amount of
tension in their relations with other commissaries.
Finally, some commissaries showed their devotion to
the service in their attitude to financial affairs • Pownall claimed
in 1763 that he had borrowed 5,000 ducats, or nearly £2,500, to supp-
ort his office, and that everyone else in the department of control
who could find credit had done the same. 1 By the time Bilgen's acc-
ounts came to be settled in 17611' the Crown owed him the immense sum
of £ll,34Lf/19/1l. , 2 and Faber's widow eventually received £5,373/3/4+,
although not before her husband, whom she claimed had been obliged
to borrow money at 6%, had had his goods seized and had died under
arrest. 4
 Bishop's accounts show that he was owed £3, LI60/3/S3 at the
end of the war, a sum which was finally paid to him or more probably
his descendants a quarter of a century later. 5
 The government was in
6debt for smaller sums to a number of other commissaries, and alto-
gether it received considerable assistance front those who were pre-
pared to put their financial resources and their credit at its dispos-
al. Not that the commissaries were ever indifferent to financial con-
1 Pownall to Martin, 25 January 1763, T/l/L1'27 f.499.
2 T/52/56 f.38, 25 July 1764.
3 Ibid. f.450, ILl. June 1765.
1f Memorial of Mrs. A.D. Faber, 5 March 1764, T/l/432 No.6, f.lLI/280.
5 Declared Account of ¶1'. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/l/1507/2l8.
6 Declared Account of Sir J. Cockburn, 10 February 1791, A0/l/1508/
224 (&793J0/1), Declared Account of M. Hatton, 20 December 1766,
A0/1/519/222 (z824/l5/1), Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July
1777, A0/1/520/225 (684/13/0).
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siderations, they would have been more than human had they been so,
but their public image as money-grubbers needs some modification.
Higgins expressed a very different attitude when he wrote to Cock-
burn:- ".... I beg the favor of you to let me know whether it is in
your power to grant me my dismission; I don't speak this, Sir, from
any inclination or desire that I have to decline the Service, as long
as I can be useful or serviceable, but merely from a Shame of taking
the Government's Money any longer for doing nothing
What then of the commonest charge against eighteenth
century commissaries; that they were by definition dishonest? It was
said that the very word 'commissary' conveyed the idea of making irr
egular money, 2 and that their practice of occupying a church recalled
the text, 'My house shall be called the house of prayer, but ye have
made it a den of thieves'. 3 Despite sweeping accusations of corrupt-
ion 
14. 
very few officials fell under real suspicion, and only one Brit-
ish commissary was dismissed. Frederick Halsey had on more than one
occasion disobeyed the strict letter of his instructions in order to
prevent the army suffering. 5
 His granting of a certificate for a con-
siderable sum of money to the contractor, N.F. Leopold, stating that
he had examined and approved the vouchers of a delivery, whereas he
1 25 Apr11 1763, T/l/427 f.387.
2 Peirson to Newcastle, 28 August 1760, Add. S. 32910 f.382.
3 G. Davies, Wellington and His Army. (1954) pp.77 - 78.
4 Intelligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. !S.
32922 f.420.
5 F. Halsey to Colonel de Lachevallerie, 3 November 1760, Halsey MSS.
15030. Halsey granted a certificate for hospital expenses before any
money had actually been paid.
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had seen no vouchers at all, 1
 may have been an attempt to encourage
the speedy production of provisions by making a cash advance, as Hal-
sey claimed after Leopold had fallen under suspicion of large-scale
fraud and fled to Amsterdam, 2
 and the whole matter had been investig-
ated by the Commissioners of Enquiry. 3 This explanation is not com-
pletely plausible, however, as since early 1760 the Treasury had per-
titted advances of cash on account to large contractors, so that
there was in theory no reason for Halsey to engage in his irregular
manoeuvre. Further suspicion is aroused by the close financial conn-
ection between the commissary and the contractor. In March 1761 Leo-
pold transferred 66,025 guilders, or £6,228/l5/6, from his own to
Halsey's account with Cliffords of Amsterdam, and althougt this sum
was supposed to have been repaid in its entirety, 6 there is at least
a possibility that the transaction concealed a 'douceur' for services
rendered. Another relevant piece of information is contained in a
letter Halsey wrote to Nicholas Magens in June 1761, concerning a
friend of the latter who wished to invest £2,000 in the English funds.7
The anonymous individual had asked Cliffords to remit the money to
Magens and Halsey to recommend it to his care. 8
 This fact takes on
1 Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 2 March 1762, Add. !S. 32935 f.1k5.
2 Memoranda resulting from Fuhr's Examination etc. before the Treasury,
27 October 1761, Add. !S. 32930 f.97.
3 F. Halsey to Hamilton, 18 March 1762, Halsey MSS. 150149.
14. See above pp.8]. - 82.
5 The £ sterling was worth 10 guilders 12 stivers at this time, PMGf
2/5 f.256(b).
6 F. Halsey to Messrs. G. Clifford & Sons, 25 March 1761, Halsey !€S.
15029.
7 10 June 1761, Halsey MSS. 15029.
8 Th&d.
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more significance in the light of a letter of Fuhr to the Treasury,1
stating that he had been told that in June 1761 Leopold had settled
his accounts with C].iffords and other banking houses, and by means of
correspondents had endeavoured to fix his lU-gotten gains in the
funds, If therefore, Halsey was a party to this stratagem the probabil-
it7 of his involvement in fraizi. is heightened, although the surviving
evidence will only permit his conviction on a charge of irregularity.
Another possible case of dishonesty concerned deputy
commissary Smith, who was instructed by Cockburn in October 1762 to
make a contract for 30,000 quintals of meal. 2 These orders were count-
ermanded two weeks later in view of the approaching peace, 3
 although
Smith still concinded. an agreement for half the required quantity at
a high price.h1 The Commissioners for Examining German Demands found
these circumstances suspicious and accused the commissary of trying to
make a coUusive bargain, 5 In Smith's defence, however, it may be
pointed out that while the price was far from cheap, it was not the
most expensive agreed at this time, 6 and that as Cockburn's letter,
which had two hundred miles to travel, 7 had only been written the day
1 Fuhr to P.rtin, 1 December 1761, SP/9/227. Fuhr had followed Leo-
pold to Amsterdam,
2 Cockburn to G. Smith, 29 October 1762, T/]J420 f.260.
3 Cockburn to Smith, 2 December 1762, T/l/ Li.31 No.21, f.61/O5.
k Contract between Smith and Amtmann Milt z, 12 November 1762, T/1/420
f.276.
5 Pownail, C .W. Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 214. October 1764,
T/l/k31 No.21, f.60/40L1.
6 Fraser to Cockbnrn, 28 December 1762, T/l/420 f.264.
7 Post Road which Cockburn's Letter was to go, T/l/ Ll.20 f.258.
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before the contract was signed, it could not have been in Smith's
possession at the moment of the agreement. There remains the possib-
ility that the contract was made after the receipt of the letter and
antedated, although this accusation was never made against Smith, who
consequently cannot be conclusively convicted of fraud.
Allegations of dishonesty were made against Pownall on
two occasions, both involving the contractor J.J. Uckerman. On the
first he was accused of allowing bad forage belonging to Uckerinan to
pass up the river Weser after it had been rejected by John Ghest, the
magazine inspector at Bremen, with the insinuation that he was invol-
ved in collusion with the contractor. 1 When the Treasury chose to
believe Pownall's explanation that the Army's desperate need obliged
the acceptance of inferior provisions with an appropriate reduction
in price, 2 the case was taken up by John Wilkes in 'The North Briton'
as a means of embarrassing the ministry. 3 Chest's accusations were
not corroborated by the investigations of either the Commissioners of
Enquiry or the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, and both
Hatton and Peirson found his conduct highly arbitrary.I There can be
little doubt that his prime motivation was a desire for revenge after
Pownall 's termination of his employment in May l762 , and although
his zeal for the service and his determination to eradicate fraud may
1 Memorial of J. Chest, (1762), T/l/kll f.8l.
2 Pownall to Jenkinson, 1 LI. October 1764, T/l/439 f.280. T/29/35 fT.
23 - 24, 24 December 1762.
3 The North Briton, No.40, 5 March 1763.
4 Hatton to Pownafl, 15 October 1761, T/l/4l1 f.127. Peirson to Pow-
nail, 24 October 1761, ibid. f.126.
5 Ibid. ff.81 - 82.
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be recognized, it would be unjustified to condemn the director of the
department of control on the basis of this evidence alone.
After the end of the war, when Pownal]. acted as one
of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, Uckerman claimed
that at his prompting he had written to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel,
stating the need for money to be advanced before the Hessian accounts
could be settled, 1 and in return he had been authorized to dispose of
up to £4, 000 In bribes • 2 Uckerntan added that Boyve, Pownall 's former
secretary and a clerk to the Commissioners, had been privy to the aff-
air. 3 Early in 1766 Boyve was accused of taking bribes to settle some
accounts, 4 and suddenly fled the country, removing a large number of
papers from his office. 5 In a letter to the Treasury he denied Ucker-
man's charges against Pownall and himself, 6 a story which he changed
on his return to London in July, when he said that Pownall had told
him and another clerk, Tozer, that they were all to have a share of
the money provided by the Landgrave. 7 This new version of affairs was
denied by Tozer and Pownall, 8 but Peter Taylor, the former deputy pay-
1 T/29/37 ff.342 - 343, 13 February 1766.
2 Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel to J.J. Uckerman, 24 February 1765, Add.
NSS. 38204 f93•
3 T/'29f37 ff.3LF2 - 343, 13 February 1766.
4 J.C. Jeanneret to West, 31 January 1766, T/i/'446 f.314.
5 T. Bradshaw, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to (Treasury), 24 February
1766, T/l/451 f.364.
6 Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, ibid. f.292.
7 Examination of Boyve, 12 July 1766, T/l/455 f.33.
8 Examination of Tozer, 12 July 1766, Ibid. f.40. Pownall to Grey
Cooper, 27 July 1766, T/l/451 ff.222 - 223.
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master of the forces in Germany, said that Uckerman had told him that
it had been at Pownall 's instigation that he had applied to the Land-
grave for money to expedite the settling of accounts. 1 It is again
hard. to convict Pownall on the basis of this evidence. Hj.s name was not
mentioned in the Landgrave's letter, and even Alt, the Hessian minister
in London, who recollected having heard the accusations, was unable to
identify him as the author of the plan. 2 Tozer denied the charges,
Taylor's evidence was mere hearsay, and Boyve 's contradictory versions
hardly made hi, a credible witness. The Treasury nevertheless saw fit
to deprive Pownall. of the £3,000 paid to the other two Commissioners
for Examining German Demands as a reward for their services , justify-
ing this penalty on the grounds that he should have brought the matter
to the Board 's attention when rumours of it had first begun to circul-
ate ten months before Boyve's flight.4
Boyve '8 own role in the affair was probably less inn-
ocent, although there is no positive proof of his precise involvement.
His position as clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Dem-
ands at a salary of only l2/6d per day compared very unfavourably with
the extensive responsibilities and the £2 per day which he had enjoyed
in Germany. When therefore Pownall told him that merit alone in a for.-
1 Add.. ?S. 38339 11.232 - 233, (1766).
2 Ibid. 1.233.
3 T. Whately to Jenkinson, 11 July 1766, Add. !S. 38205 1.60.
Li. Pownall might well have felt that he had been unfairly treated in
view of the fact that Charles Wolfran Cornwall, another of the Comm.-
issioners, was conversant with the whole affair from an early date,
but was neither criticized nor penalized for his failure to inform
the Treasury. Add.. !'S. 38339 11.229 - 230. Paper transmitted by Mr.
Cornwall to Uckerinan, 16 May 1765, ibid. 1.125.
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eigner was seldom a recommendation in Britain,' he may well have dec-
ided to look to his own interests, and his close and partially inform-
al connection with the settlement of Uckerman's accounts 2 suggests
that it was through him, and perhaps at his Drompting, that the con-
tractor tried to offer the Hessian bribe money. His precipitate and
suspiciots disappearance with his papers was never satisfactorily cx-
plained, 3 and his belated attempt to incriminate Pownall by changing
his story was probably designed to draw attention from himself.
Finally, there is sufficient evidence to form a judg-
ment on the allegations of fraud made against another German commiss-
ary. Fuhr showed that on more than one occasion President von Massow
had ordered magazine keepers to issue general forage receipts to con-
tractors in exchange for the detailed receipts, which had originally
been given by the troops to local people but which the contractors had
bought up at a substantial discount. 4 In this way the latter were paid
the contract price for forage which they had not delivered and made a
considerable and totally unjustified profit. In his defence Massow
claimed that he had only ordered subordinate officials to accept rec-
eipts for forage which the troops had taken from contractors' depots
1 Memorial of Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/l/444 f.223.
2 Pownall had ordered Boyve to provide tJckerinan with factual informat-
ion to help him answer the Commissioners • objections to his accounts.
Pownall to Grey Cooper, 27 July 1766, T/l/Lf51 ff.224 - 225.
3 His claim that he had to leave the country to take up his appoint-
ment as a Prussian councillor of state was a convenient but not very
plausible excuse. Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/1f451
f .292.
4 A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury s Correspond-
ence with the Commissariat in Germany ...., Dashwood ?S. D/D/19f6
ff.]. - 3. Fuhr to Martin, 22 August 1761, Add. MSS.32927 f.163.
1)40.
in the vicinity of the magazine, 1 it his statement was disproved by
his directions to the magazine keeper at Holzminden to obey all the
orders of the contractor, Baron Hoyin, as if they came immediately from
headquarters, and. by a letter from his secretary to the magazine keep-.
er at Paderborn, ordering him to accept a.1l the receipts presented by
another contractor, Councillor Rose. 2 Both men were thereby aided in
any fraud they chose to perpetrate, and it seems unlikely that Massow
would have assisted his fellow-countrymen in this way without some
share of the epoils.
Unverifiable charges of corruption were made against
four other commissaries. 3
 There was some suspicion that Fuhr did not
only make revelations of fraud bt actually shared in some of the pro-
Legh. was said to have demanded 'douceurs' for the settlement of
5	 6accounts in Germany and London, while the accusations against Hatton
and. Ramberg exist only as general complaints. Perhaps there were
other examples which did not come to lights corruption is difficult
1 shwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.4.
2 Ibid. ff.2 - 5.
3 The charges against Redecker concerned his activities as a contract-
or rather than as a commissary, Continuation of the &position of
Frauds and Irregularities ...., 5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 if.
427 - 428.
4 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 5 July 176k, T/1/43].
No.15, ff.113 - 114/33 - 34.
5 Evidence of S. Ascher, 30 April 1765, T/l/455 ff.172 - 173.
6 A $iort Narrative of the Evils Arising under the Commissariat in Ger-
many ...., 8 February 1762, Add. MSS. 329' 4 ff.237 - 238.
7 As director of the provision train he was implicitly criticized in
Hunter's statement that he suspected the affairs of the train to be
subject to frauds and bad practices, Instructions for Hatton
(1759), Add. MSS. 2905 ff.150 - 151.
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and often impossible to detect and prove in the face of determined
efforts to conceal it. Yet it seems improbable that such activities
could have completely eluded the careful scnttiny of Pownal]., the en-
ergetic and. sometimes fanatical enquiries of Fuhr and the meticulous
and lengthy investigations of the Commissioners of iquiry and the
Commissioners for camining German Demands. Nor is there any question
of the Treasury having turned a blind eye to the peccadilloes of its
employees, so giving the impression that they were more honest than
they actually were, for the summary dismissal of Halsey and the heavy
financial penalty imposed on Pownall, both active and successful
commissaries who had much to commend them, show that the Board re-
acted strongly to the slightest suspicion of irregularity. Thus on
the basis of an admittedly small number of examples, in which the
evidence is not always definitive, it is possible to conclude that
while the commissaries were clearly not all as innocent as lambs they
bear little resemblance to a pack of ravenous wolves.
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APTER TV
P'ORAGE
'.... the petrol .... of ages other than our own	 '....
Few contemporaries, civilian or military, underestiin-.
ated the crucial importance of forage to the forces in Germany. The
Treasury went so far as to call it 'an article of the most essential
Consequence to the very being of an Army', 2 while commanding off icers
lived in a state of perpetual nervous tension as the initiation of tac-
tical movements was delayed by the tardy formation of magazines and de-
pots, or as dwindling stocks forced them to abandon vital ositions
Adequate supplies of animal food-stuffs were the prerequisite of mob-
ility and therefore of military success, if not indeed of military sur-
vival. In summer it was sometimes possible for the animals o± the Com-
bined Army to find free grazing on the road sides, commons and meadows
in their immediate vicinity, but such supplies were limited and might
be quickly exhausted, so that even at this season, as throughout the
winter, it was necessary to supply large quantities of hay. Horses,
however, cannot live on grass alone, and thus oats or other suitable
grain had to be furnished all the year round, while the term 'forage'
also included straw which was used for bedding purposes. It is diffi-
cult to make an accurate computation of the total amounts of provis-
ions involved in meeting these needs. In the first place reliable stat-
1 A.C. Carter, The Thitch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War.
(1971) p.137.
2 S. Martin to N. Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/6k/96 f.339.
3 Prince Ferdinand 'a concern about forage supplies for the expedition
to Hesse-Casse]. early in 1761 is constantly reflected in his corres-
pondence, and his abandonment of the siege of Cassel in March 1761
was at least partly due to shortages of the essential commodity.
Ferdinand to Duke of Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. ?S. 32922 f.76.
Marquis of Granby to Newcastle, 31 March 1761, Add. S. 32921 f.200.
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istics of the numbers of horses in the Army do not exist, and in any
case they would have been impossible to formulate because of the large
numbers of animals engaged in multitudinous temporary services. In
1762, however, one commentator claimed that the Army contained as many
horses as men, 1
 and although this was probably an exaggeration, Peir.-
son spoke of the existence of 60,000 effective horses in 1761,2 while
two estimates from an unknown source give figures of over 55,000 dur-
ing the last year of the war, not including the animals used. to pull
local wagons pressed into service by the regiments. 3 Such numbers, how-
ever vague, clearly represent a massive increase on the 16, L$.1l horses
maintained in the last year of the War of the Austrian Succession.k
Secondly, the daily quantities of forage consumed by individual horses
were not constant, for not only was there a variation in the size of
the standard ration between armies of different nationalities - and
between animals engaged in different services, 6 but it was sometimes
necessary to order the delivery of reduced rations on account of short-
1 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 Nay 1762, Add. NSS. 3293 8 f.21k. The eff-
ective state of the Army on 1 October 1762 was 77,139, Add. W3S.
3833k f.186.
2 B. Peirson to Newcastle, 12 June 1761, Add. MSS. 329 2k f.25.
3 An Estimate of the Number of Horses Employed by the Army during the
Last War in Germany, 1762, Dundas of Beechwood !S. It should also
be noted that there were significant numbers of draught oxen; 800
having been purchased in 1760 merely to pull the siege artillery,
Ferdinand to Commissariat, 28 August 1760, Add. ?S. 32911 f.k9.
k A Calculation of the Number of Horses for which Forage was Probably
Provided during the Campaign 17&4-8, PROI3O/8/89 f.U.
5 T.0. Hunter to Newcastle, 9 May 1759, Add. ?S. 32891 f.58.
6 In the British army the forage ration of the horse guards was larger
than that of the dragoons, T/29/33 ff.63 - 64, 10 July 1758.
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ages, as also on occasions to increase allowances when services were
particularly onerous . Nevertheless, on the basis of the standard. Ger-
man ration of 10 lbs. of hay, 8 lbs. of oats and 5 lbs. of straw 60,000
animals consumed 268 tons of hay, 211+ tons of oats and. 131+ tons of
straw each day, figures which require very little multiplication be-
fore beginning to assume somewhat overwhelming proportions.
The above factors together with the constant fluctu-
ations in the price of forage, which denended not only on its avail-
ability but on the distance over which it had. to be transported, 2 make
it equally difficult to calculate the total cost of these provisions.
It was estimated in 1759 that the purchase of forage to supply the
entire needs of the .Army would cost £112,000 per month, 3 and a calcul-
ation of 176]. yielded a figure of over £124,000 per month. 4
 As some
provisions were obtained free these totals are not incompatible with
those for the annual expenditure on forage of £615, 1+53/17/5, £677,134,'
10/3 and £749,963/lk/10 in 1759, 1760 and 1761 respectively, quoted by
I Standing Orders ...., 25 October 1760, Add. NSS. 28855 f.24. Hunter
to Lord George Sackville, 26 April 1759, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/31.
2 See below pp.166 - 168.
3 Computation of .,.. the Expense of the Extraordinary Services of the
Combined Army in Germany for the Campaign 1759, T/l/395 f.7.
4 Peirson to Newcastle, 12 June 1761, Add. TS. 32924 f.25. Peirson
calculated on the basis of 60,000 effective horses and a daily rat-
ion costing 15 stivers, giving an approximate total of £1+,lO0 per
day. This figure was an underestimate for it was based on a valuat-
ion of the £ : 11 guilders, whereas at this time it was only worth
10 guilders 8 stivers, Pr/2/5 f.257.
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Westphalen, 1
 which show that forage was a consistently significant
item in the military budget. Free forage came from the bounty of nat-
ure, the capture of enemy supplies, and the system of forced contrib...
utions whereby enemy states, such as the Bishoprics of Hildesheim,
Minster, Osnabrck and Paderborn and the Duchy of Westphalia, were ex-
pected to supply their occupying forces without remuneration usually
during the period of winter quarters. The initiative in establishing
the latter arrangement apparently came from Prince Ferdinand, 2 whose
close attention to British financial interests in this matter hardly
corresponds with the popular contemporary view of Germany as an in-
satiable and wasteful consumer of British resources.
The payment of forage obtained in other ways was gov-
erned by a complex and confused tangle of responsibilities. The ult-
imate financial liability for the provisions consumed by both the
British army and the German forces in the pay of this country belonged
to the Treasury, which attempted to recoup some of its expenditure by
deductions from pay. British cavalrymen and dragoons were expected to
contribute to the cost of their horses' food by a nominal deduction of
6d from their subsistence money for every ration supplied by the govern-.
I F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Ceschichte der Feldze des Herzogs !'erdin-
and von Braunschweig-Lineburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, pp.1,114 - 1,123.
The cost for 1761 is given as £374,981/17/5 until 24 June and this
figure has therefore been doubled. Westphalen 's accounts for 1760
and 1761 contain additional sums for forage which cannot be distin-
guished from other items, so that the totals given here are an under-
estimate.
2 Ibid. Vol.1, pp.113 - ilk. Hunter to Treasury, 13 August 1759, TI6LI./
96 ff.216 - 219. Hunter claimed that the system of contributions was
a new one, but as the practice of armies subsisting at the expense
of enemy territory is as old as war itself, he must have been refe-
ing to the detailed arrangements and quotas which the Commander-in-
Chief had introduced.
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ment) During the war the Treasury adopted a harf-line approach to this
matter, refusing to abate its claim to reimbursement even when it was
iointed out that during t1e campaign of 1758 it had not in fact pro-
vided any forage. 2
 Similar deductions were made from the pay of the
Hessian troops, 3
 and also presumably from that of the Hanoverian and
Brunswick forces.4 From the opposite point of view, however, the Trea-
sury granted allowances of forage money to British officers and other
regimental officials, such as surgeons and sutlers, to assist them in
the period when they were not supplied by the government and usually
calculated as two hundred days per annum. 5
 Among the German troote in
British pay a far more complicated system known as 'vacant rations'
was operated • In fact this general term had a number of different mean-
ings. In the first place it was a cayment to re giments for the differ-
ence between the number of horses to which the officers were entitled
on the establishment and the number of horses which they actually kept,
so that by a somewhat twisted logic, not uncommon in military admin-
1 Sackville to Hunter, 26 July 1759, T/]./395 f.113. J. Williamson, A
Treatise of Military Finance. .... (1782) p.53.
2 Granby to Newcastle, 25 September 1759, Add. !S. 32896 f.82. Vis-.
count Barrington to Newcastle, 4 October 1759, ibid. f.268.
3 T/29/35 f.246, 26 December 1763.
4 No specific reference to this has been found, but a deduction of 6d
per ration was made from the pay of the Hanoverian troops in British
service in 1743, Forage Allowed to the Troops of Hanover, T/l/375
No.155, f.286.
5 Rations Allowed to the Officers of the British Troops ...., 6 oct-
ober 1762, Hotham S. DDHO/ L1/59. T/29/34 f.284, 18 May 1762. Letter
from the Genera]. Serving in Germany, 211' September 1762, Bute !S. No.
456(a). The allowance was granted in terms of a number of rations and
then translated into cash at the rate of 6d per ration, Return of the
General Staff in Germany .... 1758 - 1762, Hotham ?S. DDHO/l1'/64.
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istration, money was claimed for the forage which the non-existent
animals did not consume. 1 In this case the allowance was also known as
a 'rachat' and for the HeBs tans was again calculated at 6d per ration.2
Before the end of 1759 the concession was only granted to commissioned
officers, but after pressure from Prince Ferdinand the Treasury order-
ed Hunter to aUow it to the non-commissioned officers of cavalry and
dragoon regi, who were entitled to two rations of forage per day
but only had one horse.3 Secondly, vacant rations represented the for'.
age which was not drawn for the non-effective horses of the private
soldiers of mounted regiments, an allowance also accorded by the Treai-
sury at the end of l759. Thirdly, when parties and detachments of
troops who were entitled to draw government forage were too distant
from the sources of supply to do so, and were thus obliged to purchase
their own provisions, these rations were also considered vacant and
reimbursed at the rate of 6 dollars per month.5
The system of vacant rations was a peculiar one not
1. Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. ?S. 32935
f. 323.
2 T/29/33 f.22, 1 March 1758.
3 Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. lBS. 32905 f.l51. Extract
of a Letter from J. West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, Add. IS. 32898
f.153. Extract of a Letter from Hunter to West, 9 October 1759, ibid,
f.15L1.
k Ibid. Extract of a Letter from Martin to Hunter, 25 October 1759,
Add. 1S. 32898 ff.154 - 155. Although it was claimed at the end of
the war that the allowance for vacant rations did not apply to non-
effective horses, Memorial Representing the State in which the Aco..
ounts •... Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/l/427 ff.359 - 360, this
view did not accord with established Treasury policy.
5 Peirson to F. Halsey, 23 June 1760, Halsey 1S. 15115.
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found in either the Prussian or the British ariny, and the money paid
was supposed to be used to help keep the regiments numerically coin-
plete, 2 although the complexity of the accounts and the resultant dc-.
lays in payment meant that the cash for this matter of vital import-
ance was seldom promptly available. 3
 Nor did the system necessarily
encourage the maximum military efficiency, for there were financial
advantages in remaining below the regimental establishment. As one
correspondent remarked:- '.... on peut inaTheureusement dire de quel-
ques Regimens, que plus us sont incomplets, plus us gagnent'. '
 It
was presumably because of these factors, coupled with the increasing
revelations of fraud in connection with officers' receipts for vacant
rations, that towards the end of the war the Treasury suggested the
total abolition of the allowance, and its replacement with a fixed
sum to be agreed with the commanding officers of regiments. 5 But the
Commander-in-Chief opposed the change, concerned at the discontent
which it would create in his army, and arguing that the Treasury gain-
ed financial advantages from the existing arrangements as vacant rat-
ions were calculated at less than their real value. 6
 As usual the
1 Extract of a Letter front Hildesheim, 3 April 1762, Add. MSS. 32936
f.382. Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. !S.
32935 f.323.
2 Mr. Best's Answers to the Objections of the Commissioners for Exam..
ining German Demands, 9 May 1764, T/1/432 No.97, f.223/273.
3 A considerable proportion of the accounts were not settled until the
end of the war and then on an arbitrary basis. See below p.2O9, n.).
4 Add. ?'S. 32936 f.382.
5 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add.. !'S.
32935 ff.135 - 136.
6 Reply of Ferdinand to Howard's Memorial, 3 June 1762, T/1/kl7 if.
61 - 62.
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Board felt obliged to bow to military advice, although by 1762 it was
really far too late to change an established practice.
The whole system of forage deductions and allowances
illustrates some of the typical complexities of military finance in
this period. Designed to ensure that the troops had sufficient money
to provide for themselves and to reimburse the government for what it
supplied, it gave with one hand and took away with the other. One is
inevitably left wondering whether it might not have been simpler not
to give in the first place and equally to abandon the claim to reim-
bursement. This would have led to much simplification and to no more
inaccuracy, for the sums actually allowed such as 61 per ration and
6 dollars per month were purely nominal, and bore no relation to the
cost of the forage involved, to transport charges or to fluctuations
in the rate of exchange. 1 Under these conditions it was impossible to
say whether the financial interests of either the troops or the Trea-
sury were being upheld or damaged, and. this was clearly an unsatis-
factory situation. A complicated accounting exercise with a facade of
accuracy thus bore no relation to financial reality, and stands as a
significant criticism of the administrative methods of the period. On
behalf of the Treasury, however, it may be argued that it was not un-
aware of the drawbacks of a system which it had inherited, and its
proposal to abandon payments for vacant rations in the interests of
greater rationalization, albeit belated, does not support the theory
that eighteenth century administration was characterized by blind ad-
1 The cost of a ration of forage varied considerably in the course of
the war. See below pp.176 - 180.
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herence to tradition. Nor was civilian reluctance to rock the military
boat in the midst of war entirely misplaced as a guidin g principle.
-	 The simplest method of purchasing animal food-stuffs
was for the soldiers themselves to fora ge what was needed from the
houses, barns and fields of the producers, for which purpose reaiinents
usually possessed such non-combative equipment as scythes, sickles and
cords. 1 In theory this was a cheap and effective procedure, for it
oided transport costs and the army was not deprived of valuable res-
ources by the refusal of the indigious population to make them avail-
able. In practice, however, the process of foraging was time-consuming
and militarily inefficient, and it was also cordiaUy hated by local
people, to whom it seemed little better than armed robbery, frequently
involving forced entry of their property, 2
 physical assault on their
persons, 3 and the loss of the essential sustenance of themselves and
their animais.k Military authorities regarded some degree of foraging
as inevitable, 5 but there was always a feeling that its existence re-
flected an inadequacy in or a break-down of more re gular supply arr-
angeinents. 6
 The latter consisted of delivering forage to the troops,
either directly to their positions in the field or into depots and
stores known as magazines in their immediate vicinity. These so-called
1 Military Order Book, 4 y 1758 , Peterborough Museum Society.
2 Standing Orders ...., 13 September 1760, Add. !'S. 28855 f.14.
3 D. Reden to C. Hotham, 8 August 1762, Hotham !'S. DDHO/k/313 f,lOO.
4 Military Order Book, 10 October 1762, Peterborough Museum Society.
5 Ferdinand to Cranby, 21' April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 ff.l16 - 117.
6 Peirson to Newcastle, 29 July 1760, T/l/405 f.72.
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'country deliveries' were made by local peasants and farmers, some-
times on their own accounts or as part of more general agreements
made by governments, local authorities and officials. Private con-
tractors and agents could also be employed, and this method had the
advantage of extending the area from which forage was drawn, in some
cases beyond the frontiers of Germany, although transport costs were
thereby augmented and had to be added to the profits which private
merchants expected.
Certain aspects of foraging raised further content-.
ious financial issues on which the Treasury formulated no clear pol-
icy until 1760, and then only as a result of Prince Ferdinand's ur-
gent request for a statement. The Commander-in-Chief was concerned
that the increasing resentment against foraging would make local veo-
pie withhold their provisions, and. consequently jeopardize the supply
arrangements for the coming campaign. His letter to Granby made it
clear that a number of issues required. greater precision. For exarimle,
when a country was foraged to prevent supplies falling into the hands
of the enemy were the inhabitants to be paid for what was seized, and
could the subjects of enemy and neutral states claim payment for ro-
visions taken by the troops? On the whole the Board's views on these
matters seem to have been moderate and just. Allied and neutral terr--
itories, foraged to deprive the enemy of their provisions, were not to
expect an indemnification for what was tantamount to a loss to the
I Ferdinand to Granby, 2k April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 ff.116 & 118 - 119.
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enemy, 1
 although even subjects of hostile states were to be reimbursed
for ordinary foraging as long as their contribution commitments had
been fulfifled. 2 The Treasury also took up the question of green for..
age cut from the fields, pointing out that it was almost impossible to
ascertain its value, as a result of which it had not been the usual
practice of armies to pay for such supplies. No specific decision on
this matter has come to light, but there is evidence that the troops
continued to give rece iota for such forage and that the right to re-
imbursement was recognized at the end of the war. In these ways the
Board enjoyed some success in balancing the claims of German producers,
supported by the military's desire to encourage effective supply, with
the upholding of British financial interests. But at the same time the
delay in formulating its precise liabilities shows a certain readiness
to procrastinate in the face of complicated administrative decisions,
and to take refuge in the belief that everything could be comprehen-
sively settled at leisure when the war was over. Such an attitude had
a detrimental effect on the efficiency of supply and was a contribut-
ory factor in the delays which developed in the settlement of accounts.
Although the Treasury accepted an extensive financial
liability for the forage of its troops and the intervention of its
commissaries was always necessary to authorize the prices to be paid,
I Prince Ferdinand's Paper of 24 April, Observations upon it, ibid.
f.124.
2 T/29/33 f.323, 21 Nay 1760.
3 Peirson to Martin, 7 July 1760, T/1/405 f.70.
4 T. Pownal]. to Martin, 16 July 1762, T/1/420 f.107. The issue is com-
plicated by the fact that the term 'green foraging' could also apply
to provisions taken from the bounty of nature.
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its control of the practical arrangements for supply was significantly
limited firstly by the powers of the military authorities, and secondly
by those of German governments and officials. Military influence is
seen at Its clearest in the organization and direction of foraging,
which remained the responsibility of individual commanding officers
throughout the war, 1
 although towards the end of 1761 Prince Ferdinand
appointed Lieutenant-General Howard to direct and co-ordinate these
activities so as to avoid the many conflicts and confusions which had
arisen.2
 It would have been more appropriate for a Treasury commissary
to have exercised this function, for military commanders, having no
responsibility for the formation of magazines, did not always see the
forage problem from a sufficiently long-term point of view. 3 Nor was
the Treasury 's Influence over the supply of contribution forage much
more pronounced, for the direction of these matters was in the hands
of the Commander-In-Chief, assisted by a body called the Winier Quar-
ters Supply Commission. From its inception the membership of the
latter included both German and British military officers and German
officials, although there Is some uncertainty as to whether a rep-
1 See the numerous rules and regulations which form part of the Stand-
ing Orders, Add. S. 28855.
2 Ibid. f.60, 8 September 1761.
3 Foraging could exhaust a country's supplies and make deliveries to
magazines impossible, Letter of J,P. Heppe, 22 October 1762, Howard
Vyse 1'S. D/HV/B/8/l1. When Howard was appointed to the direction of
the coinmissarIat in 1762, the post of co-ordinator of foraging was
apparently transferred to German hands, although Sir James Cockburn
felt that logically it should have been given to the commissariat,
Cockburn to Howard, 6 September 1762, ibid. D/HV/B/8/'l.
4 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.1, pp.111 - 113.
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resentative of the cominissariat was associated with them before 1760.1
In the latter part of the war a number of Treasury employees served on
the Commission, 2 but it seems likely that the dominant influence was
exercised by the ubiquitous President von Massow, 3 and despite the
fact that British commissaries usually participated in decisions,
they probably played second fiddle to a man whose knowledge of the
country and whose contacts with local officials were far superior to
their own. Such a situation was hardly satisfactory in that the comm..
issariat's formation of magazines depended partly on forage purchased
from enemy states once they had fulfilled their contribution quotas,
for which purpose some control over the arrangements made during the
winter was essential. That this was far from the case appears in Hat..
ton's comment that, although a member of the Commission, he had never
been in possession of any of its papers.5
The control of the Treasury and commissariat over
deliveries made on a voluntary basis by the local authorities, off Ic-
lals, peasants and. merchants of allied and neutral states was in the-
cry more complete. The requisitions or requests for supply from these
l According to Ferdinand's letter to the Earl of Halifax of 23 Decein-.
ber 1762, SP/87/k7 f.211, Hunter had been a member of the Commiss-
ion, although another source suggests that Hatton was the first
British commissary to serve in January 1760, Letter of the Commiss-
ion, 5 January 1762, SF/81/117.
2 Peirson, Howard and Cockburn, SP/87/47 f.211.
3 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.1, p.113. Letter of the Commission, 5 Jan-.
uary 1762, SF1811117.
Lj. Peirson and Hatton signed the orders of the Commission, Instructions
to Mr. Rose .... for Levying the Contribution Money ...., 26 January
1760, SP/9/233.
5 Hatton to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 6 December
1765, SF191231.
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sources could come from military commanders, but they needed the auth-
orization and confirmation Qf the commissariat before being accepted
as a legitimate charge on Great Britain. 1 In the case of the British
troops in the Combined Army this was something of a new develooment,
for their commanding officers traditionally possessed plenary powers
to make forage agreements abroad, 2
 a situation which not infrequently
led to friction between the military and civilian authorities. One
such example occurred in 1758, when on arrival in Germany the British
Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Marlborough, signed what the Treasury
considered to be an exorbitant forage contract. 3
 Marlborough was in-
formed that had the bargain been made subject to the Board 'S approval
it would not have been confirmed, and he was advised to try to per- -
suade the contractor to abandon his agreement and to make a new and
hopefully more reasonable one, 5 a somewhat humiliating posture for any
government to have to adopt. But after the assumption of direct res-
ponsibility for the supply of the Combined Army in December 1758 such
a situation could not arise, for the forage of the British contingent
was provided by the commissariat in the same way as that of the for- -
eign troops, a development which constituted a sensible centralization
1 PownaU, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 25 February
1765, T/52/109 ff.32 - 33.
2 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Ger-
many, 23 October 1758, T/l/386 No.73, f.3.
3 Treasury to Duke of Marlborough, 30 October 175 8 , T/27/27 f.394.
Lf Ibid. This seems to suggest that the Treasury would have preferred
to compel the military authorities to make contracts subject to its
approval, but was unable to do so as the provision of forage abroad
was traditionally a matter for the commanding officer, with which
the Board did not interfere. T/l/386 No.73, f.3.
5 T/27/27 f.39.
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1
of authority in the Treasury a hands.
The commissaries could issue their own orders and
make their own contracts and agreements for forage su1y, subject to
the Treasury 'a atprova1, without waiting for specific military orders,
although their practical freedom of action was restricted in a variety
of ways. For example, Prince Ferdinand and his closest advisers made
no attempt to conceal their dislike of the employment of private mer-
chants and entrepreneurs, arguing that they thought only of their own
rof its, 2 and that the need to reveal troov disnositions to them for
delivery ourposes was an unnecessary security risk. 3 Such an attitude,
emanating from the Commander-in-chief, must have raised doubts in the
minds of the Treasury's employees as to the wisdom of this method of
supply, and the uncertainty may well have been reinforced by the pre-
judices exhibited by governments and local authorities towards con-
tractors who did not enjoy their favour. 4 Thus Hunter complained that:-
"The Supply of Forage & Provisions to the army here is now become a
more irksome & disagreeable Task than ever, for those in power in
these Countrys show but too plainly that none but such as are counten-
anced by themselves shall have the means of doing it ...." There was
I The powers of the British Commander-in-Chief were not abrogated, but
fell largely into abeyance with the appointment of Hunter as Super- -
intendent and Director of Extraordinaries.
2 Ferdinand to Baron I4iinchausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.
III, p.338.
3 Ferdinand to Granby, (1760), Add. iS. 28553 f.121.
4 In the case of Moses Levy, a Hanoverian contractor sent to supply the
army in Hesse-Cassel in 1759, these prejudices went as far as impris-
onment and. the extortion of a large fine to secure his release, Hun-.
ter to (R. Oswald), 4 November 1759, T/l/395 f.379.
5 Hunter to (Martin), 13 September 1759, T/64/96 f.226.
1.58.
thus some pressure on the commissariat to supply the Army with forage
delivered directly by local producers, not in itself a bad principle,
as 8uch provisions were in theory cheaper than those of contractors,
although the fact that the commissaries lacked any political or mil-
itary authority tended to allow the control and organization of local
deliveries to fall entirely into the hands of German authorities and
officials. When in 1760 - 1761 Ferdinand demanded over one million
rations, a so-called 'aid delivery', from various allied states, the
coiutissariat failed to take the initiative in making the necessary
administrative arrangements and an 'ad hoc' body, known as the Corns-
ission for Froviding the Army, came into existence. 1 Peirson stated
that in reality the Commission did not exist; that it was merely a
high-sounding title invented to encourage the carrying out of orders
This would not have mattered had such orders come from Treasury coins-
issaries, but although Hatton 's signature was sometimes included in
the Commission's directives, 3 the dominant influence again belonged
to Massow, who issued instructions under his name alone and used the
unofficial title to arrogate unwarranted powers to himse1f. To organ-
ize that part of the delivery which was to come from Minden and Ra y
-ensberg he employed another Prussian official, Redecker,5
 who by mak-
-
1. Protocol of the Commission for Providing the Army, 23 December 1760,
SP/9/228. A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury 's
Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany ...., Dashwood !IS.
D/D/l9/6 f.3.
2 Dashwood )S. D/D/19/6 f.3.
3 Providing Commission to Minchausen, 3 Jazary 1761, SF/9/228.
Li. Dashwood ?S. D/D/19/6 f 
.3.
5 Massow to Councillor Redecker, 23 December 1760, sP/9/230.
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ing agreements with entrepreneurs to supply the forage totally changed
the nature of the operation. 1 When these affairs were investigated in
1762, it proved to be virtually impossible to decide Redecker 's exact
status and the authority by which he acted. 2 Such were the ramificat-
ions and complexity of the affair that the commissariat had lost con-
trol of arrangements, and it is not inconceivable that it was unaware
of Redecker's activities.
Towards the end of the war efforts were made to pre-
vent matters slipping out of the hands of the Treasury's representat-
ives in these ways. On the basis of information provided by Fuhr in
1761 the Board instigated an investigation of Nassow's involvement in
supply arrangements, and this culminated in an order to Peirson on 27
January 1762 that, while the President of the Chamber of War of Minden
was to continue to advise and assist the commissariat, he was on no
account to issue directions or to take any authority upon himself.3
A more positive move followed shortly afterwards, when the number of
British commissaries was dramatically increased 1. in an attempt to ren-
der the services of German officials less necessary. These changes were
introduced very late in the day, but at least the problem had been rec-
ognized and some steve taken to ensure that he who paid the piper call-
ed more of the tunes.
1 Expos of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham S. DDHO/
i+1313 ff.285 - 286. If the delivery was to have been executed by
private merchants, the commissariat should have made the necessary
contracts without recourse to the assistance of German officials.
2 Letter of the Commissioners of Enquiry, 11 November 1762, SP/9/230.
3 Dashwood ?S. D/D/19/6 ff.3 - 4.
1+ See above pp.58 - 59.
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This examination of the administrative framework,
within which the supply of forage to the Combined Army was organized,
reveals a state of divided responsibilities with no one authority in
a position to undertake the task of overall co-ordination. Such a
situation did not facilitate the commissariat's duty to fill the ntag-
azines as efficiently and as cheaply as possible, although it was to
some extent inevitable. The system of contributions, established by
the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of military conquest and involving
no financial liability on the part of the Treasury, would not have
been an appropriate charge for the cominissariat to administer, while
although the Board paid for provisions foraged by the troops in non-
enemy states, the process of foraging could only operate on a foundat-
ion of military authority and discipline, which commissaries could not
provide. In the same way German officials were bound to play an imp-
ortant part in forage supply, as they alone possessed political auth.-
ority and influence over local inhabitants. Nevertheless, the commiss-
ariat does not always seem to have grasped the opportunities which
presented themselves to assert its authority over various aspects of
supply, and it must be criticized for its readiness to hand over the
wheel to those like Massow, who did not have the safeguarding of Brit-
ish interests at heart. Nor was the Treasury above criticism, for its
underestimate of the numbers of employees needed to staff the service
in Germany adequately was at least partially responsible for the coinm-
issaries' somewhat passive acce ptance of a back-seat role.
-
From a discussion of the system by which the provis-
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Ion of forage was controlled and. administered, we turn to an investig-.
ation of the policies pursued by the Treasury and its commissaries in
carrying out their particular responsibilities. Firstly, did the mea-
sures adopted provide effective supply for the troops in the form of
prompt arrangements for adequate provisions, and secondly, were the in-.
terests of Great Britain upheld in the form of agreements whose terms
were precise and exact and at prices which were reasonable or advant-
aeous? In 1757 and 1758, when provision was confined to the Hessian
troops in British pay, to the small corps of Prussians which served
with the Combined Army and to the British troops, who only arrived In
Germany In July 1758, the record of the British authorities was far
from successful • To Amherst and Boyd, the two commissaries in charge,
the most sensible arrangement seemed to be for the Hanoverian Chancery
of War, through its commissariat services, to provide forage for the
contingents maintained by Britain from the same sources and by the same
means as they furnished their own more numerous troops, so avoiding a
uazteful. duplication of effort in making contracts and forming saga.-
zines.1 In theory' there was much to be said for this point of view and
forage thus supplied should have been considerably cheaper than that
of a private merchant, but unfortunately the Hanoveriaxl authorities re-
fused to make any contractual agreement on prices, arguing that provis-
ions were purchased at many different rates and involved widely varying
costs, 2 so that what was supplied on the British account would have to
be left to a retrospective settlement. Thus the Treasury was committed
1 T/29/33 ff.22 & 25 - 26, 1 & 8 March 1758. On his way to Germany Am-
herst, through Sir Joseph Yorke, had made an initial contract with
the British firm of Pye and Cruickshanks at Amsterdam for 1,200,000
rations. (J. Amherst) to Treasury, 10 April 1757, T/1/375 No.31, f.66.
2 T/29/33 ff.21 - 22, 1 March 1758.
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to pay for forage at whatever prices the suppliers chose to buy it, and
Amherst 'a belief that a specific and. detailed contract was unnecessary
as the Hanoverians were equally the King's officers shows a certain
degree of naivety) Moreover, by early 1758 when the Treasury came to
investigate these affairs in detail, it had become clear that any sett-
lement might prove to be even more detrimental to British interests, as
many of the receipts of those who had sold. forage to the Hanoverian
commissariat and of those who had paid for its transport were irretr-
levably lost in places occupied. by the French. 2 There was thus little
chance of verifying the accounts let alone justifying them. Although
the Board had every reason to be concerned at this unsatisfactory state
of affairs, its own part in events was not above criticism. The exact
nature of Amherst 'a agreement had not been discovered until nearly a
year after it had been made for the simple but somewhat astonishing
reason that his letter of March 1757 was mislaid in Whitehall, and. only
came to light after a frantic search in February 1758.
Determined to make amends for this lapse, the Board
decided to take matters more into its own hands by concluding a con-
tract with Pye and Cruickshanks of Amsterdam for the purchase of uo to
£100,000 worth of forage in the Dutch Repub1ic. '' It seems that this
1 mid. f.21. The Treasury certainly did not share this opinion, reg-
arding the King's Hanoverian officers with the greatest suspicion.
2 Ibid. f.22.
3 T/29/33 ff11 & lI, 1 & 8 February 1758. It is possible that Devon-
shire's Board was aware of the letter but Newcastle's, which took
office in June 1757, apparently remained ignorant of the affair.
L. Treasury to Pye & Cruickshanks, 21 March 1758, T/1/385 No.32.
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agreement involved more than simple supply considerations, being partly
a response to Prince Ferdinand's opinion that such purchases would make
it more difficult for the French to find provisions, 1
 but this could
hardly excuse a basic lack of precision in its formulation, which later
made it impossible to decide whether the forage had been bought for the
forces in British pay or as a friendly advance to the Hanoverians
Moreover, in another alarming example of administrative laxity, no rec-
ord of the transaction found its way into the Treasury's papers . In
addition to these moves Boyd, who had now succeeded Amherst, was given
strict instructions to make no further agreements with the Hanoverian
Chancery without seeking approval from London, except on a temporary
basis in an einergency.l1 Unfortunately, according to the commissary,
this order came too late to prevent him reopening negotiations to re-
new the arrangements on the same vague terms. 5
 Boyd was also instruct-
ed to obtain proposals for alternative methods of supply, 6 although
his search for such proved largely elusive because of the high prices
demanded by private contractors and their reluctance to undertake the
transport of the provisions. 7
 In August theref ore the Treasury sugg-
1. Ferdinand to Boyd, 11 March 1758, Add. S. 32878 f.199.
2 Remarks on Baron Niinchausen 's Memorial ...., 3 August 1759, T/l/395
ff.3k1 - 3112.
3 Ibid.
k J. West to Boyd, 11 March 1758 , Tf27/27 f.322.
5 West to Boyd, 1k April 1758, ibid. f.327. Boyd to Treasury, 29 April
1758, Tfl/386 No.29.
6 West to Boyd, 1k Apr11 1758, Tf27/27 f.328.
7 Boyd to Treasury, .5 May 1758 , T/l/386 No.30. Baron Steinberg to
Boyd, 1+ May 1758, ibid. No.31.
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ested to Boyd that forage for the Hessians and Prussians, as well as
for the newly-arrived British troops, might best be supplied by the
Hanoverian commissariat, not so much a contradiction of its former
views, as the expression of a somewhat forlorn hope that the German
authorities would change their minds and be prepared to contract on
the basis of fixed prices. Their refusal to do so 2 can have surprised
no one but the Board, although their inability to supply forage to the
British troops on even a temporary basis was more unexpected, and
caused an immediate crisis, which drove the Duke of Marlborough into
his contract with Abraham Prado at the astronomical price of 2f9d er
ration.'
Thus in these first two years forage supply was not
organized with the maximum efficiency. Although the Hessians and Pru-
asians were apparently never short of provisions, this was far from
the case with the British troops, while in a number of ways the agree-
ments concluded lacked the precision necessary for the safeguarding of
British interests • The Treasury had for long remained ignorant of the
nature of the policy pursued by its employees, and its attempts to
find a more effective way to supply the Army in the first half of 1758
had been characterized by an inappropriately vacillating attitude. The
commissaries for their part, labouring under a heavy burden of work,5
1 Treasury to Boyd, 1 August 1758, T/27/27 f.371.
2 Martin to Boyd, 30 August 1758, Ibid. f.377.
3 Boyd to Treasury, 9 September 1758, Tfl/386 No.57.
L Computation of Forage by Mr. Hume, T/l/l.'05 f.490.
5 Both men acted as commissary of musters to the Hessians as well as
having onerous military duties to perform.
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had shown an unfortunate tendency to abandon their responsibilities to
the Hanoverian authorities.
Given the far greater obligations and the increasing
difficulties of forage supply in the last four years of the war, the
record of the Treasury and its commissaries shows much improvement. Al-
though there were frequent complaints about shortages of magazine pro-
visions, the evidence does little to suggest that such failures were
primarily the result of inadequate or tardy arrangements on the part
of British officials. Throughout his period in office Hunter was clo-
sely attentive to the organization of supply from a variety of sources,
including the purchase of magazines belonging to the Hanoverian comm-
issariat, 1 agreements with German authorities for deliveries by their
subjects 2 and contracts with both German and British merchants, 3 If
the Army did not always have sufficient forage ,1 was often the re-
sult of practical difficulties of delivery, 5 and although the Super
intendent 'a arrangements did not always reach the level of optimum
provision, it was artly because he justifiably refused to make pur-
chases faster than supplies could be brought into the magazines.6
1 Hunter to (Martin), 31 January 1759, T/61V96 f.l2(a).
2 Hunter to Oswald, 1 April 1759, T/l/39.5 f.373.
3 Hunter to Oswald, 5 March 1759, T/l/396 f.131. Contract between Hun-
ter and J.J. tJckerman, 20 September 1759, T/6k/96 ff.232 - 236. Hun-
ter to Martin, L. March 1759, ibid. ff.51 - 52. Hunter to Oswald, 3
May 1759, T/l/396 ff.30/31.
+ Ferdinand to Münchausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.111,
p.338.
5 Local people would not always obey Hunter's requisitions for forage,
C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 21+ June 1759, ibid. pp.298 -
299.
6 Hunter to Martin, U February 1759 & 1+ March 1759, T/614'/96 ff.28 -
29 & 51 - 52. Extensive purchases in a short space of time would
also have caused an artificial rise in prices.
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Further rumblings of dissatisfaction with the commissariat 's perform-
ance were heard early in 1760, when Ferdinand complained that in three
months scarcely eight days forage had been amassed at Cassel, so ruin-
ing his tactical plans. 1
 He attributed the failure partly to the comm-
issariat 's lack of knowledge of the country, 2 although in this conn-
ection it may be pointed out that British officials had certainly not
made the mistake of trying to draw supplies from too restricted an
area, having commissioned Thomas Halsey to make purchases for Cassel
along the Weser, 3
 a plan frustrated as much by transport problems as
by anything else.
More serious complaints and recriminations occurred
a year later, when it was reported that:- '.... the troops, (The Brit-
ish especially) and the Horses, are dwindled down almost to nothing,
for want of Bread, & Forage, and .... a Total neglect of Magazines in
the proper Places'. 5 A detailed examination of the state of affairs in
one part of the country at this time front the papers of Frederick Hal-
sey, who was acting as a commissary in the Minster area, reveals that
there were certainly some failures of supply. At Lipetadt in April the
troops had to forage for themselves over considerable distances more
1 Ferdinand to W. Pitt, 20 April 1760, Add. S. 32904 f.450. Ferdin-.
and to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. 1SS. 32905 ff.31 - 32.
2 Ferdinand to Pitt, 20 April 1760, Add. !S. 32904 r.4o.
3 Hatton to Martin, 15 April 1760, T/1/Li.05 f.185.
Li. In his letter to Pitt Ferdinand also attributed the transport diff-
iculties to the commissaries' lack of knowledge of the country, but
this was a somewhat oversimplified view.
5 Newcastle to Peirson, 13 January 1761, Add. MSS. 32917 f.275.
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than 17, 000 rations of oats and hay and nearly 7,000 rations of straw
in a mere four or five days because they were unprovided with maga-
zi.nes. 1
 But this was hardly surprising, for the whole area had been
almost foraged to exhaustion and the commissariat was desperately
bringing in oats, hay and straw from the Dutch Republic, the lower
reaches of the Ems and the county of Bentheiin. 2 Halsey gave his full
attention to the organization of supply, making numerous contracts
large and small, according high prices for forage carried over long
distances so as not to deprive himself of any possible source of sup-
ply, 3 and forming depots at critical points on the Dutch supply lines
in order to effect a continuous replenishment of the major magazines.l
Nor could he be accused of giving too much attention to less pressing
aspects of his duties, such as the settlement of old accounts, for he
specifically ordered his deputies to concentrate on the more immediate
matters of supply. 5 The object of all this effort was to keep the
troops provided with their daily needs on a hand-to-mouth basis, and
yet at the same time Ferdinand expected the forming of magazines for
the coming campaign. Considering all the difficulties and obstacles it
was something of an achievement that by mid-June Halsey had amassed
1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 10 April 1761, Halsey !'S. 150131. F. Halsey
to Hatton, 14 April 1761, ibid. Some of the provisions had to be
carried distances of four or five leagues.
2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, Halsey I'S. 15030. F. Halsey
to Nassow, 13 Nay 1761, ibid. 15031. F. Halsey to Ferdinand, 11
April 1761, ibid.
3 F. Halsey to Peirson, 2 Nay 1761, ibid. F. Halsey's Book of Con-
tracts, April - June 1761, Halsey !S. 15303.
4 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, ibid. 15030.
5 F. Halsey to . Berth, 8 Nay 1761, ibid. 15031.
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five magazines and a depot to supply a garrison of 10,000 for two
months at Minster) The military authorities might feel dissatisfied,
but it is doubtful whether more could have been done to effect a reg-
ular supply of forage in an exhausted country.
Much the same story can be told in connection with
the forage shortages in Hesse-Cassel, which were a contributory factor
to the raising of the siege of Cassel in March 1761. Here the country
had been reduced to something not far short of a desert by the coin-
bined effects of continuous campaigning and French exactions, 2 so that
most provisions had to be brought long distances up the Weser. Before
the winter campaign had begun, Hatton had travelled as far as Bremen
in an attempt to lay the foundations of a regular supply of forage by
water from as far afield as the Dutch Republic and Hamburg, 3 and yet
in the end the best laid plans had gone astray and all the obstacles
to provision over such distances in mid-winter had proved too much.
Thus in formulating its policies for supply the cominissariat had not
shown any tendency to lethargy and negligence, and although some of
its plans presented major problems of execution, it had had, no alter-
native but to attempt to put them into operation.
In turning to an examination of the defence of Brit-
1 F. Halsey to N. Magens, 12 June 1761, ibid. 15029.
2 T.G. Smollett, Continuation of the Complete History of England.(1762 - 1765) Vol.V, pp.113 - 114. J. Clavering to Earl of Holder-
nesse, 9 September & 13 December 1760, Clavering Letter Books.
3 Peirson to Newcastle, 6 November 1760, Add. MSS. 3291k f.130. Peir-
son to F. Halsey, 30 October 1760, H&lsey !TSS. 15134.
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ish interests in the years 1759 - 1762, it is clear firstly, that the
commissaries were largely successful in formulating contractual agree-
ments in precise terms with the inclusion of adequate safeguards. At
the beginning of the period care was already being taken to define
weights and measures accurately, a matter of some importance in a
country where several different systems were in operation, 1
 and to en-
sure that when payments were made in German currency, the fluctuating
dollar was quoted in ducats. 2 Most contracts at this time were also
careful to lay down the exact arrangements for payment, stipulating
that it would be made at regular intervals or as certain roportions
of the total delivery were effected, so as to encourage the contractor
to carry out his obligations methodically and completely. 3 In addition,
attention was usually given to fixing the time limits within which
deliveries were to be completed, although by 1760 there seems to have
been some slackness in this respect, probably as a result of the In-
creasing shortages of provisions and of difficulties in transporting
them. In 1761 Pownal]. drew attention to this matter, pointing out
that every agreement must contain a time clause if the coinmissariat
was not to find itself short of forage at critical moments, and burden-
I Contract between Hunter and Uckerinan, 20 Se ptember 1759, T164/96 f.
233. Contract between the Commissariat and C. Aussemorth, 8 October
1760, Halsey ?S. 15055.
2 Contracts separated by only short intervals of time showed signif 1-
cant variations in exchange rates • Thus an agreement with C. Mottman
& Co. of iLl' October 1760, Halsey ?'S. 15056, quoted the ducat @ 34
dollars, while one with Samuel & Zuntz of 29 November 1760, ibid.
15066, valued it @ 3-dol1ars.
3 Contract between Hunter and Uckerinan, 20 September 1759, T/624./96 f
234. The proportion to be delivered before payment could be demanded
was usually at least one half, but there were wide variations. Con-
tracts between the Cominissariat and N.F. Leopold, 19 November 1760,
Halsey MSS. 15062 & 15063.
4 Contract between the Coinmissariat and Mottman & Co., 14 October 1760,
Halsey flSS • 15057, stating that deliveries were to be made as soon as
possible.
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ed with unwanted deliveries when the need had long since passed. 1 This
recommendation was scrupulously observed in a number of contracts made
by Cockburn in the last year of the war, 2 suggesting that any former
tendency to a lack of precision had been corrected.
The commissariat's agreements also contained more s pec-
if ic safeguards of British interests. It was always the custom to in-
dude inspection clauses, so that it was possible to verify that pro-
visions were up to standard and that the exact terms of the contract
had been fulfilled, 3
 while failures in these respects were subject to
penalties throughout the period. As dishonest practices increased,
further conditions based on bitter experience were written into con-
tracts, such as that the deliverer must make his account books avail-.
able for inspection, 5 while the penalties imposed for non-fulfillment
and fraud became both more precise and more harsh. Thus whereas in
mid-1760 the contractor Uckerman had been threatened simply with what-
ever punishment the Commander-in-Chief should see fit to impose should
he fail to carry out his obligations on time, 6
 by the last cart of the
war it was more usual to insist on a forfeiture of one third of all
1. Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. S. 32928 f.286.
2 State of the Contracts made by Sir J. Cockburn, 17 June 1762, 'r/ij
Li.17 ff.k13 - 14.lLf. Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, October - November
1762, ibid. ff.242 - 261.
3 Contract between Hunter and M. Levy, 6 March 1759, T/6k/96 f.69.
L Contract between Hatton and Uckerinan, 3 June 1760, T/l/ Li'05 f.1101.
5 Contract between the Coininissariat and G. Ausseinorth, 8 October 1760,
Halsey !'t3S. 15055.
6 Contract between Hatton and Uckerinan, 3 June 1760, T/l/ L O5 f.4014.
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deliveries if time limits were not adhered to. 1
 From 1761 onwards
traffic in bought receipts 2 was subject to the draconian but necess-
ary penalty of total confiscation of all provisions already delivered
and also of those amassed in depots awaiting delivery.3
The generally satisfactory nature of contract form-
ulation in the last four years of the war does not mean that there
were no mistakes and lapses. Hunter's great contract with Uckerman,
which turned over the employees of the coinmissariat to the service of
a private contractor in order to expedite his deliveries, ran the risk
of compromising British interests. Hatton was guilty on one occasion
of making a contract which contained a basic contradiction in its
terms, allowing the contractor on the one hand to bring to account
vouchers for deliveries to the troops from his depots, while on the
other forbidding all commerce in receipts on pain of confiscation.5
Frederick Halsey unwisely included a clause in an agreement with Leo-
pold, permitting unsupervised deliveries direct to the troops instead
of into a magazine, where quantity and quality could be verified by a
conimissariat official. 6 Such examples of lack of judgment or careless-
-r
1 Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, October - November 1762, T/l/417 ff
246 & 260. Contracts throughout the period had contained the pro-
vision that if deliveries were not made on time, the commissariat
had the right to make alternative purchases at the contractor 'a ex-
pense.
2 See below pp.198 - 199.
3 T/l/417 ff.242 - 261.
Li. Contract between Hunter and tickerman, 20 September 1759, Tf6Li/96 f
235. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.125.
5 Remarks on Hatton 'a Contract with Red.ecker of 19 February 1762, sp/
9/230.
6 T/29/3k f.75, 19 May 1761.
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ness should not be passed over, yet they are not typical of Hunter,
Hatton and. Halsey, nor of the commissariat in general, whose approach
to the draughting of forage contracts was on the whole very careful
and alive to the need to protect British interests within a framework
of specific conditions backed by mercantile law.
Agreements between the commissariat and local farmers
tended to be considerably vaguer than those concluded with contract-
ors. Instructions issued. by Blakeney to various bailiwicks for forage
deliveries at the end of the war made no regulation as to time, quan-
tity, species and price, 1 while Frederick Halsey's letter to the Reg-
ency of Waldeck in 1761 spoke somewhat casually of several thousand
rations and payment at a reasonable price. 2 Such examples, however, do
not necessarily prove negligence om the commissariat's part for, as
many local people had. little desire to yield up their valuable provis-
ions to the troops and had to be persuaded or cajoled to part with
them, specific agreements were outof the question, while it would
hardly have been possible in any case to make a contract with every
individual who delivered a few pounds of forage. Nevertheless, when
local officials were prepared to undertake full responsibility for
the organization of deliveries by their subjects, advancing money to
make purchases and acting in much the same way as private contractors
at much the same prices, 3 more precise conditions were not only pose-
1 Letter of Requisition ...., 6 September 1762, T/l/420 f.39.
2 28 March 1761, Halsey ?S. 15031.
3 The prices allowed by Cockburn to Amtsrath Borries, a deputy of the
Chamber of War of Minden, were on the same level as those granted
to private contractors, T/l/4l7 ff.2 L12 - 245.
173.
ible but necessary. A number of agreements were made in such terms,1
although there was at least one significant failure, when in 1761
Hatton authorized Councillor Redecker to buy up an unlimited quantity
of forage and stated that everything he dxi would be retrospectively
confirmed by the coinmissariat. 2 Handing a German official 'carte
blanche' in this way clearly ran considerable risks, which are diff-
icult to justify even on grounds of the Army's desperate need.
An examination of the economy with which forage was
provided between 1759 and 1762 suggests that the Treasury and its
commissaries enjoyed some measure of success, while at the same time
failing to grasp certain opportunities. Deliveries by local farmers
were the cheapest method of supply and according to Frederick Halsey
could cost 2C less than entrepreneurs' forage. 3 British officials
therefore had a bounden duty to do everything possible to tap such
sources, and Ferdinand's opposition to the employment of private con-
tractors for security reasons was an additional incentive in this
direction. But while the commissariat always relied on local deliver-
ies to a significant extent, it tended to regard them as the cause of
much trouble and frustration. As Peirson wrote:- ".... the hanover-
ians don 't produce their forage with that alacrity that a friendly
army ought to expect from a country it comes to defend. They seem to
keep it up in order to augment our want of it, & so raise the price at
1 See the contracts made by Cockburn with a number of bailiffs in late
1760 and. early 1761. Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, Halsey MSS.
1506k(A)
2 Hatton to Redecker, 29 ?.rch 1761, SP/9/230. See below p.207.
3 F. Halsey to Howard, 23 January 1761, Halsey !S. 15030.
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their will. There is undoubtedly forage enough in that country, but it
comes out like drops of blood." In this situation the commissaries
often tended to favour agreements with merchants, which although more
expensive relieved them of much difficulty and trouble. This attitude
was understandable but British officials failed to take certain steps,
which were well within their power, to encourage local deliveries. For
example, it was left to Prince Ferdinand to point out early in 1760
that people might produce their forage more readily if tariffs of pay-
ment were fixed and published in advance. 2
 Nor did the failure to take
prompt steps to prevent delays in the settlement and payment of acc-
ounts do anything to overcome any reluctance to make forage available.3
If then for various reasons great reliance was placed
on entrepreneurs, were the latter employed with the maximum economy?
Commissaries of supply had the power to make contracts in different
places at what seemed to them to be the most appropriate prices, 4 but
little or no evidence has apparently survived as to how exactly they
went about this task. Sometimes they seem to have acted in a way which
was detrimental to British financial interests, as for example in em-
ploying contractors at least partly for reasons of favouritisnt and
connection or because of past services. Thus Blakeney was said to have
relied on provisions sent from Amsterdam by his friend, Arthur Conron,
despite the acute transport problems involved, rather than on those
1 Peirson to Newcastle, 2 January 1761, Add. l'S. 32917 ff.k0 - 41.
2 Granby to Newcastle, 23 April 1760, Add. S. 32905 ff.45 -
3 Peirson to Martin, 12 Nay 1761, T/l/410 f.9.
4 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.l5.
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which could have been supplied more cheaply from the depots of German
contractors nearer at hand, 1
 while the granting of a vast forage con-
tract to TJckerinan in December 1761, shortly after he had. been accused
of fraud and malpractice in the execution of his previous agreements,
certainly exposed British finances to the possibility of further de-
predations. 2 At the same time, however, there were contractors who
attempted to gain unfair advantages on the basis of their military and
political connections, but who were made to moderate their terms by
the cominissariat. Such was Councillor Knipping, who was recommended
f or a delivery of 200,000 rations of oats by Prince Ferdinand, and pro-
posed to supply them at 12 stivers per ration when others were ready
to undertake the business at 8 stivers.3
The contract price of forage was always considerably
higher than its prime cost, because legitimate expenses, charges and
profits had to be paid not only to the main contractor but also to
the subdeliverers whom he employed. Redecker's accounts suggest that
there could be a difference of as much as 30% between the prices char-
ged by the subdeliverers and those paid. by the commissariat to the
4
contractor. This inevitably raises the question of whether it would
1 Hatton to (F. Halsey), 17 November 1760, Halsey !S. 15141.
2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry liulton, ff.82 - 83. Memoranda Result-
ing from Fuhr's Examination ...., 27 October 1761, Add. ?S.3293O
f. 102.
3 Peirson to (F. Halsey), 15 November 1760, Halsey r'S. 15135.
4 Redecker's Affidavit of the Prices Paid to Subdeliverers in 1761,
SP/9/230. The prices paid were 11.02 stivers (21 March 1761), 9.84
stivers (12 April 1761), 11.02 stivers (25 April 1761) and 10.89
stivers (12 May 1761), an average of 10.69 stivers per complete rat-
ion. A letter of Hatton to W. Fraser, 23 July 1761, ibid., shows
that the coinmissariat paid Redecker an average of 13.88 stivere per
ration, viz. 15 stivers, 14 stivers, 13+ stivers and 13 stivers. The
increase in the two average figures is thus 29.8.
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not have been better to have made agreements with those who initially
purchased the forage, so avoiding one set of costs and profits. The
additional work and. responsibility involved in such a policy would have
necessitated a considerable augmentation in the numbers of cominissar-
ies, but even if the Treasury had come to accept this much earlier than
it did, its officials could. never have taken the place of a great con-
tractor. The latter was by definition a man of standing in the cominer-
cial world, with a wide circle of contacts, possessing specialist know-
ledge and. information and commanding confidence and financial credit,
all factors which were of considerable service to him in carrying out
his obligations.
The surest guarantee of reasonable prices was compet-
ition, and although there is no specific evidence that the commissar-
tat invited formal proposals to deliver forage by means of public ad-
vertisements, it nevertheless tended. to employ considerable numbers
of contractors, who acted as a brake on each other. 1 In this way stan-
dard prices for deliveries in different areas, with suitable variat-
ions for additional transport costs, 2 became generally recognized and
it was difficult for contractors to make agreements at prices above
the norm, except in cases where, the Army's need was desperate rather
1 The agreements made by Frederick Halsey, Halsey MSS. 15103, and by
Cockburn, ibid. 1506L1. (A) & T/l/147 ff.2L12 - 261, demonstrate the
tendency to employ large numbers of contractors at prices, which al-
though not standardized, fluctuated within well-defined limits.
2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 2 May 1761, Halsey !'S. 15031.
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than urgent. 1
 There was also, however, a small core of entrepreneurs,
who were involved in forage deliveries on such a grand scale and whose
services were so indispensable to the commissariat, that they appar-
ently occupied a position in which they could have profiteered had
they so wished. Of these no one was more important than Johann Jacob
Uckerman, a Hessian, 2 who by the end of 1761 had obtained contracts
worth over £800,000 on com pletion, and representing nearly three hun-
dred days' supply of oats to every horse in the Combined Army, as well
as additional quantities of hay and straw. 3
 Uckerman was extremely
useful to the commissariat; with wide connections and numerous agents
4in Germany, other Baltic countries and England, he was able to draw
forage from a large .rea, so effectively by-passing local shortages.
Until the very end of 1761 he does not seem to have used his position
and influence to profiteer at the expense of Britain, for the prices
which he was allowed compare very favourably with those granted to
other contractors. Thus his agreement with Hunter in September 1759 to
deliver in Hesse-Cassel at 15 stivers and later l44 stivers per rat-
ion - was on the whole cheaper than Moses Levy's contract at the be g-
I This was probably the reason for an agreement of 1761, allowing 23
groechen per ration, a price far above the norm, Peirson to Fuhr, 2
September 1761, Add.. !'S. 32928 f.88. In such cases commissaries
tended to ask the advice of their superiors before committing them-.
selves, Extracts from Hatton's Letters, 4 December 1760, Halsey MSS.
15211(B).
2 He eventually took British nationality, Journal of the House of
Commons, 6 March 1764, Vol.XXIX, p.908.
3 See Appendix III.
4 Narrative of Uckerman ...., (1762), T/1/409 f,309.
5 Contract between Hunter and Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 f.
233. The price was reduced when the agreement was prolonged beyond
its initial two month period, Hunter to Martin, 22 November 1759,
ibid. f.275.
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inning of the year.' In 1760 his delivery of rations at 15 stivers un-
ti]. the end, of November and then at 16 stivers 2 seems superficially
expensive when compared to his contract of August of that year, which
allowed him 13 - 14 stivers, and. to Leopold's deliveries in November
and. December, which were made at 14 stivers, 4 but it has to be remem-
bered that this was a special assignment, undertaken at a very diff-
icult time of year for a corps of troops which was unprovided with
magazines. 5
 In the first part of 1761 the cost of a ration of oats in
Uckerman's agreements varied between 8 and 9 stivers, prices which
correspond to those allowed to other deliverers at that time, 6 and
thus the burden of any charge against him must rest on his contract of
7 December 1761, in which he was granted 10 stivers per ration for the
vast quantity of six million rations of oats, or 21,429 tons. 7 Even
this price, which is the equivalent of 16.67 stivers for a complete
ration, 8
 did not seem superficially exorbitant, although it was not
1 Hunter to Oswald, 5 March 1759, T/l/396 f.131. Levy had been allowed
a uniform 15 stivers.
2 Hatton to T. Halsey, 25 December 1760, T/1/kl4 f.342.
3 Contract between Hatton and Uckerman, 25 August 1760, T/l/L 05 f.L46.
4 Certificates of F. Halsey to Leopold, 19 December 1760, Halsey MSS.
15297.
5 Hatton to T. Halsey, 25 December 1760, T/l/ L144 f.342.
6 Contract between Peirson and Uckerman, 25 May 1761, T/l/4l0 f.254.
Agreement between Hatton and Uckerman, 11 June 1761, ibid. f.252.
At this time Redecker was allowed 74 - 9 stivers for rations of
oats, Accounts of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS.
DrIiO/4/3]3 ff.289 - 300.
7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.82 - 83. Pownall & Corn-
wall to Jenkinson, 3]. March l76Li., T/l/43]. No.3, f.5/151.
8 Oats usually represented three-fifths of the cost of a complete rat-
ion of forage in mid-1761, Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 15 Jan-
ua.ry 1765, T/52/56 f.Z88.
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long before the emergence of certain inside information began to sug-
gest that appearances might be deceptive. Uckerna.n proposed to fulfil
a large part of the delivery by agreements with a number of English
subcontractors, who were to ship provisions from England to Bremen,1
and it was an application by Aniyand and Tierney for permission to ex-
port grain, which fortuitously brought the whole affair to the Trea-
sury's attention. 2 On making enquiries the Board was horrified to
learn that the subcontractors were apparently delivering provisions
at Bremen for a mere 6d, or not more than 54 stivers, per ration, 3 and
further investigations brought a proposal from a Nr. Wilson to deliver
oats at Bremen at 16/Cd per quarter, apDroxinlately 6. 24d, or not more
than 5.72 stivers per ration. In an atmosphere of panic the Trea-
sury made its first positive intervention in affairs since 1758,6 ann-
ulling Uckerman' a contract and making agreements with various English
merchants to ship grain to Germany on the Board's account. In the
course of the next few months a considerable quantity of forage was
delivered at Bremeri in this way at an average cost of 7,59d, or not
more than 6.96 stivers per ration. 7 niel Weir, the commissary char-
1 Narrative of Uckerman ...., (1762), T/l/1109 f.309.
2 Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 19 February 1762, Add. MSS. 3293k f.Li36.
3 Ibid. ff. L4.36 - L37. Calculating the £ at its maximum value at this
time of U guilders, PMG/2/6 f.231.
L Calculating one quarter as producing a maximum of 3l. and. a minimum of
28 rations, see Appendix IV, and taking the average cost. £ : U
guildere.
5 Newcastle spoke of his brethren in the Treasury being frightened out
of their wits, Add. MSS. 32934' f.436, lit it is difficult to imagine
the First Lord keeping his head when all around were losing their's.
6 The Board had previously declined to judge the prices allowed to con-
tractors on the grounds that only the commissaries on the spot could
do this accurately, Newcastle to peirson, 16 September 1760, Add.
MSS. 32911 ff.334 - 3_5.
7 See Appendix IV. £ : 11 guilders.
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ged to receive it and send it up the Weser, claimed that the Treasury
had saved at least £50,000 by taking matters into its own hands)
And yet a careful examination of the evidence sugg-
eats that the actual saving may well have been much less. Considerable
expense was involved in getting provisions from their point of arrival
in Cermany to the Army, and thus goods for Bremen had to be unloaded
at Brake or Vegesack, from whence they were taken in other boats to
the port of Bremen itself to be stored prior to transport up the Weser.2
This process involved not only the coat of freights, but that of other
incalculable items such as demurrage, warehouse hire, renting of sacks,
labourers' wages and expenses of land carriage, all of which may well
have brought the average cost of a ration of oats from England to some...
thing not far short of the 10 stivers allowed to Uckerman. 3 And even
if the Treasury 'a oats were slightly cheaper, the contractor had every
reason to expect a legitimate profit for all his trouble and respon-
sibility. The coinmissariat 's negotiation of prices in this affair may
thus be vindicated and the Treasury, while it showed itself commendably
aware of its supervisory obligations, caused a considerable amount of
disruption for very little financial gain, and perpetrated something
of a miscarriage of justice, at which Uckerman might feel justifiably
1 B. Weir to Howard, 16 September 1762, Howard Vyse S. D/HV/B/5/18.
2 Peirson to Martin, LI. March 1762, Add. ?S. 32935 ff.2l9 - 220.
3 See Appendix IV.
L. The vast amount of work, frustration and anxiety, which were invol-
ved in collecting the provisions at Bremen and transporting them up
the Weser, and. which kept a commissary and several, assistants fully
occupied for some six months, are clearly apparent in Neir 'a corres-
pondence in the Howard Vyse MSS.
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aggrieved. Government contractors may well have made considerable pro-
fits, but it should not be forgotten that they also ran considerable
risks.
The English merchants, who delivered forage on the
Treasury's account in 1762, were mostly employed as agents on commiss-
ion rather than as contractors at fixed prices, thus raising the gen-
eral question of the use made of this method of supply during the war.
Purchases on commission were particularly appropriate when provisions
were to be bought in many different places, with great variation in
price and. cost of transport, so making it difficult to strike a fair
bargain in advance, and they avoided the tendency of contractors to
demand higher prices than were justified in order to safeguard them-
selves against inflationary trends in the market or delays in settling
accounts, which if they failed to materialize brought unwarranted pro-
f its. At the same time, however, it was obviously to an agent's advan-
tage to buy at the highest possible prices in order to augment his
profits. The Treasury showed a certain 'penchant' for the employment
of agents when large deliveries were involved. As early as 1758 James
West, the Secretary of the Board, stressed the advantage of this method
as a means of controlling the sums of money paid to merchants, arguing
that if several agents were employed they could act as checks trpon each
other,' but it was only three and a half years later that such theories
1 West to Newcastle, 27 October 1758, Add. !'S, 32885 f.97. These views
might be considered a little naive, for agents could have no interest
in controlling each other: on the contrary, an agreement between them
to force up prices would seem theoretically more likely.
182.
were put to the test. The commission of 2% allowed to the various mer-
chants employed in 1762 was certainly not exorbitarrt , 1 and the Treasury
took proper care to stress to its agents that they should spread their
purchases over an appropriate period of tine in order to avoid the in-
flationary- effects of a sixlden massive demand, 2
 but in the end, as al-
ready noted, it seems unlikely that any real savings were made.
The comnmissariat 's attitude to this method of supply
was less consistent • Delaval and Halsey were employed by Hunter as ag-.
ents on commission in ).759,3 but Peirson declared himself no friend of
commission, arguing that it drove up market prices. Nevertheless, his
deputy, Hatton, who had at first intended to make a contract with Con-
rad Namberg for a large quantity of forage, agreed to employ him as an
agent at the end of l760, and followed this up in June 1761 with a
similar accord for three million rations of oats. 6 On both occasions
the terms were very favourable to Mamberg, for he was allowed a coma-
ission of 3%, a figure which Rattan justified because of the trouble
1 2% was aparent1y the standard merchant 's commission at this tine,
although Fuhr said that l% was sufficient for large deliveries,
Fuhr to D. Cuthbert, 25 April 1762, SP/9/227. In the 1770s the nor
ma). agent 's commission was 2+%, N. Baker, Government and Contractors:
the British Treasury and War Spp1ies, 1775 - 1783. (1971) p.89.
2 Martin to Amyand and Tierney, 2 April 1762, T/27/28 ff.276 - 277.
3 Hunter to (Oswald), 3 May 1759, T/l/396 f.30/31.
1+ Peirson to Martin, L' March 1762, Add. !3S. 32935 f.219. Peirson claim-
ed that if the quantities involved in Uckerman 's contract of December
1761 had been purchased on commission, the issuing of the orders would
have raised the price at least 50%.
5 Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/l/ LM)5 f.90. The great in-
crease in the price of corn in the Dutch Republic made Mamberg 's con-
tract proposals so high that it was decided to arrange the matter on
commission.
6 C. Mamberg to J. Boyve, + December 1761, SP/9/227.
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involved,1 but which some regarded as unnecessarily generous. 2 Indeed,
there seems to be no reason, when other merchants were satisfied with
2% for equally onerous responsibilities, why Mamberg should have ex-
acted so much more, although it may be said in mitigation that he
agreed to abate 1% if his demands were promptly raid. 3 Yet this was a
condition for which there was no precedent, and Hatton 'a wisdom in acc-
epting it was at least open to question. Needless to say prompt say
-ment was not made and so the higher figure operated, while in addition
?.mberg charged interest on the sums of money which he advanced in ord.-.
L.
er to make his purchases. Nor did the implications of these superfic-
ially simple agreements end here, for on a large rart of his delivery
of 1761 ?.mberg employed a suxieliverer, !1!ünch, who not only charged
his own commission of 2%, but took a further % towards insurance
costs. 5 Thus Hatton granted exceptionally favourable terms, and his
failure to effect a close control of Mamberg's actions by a specific
agreement in writing 6 enabled the agent to exploit the situation to
his own advantage. The coimnissariat 'a handling of the affair cannot
escape criticism, and may have resulted from lack of experience in
1 Hatton to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 30 January
1764, ibid.
2 Fuhr to Martin, 23 December 1761, ibid. He said that any merchant of
credit and reputation in Amsterdam would have delivered at 2%.
3 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 14 Ma.rch 1765, T/52/56 f.14144.
4 Ibid. The interest on all his deliveries as an agent amounted to the
not insignificant sum of 73,282 guilders 4 stivers.
5 P. Minch '8 Accounts of Oats Provided for C. Mamberg, 1 & 24 July &
18 September 1761, SP/9/227. Fuhr to Powna].1, 18 December 1761, ibid.
6 Hatton to John. West, 30 January 1764, ibid.
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making agreements of this sort.
A general assessment of the policies pursued by the
British authorities in supplying forage to the Combined Army is some-
what difficult to formulate as their record is rather a mixed one.
Shortages of provisions occurred throughout the war and on some 0cc-
as ions both Treasury and commissariat were partly to blame. Nor did
all their arrangements fully uphold British interests, for the comm-
issariat sometimes failed to exercise a sufficiently tight control
over the activities of suppliers, while the Treasury's slowness in
allowing more generous staffing ratios for the service in Germany made
it difficult to pursue the most economical policies. Yet it must not
be forgotten that failures of supply were frequently the result of
problems of execution rather than of imperfect arrangements, and that
a great deal of the commissariat's work was highly successful in safe-
guarding British interests. Above all, although there were some exam-
pies of overcharging which should not have occurred, there is no ev-
idence of rampant profiteering and extortion in connection with the
supply of this most vital commodity to an army which was far bigger
than any previously maintained by Great Britain.
In turning, finally, to a more detailed examination
of the execution of the policies described above two aspects of the
work of the Treasury and its commissaries have to be discussed; the
effectiveness with which forage was transferred from suppliers to con-
sumers, and the accuracy with which accounts were kept and the prompt-
itude with which they were settled. Nothing was more essential for the
proper supply of the Army with the greatest measure of economy than
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that the receipt, storage and issue of forage should be efficiently
and honestly conducted. The initial responsibility in this connection
belonged to a host of minor officials, known as 'Proviant Verwalters'
and 'Proviant Schriebers' , who were usually attached to magazines,
where one 'Verwalter' would have the overall charge as the keeper. In
receiving forage from contractors, peasant deliverers, the German off-
icials who organized supplies by their subjects and other magazines,
commissariat officials were supposed to check its quality and to issue
receipts for the quantities and species accepted. They then had to
store and preserve the provisions until they were needed for consumpt-
ion or for transfer to other magazines, when they would issue them to
the troops and other personnel attached to the Army or to those respon-
sible for the transport, taking receipts for the quantities involved.2
As the war progressed and the nature of the campaigning became in-
creasingly complex the numbers of magazines and subordinate officials
increased, So that by the last year of the war Pownall estimated a
total of between sixty and seventy magazines, employing some four or
five hundred staff.3
It is evident that this army of minor officials, thr..
ough whose hands passed vast quantities of forage, performed a crucial
task. Inefficiency on their part could create a bottle-neck in the
supply line between the deliverers and the troops, while a failure to
1 Literally 'directors' and 'clerks of supply'.
2 If deliveries were made direct to the troops instead of into a inag-
azine an official was usually sent to supervise the proceedings.
3 Letter of Pownall, 214. June 1763, Add. ?'S. 38335 f.106. T/29/34. f,
205, 17 December 1761.
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act as the first bulwark against fraud and peculation could have ser-
ious consequences for both the Army and the British taxpayer. How
fitted were they for this role and how adequately did they perform it?
Nearly all of them were Gerinans, and although Frederick Halsey issued
a justified warning against national prejudice when he wrote:- '....
God forbid that I shod, think that there were not honest Men in Ger-'
many as well as England •,•• ,2 the fact remains that the backgrounds
and connections of many magazine keepers were such as to make it diff-
icult for them to uphold British interests impartially against those
of the forage deliverers. Some of them had close links with the con-
tractors, and might even have been appointed by the latter rather than
by the conunissariat. 3 The relationships between magazine officers and
German officials could also be very close. At Diepenau and Bielefeld
there was even a complete fusion, for the local burgomasters them-
4.
selves were in charge of the depot or magazine, while everywhere it
must have been very difficult for a petty official to resist the in-
fluence of the local authority, to which he might well be subject as
a German citizen or as an employee, 5 Such factors were clearly ill-
1 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.15. There are occasional
references to magazine keepers with English names, Pownall to West,
31 October 1761, T/l/kl0 f.32k.
2 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey ?S. 15038.
3 Boyd to Pye & Cruickshariks, 17 May 1758, T/l/386 No.33. Pownall to
West, 31 October 1761, T/l/LflO f.324. Such examples usually occurr-
ed when the suppliers' depots were turned into commissariat magaz-
ines.
4. Report of Forage at Diepenau, 30 October 1761 T/l/413 f.378. Memo-
rial of GD. Elverfeld, 6 February 1766, T/l/4i4.5 f.16.
5 Many magazine officials in the service of the Hanoverian Chancery
of War were taken into British employment after 1758. Hunter to New-
castle, 7 March 1759, Add. !S. 32888 f.393. Memorial of J.D. Sch-
roder, i6 July 1763, SP/9/228.
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ustrated by the pressure brought to bear by President von Massow on
magazine keeper Schmedding to accept forage receipts instead of actual
deliveries on the account of Baron Hoym, 1 an action designed merely to
further unjustifiably the interests of the contractor. But Massow's in-
fluence over magazine officials was not confined to such isolated ex-
amples, for he employed large numbers of deputies, who appropriated to
themselves the titles of 'Kriegsrath', 'Kriegs Cominissarius', 'Aide-
Garde Magasin' and 'Sous Controlleur', 2 to whose influence and indeed
interference those employed in the magazines were frequently subject.
In such a situation it was difficult for the coimnissariat's employees
to maintain their freedom of action and to ensure the efficient and
honest fulfillment of forage agreements.
Even without these pressures the duties of magazine
officials in receiving forage were by no means easy to perform. In the
first place they might be ignorant of the precise terms of the agree-
ment under which deliveries were being made, and thus to take simply
one example they might accept forage offered outside the stipulated
time limits. 3 Secondly, the verification of the quantities delivered
1 Dashwood S. D/D/l9/6 f.3. For further information on the trade in
forage receipts see below pp.198 - 199.
2 Literally war bailiff, war commissary, assistant storekeeper and
sub-inspector. Pownall to Massow, L' September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928
f.278. Pownall's Comments on Massow's Letter, 31 October 1761, TIll
iti3 f.371l. Most of these people were presumably employees of the
Chamber of War of Minden.
3 As late as August 1762, after something of a revolution in forage
administration, Pownall complained that magazine keepers remained
ignorant of contract terms, Remarks on the General State of Deliver-
ies ...., July & August 1762, T/l/417 f.88. Unjustified deliveries
could be rejected in the accounting process, but it was clearly more
efficient not to accept them in the first place.
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could be a complex and arduous task, demanding a lengthy process of
weighing
 and measuring. This was at least feasible when grain was de-
livered in sacks, but a labour of Hercules when hay and straw were
received by the cart-load or even by the boat-load. Fuhr claimed that
the magazine keepers rarely weighed the vast quantities delivered by
Uckerman, but simply accepted his bills of loading , 1
 while many off-
icials seem to have contented themselves with a cursory count of sacks
and trusses when accepting provisions. 2 Thirdly, quality control was
equally problematical, for if performed thorou ghly it meant opening
every sack and probing to the middle of all loads of hay and straw.
This was not always possible, as in the case of some large depots of
hay and, straw, collected by Uckerinan at Verden, and accepted by the
commissariat under the contract of December 1761. A magazine keeper
was sent to take charge of them in February 1762 , but because of the
time of year he was unable to break down the stacks to make a full in-
spection. By June the fora had begun to show distinct signs of rott-
ing and it was clear that some of it had been bad when taken over by
the commissariat. 3 From such examples there seems little reason to
doubt that deliverers were able from time to time to unload short wei-
ght and inferior provisions.
Having received the forage, ma gazine officials were
1 Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities ..,.,
5 October 1761, Add. ?S. 32922 ff.k29 - 3O.
2 Pownail's condemnation of such methods in his Standing Instructions
to Magazine Keepers at the end of 1761, T/1/413 f.3611, sugests that
they were widespread at that time.
3 Pownall to Commissioners for Stating German Demands, 26 March 176k,
T/1/Lf3]. No.2, f.3/155.
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faced with the problems of storing and preserving it. The term 'Triag..
azine' perhaps conjures up a mental image of a concentrated group of
purpose-built structures, effectively protected and guarded: the real-
ity was very different. Magazines were frequently composed of a cen-
tral store and a number of satellite depots, which could be spread
over an area of several miles) This was sometimes a deliberate and.
positive arrangement, designed to avoid useless transports when supp-
lies passed the positions of the troops on their way to the magazine,
although it could also derive from a lack of storage space in some
places. Whatever the reason, the task of supervising a dispersed mag-
azine was a difficult one and frequently obliged the keeper to del-
egate major responsibilities, which ideally he should have kept in
his own hands. Moreover, although special buildings were sometimes
erected for the storage of provisions, 2 it was more usual to take over
existing barns and granaries, 3 thus again dispersing coinmissariat pro-
perty and making it difficult to supervise. But such arrangements were
infinitely preferable to lodging forage in private houses in the ab-
sence of any better accommodation, where it was almost inevitably sub-
ject to damage and depredation,k or storing hay and straw in the open
air, sometimes without the elementary precaution of forming it into
ricks and stacks, or protecting and guarding it against theft. 5 The
1 According to its keeper the Magazine at Lemfrde was spread over
eight German miles, Memorial of J.D. Schroder, 16 July 1763, SPI9/
228.
2 F. Halsey to E. Blakeney, 31 January 1761, Halsey IISS. 15030.
3 A, Tozer to Pownall, 21 March 1763, T/l/11.27 f.227.
k Pro Memoria of Councillor Redecker, 22 November 1765, SP/9/230 . Re-
port of the Magazines .... by Cuthbert ...., 20 November 17 61, TIll
kb f.238.
.5 Thid. f.239.
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fact that the magazine keepers were frequently short of cash to pay
for the necessary materials and labour may explain some of these in-
adequacies, and this situation could have the further ternicicus eff-
ect of forcing them to borrow money from deliverers, who expected pm-
•1ferential treatment or unjustified favours in return. Altogether,
significant quantities of forage in store must have been pilfered,
damaged or allowed to decay.
Finally, the issue of provisions brought the magazine
keepers another set of problems, of which the most important concerned
the right to draw forage. The troops were supposed to be supplied with
rations according to their regimental entitlements and their effective
numerical states, but it seems that officers rarely produced authoriz-
ation for the quantities demanded and that magazine keepers were ob-
2liged to issue on good faith. Even more intractable was the problem
of the legions of auxiliary personnel, camp-followers and hangers-on,
who all laid claim, usually unjustifiably, to government forage, 3 80
that Pownafl commented:- 'The whole of the Issue is a kind of i.rreg-
ular Scramble for what every one can get ....'. This state of affairs
could arise when keepers of large and busy magazines had. to leave the
I Ibid.
2 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (Narch 1762), Add. t'S.
32935 f.135. Again it was probably hoped that such matters would
correct themselves in the accounting process, although the coimniss-
aries of account frequently found themselves as ignorant of entitle-.
inents and effective states as the magazine keepers.
3 A Short Sketch of the Evils Arising under the Coinmissariat in Germany,
8 February 1762, Add. ?S. 3293sf f.235.
1+ Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.290.
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issue of forage to their subordinates, 1 although the officials in
charge were not completely innocent, and a number of them cheated the
commissariat by receiving forage from the deliverers by one weight or
measure and issuing it by another, 2 so apparently balancing their acc-
ounts but in fact leaving themselves with a surplus which they could
sell. The exact quantities of forage which were lost in these ways
will never be ascertained, but there is a strong suspicion that it was
not minimal.
Despite the situation described above, no attempt was
made to subject the activities of magazine officials to a comprehen-
sive system of control and supervision until the war was nearly over.
No full-time commissary of control was assigned to the business of mag-
azine administration before mid-1761, 3 although Hunter had appointed
two minor officials, Alexander Ross and John Ghest, to act as magazine
inspectors, and the former at least seems to have continued to exer-
cise his functions in succeeding years, 5 while a German, Andrew Rh1,
was appointed in the same capacity in 1761.6 But although it may be
1 Memorandum of J. Bessell, 12 December 1765, SP/9/231. Bessell was
writing of a period when there were inspectors present at the issue
of forage, but this had not always been the case.
2 T4/4l0 f.239. The German 'icimptezi' could be either a measure or a
weight, the former representing a greater quantity than the latter.
3 See above pp.65 - 67.
1+ An Account of .... Offices under the aiperintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany ...., 1759, T4/397 f.67.
5 Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/l/4l0 f.].51. Cuthbert & Hul-
ton to (Treasury), 30 November 1764, T/1f11.39 ff.301 - 1304. In 1760
Ghest claimed that he was inactive for want of orders.
6 Peirson to (Treasury), 16 June 1761, T/1/410 f.72.
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assumed that from time to time their efforts checked the growth of
malpractice and. led to the dismissal of negligent and dishonest off-
icials, their limited numbers and Fuhr's comment that '.... no Mag-
azines have been regularly inspected .... ever since Mr Hunter's
leaving the Army •••• 2 suggest that their work was piecemeal and
haphazard. Yet even if it had been perfectly performed, little sign-
ificant improvement would have resulted, for in Pownall 's vivid phr-
ase it was pointless to try to cure the smallpox by applying a plaster
to each pustule. 3 Any radical reform of forage administration required
initially a far closer definition of the various responsibilities,
duties and rights of the personnel involved, and of the methods and
techniques which they were supposed to adopt. Only when the framework
itself was tightened could any valid attempt to enforce the rules be
made.
In late 1761 and early 1762 such a reform was grad-
ually put into effect as a result of Pownall's establishment of the
department of control. The changes and improvements thus introduced
may be conveniently summarized under three headings. Firstly, the
staff attached to the magazines, and involved in other aspects of
forage deliveries and issues, were purged and totally subjected to
the commissariat's control. Thus German officials, who had used high-
1 Peirson pointed out, however, that it was often difficult to find
replacements, who were more suitable than those dismissed, Peir-
son's Answer to Complaints relating to the Cominissariat, 6 June
1761, Add. !'S. 32923 f 393.
2 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Reed. 29 September 1761, Add. 1S. 33048
f.150.
3 Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/l/1413 f.361.
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sounding but invented titles, and had involved themselves in forage
administration with no obligations to defend British interests, were
brought under Pownall's direction or eliminated from the service.1
At the same time it was laid down that all magazine keepers were to
be appointed, or to have their appointments approved by the director
of the department of control, and were to be assigned to specific
magazines, with the exhaustion of which their commissions were auto..
matically terminated, 2 while all subordinate magazine personnel were
to be nominated and to have their salaries fixed by the department of
control and not by their keepers. 3
 Secondly, the commissariat's em-
ployees were made fully aware of their responsibilities and duties,
which were now more closely and precisely defined, for Pownall '8 in-
structions to the magazine keepers, running to twenty-six clauses,
left little room for doubt.4 Officials were ordered to attend in per'-
son the delivery of all provisions and to weigh and measure the quan-
tities exactly, rough estimates and counts being no longer regarded
as sufficient. Issues were to be made by the same weights and measures,
and in order to standardize practices and leave no loop-holes, Pownall
fixed the Berlin pound and the Brunswick kimpten as the official wei-
ght and measure respectively, circulating patterns of each marked with
-
1 Pownall to Massow, 4 September 1761, Add. ?S. 32928 f.278. Pownall
to Peirson, 20 September 1761, ibid. f.289. The purge inevitably in-
volved a clash between Pownall and Massow, but the director of the
department of control was sufficiently strong-willed and sure of him-
self to carry the day. The correspondence of the two men in October
and November 1761 is found in T/1/413 ff,374 - 377.
2 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 f.364.
3 Circular Letter to Magazine Keepers, (1762), T/1/420 f.l23.
4 T/l/4l3 ff.3611. - 368.
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the coinmissariat's stamp.1
 In everything he did the director of the new
control branch showed the most meticulous attention to detail, and a
deterininat ion to eliminate the smallest temptation to slackness and
dishonesty. Thirdly, a more com prehensive attempt was made to provide
magazine keepers with essential information, which they needed to
carry out their duties efficiently. Of prime importance in this conn-
ection were copies of the agreements under which deliveries were made,
so that provisions offered outside the terms could be rejected, 2 and
officia). lists of those entitled to draw government forage, consisting
of a statement of effective numbers in the case of the troons and a
written authority from the military command or the commissariat to
draw a certain number of rations in the case of auxiliary personnel
such as sutlers.3
Thus Pownall overhauled and reformed the whole str-
ucture of forage administration, reasserting the commissariat 's con- -
trol over subordinate officers, layin g down a clear and exact defin-
ition of their duties, and providing them with necessary information
and guidance for the effective execution of their responsibilities.
Having achieved this, he then took steps to impose a far more detailed
and direct supervision of the activities of subordinate officials by
means of a full-time inspector for each of the five districts into
which he divided the magazines, and subinspectors and assistants ass-
1 Ibid. Powna].1 to Martin, 9 February 1762, 1/1/418 f.310.
2 1/1/413 f.367.
3 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. lS.
32935 f.]35. Memorial of Howard to Ferdinand and the Latter's Reply,
3 June 1762, 1/1/417 ff.59 & 61.
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igned to each individual magazine to superintend its day-to-day act-
ivities. 1 A series of regular reports were to proceed from the magaz-
me keeper to the control agent each day, and from the latter to the
-	 district inspector each week, while Pownall received a monthly report
from the inspectors on the basis of which he issued his own monthly
survey of affairs for the Treasury. 2 The scheme clearly illustrates
the constant care and attention which were being given to all aspects
of forage administration as the war drew to a close.
While there can be little doubt that these changes
had effects which were largely beneficial both for the supply of the
Army and for the upholding of British interests, certain caveats must
be entered. Firstly, control officers could sometimes take their dut-
ies so seriously that they impeded. the flow of forage to the Army. Al-
though Chest was surely not typical in his refusal to accept a load of
hay until a gang of workmen had picked all the clover out of it, 3 and
in his unjustified objections to the quality of much of the forage
delivered by Uckernian and Mamberg, 4 his actions illustrate the para..
dox that the more effective the system of control the slower the Army
was supplied. 5
 Secondly, it must not be assumed that Pownall 's regul-
1 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 ff.106 - 107. Pow-
nail to West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 ff.360 - 361.
2 A number of these are found in T/1/417.
3 S. Dyer to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 15 June 1764,
T/l/432 No.80, f.36/188.
4 Narrative of facts Relative to Uckerman's Deliveries, quoting letters
of Peirson and Dyer to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands,
16 June 1764, T/1/439 ff.288 - 290.
5 Such a disadvantage had to be balanced against the fact that less for..
age was lost as a result of dishonest and slack practices.
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ations were immediately and perfectly translated into practice. It was
not until June 1762 that steps were taken to publish the effective
numerical states of the troops on the fifth of each month in order to
control the issue of forae, and as already noted, as late as August
1762 Pownall was still complaining that copies of contracts were not
being forwarded to the department of control to be communicated to
magazine keepers before deliveries began. 2 Final1y, the first effective
system of supervising forage administration really came far too late,
for no sooner was it fully operative than the war ended. Such pract-
ical limitations, however, do not detract from Pownall's reputation as
one of the most assiduous, perspicacious and determined administrators
to serve the Treasury in Germany.
In turning to an examination of the various accounts
involving the quantities of forage received and issued and the payment
of those who were entitled to reimbursement for what they supplied,
we are confronted with what was perhaps the most complex aspect of
commissariat affairs, and the one in which there were the most evident
failings. Three kinds of account may be distinguished: firstly, those
of country people, contractors and agents for deliveries made or for.
age taken from them by the troops; secondly, those of magazine keepers
for provisions received and issued; and thirdly, those of the troops
themselves for the government supplies which they received, and with
1 Ferdinand to various Commanding Officers, 3 June 1762, T/l/417 f.55.
2 Remarks on the General State of Deliveries ...., July & August 1762,
ibid. f.88.
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which they were debited in order to make deductions front their pay.
But although such accounts may be detailed separately, they were in
fact interdependent, each providing a means of check and verification
of the others. Thus the settlement of contractors • accounts required
not only an examination of the receipts and vouchers which they pre-
sented, but of the accounts of the ma.gazines into which they had made
their deliveries, while demands for reimbursement from allied and neu-
tral states for provisions foraged by the troops needed to be verified
against the accounts of the individual regiments.
Unfortunately, practically every kind of account was
allowed to fall into serious arrears in the course of the war. 1
 In
Hunter's time magazine keepers were expected to send weekly returns
of the provisions in their charge, 2 and these were collected by a Ger-
man secretary, Ebeling, 3 and possibly subjected to some form of scrut-
iny and approval. But Pownall claimed that such accounts had not been
properly checked and certified before mid-1761, 4 and both Hatton and
Peirson admitted serious delays in their examination and settlement
1. The researcher working in eighteenth century administrative history
does not normally turn to the contemporary national press for in-
formation, but 'The Guardian' of 28 October 1964, p.19, reported
that the conunanding officer of the 3rd. Carabiniers was to make a
token payment to Herr Blume, a farmer of Soest, for 490 rations of
forage, taken without payment front his ancestors in 1761 by the reg-
iment s predecessors. This is an unexpected illustration of the fact
that the settlement of some forage accounts was not only delayed,
but deferred almost until the Greek Calends.
2 Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.147 - 148.
3 An Account of ..... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany ...., 1759, T/l/397 f.66.
Li. Memorial representing the State in which the Accounts .... Appear to
be, 10 January 1763, T/l/427 f.348.
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in 1760 - 1761.1 This meant that as well as it being impossible to
verify the accounts of deliveries, and to tell at any given moment
the exact quantities of forage in the commissariat's possession, 2
 the
magazine keepers' accounts were not subjected to any check, and con-
sequently shortages in their stores as a result of carelessness or dis-
honesty were not detected or punished. 3 Serious delays also occurred
in settling the accounts for deliveries into magazines by local farm-
ers. Sometimes this derived from the fact that, people could not pre-
sent their receipts for certification and payment because of the dis-
tances involved, but it is also clear that the commissaries were fre-
quently too busy to deal with bulky collections of such documents pre-
sented by local authorities.k A similar situation arose in connection
with receipts given by the troops to country people when foraging took
place. The failure to collect and pay the latter promptly was respon-
sible for the growth of a widespread and pernicious practice, in
which the creditors of the commissariat, desperate for cash, disposed
of their vouchers to contractors at a discount, while the latter per-
suaded magazine keepers to exchange them for general receipts as if
the forage had been taken from the magazine by the troops • The con-
tractor was thus relieved of the need to fulfil his obligations and
cheated the commissariat by being paid the higher magazine price for
1 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/l/L1.05 f.179. Peirson & Hatton to
Ferdinand, 13 April 1761, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, pp.288 - 289.
When Fuhr was given the unenviable task of dealing with the backlog
in 1761, he found himself with thirty or forty large chests of rap-
ers, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.5.
2 T/1ff27 ff.3L 8 - 39.
3 Ibid. f.3k9.
Lj. F. Halsey to Mr. Berth, 8 May 1761, Halsey ?S. 15031.
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forage. Contractors posted agents up and down the country to purchase
receipts, the magazine keepers themselves sometimes acting in this
capacity, 1
 and German officials attached to the commissariat such as
2Massow and Redecker were also involved in these shady activities.
Even worse, however, was the fact that military officers and others
with the Army wrote unjustified and fraudulent receipts specifically
for sale and reputedly for the payment of tavern bills, 3 while accord-
ing to Pownall the forging of such documents became at one time 'al..
most a Public Fabrick,k and they were offered on the open market
rather lIke 'Stocks upon the Exchange in England '. To have prevented
these abuses the receipts should have been collected in, posted to the
accounts of the regiments which had given them and paid as soon as
possible. Some attempt to do this was made when Hatton asked the var-
ious German governments to gather up and send the documents to the
commissariat, but he apparently received scant co-operation 6 and in
any case there was little ready money available for payment. 7 An att-
empt to overcome these obstacles by employing Uckerman to take up and
pay receipts later emerged as a crass blunder, in that the contractor
1 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.17 - 18.
2 Dashwood 1S. D/D/19/6 ff.2 - 3.
3 IbId. f.6. Standing Orders ...., 10 August 1760, Add. ?S. 28855 f.
10.
Lf Pownall to Martin, 22 March 1763, T/l/k2LI. f.3k2.
5 Pownall to Martin, 5 April 1763, T/1f427 f.1462.
6 Intelligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. ?'S,
32922 f.&420. Peirson's Answer to Complaints relating to the Commiss-
ariat, 6 June 1761, Add. T'S. 32923 f.39&'.
7 The Treasury told. Peirson in June 1761 that it was not practicable
to make arrangements for the immediate payment of these accounts, In-
structions to Peirson, (Clause 6), 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse !'S.
D/HV/B//L.
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introduced the vouchers into his own accounts But even if there were
almost insuperable difficulties in getting to the root of the problem,
some improvement could have been made by relatively simple reforms,
such as issuing commanding officers with printed books of numbered re-.
ceipts, 80 making forgery less easy.2
Although contractors' accounts were settled with
greater proiiptitñe, it is clear from the situation described above
that they were frequently not verified with the requisite degree of
care and accuracy. Thomas Halsey liquidated a large part of Uckernan 'a
accounts on the basis of general, rather than of specific and detailed
receipts, 3 an action which Hulton believed inconsistent with the duties
of a certifying commissary, who should have examined the original you-
chers.1 In such a situation it was impossible to be certain that the
forage had actually been delivered, and even if it had, that the time
limits and other conditions had been observed, and that the deliveries
had been made on the specific account for which the contractor claimed
payment .5
1 Hatton to C.W. Cornwall, I. Bradshaw & C. D'Oyly, 3]. October 1765,
T/1/1i44 f. I+09. Dashwood ?S. D/D/l9/6 fl]..
2 Although printed receipt forms were sometimes used when the troops
received forage from magazines in 1760 and 1761, some examples being
found in SP/9/226, it was apparently not until June 1762 that steps
were taken to extend the system to receipts given for foraging, Mem..
oriai. of Howard to Ferdinand, 3 June 1762, T/l/f].7 f.60.
3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.127 - 128.
k Hu].ton to Martin, 18 August 1761, Add. 1S. 32927 f.90.
5 Some contractors made deliveries to the same magazine under more
than one contract, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff .1511 -
155, and in the absence of fully detailed accounting could present
their receipts for the agreement which allowed them the most advan-
tageous terms,
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As with the system of inspection and supervision it
was only in 1761 - 1762 that a more comprehensive and accurate form of
account was brought into existence, deriving once again from Pownall 's
work in establishing the department of control • In the first place,
the changes involved the initiation of an exact record of all the for-
age in the comniissariat's possession at any given time, together with
its precise whereabouts, this information being contained in the 'jour-
nal • and 'grand ledger' kept in the department, 1
 arid permitting for
the first time not only a detailed verification of all forage accounts,
but also the organization of the Army's supply on the basis of accurate
statistical information. These records were compiled from details for-
warded regularly by the magazine keepers, who in turn were ordered by
Pownall to keep no less than five books of accounts, including their
own general ledger, and giving, in addition to the crude particulars
of all entries and issues of provisions to and front the stores in their
charge, more detailed analyses, as for example of the quantities drawn
by each regiment, corps and other service attached to the Arny, 2 so
that they could be more speedily and accurately charged with what they
had. received. Needless to say, all accounts were to be based on full
and adequate authorities and to be justified by comprehensive receipts
and vouchers, while the magazine keepers were to compile an exact num-
erical record of such documents, making copies where necessary.3
1 The journal was the current daily record of all deliveries, issues
and other movements not only of forage but of bread and meal. as well,
while the grand ledger gave the comprehensive monthly state of aff-
airs. Examples of the journal are found in 'I'/3 8/ 806 - 808, and of the
ledger in T/38/809 - 811.
2 T/l/ L l3 f.365. They were also to keep two other books of cash rec-
eipts and expenditure.
3 Thid. ff.365 - 367.
202.
In the office of control itself a number of conuniss-.
aries were employed in the processing of the paper work involved in
1these changes. Among the tasks performed were posting receipts to the
accounts of the various branches of the military service and calculat-
ing the quantities of forage drawn by them, 2 scrutinizing magazine
keepers' accounts of receipts and issues and checking the same against
other records in the department, verifying all vouchers and receipts
presented by deliverers in justification of their claims to payment,
and examining, liquidating and. certifying such accounts themselves
after comparing them with the grand ledger.' Individual commissaries
were assigned to each specific aspect of this work, and were provided
with the detailed instructions and rules of conduct, which were so
characteristic of Poinall's efforts to redefine and. clarify adutin-
istrative responsibilities. 4
 Thus for the first time the accounting
branch of the cominissariat was raised to the position of primary imp-
ortance which it merited; it now possessed sufficient staff, free to
give their undivided attention to its affairs, and with the opportun-
ity to become proficient in the execution of specialized aspects of a
highly complex business. The beneficial effects of such changes were
legion, but one of the most important was that contractors could no
longer use bought receipts in claiming payment for deliveries, as all
I Letter of Pownall, 24 June 176:3, Add. !!SS. 38335 ff.l08 - Ill.
2 Some idea of the complexity and volume of this work can be gathered
from Frederick Stanton's report that on the basis of the magazine
keepers' accounts for y, June and July 1762, he posted to approx-
imately 450 different headings 98,450 rations of barley, 1,888,031
rations of oats, 2,034,856 rations of hay and 1,258,1116 rations of
straw, T/l/420 f.213, 31 December 1762.
3 Add.. MSS. 38335 ff.108 - 111.
L1. Ibid. Instructions to the Commissary of Check and the Commissary
General of Accounts, 1762, T/1/420 ff.112 - 117.
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vouchers presented now had to make reference to a specific contract
and account and could be verified against the exact magazine record.1
Pownall 's work was not accepted without criticism by
some of his colleagues. Mason charged him with establishing unnecess-
ary offices and appointing superfluous staff, with the insinuation
that he was only interested in building an empire for himself, but
these opinions seem to have been strongly influenced by personal jea-
lousy and professional rivalry. 2 More specific criticism came from
Hulton, who believed that the system for magazine keepers' accounts
was too complex to be efficiently executed, 3 apparently arguing in
particular that it was unnecessary for them to keep general ledgers .
These views may have been based on the fear that minor officials were
incapable of performing the advanced actuarial exercises demanded of
them, that they would have no time to keep their voluminous accounts
up-to-date, and that they would be constantly at their desks when
their presence elsewhere might do more to facilitate the supply of the
Army. Pownall, however, was not unaware of these dangers, and before
bringing his system into operation had sent Boyve on a tour of the
magazines to instruct the staff in their accounting duties, 5 while his
intention was that every magazine keeper should be assisted by a
1 Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/l/4l3 f.359.
2 Memorial of C. Mason, 17 March l?6 t4, T/1/k33 f.1k8/1l5.
3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry ifulton, f.52.
14. T/lf'+13 f.359.
5 Pownall to Martin, 9 February 1762, T/l/418 1.310.
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qualified book-keeper who would undertake most of the paper work. 1 It
may well be that the system of accounts introduced in 1761 - 1762 re-
tarded certain aspects of forage supply, especially in connection with
the movements of provisions in and out of magazines, and although this
was apparently contrary to the best interests of the Army, it was nev-
ertheless essential for upholding those of Britain in a more effective
way than in previous years. And yet the prevention of unnecessary loss-
es and the greater knowledge of the exact quantities and of the precise
whereabouts of forage was bound to facilitate the supply of the troope,
as was the greater speed with which the new fully-staffed accounts
branch could expedite deliverers' claims, despite having to subject
them to rigid checks. Altogether Pownall 'S reforms benefitted all part-
ies involved in forage sutply, administration and consumption with the
sole exception of those who wished to act slackly or dishonestly, and
it is a tragedy that no one in the Treasury or the comndssariat fully
appreciated the need for such changes until it was almost too late.
Lessons were only slowly learned as a result of bitter experience.
Although Pownall had made adequate arrangements for
the current service, there still remained the issue of how to deal with
the vast backlog of unsettled forage accounts from previous years, and
the thorny problem of what to do about a number of accounts, which had.
been examined, liquidated and even paid, but which belonged to con-
1 Commission and Instructions to Book-Keepers, 1762, T/11420 ff.120 -
121. The theory was not always translated into practice, Circular
Letter to Magazine Keepers, 1762, ibid. f.123.
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tractors who had been accused of fraud. 1 In connection with the latter,
the Treasury decided at the end of 1761. to appoint a commission of en-
quiry to investigate the charges and to submit the relevant accounts
to re-examination. 2 The bulk of this work was carried out in 1762 by
Cuthbert and Hulton, with Puhr, who had made many of the accusations,
acting as assessor, 3 although reports continued to be issued until 176L1.,
long after the commissariat 's return to Englarid. ' The Commissioners
went about their tasks in a determined if not ruthless way: armed with
powers to demand contractors • books and papers, they also summoned peo-
ple to appear before them for interrogation and arrested a number of
suspects.5 The severity of their actions was paralleled by the harsh-
ness of their decisions, for out of accounts worth £1 million examined
by them they recommended deductions amounting to £245,000.6 Not sur-
prisingly their actions were the subject of considerable complaint,
1 Memoranda Resulting from Fuhr's Examination etc. before the Treasury,
27 October 1761, Add. ?'S. 32930 ff.96 - 103.
2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.64 - 69. Minutes of Resol-
utions ...., 29 October 1761, Add. !S. 32930 f.140.
3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.119. There were originally
five Commissioners of Enquiry, but Harvey and Watson, two military
officers, were given leave to retire after a short time, and Cock-
burn, who was given temporary direction of the coinmissariat on the
retirement of Peirson early in 1762, does not seem to have exercised
his commission, T/29/34 f.251 , 25 March 1762. Fuhr quarrelled with
the Commissioners, who accused him of trying to bring their office
under Pownall's influence, and eventually arrested him, Journal and
Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.1l8 - 120.
Lt. Memorandums Relative to the Case of Mr. Uckerinan, T/l/437 f.322.
5 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.61, 72 - 73 & 80.
6 mid. f.l73. The Commissioners only had the power to make recoinin-..
endations to the Treasury, Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/l/
417 f.119.
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not least from Prince Ferdinand, who feared that the stop put to the
settlement of the accounts of some of the most substantial contractors
would have a disastrous effect on the Army's forage supply. 1
 Although
there can be no doubt that the Commissioners unearthed and proved the
existence of a great deal. of fraud, especially in connection with
bought receipts and. coilusions between contractors and. magazine keepers,
they were not above criticism, for their guiding principle that all
contractors were guilty until they proved themselves innocent led them
to jump to a number of unjustified conclusions. Thus they assumed that
if receipts did not bear the contractors' names they must have been
bought, although when great entreprenens employed large numbers of
subdeliverers it was quite normal and legitimate for the latter's names
to appear on the vouchers. 2 On other occasions the Commissioners' ignor.
ance of the full details of cases led to unwarranted deductions, as
when extensive deliveries made by Uckerman to the troops were disall-
owed because they were vouched by the general receipts of ma gazine keep-
ers instead of by the military authorities • In fact this situation was
quite regular, for the commissariat had assigned several magazine keep-
ers to supervise these pe.rticui.ar deliveries on the spot. 3 Nor were the
Commissioners completely fair to the British commissaries who examined
and certified accounts before 1762, accusing them of negligence in sett-
ling on the basis of general receipts instead of on that of iarticular
1 Granby to (Commissioners of Enquiry), 21 July 1762, T/1fLl7 f.85.
2 Answer of Fraser, 1+ April 1765, T/l/51 f.k8.
3 Remarks of Commissioners of Enquiry on Two Certificates Granted to
Uckerman, 10 August l?6L1, T/l/L244 f.3k5. Answer of T. Halsey, 2].
April 1765, ibid. f.35Li D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to C. Lowndes,
6 November 1765, ibid. f.356.
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Vouchers, 1
 thus ignoring the fact that before the establishment of the
departmeyrt of control such detailed documents and records were not al-
ways available.2
But the Commissioners' criticisms went even deeper,
for they also rassed juigment on the formulation and modification of
contracts by the commissariat. Finding Hatton 'a agreements with Coun-
cillor Redecker lacking precision in time, place, species of provis-
ions and price, they chose to interpret the commissary general 'a ord-
ers as instructions to a commissary of supply, arguing that the supp-
11cr was entitled to no more than the prime cost of the forage and re-
ducing his demands accordingly. 3 The Commissioners also held that Hat-
ton had had no right to modify the time limits in connection with one
of Uckerman 'a contracts, and thus made large deductions for late del-
iveries. ' On review, however, the Treasury was advised against accept-
ing either of these. decisions, for the Commissioners for Examining
German Demands were of the opinion that although Redecker had received
from Hatton such genera]. and unlimited orders as would cover any del-
iveries of forage he chose to make in late 1761 and early 1762, they
none the less constituted an undoubted authority, 5 while the Commiss-
1 Hulton to Mrtin, 18 August 1761, Add. ?S. 32927 f90. Journal and
Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.l27 - 128.
2 On another occasion Hulton himself admitted that he had had to sett-
le accounts at least partly on the basis of magazine keepers • gen-
eral receipts, Journal, and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.25.
3 Hu].ton & Cuthbert to Redecker, ' February 1763, SP19/230.
1+ Hulton & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 16 October 1764, Tf1/l4 f.h146.
5 Powna.U, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Lowndes, 29 November 1765, T/52/109
ff.170 - 171.
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loners of Revision 1 argued that the movements of the Army, together
with the inability of the commissariat to fulfil its obligations to
contractors by providing transport and effecting speedy payment, made
a certain flexibility in connection with time limits obligatory.2
In conclusion, therefore, It may be said that the
Commissioners of Enquiry did valuable work, not only saving signifi-
cant sums of money, albeit far less than they had wished, 3 but shedding
light on shady practices and inducing a more critical attittzie towards
claims in genera].. If their suspicions were sometimes exaggerated, it
was perhaps a natural reaction to the frightening revelations of fraul
and dishonesty, and the fact that many of their recommended deductions
could not be ueld on grounds of natural justice may simply reflect
the inadequacy of the evidence, rather than the erroneous nature of
their opinions. Nevertheless, the fact that many of their decisions
had to be revised by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands and
the Commissioners of Revision, while clearly demonstrating the Treas.
-ury's determination to be scrupulously fair, meant that much of their
effort had been wasted.
1 Most of the work of reviewing the recommendations of the Commission-
ers of Enquiry was undertaken by the Commissioners for Examinin g Ger
man Demands, Charles Woifran Cornwall, Pownall and Cuthbert, bnt be-
cause the two latter were interested parties to a number of Ucker-
man's accounts, these were examined by Cornwall, D 'Oyly and Bradshaw,
who were known as the Commissioners of Revision, T/29/37 f.7, 5 June
1765.
2 Answer of Fraser, 4 April 1765, T/l/ L444 f.437. D'Oyly, Bradshaw &
Cornwall to Lowndes, 15 November 1765, ibid. f.64. Fraser's statement
that time limits were never meant to be adhered to, and were only sup-
posed to act as a goad to contractors, was presumably an exaggeration.
3 Only £55,000 of their recommended deductions of £245,000 were uiie1d,
Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hu].t on, f .190.
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With a few exceptions despatched by Pownail in Ger-
many, 1
 the unsettled forage and magazine accounts on which payment was
claimed were eventually submitted to the Commissioners for Examining
German Demands in London. Faced with a formidable collection of vol..
uminous papers and intricate accounts, the first part of their work
was to decide whether demands were based on legitimate and adequate
authorities. In this connection they insisted on specific orders from
the British cominissariat before entertaining claims, 2
 and rejected all
demands for forage taken by force by the troops, 3 for reimbursement of
contributions levied on enemy states, 1 for granary hire, of which they
said it had always been understood 'that the Kings Magazines were en-
titled to free quarters as the unavoidable consequence of Var',5 and
for interest on outstanding accounts. 6
 Secondly, the Commissioners re.-
1 He settled the accounts of the German regiments for vacant rations
on the basis of a composition, as the inadequacy of the records made
mathematical accuracy impossible, Pownall to Martin, 5 & 22 April.
1763, T/l/Lf27 ff.461 & 422.
2 Pownall, Cornwall and Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/
109 f.33, where the orders of Prince Ferdinand unconfirmed by the
commissariat were rejected as an insufficient authority.
3 Report of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands on the Dem..
ands of Count Nirfeldt, T/29/36 f.142, 20 November 1764. The Commiss-
ioners also refused to allow the rather special demands which arose
from enemy seizure of British forage and its forced sale to local in-
habitants, who claimed reimbursement when allied troops recaptured the
area and the commissariat retook possession of its property, Re port on
the Demands of Mr. Recke, T/29/36 ff.l68 - 169, 3 December 1764.
11. Report on the Demands of the Bishopric of Hildesheim, T/29/'35 f.306,
20 February 1764.
5 State of the Demands of Sundry Inhabitants of the Country of Hanover
in Pownall, Cuthbert & CornwaU to Lowndes, 10 February 1766, T/52/
109 f.159.
6 Report on the Demands of Mr. Rappard, T/29/36 f.161, 27 November 1764.
Pownail & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 22 March 1765, T/52/l09 f.60.
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solved that all receipts and vouchers presented in verification of acc-
ounts must conform to rigid standards before they could be accepted.
Among the reasons for the rejection of such documents were their sign..
ature by unauthorized persons, 1 their lack of essential detail, 2
 their
failure to mention or to adhere to time limits and to conform to the
geographical areas laid down in the authorities on which they were
based? and the strong supposition that they were of a fraudulent nat..
4
• Reductions in the sums demanded were also made or recommended
when unjustified prices were charged, when evidence of provisions of
poor quality was found, 6 when rates of exchange were calculated to
Britain's disadvantage, 7 and when errors in arithmetic were detected.8
AU this is sufficient evidence of the Comjnissioiers' strictness and
of their determination to uphold itish interests, there being very
1 Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 12 May 1764, T/52/56 f.475. Acc-
ount of a Demand of the Country of Hanover in Pownall, Cornwall &
Cuthbert to Lowndes, 9 December 1765, T/52/109 f.294.
2 Pownal]. & Cornwall to Jenkinson re. Demands of A.H. Kenton, 6 April
1764, T/52/56 f.472. A receipt which did not mention the species of
forage delivered was rejected.
3 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 9 May 1765, T//109 f.79.
The Commissioners aprently used detailed maps to verify the places
of delivery, Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 21 September 1764, T/52/
109 f.6.
Li. Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 23 November 1763, T/52/56
f.813.
5 Pownal]. & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 31 March 1764, T/52/56 ff.65 - 66.
The city of Miihlhausen had charged the prices allowed in Hesse-Cassel
instead of those allowed for deliveries in neutral countries.
6 Pownall, Cornwall & Ctrthbert to Jenkinson, 10 November 1764, T/52/109
f.14.
7 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 12 March 1765, Tfl/1441f f.250.
8 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenldnson, 22 March 1765, T/52/109 f.69.
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few accounts from which they did not make deductions, in some cases
very substantial ones. Yet at the same time they went out of their
way to be fair to the comaissariat 'a creditors, and thus they allowed
accounts without proper authorities 1 and accepted receipts outside
the official time limits, as long as there were valid reasons for
these exceptions to the rules 2 Unlike the Commissioners of Enquiry
they ordered the payment of bought receipts as long as they were not
forgeries at what seemed to be fair prices, considering the fact that
they represented forage for which Britain was financially liable, and
that the purchasers had actually expended money on them. 3
 Finally,
errors of calculation to the deliverers' prejulice, however small,
were methodically corrected.1
In the course of these detailed and painstaking in-
vestigations, in which the Commissioners frequently had to base their
conclusions on evidence which was far from complete and direct, they
were sometimes presented with intractable problems, apparently defy.
ing any accurate solution. One of the best examples was the accounts
1 Uckerman was allowed sums of money for sacks, which he had purchased
to transport oats to safety, without a specific order from the coma-
issariat, in view of the fact that his prompt action had avoided
substantial losses, Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenldnson, 18
August 176l, T/l/Lf33
 No.75, f.306/].29.
2 pownail, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 20 June 1765, T/.52/109
f.28L . In another case where the delay had been a short one the Coma-.
issioners ordered payment, but reduced the price allowed , Pownall,
Cornwall & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 19 January 1765, T/521 56 f.183.
3 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 12 March 1765, T/l/!41414 ff.250 - 251.
k Pownafl, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, (27 June 1765), T/52/109
f .11+5.
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of Sir Lawrence Dundas and Richard Oswald for the forage drawn from
coamissariat magazines for their train horses, for which they were
to be charged at the rate of 6d per ration. 1 As receipts for the
issue of forage had not been posted to the accounts of the various
services between 1759 and 1762, the Commissioners proceeded on the
basis of a hypothetical charge against Dundas of one ration per day
for every horse which he had maintained, and because the search in the
records for this figure took so long, they accepted Oswald '5 statement
of the maximum forage charge against himself without verification.2
From these total charges various deductions had to be made for the es-
timated periods when the contractors had supplied their own forage, and
when their animals had received provisions at no cost from the fields
or as a result of contributions • The Commissioners assumed that most
services had been supplied with magazine forage for six months in every
year, 3
 an estimate which both Cranby and Peirson considered equitabla.
Cuthbert, however, did not agree with his fellow Commissioners, and
in a dissenting jtxigment argued with cogent reasons that a period of
six months was too short and allowed the contractors an unfair advan-
1 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 14 March 1764, 1/1/432 No.25, f.218/
55. The arrangement did not apply to the forage of the great foreign
artillery train, which was provided at government expense, Reasons
Offered by Mr. Cuthbert ...., 12 June 176k, ibid. No.28, f.208/62.
2 1/1/432 No.25, f.218/55. Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson,
19 June 1764, ibid. No.29, ff.211 - 213/65 - 67.
3 1/29/36 ff.].l 12, 10 July 1764. The great foreign artillery train
was assumed to have received forage from these sotn'ces for ten mon-
ths in every year.
4 Tbid. f,117, 24 October 1764.
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tage. 1
 He also made the simple but somewhat startling discovery that
a sum of no less than £10,555 could be saved on Dundas' accounts by
adopting a different method of calculating the value of the forage,
2
which he had supplied to- the great foreign artillery train. In a true
spirit of compromise the final agreement apparently endorsed the latter
proposal, but rejected Cuthbert's other objections. 3 Ultimately, the
Commissioners showed perseverance and. skill in arriving at a settlement
acceptable to all parties, but there was no certainty as to its accur-
acy, and the way in which large sums of money could change hands acc-
ording to different interpretations of conditions during the war or new
mathematical insights is to say the least disturbing. Such were the dis-
advantages of what Pownall called settlement by 'inodus negotiandi'
'4
rather than by 'inodus computandi
In May l766, some two and a half years after they had
opened their office, the Commissioners f or Examining German Demands
concluded their investigations. By contemporary administrative stand-
1 He argued 'inter alia' that no contributions had. been imposed on
most provinces which were the seat of war after 6 February 1761,
that it was impossible for the various kinds of free forage to have
lasted for as long as half the year, and that the provision train in
particular, plying from magazine to magazine, must have taken its
forage mostly from commissariat sources, T/l/ L4.32 No.28, f.207/61.
2 Ibid. ff.208 - 209/62 - 63. See Appendix V.
3 Ibid. In 1766 the final calculations on the account were still made
on the basis of six months supply of magazine forage each year.
State of Adjustment •... between the Crown and Dundas, T/l/451 f.33.
Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown against Dundas ...., ibid..
f 
.39.
4 Pownall to Jenkinson, March 1765, ibid. f.LI2.
5 The Treasury revoked the Commissioners' authority on 2 May 1766, T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.
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ards such a speedy consummation might seem to reflect an almost indec-
ent haste, although any suspicion that it was therefore the result of
negligence is immediately dispelled by a review of the Commissioners'
settlement of forage accounts, where the indefatigability, attention
to detail, technical expertise and balanced judgment, which were con-
stantly brought to bear on their work, are abundantly illustrated. And
yet the need to establish such a commission, which was far removed in
time and place from the accounts which it examined, and which in the
absence of concrete statistics and facts frequently had to resort to
deductions and inferences, to principles of natural justice and to ab-
stract mathematical exercises of composition, stands as unflattering
proof of the inadequacy of the system of forage accounts, operative in
Germany in the critical middle period of the war. The Commissioners
made the best of a bad job, but much of their work should never have
been necessary.
215.
CHAPTER V
BREAD
236.
"Famine makes greater havock in an army than the enemy, and is more
terrible than the bayonet."
Bread was the staple item of the eighteenth century
soldier's diet and if all other provisions failed, which was by no
means an unknown occurrence, he relied on it to keep body and soul to-
gether. Not surprisingly therefore military commanders set great store
on the regularity of bread supplies, and. tended to react to any serious
break-downs in this sphere with more than a little displeasure. For the
British soldier the standard allowance or 'portion • was 13 lbs • per
day, 2 while German troops in the Seven Years War had a somewhat more
generous daily ration of 2 lbs. 3 The latter's bread was made of rye,
which was more plentiful and cheaper than wheat in Germany, and had. the
additional advantage of remaining edible for nine days, while a wheaten
loaf did not keep well for more than five.4 The British troops who had
fought on the Continent in queen Anne's time had been supplied with rye
bread, presumably for reasons of economy and simplicity, while during
the Austrian Succession War the soldiers' bread had been made of one
third rye and two thirds wheat. 5 But the military authorities were gen-
erally opposed to what they considered a false economy in supplying
the British soldier with the standard German 'ammunition' bread 6 made
1 T. Simes, A Treatise on the Military Science, which Comprehends the
Grand. Operations of War .... (1780) p.6.
2 T/29/33 f.67, 13 July 1758.
3 standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/l/413 f.368.
4 R. Peirson to Duke of Newcastle, 27 September 1760, Add. TSS. 32912
f .162.
5 T/29/33 f.68, 13-July 1758.
6 The word 'ammunition' simply means that the troops were provided with
the bread, and does not imply another use to which this hard, black
substance might conceivably have been put.
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from flour ground with the husk, and described as dry, hard, black and
bitter. 1 Such unpalatable provisions were frequently held responsible
for the sickness which inevitably dogged a British army abroad, Lord
Ligonier being of the opinion that rye bread had caused more deaths in
the Spanish Succession War than the sword of the enemy, while the Duke
of Marlborough, the British Commander-in-Chief in Germany in 1758,
warned bluntly:- 'I hope the Bread will be all Wheat, or half Our Men
will dye of Fluxes on the March',2
On distant manoeuvres and expeditions, when the troops
were likely to remain far removed from the Army's bakeries, it was com-
mon to issue them with biscuit, 3 which although equally unappetizing
was also practically indestructible. tinder normal conditions, however,
bread rations came in the form of six-pound loaves, which were carried
in knapsacks, and were supposed to last the British soldier four days
and his German comrade-in-arms three • The Army s rations were some-
times cooked in the ordinary bakehouses of a town, which were hired or
commandeered for this purpose , but such facilities were rarely adequate
from the point of view of both size and situation, and it was thus com-
mon for new stone or brick ovens to be constructed, 6
 with some sort of
-
1 Letter of a French Officer in the Cantonment of Xanten ...., 24 Aug-
ust 1761, Add. S. 32927 f.251.
2 T/29/33 ff.67 & 7]., 13 & 20 July 1758.
3 T.O. Hunter to Newcastle, 7 March 1759, Add. ?CS. 32888 f.394.
lj. Proposal of L. Dundas for Furnishing the Hessian and British Troops,
9 January 1759, T/1/395 f.421.
5 C.H.P.E. von Westpha].en to Prince Ferdinand, 9 July 1759, F.O.W.H.
von Westphalen, Geschichte der FeldziIe des Rerzos Ferdinand von
BraunschweigLiineburg, (1859 - 1872), Vol.111, pp. 49 - 350.
6 Ferdinand to Commissariat, 28 August 1760, ibid. Vol.IV, p.423. T/'29/
36 f.105, 18 October 1764, re. the demands of the village of tJlff.
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shelter in which to store the various ingredients and. utensils used by
the bakers) Such buildings might well have to be protected and guarded
against marauders, whether from the enemy or front one's own troops and
camp-followers. 2 If the main army moved too far from its bakeries, or
they were threatened by the approach of hostile forces, they had to be
demolished, and as many of their materials and. contents as possible
transported for re-establishment in a more convenient or safer place,
an extensive and difficult task. Frederick Halsey ruefully commented:-
s .... the Bakery has been removed & ye. Ovens broke down, & rebuilt 3
times since I have been here, 3 .... when a Bakery is removed, the Dir-
ector of ye. Bakery, principal Bakermasters, 6 Underbakerms., Forty
Bakers & 250 under baker(s) & assistants must march with it, wch. is
not a very easy operation; ••	 Such manoeuvres naturally involved
some lapse of time before production could be resumed.
fl.our for the baking of bread was amassed in magazines
and depots, and transported to the bakeries in hired or train wagons,5
-which might carry loads of between eleven and twelve hundredweights.6
). T/29/36 f.lO5, 18 October 17621., mentioning that tiles were used in the
building of ovens. State of the Magazines ...., 23 November 1759, T/
621/96 f.268. A major item of equipment was the large coppers used for
mixing the dough.
2 Standing Orders, 1 June 1760, Hotham MSS. DrIO/k/10O.
3 He had, been at Gross Reckum for some two weeks.
L1. F. Halsey to T.H. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey P155. 15029.
5 This was one of the major functions of the provision or proviant train,
although it is possible that the bakery train, which was 'primarily
meant to carry utensils and equipment, could. also be used. for this
purpose. See below p.260.
6 In a contract between P1. Hatton and the Councillors of the hessian
Chancery, 13 July 1760, T/l/L405	 it was sti'pulated that the
wagons hired were to carry a minimum of 12 quintals each, a itntal
weighing between 108 and 110 lbs.
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When grain had been purchased it had first to be taken to mills for
grinding, a process which might cause considerable delays, especially
during dry periods when there was insufficient water in the streams to
turn the wheels) Both flour and grain in transit had to be protected
against the elements and were normally carried in stout sacks, al-
though it might be considered necessary to pack flour in casks which
were hopefully waterDroof. 2 The other major item required by the Army's
bakeries was firewood, which was burned in vast quantities and fre-
quently had to be transported long distances. Once the bread was baked
it had to be delivered to the troops, and for this purpose all British
and German regiments were assigned a certain number of bread wagons,
which could carry between two hundred and two hundred and fifty loaves
4.
each, and which would normally be covered and sometimes fitted with
wicker baskets to prevent the provisions being spoiled while on the
road. 5 The bakery was usually situated some ten to twelve miles to the
rear of the main army, 6 a distance which might take the wagons the best
part of a day to cover, so that allowing one day for loading, unloading
1 F. Halsey to President von Massow, 13 May 1761, Halsey PBS, 15031.
Frederick the Great 's soldiers were provided with handmills for grind-
ing their own grain, R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of
the British Army, 1795 - 1809, (1963) p.260, but no reference has been
found to their existence in the Combined Army.
2 Hatton to S. Martin, 3 September 1758, T/l/3 84. No.54..
3 The common unit of measurement for firewood was the 'dafter' of three
wagon loads, Certificate of J.A. Warnecke, 12 November 1765, SP/Q/223.
4. R. Oswald to C. Hotham, 22 December 1760, Hotham !'S. DDHO/k/l1. An
Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishing an Army of
4.0,000 In ...., 23 January 1758, Add.	 S. 32878 f.191.
5 Ferdinand to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, 24. July 1759, West-
phalen, op. cit. Vol.111, p.393.
6 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand 's Orders relating to the Numbers of
Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment ...., II September 1761,
Dundas of Seechwood MSS.
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and resting the horses, the troops could have their bread delivered
either to their positions in the field or to a nearby magazine at least
every three days. But if, as sometimes happened, the Army or the maga-
zines were two days' march from the bakery, there would be difficulties
in achieving a regular supply unless the wagons were sufficiently num-
erous to be divided into two sets in order to effect deliveries in re-
lays. 1
 When the wagons had to cover long distances and there were in
addition delays caused by poor roads and bad weather, the soldiers • pro..
2
visions might well arrive stale or even mouldy.
In the last Fart of the war the Combined Army consumed
in theory some ninety tons of bread each day. 3 Actual consumption must
have been somewhat less than this figure, for effective numbers were
always less than strengths on paper, but the extent of the difference
should not be exaggerated. Although the sick and wounded in hospital
were counted as non-effective, they continued to consume bread albeit
in smaller quantities, while if there was no need to supply those men
who had been captured by the enemy, there was still a corresponding
number of French prisoners of war who had to be fed, Moreover, there
were additional and supplementary allowances, such as those made to
the women and children accompanying the troops, 4
 and to soldiers endur-
1 Add, ?S. 32878 f.191.
2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.125, 2 November 1761.
3 This figure is based on 23,327 British troops and 73,504 Germans,
see above pp.31 - 33, the former consuming 1+ lbs. and the latter
2 lbs • of bread per man per day. The 5,591 drivers and other personn-
el attached to the trains, see below Appendix VII, and approximately
600 employees of the commissariat and the magazines, see above pp.59 -
60 have been allowed 2 lbs. per man per day. The exact figure is 86.78
tons.
4 Standing Orders •..., 18 October 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 f.66.
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ing conditions of rarticu].ar hardship, 1 which increased the total con-
sumption but which cannot be precisely calculated. At no time were all
the Army's extensive needs met by supplies from its own bakeries, for
there were many corps and detachments, which because of their separat-
ion from the main body of troops, were obliged to purchase their susten-
ance from civilian bakers or local inhabitants, while from 1758 onwards
a considerable proportion of the Army 's bread each year was provided by
occupied enemy states in the form of forced contributions • 2 Neverthe-
less, over a period of just under three years in the last part of the
war the bakery which served the German troops produced a total of
36,443,837 portions of bread of 2 lbs • each, or an average of 11,407
six-pound loaves each day. 3 This task, necessitating the employment of
three hundred bakers,4
 was a far more complex and delicate operation
than the supply of crude forage, and one whose magnitude should not be
underestimated. AM yet bread always remained an item of secondary im-
portance in the budget of non-military supplies, calculations for 1759
showing that the estimated cost of providing the Combined Army with
1 In November 1761 the British troops were allowed an extra half pound
of bread per day for as long as they kept the field, Extracts from
Prince Ferdinand 'S Orders relating to the Numbers of Carriages Per-
mitted to Attend each Regiment ...., 10 November 1761, Dundas of
Bee chwood ?S.
2 It was estimated in 1759 that five months supply in each year could
be obtained in this way, Computation of .... the Expenses of the Ex-
traordinary Services of the Combined Army in Germany for the Campaign
1759, T/l/395 f.7.
3 Genera]. View of the Accounts of the Foreign Bakery in T • Pownall & D.
Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 16 March 17 65, T152/56 f.454. The accounts
were for a period of 1,065 days from 1 Ma.y 1760 to 31 March 1763. On
individual days the production of bread might rise as high as 15,000
loaves, Etat de la Boulangerie Geiniinden, 18 October 1762, Howard
Vyse )S. D/HV/B/8/16.
4 Sir J. Cockburn to G. Howard, 28 May 176 2, T/]./417 f.427.
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forage was almost seven times the cost of supplying it with bread)
The general policy adopted by the Treasury and its
commissaries for the supply of bread may be examined firstly from the
point of view of the nature and quality of the provisions and. the
methods of production adopted. Although the Board originally hoped
that the British troops could be weaned to a diet of rye bread by
gradually introducing it in increasing proportions ,2 it eventually
yielded to the weight of military opinion, and contrary to the prac-
tice of both the Spanish Succession and the Austrian Succession Wars,
agreed to supply the more expensive wheaten bread to which the men
were accustomed at home. 3 But this willingness to subordinate consid-
erations of strict economy to those of the welfare of the troops and
of military efficiency, did not extend to a proposal that the bread of
the German contingents should come in the form of smaller fouri_pound
1oaves. Among the arguments in favour of such a change were the fact
that large loaves sometimes remained unbaked in the middle and caused
sickness in the ranks, 5
 and that three or four days • supply of bread
1 8,716 British troops consumed 66,277.92 six-pound loaves per month at
the rate of 1+ lbs. per day, while 61,697 German troops consumed
625,559.01 six-pound loaves per month at the rate of 2 lbs. per day,
see above pp.3]. - 32. Wheaten bread cost 8d and rye bread .54d per
six-pound loaf, see below pp.239 & 2L+2, making a total monthly cost
of £16,5L4/l0f7. Hunter's estimate for the monthly cost of forage
was £112,000, T/1f395 f.7.
2 P129/33 f.68, 13 July 1758.
3 Ibid. ff.71 - 72, 20 July 1758.
k Add. ?5, 32878 f191. A similar change for the British troops would
have required the production of three- or four and a half-pound loa-
ves to last for two or three days.
5 Ibid. If the bakery was working under pressure there might well be a
temptation to undercook the bread.
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could quickly become inedible on long marches in persistently wet weath-
er even with the protection of a knapsack, 1 while there were some sol-
diers who were unable to prevent themselves consuming their entire rat-
ion as soon as they received it and so going hungry for two or three
days. 2 Smaller loaves would not only have been more expensive to pro-
duce, but their more frequent delivery would have required many addit-
ional bread wagons, although it may be suggested that the failure of
the Treasury and the comtissariat to adopt the proposal derived less
from such considerations as from the fact that the military authorities
were sceptical about the overall advantages to be gained from the chan-
ge. Bread deliveries were difficult enough to effect with any regular-
ity, and when the wagons did arrive it was no doubt regarded as prudent
to take as many days' supply as possible.
As regards the methods of producing bread the most
significant issue which engaged the attention of the commissaries con-
cerned the provision of portable iron ovens, which although somewhat
expensive to purchase, 3 and requiring two wagons each to move them,
made it much easier to relate production to the position of the troops
in the field, and also avoided the considerable waste of time and eff-
ort involved in demolishing, removing and rebuilding permanent bakeries.
1 T/29/32f r.6, 30 Apr11 1761.
2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.l29, 10 November 1761.
3 Certificate of P. Faber to A. Rh1, 29 June 1760, T/lf27 f. 1400, giv-
ing the cost of six new portable ovens as 3,552 dollars 16 groachen
6 pfennigs. The current rates of exchange at this time were dollars
to the ducat, 5 guilders 5 stivers to the ducat, Declared Account of
T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/l/15071 218, and 10 guild.ers 15 stivers
to the £, PNG/2/k f.156. Thus the cost of each oven was £72/5h.
L One was for the oven itself and the other for the implements, uten-
s us and tents of the bakers, Hunter to Martin, ii. March 1759, Add.
?'S. 32889 f.2.
22k.
The Hanoverian coinmissariat had used these field ovens in 1757 and 1758,
but it seems that the British authorities had. had no experience of this
valuable and. more flexible means of supply. 1 At the beginning of 1759
the Hanoverian Chancery of War proposed to lend the twenty-six ovens
which it had maintained to the British cominissariat, which was now dir-
ectly responsible for all bread supplies. 2 Despite the fact that the
only additional expenditure involved would have been the cost of pro-
viding and. maintaining the necessary wagons, Hunter refused to take more
than twenty ovens and would have preferred to have made do with only
sixteen, a fact which he reported to the Treasury with some emphasis on
the saving which he had achieved.3 Yet it seems unlikely that the Super-
intendent of the coininissariat was practising a false economy, for had
that been the case he would have experienced much more difficulty than
he did in sending a detachment of field ovens to help supply the army
in Hesse-Cassel two months 1ater. As in other spheres he seems to have
found that efficiency did not demand an acceptance of everything offer-
ed by the Hanoverian authorities. 5
 Nor was there any evidence of skimp-
ing on this service a year later, when despite the difficulties caused
by Hunter's resignation, extra field ovens were ordered to serve the in-
creased numbers of troops in the Army in accordance with Prince Ferdin-
-
1 Thid. This seems to be the implication of Hunter's statement that the
ovens were a new article of expense arising from the nature of the
war in Germany.
2 Thid.
3 mid.
Z. Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, T/l/396 f.28. The letter contains no
hint of any shortages in the numbers of field ovens.
5 Hunter also exercised selection in purchasing magazines from the Han..
overians and in employing the staff attached to them, Hunter to New-
castle, 7 March 1759, Add. ?S. 32888 f.393.
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and's wishes.1
A second aspect of the basis of bread supply concerned
the formulation of the Treasury's precise financial liabilities. In the
British army this involved somewhat fewer contortions than those assoc.-
iated with the supply of forage, for while some regimental officers and
officials were accorded supplementary allowances in the form of extra
portions of	 2 presumably translated into cash payments, there was
no equivalent of the annual grant of forage money to officers. 3
 Grat-
uities were also given to German officers and N.C.Os. under the heading
of 'vacant portions', a term which, as in the case of vacant rations
of forage, covered other payments, including those made for bread not
consumed by non-effective men and a reimbursement of the cost of pro-
visions, which for various reasons the troops had been obliged to pur-
chase for themselves. 6 The Treasury pursued identical policies towards
vacant rations and portions, showing in the long run commendable fair'
ness to German interests, but unable to effect any fundamental reform
in a system which had undoubted financial and administrative drawbacks
1 Ferdinand's Demands in Hatton's Correspondence, 1760, T/l/LO5 f.321.
The document refers to the numbers being increased to twenty-five, an
addition of eleven ovens, so suggesting that by this time some had
been either lost or destroyed. Three other ovens were ordered for the
service of the British reinforcements, Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760,
ibid. f.199.
2 Rations to the Officers of Dragoons, 6 October 1762, Hotham !'S. DDHO/
4/59.
3 See above p.1117.
4 Treasury to Hunter, 25 October 1762, T/1/4l7 f.108.
5 Ibid.
6 Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.148.
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for Great Britain.1
British troops were charged the fixed sum of 5d for
every loaf supplied, deducted from their pay before issue, 2 and there
is no evidence that the Treasury ever considered alleviating this heavy
financial burden on the private soldier, representing no less than 15%
of his wages. 3
 The question of a similar deduction from the pay of the
German troops was much less straightforward. No contribution was dem-
anded from the Hanoverians for the bread supplied by the Treasury after
2k December 1758,k but the case of the Hessians was different as they
were allowed higher basic rates of pay. 5 During the Austrian Succession
War the Hessian forces maintained by Britain had been stopped 14d per
man per day as a contribution towards the cost of the bread supplied,6
but at the opening of the Seven Years War no decision was made as to
whether this was to continue. In May 1759, after two years' supply had
already taken place, Hunter raised the problem with the Treasury and
receiving no reply wrote again in July, 7
 although it was not until the
1 For a detailed discussion of this issue see above pp.1148 - 151.
2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.91, U September 1761. The regimental au-
thorities had to account for these sums with the Treasury 's commiss-
ary, who could presumably use the money for partial payment of the
bread contractor. Standing Orders, 30 September 1758, Baker Baker !4SS.
Vol.VI, 66/189.
3 ld out of &1 per day, see above p.22, n.3.
Li. Until this date they supplied their own bread and received a supple-
ment to their pay as a contribution towards the cost, Hessian Bread,(1759), Add. 1'S. 32887 f .176.
5 T/29135 f.2L ,6, 26 December 1763.
6 Add. )S. 32887 f.l76.
7 Hunter to Martin, 13 May 1759, T/61f/96 f.122. Hunter to Treasury, 6
July 1759, T/1/395 f.251.
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end of the year after a second reminder that the Board recognized the
iaportance of the issue, only to state that for the moment it could not
to any resolution. 2 One possible reason for this procrastination
is that the matter would have been delicate to negotiate in the middle
of hostilities, when a vigorous defence of British financial interests
could well have upset the Hessian authorities and made them less dispos-
ed to commit any more troops to the struggle. 3 Nevertheless, after the
end of the war, when Britain 's bargaining position was strengthened by
the existence of substantial debts to Hesse-Cassel, the Treasury was
able to insist that a deduction for bread supplied be made as part of
the general settlement of accounts. Had this decision been reached
earlier, it might have proved possible to subject the Hessian troops to
the British system of deductions before pay was issued, 5
 so providing a
greater measure of financial liquidity, and thereby facilitating the
payment of accounts for the supply of bread and nour.6
1 Hunter to (Martin), 7 November 1759, ?/64/96 f.266.
2 Martin to Hunter, 7 December 1759, ibid. ff.269 - 270.
3 The negotiation of the Hessian subsidy treaty in 1755 might also have
been considered an inopportune moment to raise the issue as the Land-
grave had demanded higher rates of pay for his troops. C.W. Eldon,
England's Subsidy Policy Towards the Continent During the Seven Years
War. (1938) pp.30 - 31.
4 T/29/35 f.2Lf6, 26 December 1763.
5 Such a change would have necessitated the issue of Hessian pay by a
British official in Germany instead of it being paid to the Landgrave 's
agent in London, Hunter to Treasury, 6 July 1759, T/1/395 f.251.
6 The exact sum of money involved is uncertain, but It was almost cert-
ainly in excess of £100,000. 12,012 Hessian troops served from 1 Jan-
uary 1757 to 16 January 1759 - 7146 days; 19,004 from 17 January 1759 to
31 March 1760 - 1440 days; and 22,396 from 1 April 1760 to 31 December
1762 - 1,005 days, see above pp.30 - 32. This represents a total bread
requirement of 39,830,692 daily portions. Assuming that no more than
half of this was provided by official sources, the rest coming from
contributions, which it had been estimated could account for five mon- -
ths' supply each year, T/1/395 f.7, self-supply and rations not drawn
for non-effective men, the sum involved at the rate operated in the
Austrian Succession War would have been 19,915,346 x 14d - £l24,470/
18/3.
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The third aspect of the formulation of general policy
concerned the methods by which bread was supplied. On campaign and in
encampments the British army and the foreign troops in British pay were
usually supplied by means of a contract with a private merchant. 1
 But
in 1757 and 1758, despite the delegation of full. powers to make such
agreements, the British commissaries, Amherst and Boyd, arranged for the
bread of the Hessian and Prussian contingents for which they were res-
ponsible to be provided by the Hanoverian authorities as an extension
of the supply of their own troops, 2 But it seems that no prices were
fixed in advance, 3 and the fear that Britain would eventually be handed
a large and politically embarrassing bill for these supplies was presum-
ably the reason why, with the despatch of the first British troops to
Germany in July 1758, the Board decided to look or a contractor, first-
ly making private enquiries, and when these proved abortive placing ad-
vertisements in newspapers. The latter produced entical and reason-
able tenders from Richard Oswald and Abraham Pmdo, although the Trea-
sury informed Boyd that it felt that it might still be best to engage
the Hanoverian commissariat, and even allow a price marginally higher
than that offered by the two merchants, as long as certain provisos were
met. 5 This statement seems to suggest that, although the Board's lack of
1 See above pp.10 & 25 - 26.
2 J. Amherst to Baron Steinberg, 7 ?rch 1757, Tf1/375 No.27, f.59,
3 See below p.239.
L Draught Treasury Letter to R. Boyd, July 1758, T/l/385 No.76. Both men
offered to supply six-pound wheaten loaves at 81 each, although Os-
wald's terms for bread wagons were cheaper. T/29/33 f.80, 28 July 1758.
5 T/l/385 No.76. The provisos included access to the accounts for the
British commissary.
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expertise and experience usually obliged it to engage private merch-
ants for the business of army supply, there was none the less a feel-
ing that it would be more aptropriate to commit such responsibilities
to the care of public authorities. 1 In the event, however, the Hanover-
lane refused to undertake supplies, 2
 with the result that the Duke of
Marlborough was led to complain of the constant threat that his men
would go hungry. 3 Finally, after a delay of some three months, an ag-
reement was concluded with Oswald 
14. 
and a period of considerable un-
certainty and not a little confusion came to an end.
At the end of 1758 Britain became directly responsible
for the supply of bread to most of the German troops in the Combined
Army, and to fulfil this obligation Hunter made an agreement with an-
other British merchant, Lawrence Dundas. 5
 The latter negotiated the pur-
chase of stores and equipment from the Hanoverian authorities 6 and sup-
plied bread until October of the same year, when his contract, which
had been made for an initial period of six months, was abruptly terinin-
ated by Hunter, who now resolved to take matters into his own hands by
establishing a bakery owned and managed by the commissarl.at, a step of
1 Oswald 's lack of experience of army supply in Germany may also have
influenced the Theasury's preference for the Hanoverian authorities,
but had this been the only consideration Prado, who had had such ex-
perience, could have been employed. Add. ?S. 32878 f.192.
2 Boyd to Treasury, 9 September 1758, '1'/11386 No.57.
3 Duke of Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. !'S. 32883 1.
31.
k Newcastle to Marlborough, 20 September 1758, T127/27 f.384.
5 Hunter to (Martin), 31 January 1759, T/6k/96 1.13.
6 Thid.
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which the Treasury unreservedly approved) Dundas' stores and equipment
were purchased, 2
 and Philip Ernst Faber, who had. been jtxlged a suitable
person to take over bread deliveries in Hesse-Cassel when there was a
fear that Dundas' subcontractor, Uckerman, might decide not to continue,
was appointed the director of what came to be known as the great foreign
bakery. 3 Thus Britain was committed to a method of supply which was al-
len to her own traditions, but which, while throwing a heavy additional
burden of work and responsibility on her administrators, offered the
possibility of a much greater measure of control and considerable fin-
ancial savings. The ostensible reason for this significant change was
the breakdown in supplies from Dundas' bakery over a period of several
days, during which time the contractor had been obliged to furnish the
troops with money instead of provisions, a state of affairs which had.
aroused the wrath of Prince Ferdinand.1 Although Hunter believed that
the failure could be partly attributed to accidental factors, his sue-.
picion that some measure of dishonesty and possibly carelessness was
also involved 5 helped persuade him to take a firmer grip on matters,
and he was probably also influenced by Ferdinand 'S rooted dislike of
contractors. 6 It would be strange, however, if considerations of econ-
omy had. not weighed heavily with him as well, f or his meticulous att-
I Hunter to Martin, 13 September 1759, T/61./96 ff.225 - 226. J. West to
Hunter, 25 September 1759, ibid. f.222.
2 Sir Lawrence Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive
ZNIC X 1/1/6 f.1.
3 Hunter to (Oswald), I May 1759, T/l/396 f.28. Instructions for Hatton
(1759), Add. ?S. 32905 f.l148.
k Hunter to (Martin), 13 September 1759, T/6/96 f.225.
5 Ibid.
6 Ferdinand to Baron Mnchansen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.
III, p.338.
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ention to Britain's financial interests must have made him aware of the
positive advantages to be gained from a system of supply which elimin-
ated contractors • prof its. As for the Treasury, while its main stated
concern was to guard against similar breakdowns in the future, 1 in fully
supporting Hunter's scheme it endorsed the view that such an objective
was more likely to be achieved by means of a method of supply, in which
responsibility rested fairly and squarely on the shoulders of its own
employees. Unlike the system of public ownership and management, which
was established for some of the transport services in 1759 only to be
abandoned at the end. of 1760,2 the supply of bread to the German troore,
representing approximately three-quarters of the Army, 3 remained in the
hands of the coinmissariat until the end of the war. But at the same
time Oswald's contract for the bread of the British troops continued to
operate, and the existence of two entirely separate bakeries resulted
not only in duplication of effort but in administrative difficulties
and frictions as we11. This failure to rationalize all bread supplies
on the same footing probably derived from the fact that on the whole
Oswald performed his task competently, 5 and the understandable reluot-
1 West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, T/64/96 f.222.
2 See below pp.261i - 268.
3Seeabovepp.32-33.
4 There were complaints that the commissariat sometimes favoured one
bakery at the expense of the other, F. Halsey to Colonel La Cheval-
erie, 3 February 1761, Halsey 1"ZS. 15030, and on one occasion a dis-
pute over the destination of a load of firewood led to an exchange of
shots between the guards of the German and British bakeries, in which
a peasant driver was gravely wounded. Ferdinand to Marquis of Granby,
30 October 1762, Motham I. S. DDHO/4/249.
5 Although there had been some complaints about failures and inadequac-.
lee on his part, the Treasury was able to refer to him at the end of
the war as a useful and good contractor whom it would be sorry to
lose. Martin to Howard, 10 September 1762, T/l/417 f.1 146. Pressure
was put on Oswald on more than one occasion to continue with his con-
tract. Peirson to Martin, 18 October 1760, P/1/405 f.8(f. Howard to
Martin, 27 October 1762, T/l/417 f.202.
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ance to change horses in mid-stream unless it was absolutely necessary,1
The general policies adopted for the supply of bread
to the Combined Army by the Treasury and its commissaries were not ab-
ove criticism. On two issues 1 the deductions from Hessian pay and the
establishment of a regular means of provision for the British troops in
the summer of 1758, the Board showed a certain lack of urgency and an
inability to make up its mind quickly and decisively, tendencies which
compromised both its own interests and those of its soldiers. In addit-.
ion, the fact that a number of policy decisions were taken simply on
the basis of military opinion meant that while some important and bene-
ficial changes, such as the supply of wheaten bread to the British for-
cee and the use of portable ovens, were introduced, other proposed iii-.
provements for which a strong case could be made out, such as the pro-
vision of smaller loaves and a complete reform of the system of vacant
portions, were simply ignored or abandoned because of lack of enthus-
iasm or definite opposition on the part of the military authorities.
Yet despite these limitations, it is clear that British administrators
were not hidebound by tradition, and that their eyes were open to the
possibilities of improving supplies and providing a more effective de-
fence of British financial interests. Both these considerations are
evident in the establishment and maintenance of the great foreign bak-
ery, the major credit for which belongs to Hunter, and although at
first sight it might seem that he and more especially the Treasury
drifted almost unawares into this fundamental reform of traditional
1 Peirson to Martin, 18 October 1760 , T/l/L O5 f.84.
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methods for merely pragmatic reasons, there is some evidence to sugg-.
est a more definite commitment to the principle involved. Had Hunter's
successors shared his views with equal conviction, the British bakery
might also have been subjected to the same system of public ownership,
but although the change remained partial, a move had nevertheless been
made towards freeing an important part of army supply from its depend-
ence on private merchants.
From matters of general policy it is necessary to turn
to a consideration of the detailed arrangements which were made for
bread supplies. Effective provision of the troops depended firstly on
binding suppliers to carry out their obligations in the clearest and
most specific ways possible, and making proper provision for the super..
vision of their activities. It is not possible to say to what extent
these factors were operative in connection with the supply of the Hess-
ians and Prussians in 1757 and 1758, for a copy of the detailed. agree-
ment does not seem to have survived, but the fact that Amherst admitted
to the Treasury that he had believed it unnecessary to enter into any
formal contract with the King 's German ministers suggests that the
Hanoverian authorities were simply requested to supply Britain's mer.
cenarl.es in the same way as their own troops, and then left very much
to their own devices. 1 Nor was Oswald's agreement of September 1758 for
the supply of the British troops any more closely defined, for it was
not even committed to paper because of the uncertainty of its durat-
ion. 2 But in February 1759 after a trial period of six months a formal
1 T/29/33 f.21, 1 March 1758 . The Treasury Minute only refers to forage
contracts, but it may be assumed that the arrangements for the supply
of bread were based on the same principles.
2 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T/61 /96 f.23,
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contract was drawn u p , 1 containing a number of clauses designed to en-
sure that Oswald fulfilled his obligations. These included requirements
that he form proper detots of grain and flour so that his bakery would
be kept regularly supplied, that all, his provisions be open to inspect-
ion by the commissariat, which had full powers to reject those of in-
ferior quality, and that all bread be delivered to the quartermasters
of regiments, who were to issue official certificates for the exact
quantities received. 2 It is likely that. the contract of March 1759
between Hunter and Dundas for the supply of bread to the German troops
was formulated on a similar basis, 4 arid its limitation to an initial
period of six mon+.hs turned out to be a wise provision, for it enabled
Hunter to change to supply from the comntissariat 's bakery in October
without any difficulty.
In the course of the war a number of other more lii,t-
ited agreements for the supply of bread were made with merchants and
local authorities and officials. It is probable that some if not many
of these were largely informal, which was not in itself inappropriate
if they were for relatively small quantities. Much more substantial,
however, were the contracts made for the supply of grain, flour and
firewood for the great foreign bakery in the tast three years of the
war. Taken as a whole they show little evidence of drafting inadequ-
1 Draft Contract between the '!'reasury and Oswald, 1k February 1759,
T/l/395 ff
.387 - 394.
2 Ibid. ff.388 - 389.
3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.l - 2.
4 No copy of the contract has been found.
5 T/29/33 ff.143 - 142+, 14 February 1759. Hunter to (Martin). 13 Sept-
ember 1759, T/64/96 f.226.
235,
acies; weights and measures were carefully defined, 1
 proper insistence
was made on delivery of provisions in strong sacks, 2
 definite time lim-
its were fixed and penalty clauses carefully inserted. After the es-
tablishment of the department of control early in 1762 it was possible
to incorporate other important conditions, such as the obligation to
give notice to the commissariat of the location of depots before beg-
inning delivery so that an inspection could take place, 5 while a stan-
dardization of penalty clauses stipulated complete confiscation if the
contractor engaged in fraudulent practices. 6 On occasions some of these
strict conditions were dispensed with because of the pressing needs of
the Army, 7 but this was not a common occurrence and a good case could
usually be made out for such exceptions. In general the care and pre-
cision which went into the drafting of these contracts were such as
must have promoted the effectiveness of supply.
Another issue of some significance is whether arrange-
1 Contract between Cockburn and C. Behrend, 114 May 1762, T/1/1420 f.
268. Contract between Cockburn and Councillor Suden of Waldeck, 28
June 1762, T/1/1+17 f.362.
2 Contract between Hatton and J. Paken, 22 September 1760, T/l/405 f.
1440.
3 Contracts between Hatton and C. Lehman, 7 August 1760, and Hatton and
Councillor Rose, 3 September 1760, ¶11/405 ff.433 & 1448 - 1449,
14 The contract between Hatton and Rose included a fine of 10 écus for
every missing quintal of flour, ¶/1/1405 f.1448 - 449.
5 Contract between Cockburn and I. Levi, 2 November 1762, ¶11/418 f.91.
6 Contracts of Cockburn, October - November 1762, ¶11/ 11.17 ff.2112 - 261.
7 A contract between Cockburn and A. Marcus and S. Arolsen, 8 November
1762, ibid. f.246, permitted the contractors to dispense with the
notification of the location of their depots to the department of con-
trol before beginning deliveries in view of the urgent need of the
service.
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ments for the supply of bread, grain and flour were made promptly and
at sufficient levels to keep the troops adequately fed. As already not-
ed, hesitancy and confusion over matters of general policy in 1758
created serious problems for the British troops and there was apparent-
ly another delay at the beginning of 1759, when it was not until nearly
three months after Britain had assumed direct responsibility for the
needs of the Combined Army that Dundas' contract was signed. 1 On this
occasion the trouble was caused by a lack of instructions from London
on the proposals offered, and this in turn was the result of an inter-
ruption in communications caused by exceptionally bad weather. 2 Never-
theless, Dundas had not been allowed to remain inactive, for Hunter had
had the foresight to make a provisional agreement with him, which per-
mitted the purchase of the Hanoverian stores of grain and meal and put
him in a position to begin deliveries before the contract was actually
signed. 3 Moreover, this was the time of year when the troops were in
winter quarters where most of their bread was supplied by local people,
so that the full services of the contractor were not immediately re-
quired. Nor does there seem to have been any significant disruption
later in the year when the commissariat 's own bakery took over from
Dundas, for after only a short interval Hunter was able to claim with
no reservations that matters were completely in his hands and working
very we11,I an achievement which must have owed something to timely
1 The responsibility was assumed on 25 December 1758 and the contract
signed on 16 March 1759. Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNX X 1/1/6 ff.1 - 2.
2 Hunter to Martin, + March 1759, T/6'F/96 f.50.
3 There were complaints of delays in purchasing these stores, Memorial
of ?'inchausen to Newcastle, 13 February 1759, ibid. ff.15 - 16, al-
though this must have been largely due to the need to carry out a
lengthy inspection.
k Hunter to West, 9 October 1759, ibid. f237.
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arrangements and effective co-ordination of the change-over on his own
part and on that of Faber, the new director.
-	 There were two major occasions in the later years of
the war when complaints were made about the inadequacy of bread suvi-
lies, but it would be wrong to attribute these failures simply to a lack
of vigilance or activity on the part of the contmissariat in making the
necessary arrangements for the purchase and transport of grain and flour
in good time. Early in 1761 there were reports of severe shortages of
provisions, 1 but in giving the Treasury a detailed analysis of the
Sons Hatton made no mention of any lack of ingredients in the bakeries,
and stressed that the root of the matter was the disruption of bread
deliveries as a result of exceptionally bad weather conditions. 2 His
view was reinforced when shortly afterwards Peirson informed the Board
that:- "Our Motions of late have been so sxIden & frequent that some of
the English Regiments have wanted bread for a few days, not from any
Want of meal or bread in the bakery, but from the Wagons not knowing
where, or how, to come up With their Regts" In September Prince Ferd-
inand was able to pay the commissariat the compliment that despite a
campaign in a country which resembled a desert the Army had not wanted
bread but a year later he found himself obliged to make further com-
plaints, and on this occasion there was a specific allegation of in-
sufficient attention being paid to the formation of large depots in the
1 Newcastle to Peirson, 13 January 1761, Add. !S. 32917 f.275.
.2 1/29/31+ f.56, 30 April 1761.
3 Peirson to Martin, July 1761, T/l/klO f.76.
1+ Ferdinand to Newcastle, 17 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.201.
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vicinity of the Army and a consequent lack of flour in the bakeries?
Statistical verification is provided by figures produced by Pownall,
which show that nearly 80% of the rye flour and over 60% of the wheat
flour, ordered by the Commander-in-Chief for the campaign of 1762, re-
iaained undelivered at the end of the year. 2
 Again, the reason for this
abysmal performance does not seem to lie in any failure of the commiss-
ariat to make agreements for adequate quantities of provisions, but
rather in the way in which deliveries were being subjected to serious
delays. On lL May 1762 Cockburn had made a substantial contract with
Cosman Behrend for more than half the rye meal ordered by Ferdinand, the
delivery to be completed within three months, 3 and yet five months later
it was reported that less than one-fifth of the provisions were to hand.1
The contractor's excuse was that he possessed the necessary amount of
grain but could find no mills free to grind it, 5
 while the usual diff-
iculties with carriage had obviously made matters no easier. 6 And yet
the commissariat cannot be completely exonerated, for while it must have
been clear at a very early stage that Behrend was not going to fulfil
his contractual obligations, no steps were taken to offer him assistance
1 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse PS. DIHV/B19/7.
2 Of 96,000 quintals of rye flour ordered, 7S,L6O quintals remained to
be delivered, while the corresponding figures for wheat flour were
211,000 quintals and 111,9116 quintals. General Report of ?agazines, 15
December 1762, T/l/kl8 f.63.
3 T/1/420 f.268.
11. Howard to (D. Weir), 10 October 1762, Howard Vyse !'S. DfHVIB,15f22.
5 T/1/11.20 f.268. The commissariat found the explanation sufficiently
plausible to allow an extension of the time limit.
6 Cockburn to C. Hotham, 11 September 1762 , Hothan ?S. DDHO/1l./13. The
commissary reported that it was necessary to transport meal an incred-
ible distance, and that it was only with the utmost difficulty that
the bakery could be kept supplied.
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or to make alternative arrangements. Only after Ferdinand's irate corn-
plaints, and indeed ultimatum, 1 did Howard entreat Daniel Weir at Brernen
to do all he could to expedite the delivery, and to make urgent enquiri-
ies as to whether other sources of supply could not be found.2
Finally, it mist be asked to what extent British fin-
ancial interests were upheld by the detailed arrangements made for bread
supplies. There can be little doubt that the cost of bread provided by
the Hanoverian authorities at the beginning of the war was unjustifiably
expensive, for the accounts for 1758 show that it amounted to nearly 10
groachen for a six-pound loaf, 3 whereas early in the same year Prado had
offered to supply rye bread at only 72 groschen per six-pound loaf.
Thus the argument of Amherst and Boyd that this method effected signif-
icant economies by avoiding duplication of effort is contradicted by
the figures. The contract made with Oswald in September 1758 by which
a six-pound wheaten loaf was to cost 8d represented a much better bar..
gain, for it was only a penny more than the price paid in the Low Coun-
1 Ferdinand to Howard, 15 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/3.
2 Howard to (Weir), 10 October 1762, ibid. D/HV/B/5/22.
3 JournaL, of the House of Commons, 9 February 1761, Vol.XXVIIT, p.1,066.
The total demand for bread supplied to 12,012 Hessians and 2,678 Pru-
ssians, see above pp.31, n.6, was 4811,996 dollars 10 groschen 5 pfenn-.
igs. The daily cost per man was thus 3.26 groechen, or 9.78 groachen
per six-pound loaf. As these figures are based on the troops being num-
erically complete and makes no allowance for provisions which from time
to time the men had to purchase for themselves, the real cost must have
been higher.
4 Add. S. 32878 f.191. Prado's proposals were 5 groechen for a four-
pound loaf, although these terms were offered for a large army and
might not have been so favourable for the small contingent of Hessians
and Prussians.
5 See above p.161.
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tries during the Austrian Succession Var and supply in Germany was
generally recognized to be a much more difficult and expensive affair.2
Certainly the price was much lower than that charged by the Prussian
commissariat for the temporary supply of the British contingent on
their landing at Eien, which had been more than lid per loaf, while
the salixtary effects of competition were apparent in the fact that
Prado, who had proposed to deliver at 8d per six-pound los! in April
1758 , had. now reduced his price in response to the Treasury's advert-
isements. 5 There is some suggestion, however, that in January 1759 the
Board might have been able to obtain an even more favourable price when
Dundas offered to undertake the service at 7d per six-pound loaf,6
this figure was probably unrealistic, for the contractor withdrew it
after his arrival in Germany, when no doubt he was more reliably in-.
formed on current market prices.7
When Oswald 'S contract was formalized in February 1759
1 ?. Hume 'a Report on Two Contracts of Mr. Prado ...., 2:3 October 1758,
T/l/38L No.63, ff.5 - 6.
2 Hume 'a Observations on the Draught of a Contract between the Treasury
and Oswald, 13 January 1759, T/l/395 f.201.
3 Hatton to Martin, 18 July 1758, T/1/38'l. No.4LI. A six-pound loaf cost
10 stivers, and with the £ worth 10 guilders 1]. stivers at this time,
PNG/2/2 f.l98, this represented 11.37d.
Lf Prado 'a Proposals .,,., 3 April 1758, T/l/385 No.109.
5 T/29/33 f.69, 13 July 1758. See above p.228, n.1+.
6 Proposal of Dundas for Furnishing the Hessian and British Troops, 9
January 1759, T/11395 f.421.
7 T/29/33 f.1f2, lLf February 1759. Dundas had not arrived in Germany at
the time of his original proposal for his letter of 9 January is head-
ed 'London', T/l/395 f, !+32 , but by 31 January he was writing from Mth-
ster, ibid. f.l91.
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he was granted a number of concessions on the basis of a report by Ab-
rahaiu Hume, the Commissary General in England, 1 of which the most im-.
portant was the right to have wagons assigned to him for the transport
of his grain and flour, or to have the cost of such carriage reimbur-
sed.2 Oswald considered this essential in view of the abnormally high
transport costs which he had found to be involved in supplying bread in
Germany, 3
 and the Treasury's motive in accepting the liability was no
doubt to forestall any attempt by him to abandon his agreement in the
middle of a campaign to the great detriment of the service • In this aim
the Board clearly failed, for by 1760 Oswald was making severe compi..
aints that the price of wheat had risen so much that he was losing mon-
ey,4 and in 1761 and 1762 he announced his intention to withdraw from
the agreement, although he was ultimately persuaded to continue until
the end of the war, 5
 a fact which suggests that the financial terms of
the contract were far from completely unfavourable to him. It is imposs-
ible to calculate the increase in the cost of a loaf represented by the
obligation to pay transport costs, but it cannot have been insignifi-
cant, although it did enable the price of an 8d loaf to be maintained
for over four years, thus effectively protecting the public against in-
1 T/l/395 ff200 - 199 (sic).
2 Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February 1759,
ibid. f.392.
3 Ibid. f.20l.
4 Peirson to 1artin, 18 October 1760, T/l/405 f.8L1.
5 Granby to Peirson, 10 September 1761, Rutland ?S. Granby Letter
Book II. Oswald to Howard, 15 July 1762, T/1/4l7 f.505. Howard to
!rtin, 27 October 1762, ibid. f.202. Oswald also complained of a
failure to settle accounts promptly.
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flat ionary movements in grain prices.
The terms of Dundas' contract of March 1759 for the
supply- of rye bread to the German troops also seem to have represented
a considerable saving compared to the previous method of supply, for a
six-pound loaf was to cost 5d, or 5 groschen. 1 Once again, however,
the contractor was granted other allowances, incluiing the reimburse-
ment of transport costs, and these may well have raised the price of
his bread to 7 groschen per loaf, 2 to which has to be added the cost of
maintaining the foreign bakery train, which was the subject of a separ-
ate account. The various other smaller agreements for the supply of
bread to the parties, corps and detachments of the Combined Army tended
not surprisingly to show fluctuations in price. Uckerman made deliveries
to the troops in Hesse-Cassel in 1759 at 5 groschen per loaf, 5 in 1760
to various regiments at 6 . groschen, 1 while his supply of the troops
stationed at Brackel in 1762, for which no price was fixed in advance
and a commission of 3% was allowed, brought the price of a loaf to
1 TJ1/395 f.42].. Early in 1759 20,000 ducats cost £9,886/3/O, Hunter to
(Martin), 25 February 1759, T/6L1'/96 f.k0, while at approximately the
same time the ducat was worth 3 dollars, Declared. Account of T. Bi.sh-
op, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/2l8. Thus ici - 0.9]. groschen.
2 Dundas' accounts show that he charged £99,589/l/6 for bread and bis-
cuit supplied, and £140,399/12/lO for transport losses to the enemy,
wastage and building of ovens, Zet land (Dundas 5 Archive ZNX X 1/1/6
if.]. - 3. The additional charges represent 40.57% of the cost of the
actual provisions, and had all the items been accepted on the liquid-
ation of accounts, the cost of a six-pound loaf would have risen to
7.03 groechen, viz. 140.57% of 5 groschen.
3 Instructions for Hatton ...., ( 1759), Add. !'S. 32905 f.148.
4 Contract between Hatton and J.J. Uckerman, 17 October 1760, T/1/LKD5
f.
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9- or 10+ groschen. 1' These last very high prices derived partly from
the fact that, as the Weser was frozen, meal had to be transported overl
land from Bremen to Brackel, an expense which the Commissioners for Ex-
ainining German Demands felt was justified in view of the great diffic-
ulties in supplying the Army at that time. 2
 On the other hand, an agree-
ment made with Behrend in 1762 by Thomas Bishop, the commissariat 's dir-
ector of foreign hospitals, to supply bread at the equivalent of 12
groschen per six-pound loaf could only be regarded as exorbitant, and
in this case the suspicion of dereliction of duty on the part of the
commissary cannot be ruled out. Corresponding price movements may be
traced in the arrangements for bread supplies which were made with local
officials, and thus in 1758 a six-pound loaf from such sources might
cost no more than + groschen, although by 176]. it had risen to at
least 6 groschen, 5 while in 1762 payments of between 7+ and 9 groechen
were authorized. 6 These progressively rising rices are lar gely a re-
flection of the general inflationary tendency of the war period, al-
1 Second Part of the Demands of Major Uckerman for Deliveries in 1762,
T/1/432 No.7k, f.297/l77. The document states that 3+ groechen per
portion of 2 lbs. was the average price charged by Uckerman, but cal-
culations of the cost of 1,840 portions show that the price may have
been 3+ groschen. As these prices were charged in gold. with 2 dollars
to the ducat, AO/l/l507/218, they were even more advantageous to the
contractor.
2 Pownail, C .W • Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 20 June 1764, T/1/432
No.73, f.299/174.
3 See below p.315, n.J.
4 Hotham to Colonel Scott, 3 November 1758, Hotham IS. DDHO/k/8.
5 State of the Demands of the Prussian Countries in PownaU, CornwaU &
Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 17 65, T/52/56 f.k22. Contract be-
tween Cockbum and Bailiff Isenbart, 16 January 1761, Halsey !S.
15064(A).
6 Howard to Cockburn, 16 November 1762, T/l/ 1+20 f.8. Contract between
Cockburn and Aintsrath Borries, 18 November 1762, T/1/417 f.24.
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though it should not be forgotten that the increase in the real cost of
bread was lees than might appear as the silver doUar steadily deprec-
lated in value against the ducat.1
The wide variations in transport costs, which were re-
flected in the prices allowed by the cominissariat for the supply of rye
flour to its own bakery, make it hard to judge whether this part of the
service was undertaken with the maximum economy. Commissaries sometimes
agreed prices which exceeded those currently being charged in a partic-
ular area, although if it was their conviction that the Army was in
imminent danger of wanting bread and no alternative sources of supply
could be found, it is difficult to see what else they could have done.2
One such agreement between deputy commissary Smith and Mr. Miltz of 12
November 1762 f or rye meal. at 5 dollars per quintal was condemned as
exorbitant, although the price was not unparalleled at that time. 14
 It
is conceivable that such examples represent an attempt to profiteer at
Britain's expense at a time when the comnmissariat was smarting under
Prince Ferdinand '8 criticisms, and desperately trying to increase the
quantities of meal in hand. But such practices were not typical of the
]. The apparent increase in the cost of a portion of bread from 2 gros-
chen to 2+ groschen in the two examples quoted above, p.243, n.5, is
12-%, but as in the former case the ducat was to be valued at 3 dol-.
laze and in the latter at 3.. dollars, the real increase is only 7.l14.
2 Frederick Halsey nade it clear that it was only fear of a shortage
which led him to pay what he considered to be an exceptional price.
F. Halsey to Mr. de K'dnig, 10 May 1761, Halsey !S. 15031.
3 Pownail, Cornwall & Cuthbert to J.enkinson, 24 October 17614, T/l/431
No.21, f.60/404. Smith was also accused of dishonesty, see above pp.
13.5 - 136.
14 W. Fraser to Cockburn, 28 December 1762, T/1/1420 f.2614.
245.
period as a whole arid calculations, admittedly hypothetical, show that
between May 1760 arid October 1762 bread from the cornniissariat 's bakery
was produced at a cost within the range 4.7 - 7.Ls8 groschen per six-
pound. loaf, not incitiling the cost of maintaining the bakery train.1
This compares very favourably with the cost of Dundas' agreement of 1759,
and suggests that savings had been achieved by the establishment of a
system of public ownership, which eliminated contractors' profits on
the actual production of bread.
The record of the Treasury and its commissaries in
making the detailed arrangements for the supply of bread to the Combin-
ed Army was by no means an unsuccessful one, although it was not with-
out blemishes, which occurred particularly at the beginning and at the
end of the war. In 1757 and 1758 British interests were clearly not up-
held by the plenary delegation of responsibilities to the Hanoverian
authorities, with no adequate controls and safeguards arid at indefinite
prices. In the second half of 1762 a certain degree of inaction in the
face of difficulties in fulfilling contractual obligations helped cre-
ate serious shortages of meal, which must have caused considerable
hardship among the troops, and which may have forced the commissariat
into panic measures as a result of which its bargaining position on
prices was weakened. But these failures should not be allowed to obs-
cure the fact that on the whole adequate steps to supply the troops had
been taken in good time, that careful attention had been given to bind-
ing suppliers to clearly defined obligations and that prices, while
1 See Appendix VI.
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showing a natural tendency to rise as the war dragged on, had for the
niost part been confined within reasonable limits.
It remains, finally, to discuss the effectiveness of
the control exercised over the execution of the arrangements described
above and of the accounting procedures which were adopted. By whatever
means bread was provided its delivery, either directly to the troops
or into magazines, required careful checks of quantity and quality, a
responsibility which fell initially to regimental officers and maga-
zine keepers, although some additional measure of supervision by senior
commissariat personnel was also essential to ensure that these funct-
ions were carried out diligently and honestly. When bread was supplied
from the commissariat 'S own bakery much more control was needed, in-.
volving not only the delivery of the finished product but every stage
in its production from the provision of grain and its grinding into
flour to the actual process of baking, lengthy and often complex oper
atlons which provided ample opportunities for lax administration and
fraud. The fact that for most of the war period the establishment of
any effective system of supervision was rendered nugatory by the fail-
ure to appoint adequate numbers of commissaries of control and magazine
inspectors, or having appointed them to hold them to their proper fun-
ctions, has already been noted,1 so that it was only with the setting
up of the department of control by Pownall in 1762 that the provision
of bread, along with all other aspects of non-military supply, came
under detailed scrutiny. The first part of Pownafl 's work involved a
1 See above pp.63 - 66.
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clear and detailed definition of the duties of magazine keepers in conn-
ection with the receipt, storage and issue of bread, train and flour al-
ong lines similar to those described above in relation to forage admin-
istration. 1 A more particular problem involved the process of sending
grain from magazines to local mills to be ground, in the course of which
there was much waste and peculation. Pownall therefore stipulated that
all grain was to be weighed before leaving the magazine and. the miller
made to sign for the quantity received, 2 while he also established the
principle that no more than 2 lbs • per quintal of 110 lbs • was to be
allowed as wastage in the course of grinding.3
Providing magazine keepers with the detailed factual
and statistical information on deliveries and issues, so necessary to
efficient administration, was another part of Pownafl's work, 4 and in
this connection an important reform, suggested by him and fiiially put
into operation in June 1762, was of considerable value in regulating
the issue of bread. The only certain way to prevent military officers
and train officials drawing more bread for their troops and their driv-
ers than they were entitled to was to hold full and frequent musters,
and to furnish not only magazine keepers but bakery officials and bread
contractors as well with the numbers to be supplied. It is not surpris-
1. See above pp.193 - 194.
2 Report on'Depots de Consommation'(Minden), 22 August 1762, T/l/417
f.l7.
3 Standing Instructions to Magazine Reepers, (1761), T/l/413 f.368.
4 The plan that magazine keepers should have detailed copies of afl con-
tracts under which deliveries were being made applied to grain and
flour as much as to forage, although it is not certain that it was
effectively realized in practice. See above pp.193 & 196.
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ing that such a methodical system was never introduced, if only be-
cause it is hardly possible to muster an army on campaign every month,
and thus in 1759 Hunter had been obliged to depend partly at least on
statements given 'on Parole of Honour' by military commanders. 1
 In 1762,
however, it was made obligatory for regimental commanders to send in
returns of effective numbers at the beginning of each month, while the
fact that these statistics were to be collated by the commander-in-thief
of each nation in the Combined Army and then by the Adjutant-General,
before being forwarded to the commissariat, provided in theory at least
a series of checks on accuracy. 2
 At the same time the first comprehen-
sive mustering of the trains produced more accurate information on the
numbers to be supplied in these services.
The third benefit conferred by Pownall 's work was the
appointment of sufficient numbers of officials to enable a proper super.
vision of affairs to be undertaken. His establishment of a system of
district inspectors and control agents for each magazine 
Lj. 
provided a
constant check on the activities of employees, not only bringing to
light examples of undesirable practices, 5
 but no doubt helping to pre-
1 Hunter to Oswald, 14 February 1759, P11/395 f.:357.
2 Ferdinand to Various Commanding Officers, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 f.55.
In practice it may be doubted whether the national commanders and the
Adjutant-General could do more than sign the returns and pass them on.
3 States of the tab1ishaent of the Trains .... 24 I'ay 1762, P11/420
ff.l25 - 126.
4 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. 1S. 38335 ff.106 - 107. Pow-
nail to West, 18 November 1761, P11/413 ff.360 - 361.
5 These included many examples of inadequate care in storage and various
kinds of confusion and fraud in connection with weights and measures.
The details appear in Pownall 's general reports on magazines and 'de-
pots de consommation' in T/1/417.
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vent or at least nip in the bud many others to the general benefit of
bread supplies. Equally important was the fact that for the first time
in its existence the commissariat 's bakery was subjected to direct sup..
ervision. The only definite request for a commissary to be assigned to
the inspection of this service before this time seems to have emanated
from Prince Ferdinand in 1761,1 and although this led to a sentence in
Peirson 'a commiss ion of June of that year empowering him to appoint
such an official, no action was taken. 2 Early in 1762 Pownall appointed
deputy commissary Meyer to supervise the workings of the bakery, allow-
ing him the assistance of an inspector and a clerk in the execution of
his multitudinous responsibilities. 3
 The minor officials were mostly
concerned with the keeping of precise accounts, which would make it
possible to check that the quantities of bread baked corresponded to
the quantities of grain and flour received, although Meyer was also
supposed to exercise a general surveillance over all aspects of the
bakery's daily affairs and the conduct of its employees, Pownall part-
icularly directing his attention to such matters as the unjustified
disposal or sale of commissariat property in the form of stores, equip-
inent and utensils.
It may be assumed that the physical presence of the
deputy commissary and his assistants at the bakery had the same bene-
l Plan of the Commissariat as Mr. Hatton Thinks .... the Duke Wants to
have it, (1761), Add. IS. 3833k f.63.
2 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse PS.
D/HV/B/k/k.
3 Instructions to J.F. Meyer ...., T/l/420 ff.l18 - 119.
4 Ibid. f.118.
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ficia]. effects as that of control officers in the magazines , although
such a statement inevitably poses the question of how far Faber had con-
ducted his affairs with efficiency and honesty over a period of two and
a half years, during which he had been left very much to his own de-.
vices • In the absence of any surviving correspondence from the director,
the only way to approach this problem is through the bekery 's accounts.
In 1762 these had not been stated and examined since the institution of
the service in 1759 and Pownall, who demanded them on a number of occ-
asions to no avail, 2 formed the impression that Faber had been deliber-
ately unco-operative, with the implication that he had skeletons in his
cupboard which he wished to hide, 3 Right at the end of the war the dir-
ector 'presumed to Offer Waggon Loads of Paper in a form that can never
be receiy 'd. as an Account' and these voluminous records were there-
fore laid before the Commissioners for Examining German Demands in 1763.
The latter approached the task with their usual zeal and determination,
proceeding firstly to make out a charge against Faber for the total
quantities of flour, sacks, firewood and bread received by him. 5 To
their surprise they found that he had in fact accounted for more than
could be actually charged to him, a somewhat unusual situation apparent-
1 As the bakery was always scattered in several places such effects may
not have been universally apparent.
2 Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts •... Appear to
be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 f.35l.
3 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. S. 38335 f.109.
4 T/1/427 f.351.
5 Powna].l & Cizthbert to Jenkinson, 16 March 1765, T/52/56 f.45].. The
charge for bread represented provisions received from private bakeries
or returned from magazines.
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ly arising from the fact that his careful and assiduous administration
had enabled him to make savings, which he had honestly carried to the
credit of the commissariat instead of putting them in his own pocket •
Secondly, the Commissioners were very impressed with the fact that, al-
though Faber could produce no vouchers for his account of losses to the
enemy and destruction or waste of provisions and stores as a result of
the weather and other accidents, the quantities involved represented
such a small or evn minute proportion of the totals which had passed
through his hands as to be quite unexceptionable. 2 The nature of the
service was such as to make some loss and waste inevitable, and it was
clear that these had been kept to a minimum. Thirdly, the Commission-
ers drew attention to the small number of errors and overcharges in
the cash accounts, 3 which presumably compared very favourably with the
grosser mistakes and attempted extortions in the accounts of some con-
tractors.
Thus the general conclusion was that, despite the lack
of supervision, Faber's administration of the bakery had left little to
be desired, and there s no reason to suspect that his accounts were
i mid. ff.k51 - k52. The quantities involved were not insignificant,
and included 3,072 quintals 35 lbs. of flour, 879 sacks and 130,031
portions of bread.
2 Thid. f.k51. On the meal account 10,97k quintals 76 lbs. were stated
as losses to the enemy and 998 quintals 102 lbs. as spoiled provis-
ions. Issues accounted for a total of 554,802 quintals 13 lbs. of
meal, so that losses and waste represented 2.16%. Similar calculations
for losses of bread yield an infinitesimal figure of 0.68%; 81,452
portions lost and l80, L #6 spoiled out of a total of 38,331,231 port.
ions produced or purchased. The percentage for sacks is higher at
10.48; 23,652 lost and 5,45 spoiled out of 277,682 received. Ibid.
f .454.
3 Ibid. f.453.
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examined with any less thoroughness and perspicacity than the Commise-.
ioners demonstrated in dealing with other aspects of the supply of the
Army. Their conclusions might be more open to challenge on the grounds
that the accuracy of every detail in the accounts had not been posit-
ively proved, were it not for the fact that Pownall, who in 1762 had
been highly suspicious of Faber's administration, three years later put
his signature to a report which was highly complimentary to him. Never-
theless, the Treasury and its commissaries had run an unnecessary risk
in leaving the bakery unsupervised for so long, and they were fortunate
to have chosen as director someone of Faber's efficiency and integrity.
But the story has something of a tragic ending. In 1762 Pownall 's sus-
picions led him to order that no further sums of money were to be ad-
vanced to Faber for the running expenses of the bakery until he had
presented and liquidated all his past accounts, something he was unable
to do before the general settlement of all commissariat affairs after
the end of the war. 1
 As a resu3.t he was forced to borrow a large sum of
money on his own credit to keep the service going, and actually died
while under arrest for debt. 2 Thus the rehabilitation of the reputation
of an administrator, who had. served both Britain and the Army well,
could unfortunately only take place posthumously.
A more detailed examination of the accounting tech-
niques and practices adopted for various aspects of bread supply during
the war reveals some further weaknesses and inadequacies. A complete
1 Thid. Letter of Pownall, 2L June 1763, Add. S. 38335 f.l09.
2 See above P.132.
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record of the quantities actually received by the troops should have
been provided by the account books, which every regiment was supposed
to maintain, although the pressures of strictly military affairs seem
to have meant that these were not always kept fully and. accurately.1
Train directors were also presumably expected to have a record of the
bread supplied to the drivers and other personnel under their command,
but neither Dundas nor Oswald, the two train contractors, were able to
provide such information at the end of the war. 2 Yet even if these acc-
ounts had existed, it would still have been necessary to check and ver-
ify them against other evidence such as the records of bread issues
from the various bakeries and magazines • There can be little doubt that
something along these lines was kept before 1762, if only because con-
tractors and deliverers had to present it as the basis for the settle-
ment of the sums due to them, while Faber and the magazine keepers
needed it as the discharge for the property committed to their care.3
But to what extent such accounts always incli1ed an analysis of the
particular deliveries and issues to the individual corps, regiments
and services, so making it possible to check whether excessive quantit-
ies had been received, remains uncertain. It may well be that little
constant effort was made to keep such a detailed record, because other
evidence of the destination of deliveries existed in the form of the
original receipts , given by military officers and other officials for
1 On at least one occasion Prince Ferdinand had to remind regiments of
their obligation in this respect, Standing Orders, Article 138, Hotham
S. DDHO/4/289 f.4&
2 The contractors were supposed to pay for the bread their employees had
received from official sources, Memorial of Dundas and Oswald, 26 Nov-
ember 176k, T/1/k3k No.3k, f.2l6. The possibility remains that the
contractors kept such accounts but preferred to negotiate a composit-
ion, which might be more favourable to them.
3 The Commissioners for Examining German Demands would presumably have
been less complimentary to Faber had he failed to keep such accounts.
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the quantities of bread taken by them. These documents, normally stating
the date, the place, the regiment or service concerned and the amount
received, thus formed the vouchers in justification of the accounts. But
to have become the basis of an analytical record of bread deliveries,
they would have had to have been constantly collected in by the cominiss-
ariat and 'posted' to the four hundred and fifty separate accounts of re-
giments and other services entitled to draw bread.1
 This was simply not
undertaken before 1762,2 and vast quantities of receipts remained in the
hands of Faber and the magazine keepers, whose accounts had not been ex-
amined and settled when the war caine to an end. After this it would
still have been theoretically possible, although a labour of Herculean
proportions, to have collected them in for posting, but in practice this
could no longer be done with any accuracy, for many particular receipts
had disappeared, having been exchanged for general ones.
This failure to keep fully detailed records of the quan-
titles of bread received had a number of unfortunate consequences. In
general terms it made it impossible to verify whether the Army had in
fact consumed more than it was entitled to, and whether therefore British
money had been wasted. In addition, it meant that a number of particular
accounts, such as those of the regiments for vacant portions and those
for bread supplied to the employees of the trains of Dundas and Oswald,
had to be settled on the basis of compositions, of whose accuracy and
1 General Report from the Office of Accounts ...., 31 December 1762,
T/l/i 2O f.213.
2 Pownail, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 19 June l76 L$, T/l/Ll.32 No.29,
f .211/ 65.
3 IbId.
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fairness there could be no certainty. 1
 Moreover, the slackness of the
whole system provided those who were so inclined with abundant opport-
unities for fraul and dishonesty, in which connection some of the act-
ivities of Uckerntan again gave rise to suspicion. For a number of his
bread deliveries he had exchanged the original receipts of the troops
for general receipts issued by Faber and, by one, flarkhard, a Prussian
in the service of the coinmissariat, and on the basis of these vouchers
had been granted certificates by Thomas Halsey, the commissary of acc-
ounts • The Commissioners of Enquiry, appointed to investigate allegat-
ions of frai. in Germany, found these circumstances highly irregular
and suspicious, arguing 'inter alia' that those who had granted the re-
ceipts had had no authority to do so, that Faber had thereby been given
the opportunity to use Uckerman 's original receipts as vouchers for his
own deliveries of bread, and that as the same original receipts had
never been produced. or given up, there was a strong probability that
they did not represent actual deliveries but had been bought from the
troops for yacant portions which they claimed were due to them. 2 !a1-
sey's somewhat indignant reply to these accusations was to point out
that !'Iarkhard had acted in conformity with Hatton 'S orders in issuing
general receipts to Tjckerman, 3 and that Faber was a proper person to
1 Powirnil to H.S. Conway, 1 January 1763, Hotham !SS. DDHO/4/15. T/l/'
427 ff.352 & 361 - 362. The settlement of the accounts for bread sup-.
plied to the trains of Dundas and Oswald was accompanied by the same
differences of opinion and finally decided on the same basis of com-
promise, as already described in connection with the forage deliver-.
ies to those services. See above p.213.
2 Reasons of the Commissioners of Enquiry for Deductions from the Acc-
ount of Major tickerinan, 22 May 1764, T/]1L444 ff.272 - 273. State of
Uckerman 'S Account as Revised by the Commissioners of Enquiry, T/],/
11.39 ff.263 - 264.
3 Answer of T. Halsey, Read 11 January 1766, T/]J1144 f.259. The commiss-.
ary probably gave such orders to facilitate the settlement of Ucker-
man's voluminous accounts.
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give such receipts, because his knowledge of the overall state of bread
deliveries enabled him to tell immediately whether the contractor's
claims were justified) But his major contention was that the Commiss-
loners' case rested on mere supposition, and the Commissioners of Revis-
ion, who were appointed to make an unbiased review of Uckerman's afT-
airs, 2 agreed with this view, finding it clearly impossible in the light
of the evidence before them to uphold the accusations of the Commission-
ers of Enquiry. 3 Yet this verdict was clearly one of not proven and, as
Halsey himself admitted, the perticular receipts on which the general re-
ceipts were based should have been carefully preserved and brought to
LI.
account.
Many of these weaknesses were overcome as a result of
the establishment of the department of control in 1762. In the last mon-
ths of the war both Oswald and Faber were issuing detailed and sometimes
daily reports on printed forms of all quantities issued from their bak-
cries, as well as a separate account of the amounts of bread drawn by
the individual regiments and train services. 5 In the same way, Pownall's
instructions to the magazine keepers bound them not only to keep a gen-
eral record of bread issues, but also a full account of the deliveries
-
1 Answer of T. Halsey •..., 12 April 1765, T/1/k39 f.256.
2 See above p.208, n.l.
3 D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to C. Lowndes, 2 November 1765, T/l/k39
f.270 . D'Oy].y, Bradehaw & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 8 July 1765, T/]/Li4L&
ff.278 - 279.
Li. Answer of T. Halsey, Read 11 January 1766, T/]JLiLI.1+ f.259.
5 Etats de la Boulangerie ...., August and October 1762, Howard Vyse
rS. D/HV/B/8/].2 - 19.
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made to each regiment or other branch of the service, 1 while deputy coinm-
issary Stanton was put to work on the task of posting original receipts
to the individual accounts of those who had drawn the bread. 2 These chan-
gee, coupled with the more reliable and up-to-date information on effect-
ive numbers, provided for the first time an accurate and comprehensive
system of account for bread deliveries.
As in so many other spheres of the supply of the Coin-
bined Army, the introduction of these essential measures had to wait un-
ti]. the war was nearly over, by which time it was too late to recover
much of the ground lost in previoiia years • As a result it proved imposs-
ible for the most tart to call to an exact and. accurate account those
involved in the delivery and receipt of bread, grain and flour before
1762. There is thus at least a possibility that irregularities and
fratzls were practised and perpetrated. But while the example of Faber's
faithful stewardship in no way justifies the inadequacies of the system,
it does provide a salutary warning against assuming too readily that if
'a Man has an opportunity of being a Rogue .... he must be one' .
1 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/1f13 ff.365 -
:366.
2 General Report from the Office of Accounts •..., 31 December 1762,
T/1/420 f.213.
3 Answer of T. Halsey ...., 12 April 1765, T/l/f39 f.256.
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CHAPTER VI
TRANSPO
259.
'the great lever of the Cominissariat'.1
Mobility is inevitably the key to all, military success;
whatever the size and strength of an army it is no more effective than a
stranded whale if it lacks the ability to manoeuvre. In eighteenth cen-
tury armies, as in those of most other aEes, few individuals were per'-
mitted the luxury of carriage for themselves, this concession bein g 'Tar-
ely confined to officers, some officials such as commissaries and the
sick and wounded. 2 The transport services were thus primarily concerned
with the movement of heavy military equipment and stores, of essential
foodstuffs for men and animals, of the tents, blankets and other items
necessary for life in the open air and of medical and hospital supplies.
To meet these various needs corps of permanently established wagons,
horses and. staff called 'trains' might be provided, or the troops simply
availed themselves by means of hire or impressment of the resources of
the area where they happened to be.
Trains were not a common feature of the British army,
although the Treasury usually supplied bread wagons to its own troops
serving abroad and to foreign troops in British pay. 3 These wagons were
assigned to regiments in certain proportions, and were meant to bring
the basic article of the soldiers' diet from the bakery and to carry
I Wellington's Dispatches '1, 86, quoted in S.G.P. Ward, Wellington's
Headquarters: a Study of the Administrative Problems in_the Peninsu'Ta,
1809 - 1814. (1957) p.84.
2 Other personnel such as drivers of wagons and sutlers enjoyed such ad-
vantages as part of their duties.
3 Contract between the Treasury and A. Hume, 1742, Add. !'S. 34736 ff.
23 - 25.
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reserves of it on the march. But they could be used for practically any
other regimental rvce, and Fortescue says that the term 'bread wagon'
meant little more than a wagon supplied by the bread contractor. 1 During
the Seven Years War in Germany the Treasury's provision of this service
at first for the Hessian troops in British pay, then for the British
contingent and finally at the end of 1758 for the whole of the Combined
Army thus represented the execution of a traditional responsibility,
although on a significantly larger scale than usual • But the Board 'S
provision from 1759 onwards of a bakery train, which carried portable
iron ovens and other bakers' utensils, 2
 and a hospital train, which
transported the sick and wounded to fixed infirmaries and carried the
stores, equipment and patients of the 'flying' hospitals, 3 and the sup-
ply of corresponding services for the British troops marked not only
an expansion of, but a greater degree of specialization in its provision
of regular military transport. 5
 The same may also have been true of a
train, which was used to carry the Commander-in-Chief's equipage and
1 Sir J.W. Fortescue, The Early History of Transport and Sipply. (1928)
p.15.
2 Bread contractors were presumably expected to provide a limited number
of wagons to move the ordinary equipment and utensils of their baker-.
ies at their own expense, but the Treasury apparently paid for the wag
-ons to carry the portable ovens even when the soldiers' bread was sup-
plied under contract. T.O. Hunter to S. Martin, 11 March 1759, Md.
S. 32889 f.2. Wagons and Horses Furnished by R. Oswald for the Brit-
ish Infantry and Cavalry, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood ?S.
3 The existence of the hospital train in 1759 may be inferred from the
letter of N. Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/l/O5 f.17l, describing
the building of additional wagons for this service. See also Appendix
VII.
+ Wagons and Horses Furnished by Oswald for the British Infantry and Cav-
alry and a Letter of Oswald, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood ?S.
5 The specialization was superficially less apparent in the case of the
British troops, where there was still a tendency to call all vehicles
bread wagons, but definite numbers were nevertheless assigned to the
specific services, ibid.
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bargap e, likewise maintained by the Treasury.1
The British army was also provided with artillery
trains, but the responsibility for the maintenance of these extensive
services lay not with the Treasury but with the Board of Ordnance,
which thus supplied this form of transport for the British troos in
the Combined Army throughout their stay in Germany. 2 The Treasury's
connection with artillery trains befe the Seven Years War was the in-
direct one of simply paying for them, when they were provided by for'-
eign governments which had hired their troops to Great Britain. Thus
payments made to the Landgrave of Hesse-Casse]. in 1757 and 1758 under
the subsidy treaty of 1755 melded sums for the upkeep of an artillery
train. 3
 When therefore at the end of 1758 the Treasury undertook the
direct provision and maintenance of the great foreign artillery train,
originally composed of contingents from Hanover and Bickeburg but later
incorporating the Hessian, Brunswick and British Legion artillery
trains as well, it accepted a new responsibility. This conclusion a pr'-
lies equally to the Board's upkeep of the treat provision or proviant
train, which before December 1758 was administered by the Hanoverian
1 See Appendix VII. The normal vractice was to make a financial aUow-
ance to the commander-in-chief to helv meet the cost of what he was
expected to provide for himself. R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen
Anne. (1966) p.20k.
2 Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol.XXIX, p.637.
3 C. Jenkinson, A Col1ectin of al the Treaties of Peace Alliance and
Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers ... (17á51 Vo1.III
p. 149, Article IV.
4' Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSSS 32905 f.1k9. Plan for
the Control of the Hanoverian Artillery Train, 25 May 1762, T/l/k20
f.128.
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authorities. 1 Used to transport the fora ge, grain and meal. involved in
the formation and removal of Magazines and depots, the service was des-
cribed by Hunter as 'a new Sistem, not known in former Campaigns
By 1762 the Treasury had at least 2, L 49 wagons, 5,591
employees and 17,359 horses in its trains, 3 at an annual cost of
£876 , l52/1/8, a substantial proportion of the total extraordinary ex-
penditure on the German war. How far did the numerical levels at which
these services were maintained meet the needs of the Combined Army,
while paying due regard to the interests of economy? To some extent the
establishments fixed themselves; the Treasury had little choice but to
accept the individuaL artillery trains at their existing levels, and to
augment the combined great foreign artillery train when military necess-
ity obliged the supply of extra cannon. 5 Similarly, the bread wagons aid
their associated services seem to have been maintained at generally
accepted customary levels, based on the numbers of troops to be served,
and their establishments were therefore automatically au gmented as the
Army grew in size. 6 According to the contractor, Abraham Prado, the Gei'.-
1 T.O. Hunter to Duke of Newcastle, 22 April 1759, Add. !S. 32890 f.249.
Originally ref erred to simply as forage wagons, the service was known
as the train of provisions by the end of 1759, Add. ?S. 32905 f.150,
and also as the proviant train, see Appendix VII.
2 Hunter to (Martin), 25 January 1759, T/6k/96 f.5.
3 See Appendix VII.
+ See Appendix VIII.
5 Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/1405 f.171. The additional artill-
ery train mentioned here had been made necessary by an augmentation in
the Army's establishment of cannon. Prince Ferdinand to Newcastle, 1k
March 1760, Add. ?S. 32903 f.26k.
6 Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760, T/1/Le05 f.199.
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man troops in the Austrian Succession War had been allowed eight bread
wagons per rewlinent of 700 men and thirty hospital wagons per 20,000
men, 1 on which basis the 96,831 soldiers maintained by Britain in 1762 2
should have had 1 , 252 such wagons, whereas they actually oossessed 1,314
bread, bakery and hospital wazons. 3 But as a new service there was less
certainty about the level at which to maintain the proviant train. The
Hanoverian authorities had provided 800 wagons for somewhat less than
60,000 troops in l758, and during the next four years the intention
seems to have been to maintain the establishment at 1,200 vehicles,5
although this figure did not in fact remain constant. 6
 Moreover, in 1761
Prince Ferdinand complained that 1,200 wagons were insufficient for the
service but that the Treasury would not allow him any more. 7 This claim
is somewhat surprisin g in view of the Board's statement to Hunter in
1759 that it would accept whatever number of provision wagons the Comm.-
ander-in-Chief considered necessary, 8 and in fact the level of their
establishment was held down more by the constant destruction of vehicles
I An Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishin g
 an Army
of 40,000 Men ...., 23 January 1758, Add.. MSS. 32878 ff.19l - 192.
2 See above ,32 33.
3 See Appendix VII.
4 Hunter to Martin, 25 March 1759, 1/64/96 f.80. See above pp.30 - 31.
5 Ibid. Letter of L. Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32c28 f.280.
6 In 1760 there were only 968 vehicles, Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760,
T/l/405 f.171., and in 1762 1,101, see Appendix VII.
7 Ferdinand. to Duke of Brunswick, 23 January 1761, F.0.W.H. von Westph-
alen, Ceschichte der Feldzge des Herzo gs Ferdinand von Braunschweig
-Lineburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol,V, pp.33 - 34.
8 Martin to Hunter, 2 February 1759, 1/64/96 f.9
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in the service and the inability to replace them quickly enough,1 than
by any parsimonious attitude on the part of the Treasury and its coinm-
issaries. On another occasion Ferdinand apDarently accepted that this
was the truth of the Tnatter, 2
 and his complaint of 1761, which does not
seem to have been laid before the Treasury, may well have been no more
than a private and exaggerated expression of frustration to his brother.
The history of other trains shows that the Board was usually willing to
allow additions to establishments to meet increased numbers of troons
or particularly severe and difficult services as long as the commanders
and the commissariat thought them essential, 3 while Ferdinand for his
part usually recognized that financial resources were not limitless and
LI.
made commendable efforts to keep such aumentations to a minimum. The
Combined Army's train establishments were thus fixed at adequate or at
least realistic levels and represented an effective compromise between
the not always compatible interests of the military and civilian auth-
orities.
The novelty of the Treasury's train commitments did
not only lie in the nature and extent of the services which it supplied,
but also in the way in which they were provided. The Treasury tradit-
ionally made contracts with reputable merchants for bread wagon trains,
1 Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.150.
2 Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. NSS. 32935 f.
322. Ferdinand was reported as being willing to accept only 800 wagons
as long as they were kept complete.
3 Peirson to Martin, 13 June 1760, T/l/O5 f.65. See below p.311, n.3.
Lf State of the Artillery ...., June 1759, T/6k/96 ff.2l0 - 211. After
augmentations in the artillery train Ferdinand reduced the establish-
merit of the proviant train in order to avoid additional expense.
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but early in 1759 Hunter was authorized to purchase on its behalf the
wagons, horses, powder and ammunition of the Hanoverian artillery train,
while the German authorities lent the ordnance and stores for the durat-.
ion of the war. 1 The Board thus became directly responsible for the up-.
keep of the train at the level of its establishment and for providing
forage, bread, clothing, equipment and wages for its animals and employ-
ees. Hunter appointed Casimir BilEen to manage these affairs, and he
accounted monthly for what he had spent, 2 presumably receiving the Super-
intendent 's warrants in return. At the same time corresponding arrange-
ments were made for the proviant train, which was purchased outright
from the Hanoverian authorities and placed under the care of 'OverStal-
meister' Ramberg, who was obliged to account in the same way. 3 In Dec.-
ember 1760 both these trains were put under contract, 4 but on 30 July
1762 the proviant train returned to direct Treasury management, 5 with
its upkeep entrusted to Andrew Clark, who was appointed a deputy comm.-
issary for that purpose, having previously acted as chief agent to Law-
rence Dundas, the late contractor for the train. 6 In addition Richard
Oswald abandoned his contracts for the Hessian and British bread, bakery
l Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. ?S. 32905 ff.1 L19 - 150.
2 ThId. f.149.
3 IbId. f.150.
4 H. Peirson to ?1artin, 28 January 1761, T/l/410 f.48. A part of the
artillery train apparently remained in the hands of the Treasury until
the end of the war, for in 1762 a distinction was made between the hor-
see of the Crown and those of the contractor, C. Howard to 1artin, 3
October 1762, T/1/417 ff.437 - 438 , and this explains why Bilgen rec-
eived money for the train until that time, Abstract of the Several
Accounts Current of C. Bflgen, 28 October 1762, T/52/56 f .39. The dis-
tinction must have been the source of some confusion.
5 Value of the Great Provision Train ...., i4 August 1762, T/l/4l7 If.
149 - 150.
6 Howard to (Treasury), 10 August 1762, ibid. f.490.
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and hospital wagons on 31 Nay 1762, from which date until the end of the
war these services were also administered by the Treasury, with Oswald
continuing to act as manager until he was replaced on 1 January 1763
by his chief agent, Peter Paumier, who was made a deputy commissary for
the specific purpose of selling the trains.1
Thus for considerable periods of the war the Treasury
operated a system of public ownership and administration of its trains,
which was unusual at that time. Some precedents did exist; for example
the fifty wagons purchased for the transport of provisions in North
America in 1757,2 but the responsibilities undertaken in Germany in 1759
- 1760 and in 1762 were of far greater importance both in variety and
extent, and may be seen as a significant step towards the provision of
regular military transport by the government rather than by private con-
tractors. The Treasury's policies were undoubtedly partially influenced
by the inheritance of an army, in which transport services were already
organized in certain clearly defined ways, and the fact that both the
proviant and the Hanoverian artillery trains were in existence and fully
operative meant that there was less reason than usual to employ a con-
tractor. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the Board 'S
attitude to public ownership was devoid of positive initiative, for it
must have been influenced by the need to economize on such vast ser
vices and the avoidance of train contractors' profits as an important
I Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains ...., 21 July
1762, T/l/14.17 ff.574 - 575. It is not clear whether Oswald abandoned
his contract for Prince Ferdinand's baggage train, see below p. 271, n.2,
in 1762. Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, A0/l/520/225.
2 R.A. Bowler, The Influence of togi.stical Problems on British Operat-
ions in North America, 177.5 - l72. (1971) p.262.
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contribution to this end. 1 Considerations of the need to extend the dii'-
ect administrative role of government, in order to provide effective
control of the affairs of a largely foreign army, may also have played
a part in its thinking. 2 Why then was the system of public ownership
abandoned at the end of 1760? There is reason to believe that the charge
of heart emanated from Germany rather than from Whitehall, for it was at
Peirson 'S invitation that Dundas submitted proposals for a foreign art-
illery train contract in July l760, and the conclusion of such an ag-
reeinent at the end of the year stemmed largely from this initiative.
The dominating influence in persuading Dundas to accept the additional
burden of the proviant train contract, although only with the allowance
of an unusually high price, was apparently exercised by Granby. 5 The os-
tensible reason for transferring both trains to the management of a pri-
I Pitt 's tirade against 'this insatiable Service' early in 1758 had pre-
sumably not been forgotten by someone as thin-skinned as Newcastle,
W. Pitt to Newcastle, k April 1758, Add. S. 32879 f.46.
2 Both the official records and the private correspondence consulted are
unfortunately silent on the reasoning behind the Treasury's decision.
3 Case for Counsel's Opinion, (176 1$), Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNIC X
1/1/139 ff.2- 3. Contract proposals for both the Hanoverian artillery
and proviant trains had been made by Sir James Cockburn and Nicholas
Linwood, as well as by Dundas, early in 1760, Brief: Plaintiff's Bill
of Complaint ...., 1761$, ibid. l/l/lkO f.1, Memorial of Cockburn and
Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/l/4O5 ff.38 Lf & 386. It is not possible to
say whether these proposals were made at the Treasury's invitation.
Dundas claimed that Cockburn had got information that public manage-
ment of the trains was to be abandoned, ZetlaM. (Dundas) Archive ZNK
X 1/1/139 f.l, but there is no evidence that either the Treasury or
Hunter had lost faith in the system at this time, and the latter ad-
vised rejection of the proposals as unadvantageous to the public, ibid.
As Cockburn had gone to Germany to find some opening in army contract
business, the proposals may well have been made on his own initiative.
+ Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/l/ L$lO f.1$8.
5 Peirson to (Treasury), 8 December 1760, T/l/1$05 ff.92 - 93.
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vate contractor was that their work would be more efficiently carried
out when directed by 'a man of substance & character, whose reputation
becomes responsible to the Duke for the exact performances of these ess-
ential services ') but it is probable that Pèirson and Granby, who both
had heavy military commitments, wished to unburden themselves of the man-
agement of the trains, which had been the subject of much complaint.2
The Treasury's handling of this affair lacked firm dir'-
ection, for it was only when the contracts had already been put into op-
eration in anticipation of its approval that the Board enquired with a
measure o± incomprehension why it should be thought better to put the
trains under contract, when they were already fully operative under pub-
lic management. 3 Had this fundamental question been asked earlier, there
would have been time to have reviewed the arguments of Peirson and Gran-
by and to have investigated whether there was not a cheaper method of
improving efficiency in the trains, and this in turn might have led to
the discovery that the services frequently suffered from inadequate sup-
ervision and control. ' Instead the Treasury allowed the coinmissariat to
present it with a 'fait accompli' on an important matter of policy, and.
it must have had misgivings about the considerable amount of extra ex-
1 Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/l/klO f.48.
2 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/139 f.2. Granby's lack of interest
in administrative matters was widely recognized, Earl of Hardwicke to
Newcastle, k May 1760, Add. MSS. 329 05 f.269.
3 T/29/3+ f.ltI, 15 January 1761.
1+ Peirson was unable to inform the Treasury of the effective states of
the foreign artillery and proviant trains, because he could not spare
a commissary to go round and inspect them. Peirson to (Treasury), 7 June
1760, T/l/405 f.63. On the lack of supervision of transport services
see below p.292.
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penditure involved. As in the case of the train establishments, the
Board was bound to rely on the advice of its commissaries in Germany,
but at the same time, and above all on far-reaching questions of general
policy, it had a duty to subject such advice to stringent examination,
something which it had not done. That the Treasury in reality regretted
the passing of public ownership of the trains is suggested by the fact
that in 1762, when Dundas and Oswald insisted on giving up many of their
contracts, the Board took an even wider range of transport services un-
der its direct management with no attempt to find alternative contract-
ore, 1
 Thus despite the change of late 1760 there had been a surviving
commitment to the new and significant method of supplying military tran-
sport. Later in the century such methods were to be tried again on a
smaller scale for the British armies in America in 1776 and in Flanders
in 1794.2 On the first occasion the publicly-owned train was sabotaged
by army officers, who were determined to hire their own wagons to the
government, 3 and on the second the Corps of Royal Waggoners eventually
had to be disbanded because of its miserable condition and its inability
to function effectively. 4 Both examples point to the conclusion, equally
valid for the Seven Years War in Germany, that the development of a pub-
licly-owned and administered military transport system was impeded more
1 The Treasury's attempt to dissuade Oswald from abandoning his contract
need not be interpreted as a loss of faith in public ownership, for it
probably reflected a reluctance to introduce change and upheaval in
essential services as the war drew to a close. T/29/34 f.2?Li , 8 May
1762.
2 Bowler, op. cit. p.262. H. Le Mesurier, A System for the British Comm.-
issariat, (1796), printed in R. Glover, Peninsular Preiaration: the
Reform of the British Army 1795 - 1809. (1963) p.273.
3 Bowler, op. cit. pp.262 - 266.
4 Clover, op. cit. p.273.
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by an inability to put conceptions effectively into practice than by an
inherently timid and conservative outlook. Despite the somewhat except-.
ional circumstances of the Combined Army, which helped lead the Tres--
sury to its first significant experiment in this sphere, such conclus-
ions apply to an age not usually associated with forward-looking adntin-
istrative ideas.
As already noted, the traditional method of supplying
trains by contract always existed side by side with the system of pub-
lic ownership. In 1757 and 1758 the bread wagons of the Hessian troops
in British pay were provided by the foreign merchants, David Mendes Da
Costa and Abraham Prado, 1 but before the end of the latter year this
service had been taken over by Oswald, 2 who also supplied the bread,
bakery, infirmary and hospital wagons of the British troops and Prince
Ferdinand 's baggage train.L4 Early in 1759 another British contractor,
Dundas, undertook the provision of bread wagons for the troops of Han-
over and Brunswick and bakery and hospital wagons for all the German
1 Contract between J. Amherst and D.M. Da Costa, 27 April 1757, T/l/375
No.32, 11.68 - 69. A. Prado to fi. Boyd, 13 October 1758, Add. !S.
3288k 1.348.
2 Martin to Oswald, 30 October 1758 , T/27/27 f.397.
3 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T/64/96 11.22 23. On 31 August1758 the Duke of Marlborough made an agreement with Prado to supply
the British bread wagons, T/1/385 No.88, and although the Treasury re-
jected this, his horses may actually have performed some services,
Martin to Boyd, 27 October 1758, T/27/27 f.396. For the bakery, infirm-
ary and hospital wagons see Wagons and Horses Furnished by Oswald for
the British Infantry and Cavalry and tetter of Oswald, 1 October 1761,
Dundas of Beechwood S.
4 Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. S. 32905 1.149.
5 Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6
If.? - 8.
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contingents. 1 All the above contracts of Oswald were terminated on 31
May 1762 , 2 but those of Dundas lasted until the end of the war. In add-
ition to these extensive commitments Dundas held contracts to supply the
foreign artillery train from 19 December 1760 until the end of the war
and the proviant train from 20 December 1760 to 30 July l762.
The forinulat ion of these agreements by the Treasury and.
by the commanders and commissaries, to whom the contracting power was
delegated subject to the Board 's approval, was in many ways effectively
and efficiently achieved. The contracts were promptly made, with one ex-
ception after the arrival of the first British forces in 1758, when the
Duke of Marlborough finding himself without bread wagons was forced into
a hasty agreement with Prado on unfavourable terms. In this case the
Treasury seems to have persisted too long in the hope that the Hanover-
Ian coutmissariat would undertake supply. 5 Secondly, the contracts were
usually based on solid foundations, for the Board took great care to see
that its contractors were men of standing, reputation and experience.
Although Oswald had already been a bread contractor to the Hessian tr-
oops in England in 1757,6 it was probably the Treasury's insistence on
1. Instructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.119. Hatton to
Martin, 9 April 1760 , 1/1/405 1.171.
2 Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains ...., 21 July
1762, 1/1/1417 11.574 - 575. There is no specific reference to the aban-
donment of Ferdinand's baggage train, although Oswald seems to have
sold all his train interests.
3 ZetlaM (Dundas) Archive ZNIC X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 15 & 19 - 21.
4 Marlborough to Newcastle, 29 August 1758 , T/l/384 No.53. Mr. Hume 's
Report on Two Contracts of Mr. Prado ...., 23 October 1758, ibid. No.
63, ff.8 - 9.
5 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Ger'-
many, 23 October 1758 , T/l/386 No.73.
6 Martin to Oswald, 17 March 1757, 1/27/27 1.279.
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his lack of experience of contracting abroad, which led him to offer to
take Graham, a colonel in one of the Sects Dutch regiments, into part-
nership as a guarantee of effective execution. 1 Thirdly, an opportunity
to make a constant review of the provision of transport services was
given by the practice of limiting contracts to six-month periods ,2 but
the Treasury also showed itself fully aware of the need for stability
and continuity, on one occasion warning Dundas that if he did not con-
tinue the proviant train agreement for longer than the minimum period
he was never to expect the government's favour again. 3
 Fourthly, there
is evidence that contracts were carefully drafted and that precise con-
ditions of service were worked out in detail, so that the contractor
was not allowed to escape his full obligations.k But at the same time
there was an occasional and unfortunate tendency to leave contractual
loop-holes, of which one serious example was the failure to bind Dundas
and Oswald to pay for the bread delivered from commissariat sources to
the employees of their trains. 5 It may also have been a lack of definit-
ion in the proviarit train contract, which allowed Dundas to maintain at
the public's expense 11.5 wagons and 106 employees of the train to make
running repairs to damaged veiic1ee instead of carrying forage. 6 The con-
1 Draught Treasury Letter to Boyd, July 175 8 , T/1/385 No.76.
2 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T16L1./96 ff.22 - 23.
3 T/29/3k ff.168 - 169, 8 July 1761. After this ultimatum Dundas retained
the contract for more than a year after the expiry of the minimum per-
iod of six months.
11. The draught of Oswald 's contract of 1k February 1759 for 150 bread wag-
ons is a good example of detailed and careful formulation of terms,
T/1/395 ff
.390 - 39k.
5 T. Pownall to C. Jenkinson, March 1765, T/l/451 f.41. The Board event-
ually had to resort to the practice in Flanders during the Austrian
Succession War as a foundation for this charge, and even this depended
on the willingness of the contractors to accept liability, T/29/35 f.
410, 24 May 1764.
6 Pownall to Peirson, 31 August 1761, Add. ?S. 32927 f.302.
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tractor 's statement that such a reserve had been 'clearly understood • in
his contract suggests that the document left some room for different
interpretations, although the apparent failure of any copy to survive
makes it impossible to be categorical.2
Important as such considerations were, the major issue
in contract formulation was the price allowed. Advertisements inviting
tenders were one way of keeping prices down and were sometimes used by
the Treasury, 3 but they were not the invariable rule,1 and the Board app-
arently preferred to make discreet enquiries among reputable merchants,
asking them to submit proposals. 5 Reliability could not be sacrificed in
the interest of the lowest possible price, and advertisements 'do in
their Nature bind the Lords to accept of the lowest Offer from whomso-
ever it shall come, altho, as the Subsistance of the Forces, must depend
upon the exactness, and punctuality of the Contractor, the Character of
the Person contracting is a Consideration no less essential to be regard-
ed than the cheapness of the Contract ,•6 Informal approaches did not com-
pletely eliminate competition, although they did facilitate the practice,
of which Sir James Cockburn complained, when he claimed that Dundas had
persuaded him to withhold proposals for the foreign artillery and provi-
1 Letter of Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f,281.
2 It is possible that lax supervision of the execution of the contract
was more to blame. See below pp.291 - 292.
3 T/29133 f.80, 28 July 1758.
Lj. Dundas to Treasury, 9 January 17.59, T/l/395 f.I+32.
5 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Geri..
many, 23 October 1758, Add. ?3S. 330k7 ff.16k - 165.
6 T/29/33 f.6k, 10 July 1758.
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ant train contracts with the deliberate intention of keening u the
prices. 1
 This may have allowed Dundas to secure 9/9d per wagon per day
for the proviant train in December 1760, 2 as earlier in the year Cock-
burn and Linwood had offered to undertake the service at 9/Cd for six
months and 8/6d thereafter. 3 Had the train been maintained at the latt-
er rates a considerable sum would have been saved in the nineteen inon-
the during which Dundas held the contract. Nevertheless, in view of the
particularly onerous nature of the services of this train, which kept
it almost constantly in motion, it is possible to justify the higher
price allowed to Dundas, while the apparently advantageous offer of
Cockburn and tinwood may have represented the sort of unrealistic prop-.
osals from inexperienced contractors, which the Treasury was so anxious
to avoid. 11 Nor were contract prices consistently high, for the rates at
which Dundas supplied the foreign artillery train were considerably
cheaper than those agreed for the British artillery train in Germany by
the Board of Ordnance, 5 while the standard price of 9/Cd per day allow-
I Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X l/l/lkO ff.2 - 5. In this tortuous aff-
air there is no conclusive proof that Dundas persuaded Cockburn not to
propose on promise of a share in the contracts, and then refused to
honour his word once those contracts were safely made in his name.
2 Dundas was allowed I ducat per day per wagon, and in his accounts,
Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.l3, calculated the duca.t at 5
guilders 5 stivers and the £ at 10 guilders 15 stivers. Hence 1 ducat
9/9.21d.
3 Memorial of Cockburn and Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/l/O5 f.386.
11 At this time Cockburn was looking for any possible opening in army con-
tracting business on behalf of himself and his partners, Zetland (Dun-.
das) Archive ZNIC X 1/1/111.0 f.l.
5 Dundas supplied the forein artillery train at the following daily
rates:- i/8d per horse, 1/Cd per driver and 2/6d per conductor, Abstr
act of an Account of the Hire of Horses and Pay of Conductors and Dri-
vers in the Foreign Train of Artillery ...., 6 April 1763, AO/3/124.
The respective rates for the British artillery train under the Board
of Ordnance 's contract with Oswald and Mill were 1/lOd, l/6d and 3/Cd,
Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol.XXIX, p.637.
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ed for bread wagons 1 was cheaper than the average price Daid to trans-
port contractors in Germany and the Low Countries durin g the Austrian
Succession War.2
In addition to payments for the hire of trains, con-
tractors were fully indemnified for horses, wagons and equipment lost to
or destroyed by the enemy, or worn out by services of exceptional sever-
ity. 3 Such compensation was on the whole justified, but the system did
involve a difficult if not impossible distinction between damage caused
by abnormally severe conditions and that arising from ordinary wear and
tear, for which the Treasury was not liable. 4 Not surprisingly contract-.
ore tended to place all damage not due to the enemy in the former cate-
gory, although their clain did not necessarily imply dishonesty, simply
representing the widest possible interpretation of terms, which lent
themselves to different definitions. In deciding this issue, commissaru.
tee must have experienced considerable difficulties and. they seem on the
whole to have taken the easy way out by simply accepting the contractors'
1 Oswald was originally allowed lO/Od per day per wagon for the British
and Hessian bread wagons, Martin to Oswald, 30 October 1758, 1/27/27
f.397, Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February
1759, 1/1/395 f.39l. This price must have been reduced in view of Peir-
son's statement that one ducat, or approximately 9/9d, see above p.
274, n.2, was 9d more than the cost of wagons supplied by Oswald, Peir-
son to (Treasury), 8 December 1760, T/l/405 ff.92 - 93. The change pro-
bably occurred when the contracts were renewed after the initial period
of six months.
2 Allowance Paid the Contractors for Carriages in Germany and Flanders
during the Course of the Last War, 12 May 1760, PRO/3 0/8/89 f.277. The
average price paid for wagon contracts over a period of four years in
the earlier conflict was 5.06 guilders, or approximately 9/5i, calcul-
ating the £ at 10 guilders 15 stivers, the standard rate of exchange
for soldiers' pay throughout the eighteenth century, T/29/33 f.63, 10
July 1758.
3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK ( 1/1/6 ff.11 - 12, 17 - 18 & 23 - 26.
4 Instructions to the Commissary General of Accounts, 1762, T/1/1+20 f!.
115 - 116.
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claims. This conclusion is suggested by Pownafl 's reminder to the comm-
issary general of accounts in 1762 that such a distinction must be
niade, 1
 by the almost exact correspondence in Dimdas' accounts between
his claims for compensation and the payments made to him 2 and by the
size of the sums paid to the same contractor on these accounts. 3 No
doubt the coinmissariat could have enforced the principle of the Trea-
suxy 's policy more strictly, but it might have been more satisfactory
if the Board had tried to negotiate with the contractors an agreed peii.
centage level of losses, arising from normal wear and tear, which figure
would then have been deducted from the total cost of loss and destruct-
ion in the trains. Presumably agreement would have been difficult to
reach, but had such a negotiation succeeded the commissariat would have
had a far clearer and simpler set of administrative principles to apply,
and a not insignificant sum of money would probably have been saved.
Train contracts seem to have been highly lucrative aff-
airs, for despite the lack of fully detailed, accurate aud comparable
statistics there is evidence that they produced gross profits in the
region of lL4 - 17%. ' In Dundas' case this meant windfalls of over
£l63,OOO, which permitted the purchase, improvement and lavish decorat-
1 Ibid.
2 Out of total demands of £414,083/17/9 for compensation on all his train
contracts, see Appendix VIII, a mere £6,OlO/O/O was rejected from the
proviant train account by the commissariat, Zetland (Durxias) Archive
ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.17 - 18.
3 Compensation always represented significant percentages of the cost of
upkeep of Dundas' trains. See Appendix VIII.
Li. See Appendix IX.
5 ibid.
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ion of properties such as Aske and Moor Park and a brazen ostentation
in his style of life. 1 Contemporaries commented on his 'German pillage'
and believed that his gains were the result of gross extortion at the
very least. 2
 Without venturing to defend the morality of such financial
operations, it may be pointed out that a train contract was considerably
more onerous than a forage or bread contract, involving constant direct-
ion and supervision of wagons and horses scattered in many different
places and major problems associated with the repair of vehicles and the
replacement of animals. Overheads were consequently high and a heavy
burden of hard work and responsibility rested on the contractor's should-
ers. The Treasury thus had to pay a considerable price for the services
and expertise of the private merchants, who had the critical task of pro-
viding its troops with their essential means of mobility. With the excep-
tion of the proviant train, whose higher price can be justified, Dundas
was merely paid the traditionally generous rates which all train con-
tractors enjoyed. The difference in his case, however, was that no pre-
vious contractor had been involved in these affairs on such a grand scale,
- and the tidy sum of just under £3,000 per annum, which could be secured
by supplying 100 wagons at 9/Cd per day each with a profit of 17%, and
at which no eyebrows would probably have been raised, was small beer coin-
pared to the massive gains of 'the Nabob of the North'. And yet the one
was not more acceptable or unacceptable than the other. Only in the pay-
ment of excessively generous sums for loss and damage did Dundas enjoy
I Sir LB. Namier Sc J. Brooke, Eds., The History of Parliamentz the House
of Commons, l751. - 1790, (l96L,.) Vol.11, p.35w. North Riding Record Off-
Ice, Annual Report 1971, pp.13 - 16.
2 North Riding Record Office, Aruival Report 1971, p .l7, citing an article
in the 'Morning Post'.
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an unjustified advantage, but while this had clearly added to his pro-
fits, there is no reason to suppose that there had been any intention
on his part to extort or defrand.
The Treasury's train contracting policy merits neither
eulogy nor severe censure. It followed a traditional pattern with no
real attempt to find new methods or techniques, and within these limits
the formulation of appropriate conditions and terms of service was lar-
gely although never completely successful. om the Board 's point of
view the prices paid were a mixture of the average, the advantageous
and the expensive, and while some better bargains might have been struck,
although always at the risk of less effective execution, there is no ev
idence of extravagance on the part of the guardians of the public purse.
It is clear that train contracting was by definition an expensive way of
providing military transport, and that it always allowed extensive pro-
fits to those fortunate enough to receive the government's favour. As
such, it was a far less appropriate system for the Treasury's extensive
new commitments in the Seven Years War in Germany than for the much
smaller provision of trains in the British army and in previous con-
flicts • To keep public expenditure under control and to avoid massive
profits for private individuals, the new situation required a system of
public ownership, with which the Treasury had experimented but which it
had failed to maintain with consistency.
Trains, by whatever method they were supplied, were the
permanent core of the military transport
	 , but they were never
provided at a level sufficient to meet the Army's total needs and it was
S
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therefore always necessary to have recourse to local resources. Country
carriage, as it was called, was more flexible if less reliable than
trains, for it could in theory be used where, when and for whatever len-
gth of time it was required. Its scale varied from the thousands of wag-
ons, used for special expeditions and sieges, down to small numbers of
horses and carts, which were attached to regiments to augment the bread
wagons and were employed in many diverse services. Local transport also
operated on water, for with a few insignificant exceptions the Treasury
neither owned boats nor hired contractors to supply them on a large
scale. 1 The Board did not commit itself to pay for all the services per-
formed by local transport for the troops in its pay. Throughout the war
subjects of enemy states had their carriages requisitioned with no pro-
spect of reimbursement, such resources being regarded as part of the leg-
itimate spoils of war. 2 In neutral and allied countries the Treasury
accepted a liability to pay for wagons and boats used to carry the Arny's
artillery with its equipment and stores, and also the commissariat 'a
provisions, which might have to be moved to places nearer to the posit-
ions of the troops or safer from enemy attack. 3 It did not, however, hold
itself responsible for the wagons taken by the regiments, which might pay
for such services if they thought fit, nor those used by the contractors
to effect the delivery of the provisions which they had agreed to supply,k
I Some boats owned by the Treasury were built for service on the Werre,
Fulda and Weser, but by the end of the war the commissariat was unaware
of their existence, Pownall to Martin, 18 March 1763, T/1/k24 f.23k.
2 Prince Ferdinand's Paper of 24. April, Observations upon it, 1760, PRO/
30/8/90 f.l25. It was, however, thought fair to allow bread and forage
for the peasant drivers and horses of enemy states after three days'
service,
3 Ibid.
L Ibid.
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The framework, within which local transport operated,
was thus a complex one, and must have been the subject of acute bewilder-
ment to those ordinary people whose animals, wagons and boats were used
for the various services, and who might find that they had a claim for
yitent against the Treasury, against German or British military auth-
orities, against private contractors or against no one at all, with some
measure of uncertainty as to the category into which they fell. This was
certainly one reason why local transport was not provided with that will-
ingness and alacrity which were so essential to the war effort, but there
is no evidence that the Treasury sought any fundamental rationalization
of the traditiorialand confused system which it had inherited. Perhaps
the major factor, which encouraged local people to keep their precious
transport resources well away from the none-too-gentle hands of the util-
itary and the coutmissariat, was the refusal to ay any compensation for
horses which were killed or which died in the course of the service. The
Treasury's a&herence to this principle I provided a stark contrast to
the generous treatment of train contractors, although any concession to
compensation in the vast sphere of local transport would almost certain-
ly have opened the flood-gates of expenditure and abuse, and the Board
was probably wise to shrink from a course of action, whose financial ia.
plications could hardly be forseen. There was, however, a certain flex-
ibility of mind in Whitehall, illustrated in the willingness to make an
extra allowance to cover the cost of bread and forage supplied to the
drivers and horses engaged in assisting regimental movements. 2 This de-
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
281.
cision was justified on administrative as well as on humane grounds, and
must have done something to improve the efficiency of these services by
discouraging desertion.
To encourage the optimum provision of local transport
services and equally to protect British financial interests, it was ess-
ential to establish and publish the rates of pay which were to be allow-
ed. There was, however, unnecessary delay in deciding this important
matter, for it was only after Prince Ferdinand had stressed the need to
fix definite tariffs early in 1760 that the Treasury authorized him to
undertake this important work,1
 and even then it was apparently not tin-
til 1761 that a tariff was published for the transport of provisions on
the river Weser, the Army 's supply lifeline. 2 The coinmissariat had app-
arently done nothing to clarify this issue or at least lay the problem
before the Treasury without waiting for the Commander-in-Chief to com-
plain, although its attitude no doubt stemmed partly from the fact that
its own authority over the provision and direction of local transport
was somewhat tenuous. It had. been the Board's original intention to in-
vest its commissaries with full powers to levy such transport in Ger-
many, but a clause to this effect in Hunter's commission was struck out
by the Attorney and Solicitor General, presumably on the grounds that
the Treasury had no such authority to delegate in a foreign land. 3 Comm-
issaries thus had to request the transport which they needed from local
-
1 Ferdinand to Marquis of Granby, 214. April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 f.l21.
Ibid. f.125.
2 Extract of a Letter from Hildesheim, 3 April 1762, Add. ?'S. 32936 f.
383.
3 Draught Commission to Mr. Hunter, 1758, T/l/385 No.120, f.5.
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governments and officials, 1 who in turn issued the necessary orders to
their subjects. Military commanders made similar requests or demands,
but they enjoyed the advantage of having a means of compulsion at their
disposal if local people proved reluctant to co-operate. F'urthermore, if
the Treasury had intended that its representatives in Germany should be
responsible for assigning local transport resources to the Army's var-
ious and rival needs, an assuinpt ion suggested by the Board 's desire to
grant plenary powers to Hunter, its wishes were again frustrated, for
this function was exercised by the military command, 2 which in turn del-
egated some of its responsibility to the Commission for Regulating Car-
iage. The latter operated at Nnster in 1760 and 1761 and. was apparently
composed largely of German officials and officers. 3
 In addition, Presi-
dent von Maseow of the Chamber of War of Minden also exercised a potent
influence over the direction of local transport services, more in his
capacity as a leading Prussian official and a close confidant of Prince
Ferdinand than on his position in the commissariai. 4
 Thus it is clear
1 Although commissaries might talk in terms of requisitioning transport,
pleas that their orders be obeyed demonstrate their lack of authority,
E. Blakeney to Regency of Bentheiin, 19 October 1760, T/1/L 05 f.300.
2 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand s Orders relating to the Numbers of
Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment ...., passim, Dundas of
Beechwood ?S.
3 The director of the Commission was a Mr. de Knig, F. Halsey to Hatton,
21 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030, and another member was a Colonel
Wense, Blakeney to Chamber of Minden, 24 February 1761, T/l/4l0 f.264.
The predominance of German officials in the Commission is suggested by
the fact that the contractor, Mamberg, mistook it for the Regency of
Minster, F. Halsey to Hatton, 18 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030, but
its exact composition is uncertain.
4 Ferdinand had given Plassow charge of all meal and forage transports in
Hesse.-Cassel as early as 1759, C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Chamber Rep-
resentative von Roeder, (27 December 1759), Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.
III, p.943. Although Massow was primarily concerned with the organiz-
ation of the local transport of the Prussian territories, where he ex-
ercised political authority, his general influence was such that Fred-
erick Halsey could apply to him to expedite the sending of a conting-
ent of the proviant train, F. Halsey to Massow, 18 April 1761, Halsey
!'ES. 15031.
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that in these matters British commissaries played second fiddle, and
while Ferdinand was always sympathetic to their needs , their attempts
to keep the Army well-supplied by the speedy movement of bulk quantities
of provisions were often impeded and. undermined by their being obliged
to rely on the authority of others, both to obtain transport and to pro-
vide the compulsion to keep it in the field.2
Some of the unsatisfactory aspects of this situation
could have been avoided. It was obviously unwise as the Treasury real-
ized somewhat late in the day to allow a German official like Massow to
exercise such extensive authority over local transport without specific
instructions, while Frederick Halsey's suggestion that a small detach-
ment of cavalry and hussars should be permanently attached to the ser-
vice of the commissariat and subject to its orders,k so that the comm-
issaries could promptly enforce the production of the quotas of local
transport assigned to them and prevent the drivers absconding, could
have been acted upon, despite the reluctance to allow civilians to com-
mand military personnel • Yet ultimately the commissariat could not be
given that full authority, which would have done much to eliminate its
difficulties, for only the Commander-in-Chief could assess the overall
transport needs of the Army, arid assign limited local resources to the
respective military and logistical services in fair proportions, while
I Standing Orders •..., 9 May & 24 September 1760 & 25 January 1761,
Add. PBS. 28855 ff.l, 18 & 29.
2 F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 January 1761, Halsey NSS. 15030. F. Halsey to
Peirson, 24 January 1761, ibid.
3 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. ?S.
32935 f.136. Another German official, Redecker, was given a more def-
inite responsibility, Instructions to Mr. Redecker ...., 25 April
1760, T/l/405 ff.250 - 252.
-
4 F. Halsey to Peirson, 24 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.
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only local officials had the requisite political authority to command
and organize effectively the transport services which their subjects
could provide. Unfortunately, neither a foreign general nor the author-
ities of foreign states could be made fully responsible for their act-
ions to the British government.
Viewed as a whole the policies of the Treasury and. its
commissaries towards local transport were certainly not above criticism.
While the Board showed itself rot unwilling to make some improvements in
the traditional pattern of payment for these services, it seemed to be
in no hurry to clarify its obligations, and its employees in Germany
did. not really appreciate the urgent need to establish recognized tar-
iffs. In these ways a certain spirit of 'laissez-faire' is apparent
and was hardly an appropriate reaction to the problems raised by Brit-
ain's vast new commitments. Moreover, starting from the premise that its
commissaries should have full control of local transport, the Treasury
seems to have been largely unaware that what power and influence they
might have exercised had been progressively eroded by the activities of
German officers and officials. In justice, however, it must be remember-
ed that when Britain assumed direct responsibility for a multi-national
army under a German commaMer and campaigning in foreign fields, it
committed itself to the maintenance of a service which by definition it
could not fully control. Administratively the decision was indefensible,
but military and diplomatic necessity overrode such considerations.
From the general policies which governed the provision
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of transport in the Combined Army it is necessary to turn to a consider-
ation of the efficiency with which the various services were executed.
The problem may be simply stated as getting the optimum amounts of trans-
i,ort into the field, and keeping them in a serviceable state in the right
places at the right time. No statistics have apparently survived for the
period of public management of the foreign artillery and proviant trains
in 1.759 - 1760, although the general consensus of opinion that matters
were badly managed at that time suggests that the established numbers of
wagons were not always available . During the second period of public man-
agement returns for the proviant train show that it was kept between
81.56% and 86.19% complete Some of the trains under contract apparently
had a more impressive record than this, although there is reason to regard
with some scepticism figures showing that at various times between 1760
and 1762 Dundas • bread, bakery and hospital wagon trains were maintained
at a level of 96.61% of the official establishment, with a corresponding
figure for the proviant train in 176]. and 1762 of 98.47%. When Oswald
gave up his transport contracts on 3]. Nay 1762, he transferred. to the
Crown from his trains a greater number of wagons and horses than the es-
tablishments stipulated, thus suggesting, although not proving, that he
had kept effective reserves from which shortages in the establishments
1 Zetlarxi (Dundas) Archive, ZNK X 1/1/139 f.2. Instructions for Hatton
...., (1759), Add. ?S. 32905 ff.150 - 151.
2 Rapports du Service Journalier du Proviant Train, 2 July 1762 - Li. Dec-
ember 1762, Howard Vyse )S. D/HV/B/6/1 - 39. In this period the min-
imum number of wagons in service was 898 and the maximum 949, out of
an establishment of 1,101 wagons, see Appendices VII and X.
3 See Appendix VIII and below pp.291 - 292.
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were quickly made up. It is of course impossible to test with any math-
ematical accuracy the success with which the maximum quantities of local
transport were obtained, but while it is clear that the Army was fre-
quently assisted by an extensive provision of such services, 2 it is equ-.
ally certain that on numerous occasions only a derisory proportion of
those resources was made available for its use.3
There was little point in providinE transport at o pti-
mum levels if it was immediately rendered useless by dama ge or even com-
pletely destroyed as soon as it went into service. Fi gures for the Drov-
lant train under public management in 1762 show an average of 12.97% of
4
wagons in repair over a period of five months, although on one occasion
the figure rose as high as 2k.89%, while in January 1761, soon after the
train had been put under contract, Prince Ferdinand claimed that only
14.11% of its wagons were fit for service. 6 Loss and destruction of anim-
1 Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains ...., 21 July
1762, T/1/417 ff.574 - 575. He handed over 716 serviceable wagons and
3,288 serviceable horses, together with 13 unserviceable wagons aM 205
unserviceable horses, The establishments of the British and Hessian
bread, bakery and infirmary wagons and of Ferdinand 's ba ggage train
stood at 681 vehicles and 3,002 horses, see Arpendix VII.
2 The Hanoverian authorities claimed that their subjects had provided
i,koo wagons for the Wesel expedition in late 1760, Pr(cis des Arran ge-
mens pris .... par la Reence de Guerre . Hannovre ...., SP/100/17.
3 Peirson to Treasury, 1 September 1760, T/1/40 .5 f.77. F. Halsey to Hat-
ton, 21 January 1761, Halsey ?S. 15030.
1+ See Appendix X.
.5 On 9 November 1762 224 out of 900 wagons were in repair, Howard Vyse
?s S. D/HV/B/6/33.
6 Ferdinand to King Frederick of Prussia, 16 January 1761, Westphalen,
op. cit. Vo]..V, p.29. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Army
claimed that out of 900 proviant train wagons only 127 were fit for
service, although it should be remembered that he was sometimes prone
to exaggeration. See above pp.263 - 264.
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ale in the same train under public management ran at the high monthly
rate of 12.38% between July and October l762, although as this occurred
at the height of the campaigning season, the annual percentage loss in-
cluling the ca].mer winter period would have been somewhat less • Stat is-
tics for the trains under contract show a similarity to these figures.
In August 1761 Pownall found over 16% of Dundas' proviant train wagons
in repair, a proportion which the contractor did not find exceptional be-
cause of the particularly severe nature of the service in which they were
engaged, 2
 while monthly losses of horses in the train during the period
of the contract 's duration amounted to 8.57%, a figure which represented
the annual replacement of approximately all the animals • Of the total
cost of all. Dundas' train contracts 25.15% represented compensation for
destruction and loss of horses, vehicles and equipment.L4 Life in the
trains, whether under public management or contract, was clearly no bed
of roses • Nor presumably were the sufferings of local transport any less
severe, despite the impossibility of measuring them accurately. At the
end of 1760 Peirson referred to 'the total demolition of the country
carriage ', and it is easy to imagine that when even the peasant drivers
were abused, beaten and starved by the troops, 6
 their property was not
treated with greater respect. The desertion rate among local wagons en-
gaged in the service of the Army was consequently very high, and Freder-
1 See Appendix XI.
2 Letter of Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add • ?S. 32928 f. 280.
3 See Appendix XI.
Dundas was paid a total of £1,232,398/4/2 for the upkeep of his trains
and he claimed £L l4,083/l7/9 in compensation. See Appendix VIII.
5 Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/l/ 1405 f.90.
6 Ferdinand to Oranby, 21' April 17 60 , PRO/30f8/90 f120. Standing Orders
...., 25 August 1760, Add. ?S. 28855 f.l2.
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ick Halsey's description of how time was wasted in roundin g up peasant
wagons, which had absconded two or three times in the course of a short
journey, undoubtedly illustrates a common occurrence.1
If then transport services were frequently executed im-.
perfectly or with a considerable waste of resources, what were the cau-
ses of these failures, which could obviously have an adverse effect on
the war effort, and how far were the commissaries to blame for them? The
physical geography, climate and rudimentary communications network of
north-west Germany, together with the nature of the Combined Army's cam-
2paigning, were all influential factors in creatin g the sort of chaos
and havoc so vividly described by Frederick Halsey.
"The disagreable news of our want of Success at Wesel,
met me upon the March, & wch. was evidently (provided) by the inexpress-.
able misery that presetd. itself in every part of the road, to wch. ye
very worst roads in any pt. of Sominersetshire, before any turnpike took
place canot be compared for badness: a transport of a large train of
Artillery accompanied with 1000 heavy amunition waggons had past it in
very rainy weather ntarchg. to Wesel, besides heavy baggage, all this art-
illery & amunition I met returning in the like kind of weather, & as it
was a kind of retreat, no halt coud. be made or time lost; in every 50
Yards laid or stuck a dead or dying Horse or Ox, & every 100 Yards a
broken Waggon or Carriage, besides several Cannons Mortars &c, our Horses
blunderg. thro • the Mire, stumbling every 20 steps over Bombs Canon Balls
1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 2k January 1761, Halsey ?3S. 15030.
2 See above pp.37 - 39 & k2 - 411,
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& powder Barrells, wch. were stuck & buried in the !ire, but which was
still more miserable in every Village, one heard of drivers & peasants
dyg. thro cold & fatigue of inarchg. thro' much roads & weather night &
day, in short it was such a scene, as no one that has not seen it, can
form an Idea of."
Equally destructive of valuable resources was epidemic disease among
draught animals, whose close physical association in military service
encouraged the rapid spread of infection. Early in 1761 practicaily all
the eight hundred oxen, which had been purchased to draw the siege art-
illery, were wiped out or rendered useless in this way. 2 The moderate
transport reserves of the campaigning area could thus be stretched to
the utmost, and as early as 1760 it was alleged that the losses of carr.
lage in the previous year had been so great that there was insufficient
dry wood in Westphalia to build the necessary replacements. 3
 Nor were
matters helped by the existence of a plethora of independent and semi-
independent political and administrative authorities in the area, al].
concerned to uphold their separate jurisdictions, and making it necessary
to hire local transport in small parcels with much duplication of effort
Il.
and waste of time.
And yet to emphasize such factors is not to justify an
attitude of stoic resignation, on the basis of which commissaries might
1 F. Halsey to ?.H. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey ! I S. 15029.
2 Peireon to Newcastle, k September 1760, Add. !S. 32911 f.49, Peirson
to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/1/klO f.k9.
3 Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760, T/l/405 f.199.
k F. Halsey to Peirson, 12 February 1761, Halsey S. 15030.
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have echoed the sentiments of the Spanish council].or, who reputedly bel-
ieved that if God had intended rivers to be navigable He would have made
them so. There are insufficient surviving records to permit a detailed
examination of the work of large numbers of commissaries in battling ag-'
ainst the odds, and the activities of Frederick Halsey, the one sinifi-
cant exception to this statement, are chronicled by himself with an in-
evitable persona]. bias. But after making allowances for some exaggeration
Halsey still appears as an active and determined official • His understan-
ding and iesourcefulness can be seen in his recognition of the value of
the Münster canal as a means of partially overcoming the unreliability
of road and river transport, and his determined efforts to provide craft
for the exclusive use of the commissariat on that waterway, and to keep
it open even in midwinter by employing a gang of workmen to smash the
ice.1 Such exertions certainly eased the supply situation in and around
!4nster in 1760 and 1761. He also had some success in conducting delic-
ate diplomatic negotiations with local authorities, by which transport
resources were made available for the use of the coinmissariat, 2 while at
the same time he knew how to bring pressure to bear on German officials,
who proved reluctant to carry out orders and agreements . There must
have been other commissaries, such as Hatton, who were at least equally
active in attempting to overcome the various obstacles to the movement
of supplies, although it would be unrealistic to pretend that there
were not others like Blakeney, whose efforts to direct and control trans-
1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, ibid.. F. Halsey to Blakeney, 12
February 1761, Halsey !S. 15031.
2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 12 February 1761, ibid.
3 F. Halsey to Hatton, 2]. January 1761, Halsey !S. 15030.
Li. Hatton 'a energy and capacity for hard work were generally recognized,
see above p.127.
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port services from his desk presumably achieved far less than the con-
stant activity in the field of his more energetic collea gues.1 Yet the
maximum effort and exercise of administrative skill could never guaran-
tee the smooth passage of supplies, and countless obstacles and adverse
circumstances were always liable to frustrate a commissary's plans and
arrangements, however carefully formulated and diligently executed • 2
Far less inevitable, however, were fraudulent and slack
practices in the administration of transport services, for which the
pressing necessity and confusion of war were an ideal breeding-ground,
and the failure to settle accounts accurately and promptly. Throughout
the war there were constant complaints about mismanagement and malpract-
ice in the trains, whether under contract or public management. As early
as 1758 Boyd accused Da Costa of gross negligence in administering the
Hessian bread wagons, claiming that the vehicles were in a shattered
condition and many of the horses fit only to be given to the dogs, 3 while
a year later Hunter warned Hatton of his suspicion that the affairs of
the proviant train had been 'subject to Frauds & Bad. Practices' on the
part of the Crown's employees.u1 Levett 's investigations of the administr-.
ation of all the trains towards the end of the war suggested that the
services had frequently suffered from the introduction and employment of
unfit or broken-down draught animals and negligence in the proper shoeing
1 Hatton to F. Halsey, 18 September 1760, Halsey PBS. 1512].. F. Halsey
to Hatton, 9 December 1760, Halsey S. 15030.
2 Early in 1761 Frederick Halsey was unable to prevent magazines and de..
pots of provisions falling into the hands of the enemy despite frantic
efforts to save them. F. Halsey to Hatton, 7 February 1761, ibid.
3 Boyd to Treasury, 28 June 1758, T/1/386 No.41.
4 rnstructions for Hatton ...., (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.l50 - 151.
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of horses, while the practice of double mustering had enabled the con-
tractors to receive payment for non-exi8tent animals to the extreme det-
riment of the interests of both the Army and the British governtent. 1
 In
the sphere of local transport the fact that peasants were often pressed
into difficult and dangerous services created a groundswell of resent-
ment, which found its easiest expression in the pilfering of provisions
and equipment in transit, while the position of influence occupied by
German officials, such as Massow and Redecker, created a situation in
which favouritisin towards one 's friends and clients on the one hand, and
strict adherence to the interests of the Army on the other were not al-
ways compatible.2
It was thus the duty of both the Treasury and the comm-
issariat to do all in their power to check and discourage such practices,
although as with other branches of the service it was only at the end of
the war that anything like an effective supervision of the Army's trans-
port began, when Pownall appointed Levett to the control of the trains.3
The commissary was provided with a number of clerks and assistants,k and
two agents, RoseU and Gervais, who were permanently attached to the
foreign artillery and proviant trains respectively in order to supervise
the details of their daily upkeep and mana gement,5 developments which
1 Plan for the Control of the Hanoverian Artillery Train, (1762), TIll
11.20 ff128 - 129. The existence of such practices casts doubt on the
high percentages for the effective states of Dundas' trains, see above
p.285, although the contractor was never accused of fraud in this re-
spect either by Powna].1 or by the Commissioners for Examining German
Demands.
2 A Short Sketch of the Evils arising under the Commissariat in Germany
...., 8 February 1762, Add. !S. 3293k f.236.
3 State of the Office of Control, (27 June) 1762, T/1/Lf17 f.35L.
L4. Thid..
5 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 f.k37. The spelling of the
two names is subject to much variation.
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must at least have provided a discouragement of fraud arid malpractice,
although they also created a certain amount of tension inside the comm-
issariat. The rejection and destruction of a number of train horses as
unfit for service on the orders of Road was strongly criticized by
Howard, who expressed great concern as to what might happen if the Army
1
was ordered to make a sudden movement, while Gervajs was accused of de-
manding an unnecessary multiplicity of reports and. a general lack of co .
-operation.2 These contentions further illustrate the difficulty of re-
conciling the exigencies of the service with the need to eliminate all
possible opportunities for fraud. While resident agents were not app-
arently appointed for the bread, bakery and hospital wagon trains, these
services also came under the purview and scrutiny of Levett and his ass.-
istants in the last months of the war, but no additional personnel were
assigned to the supervision of local transport. Perhaps the extent and
variety of the latter 'a services would have made effective control a
near-impossible task, although the mere existence of a responsible off-
icia]. might have provided some discouragement to bad practices. Neverthe-.
less, by the end of the war some of the opportunities for favouritism
and fraud had been removed by the resignation of Redecker from his pos-
ition of director of all traffic on the Weser in November l76l, and the
termination of the unchecked influence which P!assow had exercised over
local transport iervices in general at the beginning of
1 Howard to Pownall, 26 September 1762, T/l/kl7f.298.
2 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, ?/1/l7 t.438.
3 Expose of Council].or Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham lt3S. DDHO/LI/313
f. 285.
1' Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. 1453.
32935 f.136. It is assumed that the request that the Commander-in-
Chief restore to the British commissariat full powers over land carr--
iage and river navigation was directed against Maseow 'a influence.
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The creation of an effective system of control not only
enabled a greater measure of supervision of transport services to be tm-
dertaken by specialized staff, but by providing more accurate and detail-
ed statistical information than had previously been available had equally
beneficial, effects. In 1760 Peirson had told the Treasury that he could
send no details on the numerical states of the trains because he was un-
able to inspect them, 1
 bitt by the second half of 1762 the state of the
proviant train was being recorded in twice-weekly returns on printed
forms ,2 and that of the foreign artillery train in a similar way. 3
 Such
information provided a far more solid foundation on which to base y-
ments for services under contract, and at the same time provided the
comaissariat and the military command with a much clearer picture of the
exact level of train resources at their disposal. At the same time, Pow-
nail's introduction of a comprehensive 'journal' and 'grand ledger',
detailing the movement of all government provisions in and out of maga-'
sines and depots and incorporating an exact record of the transports in-
volved,4
 provided the commissariat with precise information on the quan-
tities of goods in its possession and their exact whereabouts. Thus in
addition to being able to see where and how available transport resour-
ces were being employed, it was also far easier to detect thefts occuri'-
ing during transit, and to identify unjustified or fxaululent demands by
local people and officials for transport services which they claimed to
have executed.
1 Peirson to (Treasury), 7 June 1760, T/1/ L405 f.63.
2 Howard Vyse ?6S. D/HV/B/6/]. - 39.
3 Ibid. D/HV/B/6/49 - 59. It is probable that similar records of other
trains were kept at this time, but none have come to light.
4 See above p.201.
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There were delays at various times during the war in the
settlement and payment of transport accounts • Powna].]. commented in 1762
that some country carriage accounts had been outstanding for years, 1 and
it was not in fact until 1765 that a considerable sum of money was paid
to Prussian provinces for transport services performed in 1757, 1758 aM
1759, 2
 while a number of Bremen shippers had to wait almost as long for
the settlement of their extensive demands. 3
 Such delays were contribut-
ory factors to the withholding of local. transport, 24 and must also have
encouraged dishonesty and fraud. By 1761, however, there was a greater
recognition on the part of the Treasury and the commissariat that such
a situation was equally damaging to the interests of the Army and of the
British government • One result of this was the appointment of Henry Hu].-
ton as commissary of accounts with special responsibility for the pay-
ment of freights on the Weser, 5 and the extent of the backlog of unsett-
led accounts for services on this vitally important supply line was
clearly demonstrated, when the commissary's office was besieged by such
a mob of government creditors that he had to station his clerk at an
upstairs window and make the claimants climb up a ladder as the only way
to deal with them one at a time. 6
 The attempt to effect a speedier sett-
1 Pownall to Martin, 16 July 1762, T/l/LI.20 f.105.
2 Account of Demands of Prussian Countries .... in Powna].l, C.W. Corn-
wall & D. Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/56 f.420. The
sum allowed was 150,312 dollars 1]. groschen 6 pfennigs in gold, which
@ 2 dollars per thicat, the standard rate of exchange for the gold dol-
lar, - 54, 658.97 ducats.
3 Pownali, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 31 ?rch 17624, ibid. f.1242.
The sum allowed was 32,2469 ducats 1 dollar 24 groschen.
4 F. Halsey to Hatton, 26 December 1760, Halsey ?S. 15030.
5 Peirson to Ma.rtin, 22 August 1761, T/1/k1O f.82.
6 Journal, and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f,249.
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Lement of these accounts continued in 1762, when Leonard Collings re-
placed Hu].ton, and although cash shortages created further	 def-
inite improvements had been brought about, which it may be assumed re- -
sulted in a greater efficiency of transport services on the river.
The accounts of the trains under contract seem to have
been settled with more regularity throughout the war, and although there
were some periods when payments for Dundas' bread, bakery and hospital
wagons fell into arrears, 2
 a general view of the whole extent of his
train contracts shows that he was paid with surprising promptitude at
intervals of never much more than two months and frequently of one month
or less.3 It is true that he had to wait until 1765 for the final sett-
lement of his accounts, but the sums of money which were thus delayed
were mostly for services performed in the last months of the war, and
it is not possible to claim that shortages of cash had jeopardized the
effective execution of his train contracts during the major period of
hostilities. In connection with the trains in public ownership there was
certainly one difficult moment, when early in 1760 Hatton had his warr-
ants for the expenses of these services refused by the deputy paymaster,
so causing a considerable delay in the purchase of replacement horses
and other preparations for the coming campaign. 5 But this was something
1 L. Collings to Howard, 5 August 1762, Howard Vyse !S. D/HV/B/5/].l.
2 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.7 - 8. For example, between
payments on 3 July 1.759 and 25 February 1760 he received only one oth-
er warrant on 9 October 1759, during which period he was owed approx-
imately £6,000 per month.
3 Ibid. & ff.l3 - 16 & 19 - 22.
1+ IbId.
5 Hatton to Martin, 9 Apr11 1760, T/]./1405 ff.].70 - 17]..
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of a temporary confusion, arisin g from the fact that Hunter's instruct-
ions to his deputy did not correspond with the Treasury's views on the
granting of warrants. 1
 Of more long-term significance was the deficit of
£l1,3144/19/Ll. at the end of the war on Bilgen's receipts of money for the
expenses of the foreign artillery train, 2 and although three-quarters of
this sum was made up of suvplementary expenses, 3 the accounts for which
were probably presented too late for immediate settlement, this hardly
justifies the failure to provide cash for their payment until l761. ' A
similar situation might well have developed in connection with the ad-
ministration of the proviant train in late 1762, for Clark's accounts
show that his expenditure was already exceeding his receipts in the
brief period during which he was responsible for the service. 5 Thus the
directors of the Treasury's train services were not usually in the pos-
ition to be able to discharge all their creditors promptly.
a
The scope of the system of supervision and detailed
1 Newcastle to Cranby, 25 April 1760, ADD. ?S. 32905 ff.7 8 — 79. See
above p . 77, n.3.
2 T/52/56 f.38, 25 July 1764.
3 Ibid. f,39. For the years 1759 — 1762 Bilgen had supplementary expenses
of 4,712 ducats 32 groschen, 5,030 ducats 1 dollar 29+ groachen and
9,129 ducats 3+ groechen, a total of 18,871 ducats 2 dollars 28gros-
chen. Altogether his charges came to 24,8i5 ducats 1 dollar 9 groechen
2 pfennigs.
4 Bilgen in fact complained that he was unable to get the money which the
British government owed him. C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 6
July 1762, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.VI, pp.22]. — 222.
5 Declared Account of A. Clark, 3 June 1767, A0/11519/224. Ignoring sums
of money received and expended in connection with the sale of the train
after the end of the war, Clark spent £29,920/15/0 on upkeep and main-
tenance, while a further swi of £3,218/9/5 inc1xied contingent expenses.
His receipts from various sources were £24,6l3/18/l1, £661114/b,
£26/12/lO and £1,715/9/3, a total of £27,017/iS/b.
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record of transport services was enlarged and its efficiency improved in
the course of the war, while certain limited steps were taken to encour-
age the speedier settlement and payment of accounts. These changes made
it easier to uphold and protect British financial interests and had ben-
eficial effects on the numerical levels of resources available for the
Army 'a use. But improvements had been long delayed, and for a large part
of the war the work and administration of the trains both under contract
and private management had gone unsupervised, while ignorance of the pre-
cise details of the inultit1inous and disparate tasks undertaken by local
transport had made it impossible to provide any real control of its act-
ivities and any solid foundation for the settlement of its accounts • Such
considerations make it legitimate to wonder whether the improvements in- -
troduced at the end of the war were not tantamount to locking the stable
door after a number of the horses had bolted.
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CHAPTER VII
ROS PiT ALS
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,1these distressfuil scenes are enou gh to shock humanity ....
Few accounts of eighteenth century military life are
complete without a vivid if not lurid description of the sufferings of
2the wounded and of the even greater numbers of sick, who came under
the care of the army medical services. Although there can be no doubting
the existence of profound and widespread misery, it should not be for-
gotten that much of it was unavoidable • War by its nature must always
cause appalling injuries, and the conditions in which it had to be waged
at that time inevitably led to the appearance of virulent epidemic dis-
eases in the course of campaigns, while in both cases limited or erron-
eous medical knowledge could do very little to promote the patients' re-
covery, and may often have retarded or even prevented it • Less inevl.t-
able, however, were the ruthless economies which might be made in the
numbers of medical personnel employed and in the facilities with which
they were provided for the execution of their responsibilities. It seeme
to have been generally recognized that it was cheaper to recruit a new
soldier than to attempt to cure or to rehabilitate a sick or injured
although presumably not every government was prepared to carry the
implications of this principle as far as the reputedly enlightened Fred-
1 F. Halsey to R. Peirson, 26 March 1761, Halsey !S. 15031.
2 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century. (1977) p.
97. Figures for the Combined Army in Germany in 1759 show that of the
6,682 men who died or were invalided out of the service, 2,862 or
k2.83% had been killed or wounded in battle, while 3,820 or 57.17% had
died or been incapacitated as a result of disease. F.0.W.H. von West-
phalen, Ceschichte der Feldzige des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-
Lineburg. (1659 - 1B72J Vol.111, p.951.
3 E.E. Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American Rev-
olution. (l926) p.11.
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erick the Great, who issued orders that those soldiers who wou]4 be in'.
capable of future military service should simply be left to die. 1 Fur..
thermore, even if a relatively adequate structure of medical care exist-
ed on paper, it could be easily paralysed by the sort of inefficient and
dishonest administration which dogged so many aspects of military activ-
ity, 2 so that neither the financial interests of government nor the wel-
fare of patients was promoted. This chapter seeks to examine the record
of the Treasury and its commissaries in providing arid administering a
part of the medical services of the Combined Army in the light of these
considerations.
It is somewhat difficult to obtain an overall assess-
merit of the size of the problem involved, for the numbers of incapacit-
ated soldiers tended to fluctuate within fairly wide limits according to
the nature of the campaigning, obviously undergoing a significant in-
crease after a major engagement, 3 the season of the year and the nature
of the weather, and the extent of epidemic d1sease. Moreover, as the
Treasury was never directly involved in supplying and administering the
1 C. Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great. (1974) p.140.
2 In Prussian military hospitals the sick and wounded were allegedly
plundered at will, ibid. p.139.
3 The battle of Minden in 1759 left as many as 2,700 dead and wounded,
Sir R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany durin g the Seven
Years War. (1966) Apoendix XXX, p.514. A more detailed analysis of the
casualties at the battle of Wi1helnstha1 in 1762, ibid. Appendix XXVII,
pp.509 - 510, shows that 28.42% were killed and 71.58% wounded, and on
this basis there would have been 1,933 injured men to care for after
Minden. Savory's figures show that the Combined Army's total casual-
ties in the course of the war amounted to 18,800, ibid. Appendix XXX,
p.514, which using the same proportions would have inclizied 13,457
wounded.
4 Early in 1761 a contagious fever raging in Paderborn was affecting ex-
ceptionally large numbers of men, Peirson to Duke of Newcastle, 6 Feb-
ruary 1761, Add. ?S. 32918 f.305.
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medical services of the British troops , general returns of the numbers
of sick and wounded in the Combined Army as a whole give an exaggerated
picture of the extent of the precise responsibilities of the Board and
its employees. Detailed returns, distinguishing the different national
contingents, and some adjusted figures show that in 1759 and 1760 the
numbers of German sick and wounded were somewhat in excess of 5,000,2
while by the second half of 1761 they had risen to over 8,600. It seems
probable therefore that at any given time during the last four years of
the war the number of German soldiers needing medical treatment would be
between five and nine thousand. The real cost of supplying and maintain-
ing the Army's medical services is also difficult to ascertain, as ex-
penditure was accounted for under several different and disparate heads,
while some of the moneys disbursed for the upkeep of hospitalized sol-
diers could be reclaimed from the patients themselves or from their reg-
intents. 4 But working on the basis of crude overall costs it appears that
in the period 1759 - 1763 the general running expenses of the foreign
hospitals amounted to approximately £42,000 per annum, 5
 to which sum has
1 Such matters remained entirely the concern of their military command-
ers and officers, see below p.3O9.
2 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.111, p.125. Return of Prince Ferdinand's Army
of 1 September 1760, Md. !S. 32911 ff.1]. - 12.
3 On 1 June 1761 the whole Army contained 12,457 sick and wounded men,
State of the Allied Army, Add. MSS. 38333 f.l07, while the figure for
the British troope alone on 1 August 176]. was 3,830, The Returns of
British Forces Serving in Germany, PRO/30/8/89 f.305. Westphalen, op.
cit. Vol.V, p.1,12k.
4 See below pp.3)6 - 307 & 331.
5 During this period the conimissariat 'a director of foreign hospitals
paid or was allowed a total of £l26,958/lk/7*, Declared Account of T.
Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/l/1507/2l8, while the post-war settlement
found further sums amounting to £41, 820/14/5 still outstanding, Acc-
ounts of Bishop, 28 March 1777, T/52/l09 f.316. This gives a total of
£168,779/9/Of spread over some four years.
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to be added a maximum of some £36,000 per annum for the service's estab-
lished wagon train, 1 a figure of roughly £20,000 per annum for the supply
of provisions under contract to the Hanoverian hospitals, 2
 and unknown
but probably relatively smaller sums for the pay of established medical
officers and for various regimental allowances. 3 Thus all told it seems
likely that German medical expenses were in the re gion of £100,000 per
annum, and as such were financially of less significance than the as-
pects of supply which have already been discussed.
An examination of the structure of eighteenth century
military medical services shows that they existed at two distinct lev-
els; that of a regiment or corps and that of an army as a whole.lI Reg-
imental establishments included physicians, apothecaries and surgeons,
who exercised a permanent responsibility for the welfare of troops in
1 In 1762 the foreign hospital train contained 15 four-horse and 1.11
six-horse wagons, see Appendix VII. At a cost of 9/Cd and 13/Cd resp-
ectively per wagon per day, and calculatin g on the basis that the
train was maintained 96.61% complete and that 29.14% of its effective
cost had to be paid as compensation for loss and dama ge, see Appendix
VIII, it required an annual sum of £35,929/13/9 to maintain it. The
cost would have been less in earlier years when the establishment was
s mailer.
2 The contract, which was held by the same merchants during the last
four years of the war, was settled at 32,923 ducats, or £].6,078/13/6
at the standard rates of exchan ge of ducat : 5 guild ers 5 stivers, and
£ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, for a period of sli ghtly more than a year
in 1762 - 1763. This figure, however, represented a significant re-
duction by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands of the orig-.
inal sum of 6LI.,230 ducats, or £31,368/2/9, reported due to the con-
tractors by Bishop, and also of the figure of 144,230 ducats, or
£21, 600/13/11 , certified by the commissary of accounts in Germany, see
below pp.315 - 319. It must be assumed therefore that the accounts for
the period 1759 - 1761, which were not reviewed by the Commissioners
for Examining German Demands, were settled on a more expensive basis
than those of 1762 - 1763,
3 As for example the chests of medicines allowed to each German re gi-
ment for the first year of a campaign, T. Pownall & C .W. Cornwall to
C. Jenkinson, 26 !'rch 1764, T/52/56 f.336.
4 Ibid. f.337.
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peace-time as in war, and during the latter cared for the men in what
were somewhat ambitiously called 'regimental infirmaries , which were
little more than ordinary quarters set aside for the sick and wounded
with the provision of a few extra comforts. 2 The great drawback of this
system was that, when an army was ordered to move, each regiment had to
engage in a frantic search for wagons to carry those unable to walk,
with much resultant delay and the compromising of other important trans .-
port services. It was to avoid some of these difficulties that during
war-time general hospitals serving all regiments were brought into ex-
istence. These consisted, firstly, of mobile or peripatetic establish-
ments, which maintained a position some ten or twelve miles in the rear
of the army with the bakery and collected up the sick and wounded,
those with minor complaints and injuries being returned to their re gi-
ments when better, while more serious and chronic cases were transferred
to other accommodation.5 These so-called 'flying hospitals' thus provid-
ed some temporary shelter, but were • primarily used as ambulances • Sec.
ondly, there were the fixed or garrison hospitals, to which the flying
hospitals sent patients as necessary, and which were established at app..
ropriate sites in towns and villages and maintained as long as the pos-
ition of the army allowed.6 They might accommodate as many as a thousand
1 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand 's Orders Relating to the Number of
Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment ...., 1 September 1758,
Dundas of Beechwood 1S.
2 Standing Orders ...., 29 July 1760, Add. !S. 28855 f.l0.
3 Ibid. 29 July 1760 & 25 January 1761, ff.lO & 29 - 30.
k Extracts from Prince Ferdinand 's Orders Relating to the Number of
Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment . ..., 11 September 1761,
Dundas of Beechwood 1S.
5 Ibid. 1 September 1758.
6 The problems of moving these institutions with their inmates and biil-
ky stores meant that they sometimes had to be abandoned to the enemy,
T/52/].09 f.329.
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patients,1
 although the latter would rarely be found under one roof,
being dispersed in whatever military, municipal or private quarters and
lodgings could be found.2
Both fixed and flying hospitals employed large numbers
of personnel, including the physicians, apothecaries and surgeons charg-.
ed with the patients' treatment, in which they were assisted by auxiliary
staff, known variously as mates, matrons and nurses. 3
 Secondly, it was
common to assign a number of military officers to the hospital service
to maintain discipline and good order and to take care of the arms, equ-
ipinent and uniforms of the sick and injured . Finally, there were the
directors, purveyors, quartermasters, storekeepers and clerks , assisted
no doubt by various labourers and workmen, who were responsible for the
purchase, storage and distribution of the wide range of stores, equip-.
ment and provisions which the hospital service required. Included under
these headings were considerable quantities of medicines and drugs, sur
gical supplies and various hospital utensils. 6 In addition, patients
were usually furnished with blankets and a bedstead, the latter frequ-
ently the light Indian variety known as a charpoy, 7 while brooms and
1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 26 rch 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.
2 T/52/109 f.328.
3 Bishop to T. PownaU, 6 November 1761, T/1/k12 ff.235 - 236. Establish-
ment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761, Hotham )SS.
DDHO/k/227. A0/lf1507/218.
+ T/l/1112 ff.235 - 236.
5 Establishment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761, Hot-
ham !S. DDHO/4/227.
6 T/1/+l2 ff.235 & 237.
7 T/52/109 f.328. In this document the word appears as 'charpie'.
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soap were supplied for cleaning and disinfection. 1
 Among the varied it-
ems of diet, which might be provided for the patients, were bread, meat,
dairy produce, pulses, sugar, lemons, spices, herbs and beer, while oth-
er material, comforts in the form of heating, lighting, tobacco and spir-
its also figured in the hospital. budget. 2 Finally, significant sums had
to be spent on genera]. administrative costs, maintenance and repair, the
burial, of the dead and the carriage of patients, stores and equipment.3
A proportion of the costs involved in the many and var-
led services described above came under the heading of ordinary expend-
iture. Such was the case with the pay of the regimental medical officers
and of some of the staff of the fixed and flying hospitals. In the
course of campaigning, however, as it became necessary to augment, some-
times significantly, the establishment of medical personnel, additional
officers and staff were charged to extraordinarles , as were the chests
of medicines which were allowed to regiments or corps for the first, al-
6though not for subsequent campaigns of a war, and all equipment, stores
and drugs used in the hospitals, together with the latter's general run-
ning costs. 7 Provisions supplied to hospital patients were also charged
I. Estimate of Deliveries made by C. Behrend .... in Cornwall & 1). Cuth-
bert to C. Lowndes, 10 February 1766, T/52/109 f.267.
2 Ibid.
3 A0/]/l507/2l8.
k Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/kl2 f.236. Bishop's comments
refer to the staff of the Hanoverian hospitals, whose salaries were
included in the estimates voted by Parliament after April 1758. Simil.
ar arrangements existed for the Hessians from an earlier date.
5 IbId. Additional allowances during war-time to those maintained on the
ordinary establishment were also charged to extraordinaries.
6 T/52/56 f.336.
7 T/1/1112 f.237.
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to extraordinaries, although as the authorities recouped from regi-
mental funds the men 's subsistence, that proportion of their ordinary
pay which provided their food, it was only the cost of special diets and
other supplementary comforts which represented a real additional expend-
iture •
It can thus be seen that despite the smaller sums of
money involved medical. services were as complex a matter as any other
aspect of military administration. Considerable numbers of staff, pert-
forming a variety of functions in many different and often isolated
places, needed close and effective supervision both of their activities
and of the accounts which they rendered of a wide range of goods and.
equipment, supplied for the service and committed to their care. One
particular aspect of these affairs, the keeping of a meticulous daily
record of the numbers of men in hospital, was a 'sine qua non', for it
not only provided the justification of most expenditure in the hospitals,
but it was also the only means of ensuring that the men's subsistence
money was in fact transferred to the authorities which actually fed them,
instead of disappearing into the bottomless pit of the regimental purses.
Britain quickly came to assume full financial responsib-
ility for the medical services of the Combined Army. Prom the beginning
she was bound by treaty to pay or reimburse the regimental expenses, both
ordinary and extraordinary, of the Hessian troops employed by her, while
from April 1758 onwards she undertook similar obligations towards the
1 Sir 3. Cockburn to S. Martin, 25 March 1763, T/l/1 27 f.80. Memorandum
for T. Bradshaw ...., July 1768, SP/81/l58/3.
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Hanoverians and their allies, as well as responsibility for the extra-
ordinary hospital expenses of the Army as a whole. 1 During these first
two years decisions as to the framework within which the medical seru.
vices operated and the formulation of the general policies governing
their administration seem to have been left largely in the hands of the
German civilian and military authorities. It is true that Britain con-
trolled the numbers of medical officers attached to the regiments, for
their appointments were subject to parliamentary approval, while at the
same time the Treasury's commissary attached to the service of the Hess-
ian troops exercised a general responsibility for the provision of ex-
traordinary medical services. But in the case of the latter neither Am-
herst nor Boyd had the time and perhaps the inclination to play an act-
ive role, 2 while the commissary attached to the Hanoverian troops in
April 1758 was only charged with mustering them.' Such regimental. ex-
penses were, however, limited and largely customary, although it was
otherwise with the extraordinary hospital expenditure of the Army as a
whole, where considerations such as the numbers of beds to be made av-
ailable, the appointment of supplementary medical, administrative and
domestic staff, the provision of transport services, and the quantities
of stores, equipment, drugs and provisions to be supplied were extremely
flexible. Leaving such matters to the German authorities ran the risk of
compromising British interests, whose safeguarding really required an
1 See above p.31.
2 See above pp.164- 165. Their correspondence is devoid of references to
medical and hospital services.
5 See Appendix I (]lirand).
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active and informed commissary on the spot . It was only in December
1758, with the decision to assume direct responsibility for all aspects
of the supply of the Combined Army, that this necessity became a reality.
The position of Hurrter, the new superintendent of comm-
issaries, did, however, involve one anomaly from the beginning, in that
he was given no authority over the hospital services of the British
troops in Germany, whose administration for the rest of the war remained
in the hands of their medical and military officers. 2 This situation,
which inevitably involved duplication of effort, was not ideal, and ear-..
ly in 1760 Prince Ferdinand, in requesting the establishment of a new
flying hospital to serve the greatly increased numbers of troops in the
Army, proposed that all' hospitals be brought under the direction of the
commissariat, so that Hunter could take a global view of their admin-
istration and costs. 3
 The matter was discussed in London at a meeting
between the British Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary to the Treasury
and Hunter himself, where Granby's view that 'the Troops in General will.
prefer being separate, as not used to each others manner of practicing
Physick' prevailed.4 Furthermore, when shortly after his appointment,
Hunter sought the Treasury 'a advice on the methods to be adopted for the
day-to-day administration of the foreign hospitals, the Board recommend-
1 It is conceivable that between April and December 1758 the Hanoverian
authorities consulted the Treasury directly on matters of hospital
provision and expenditure, but no examples of this have come to light
in the official correspondence, and even if its advice had been sought,
the Board would have had no detailed information at its disposal on
which to formulate a decision.
2 Fe irson 'a Answer to Complaints Relating to the Commissariat, 6 June
1761, Add. PBS. 32923 f.395.
3 Prince Ferdinand to 1.0. Hunter, 5 February 1760, 1/1/405 f.377.
4 Minutes at a Meeting of Lord Granby, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Martin ....,
27 March 1760, Add. S. 32904 f.49.
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ed that it be left in the hands of the German officers 'already stat-
ioned in that Department and familiar with it ', and one result of this
was that the Hanoverian and Hessian hospitals continued to a.].]. intents
and purposes to act as separate entities. Thus no attempt was made to
weld the hospital services of the Combined Army into a single unit in
the interests of administrative efficiency. This failure probably der-
ived from the highly specialized nature of the service and the relative-
ly small amounts of money involved, in the light of which the Treasury
and its commissaries may have felt it better not to disturb established
traditions or arouse national prejtiices.
Hunter had hoped that the Treasury would provide him
with a commissary, who could direct and supervise the running of the
foreign hospitals, and in February 1759 he requested that 'a proper per-
son of Experience and Integrity' be sent from England for this purpose.2
When the Board was unable to offer him any assistance or even suggest-
ions, 3 he chose Thomas Bishop, who had acted briefly as assistant to the
director of British military hospitals in Cerinany.L4 Nothing is known ab-.
out Bishop's background and earlier experience, although he had been re-
commended to the Secretary at War by Robert Adair, later Surgeon General
of the Army, 5 as one 'whose Character is fair in the World; .... a Man
of Sense and Activity' Unlike the British director of military hospit-
1 Martin to Hunter, 23 February 1759, T/6l./96 f.29.
2 Hunter to (Martin), 1]. February 1759, ibid. f.27
3 Martin to Bunter, 23 February 1759, ibid. f.29.
L Short State of Documents .... as Relate to .... the Expenses of the
Foreign Hospitals, (1766) T/1/e45 f.125. Colonel Parker to C. Hotham,
6 November 1758, Hotham PS. DDHO/k/8.
5 Gentleman's Magazine, Vol.LX, 1790 , p.282.
6 R. Adair to Viscount Barrington, 12 October 1758, wo/i/6 f.k8.
-
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ala in Germany in the last part of the war, who was a practising sa
geon,1
 there is no reason to suppose that he possessed any medical skill
or qualifications, and although the description of him as 'an inferior
(erk to Mr. Hunter' 2 seems somewhat exaggerated, it soon became clear
that he was not of sufficient weight or standing to deal on equal terms
with the German medical and military authorities, and this may well have
been a major reason why Britain s control over the establishment, struct-
urea and practices of the foreign hospitals remained extremely limited
throughout his administration. It is true that early in 1760 the comm
issariat and the Treasury were fully consulted on the proposed expansion
of the flying hospital and gave their unconditional. approval to Ferdin-
and 'a plan for the augmentation of the service, 3
 but for most of the time
the German authorities were able to exercise considerable freedom of act-
ion in deciding the range of services to be provided, for example by es-
tablishing independent hospitals and appointing supplementary staff to
man them without reference to British officials . A similar state of a!!-
airs existed in connection with matters of detailed expenditure, for as
Bishop quite frankly admitted the Hanoverian hospitals continued to be
rtm by their own officials on a basis 'agreeable to their ancient Custom
as prescribed by the Rules of the Chancery'. 5
 Yet this never meant that
1. Declared Account of P. Burlton, Director of the British Hospitals in
Germany, 9 May 176]. - 30 June 1763, AO/l/1507/221. Warrant Appointing
Burlton, 22 July 1758, SP/+4/l90 f.375.
2 State of the Commissariat •..., Add. !'S. 38335 f.176.
3 Ferdinand to Hunter, 5 February 176ó, T/l/405 f.376. M. Hatton to Max-
tin, 9 & 10 April 1760, ibId. ff.17]. & 180. Hatton to Manoverian Chan-
cery of War, 10 May 1760, Halsey 1S • 15029. Bishop to Granby, 14 May
1760, T/l/405 f .101. Staff, stores, equipment, medicines and transport
were all augmented with the Treasury's permission, and Bishop produced
estimates for the various items to be purchased.
4 Bishop to John West, 1.]. November 1765, SP/9/231. T/52/109 ff.320 - 322.
5 Bishop to Pownail, 6 November 1761, T/1/4].2 f.255.
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he was prepared to commit Britain to the repayment of any expenditure
which the German authorities cared to regar! as traditional, a claim
which was put forward by the Hessians when they asserted:- 'we were told
that you Sr, as Intendant, had no concern at all of the regulations of
owr Hospital. but onley to take Care for the Payment of the Extraordin-.
airs Expenses thereof'. 1 The particular question at issue in this conn-
ection was the Hessian claim that all, patients were subsisted on a full
diet and that Britain was obliged to reimburse this expenditure, part of
which no doubt represented a perquisite of the hospital officers. Bishop,
however, refused to accept the argument 'Whence they wou 'd ridiculously
infer that every Sick man in their Hospitals must eat whether he ought
or has any Appetite or not', 2 and thus maintained the principle that the
economies of the establishments under his care must conform to a gener-
ally acceptable and equitable pattern. Unfortunately, this dispute dr..
agged on until the very end of the war, when the Hessian authorities
were still asserting that Britain had no concern with such matters and
refusing to supply the information and statistics which Bishop required,3
and in the course of this long struggle the commissary seems to have re-
ceived very little effective assistance from either his superiors in
Germany or the Treasury itself.' Thus for four years Britain was kept in
the dark about important aspects of the arrangements governing a major
branch of the service for which she was financially liable.
I. Letter of Mr. Commissary Schmidt, 16 September 1760, T/l/05 f.208.
2 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/l/k12 f.238.
3 Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts .... Appear to
be, 10 January 1763, T/l/427 f.357.
If It was, however, always difficult for Britain to assert her full fin-
ancial rights against her mercenary allies in the iidMle of hostilit-
ies.
:313.
Altogether, therefore, while after 175 8 this country in
theory controlled the general levels of provision of hospital. services
and the detailed regulations by which they were administered, in prac-
tice such control remained incomplete and indirect as it had been in the
first two years of the war. In addition, the acceptance of the tradit-
ional. administrative and. financial pattern, the precise details of which
in the case of the Hessians remained shronded in deliberate obscurity,
prec].nded any attempt to effect changes and reforms in the interests of
greater efficiency and the promotion of the welfare of patients. Finally,
while Britain's financial interests were partially safeguarded by the
fact that expenditure incurred by the independent action of the German
authorities had to be justified on grounds of necessity and equity in the
settlement of accounts, such a process was obviously more arduous and
complex and more likely to aUow some unwarranted claims to escape det-
ection, than the specific authorization or rejection of expenditure at
the precise moment of its occurrence by the direct intervention of a
responsible British commissary. But Bishop was never able or allowed to
play such a positive role.
Turning from these general considerations to the det-
ailed arrangements by which the hospitals many and varied needs were sup..
plied, it is again apparent that the part played by British commissaries
was to a large extent a limited and restricted one, for throughout the
war most requirements, with the exception of a considerable proportion
of food-stuffs, were purchased by the German authorities. Before the ass-
umption of direct responsibility for the supply of the Combined Army in
3111.
December 1758 such a state of affairs was unavoidable, except in the
case of the Hessian contingent, where the low profile adopted by the
British commissaries nevertheless ensured that these matters would be
left in the hands of the hospital officials. 1
 But it is more spuising
to find that, while after 1758 the commissariat's director of foreign
hospitals occasionally took direct action for the supply of goods, as
for example in ordering medicines to individual hospitals, 2 such con-
cerns remained for the most part the preserve of the Hanoverian and Hess-.
Ian officers. Bishop wrote of the latter 'Medecines, Hospital Goods &.
they furnish themselves with and account for as they find occasion for
I' • It is conceivable that this principle was originally established
as a result of Bishop 's lack of medical knowledge, 11' although there can
have been no insuperable obstacle to his informing himself on such matt-
ers, and another possible consideration was the fact that it was more
convenient for the officials of detached and frequently isolated hosp-.
ita].s to purchase their own medical requisites in limited quantities in
the immediate vicinity. In this way heavy transport costs were avoided,
-	 although any financial advantage to be gained by purchases in bulk was
inevitably lost, and no guarantee could be given of the regularity of
the supply of items so essential to the welfare of the patients. Moreover,
the British commissariat exercised no influence over the prices and other
1 The extraordinary expenses incurred by the Hessian hospitals were in
fact not reimbursed directly by Britain but by the Hanoverian authorit-
ies, which subsequently claimed repayment from the Treasury, Pownafl &
Cornwafl to Jenkinson, 26 March 1764, T/52/56 f.337.
2 T/29/36 f.290, 17 March 1765.
3 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/l/L1.].2 f.238.
4 Such a conclusion is suggested by the fact that he made the contracts
for the supply of ordinary provisions to the Hanoverian hospitals from
the beginning of his administration. See below.
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contractual conditions which were agreed, so that the tenuous nature of
their immediate control of hospital affairs was again apparent.
In one sphere, however, Bishop made a more positive and
direct contribution, for the food-stuffs of the Hanoverian fixed and
flying hospitals were supplied under contracts between himself and the
merchants, Cosman Behrend and Cosman Lehman, the first agreement being
made in 1759 and subsequently renewed at six-monthly intervals until the
end of the war. 1 There is no detailed information on the terms of these
arrangements in the early part of the period, but the accounts of the
deliveries made under the contracts of 6 January and 12 June 1762 were
submitted at the end of the war to the scrutiny of the Commissioners for
Examining German Demands, whose investigations brought to light a number
of disturbing circumstances. In the first place the prices agreed for
some provisions seemed to be exorbitant, while Bishop's commitment in
other cases to pay current market rates instead of fixing actual prices 2
had been the basis of serious overcharging by the contractors. Altogeth-
er, the prices seemed 'extravagantly high', some being treble and almost
all of them double the usual rates. 3 Bishop produced a number of differ'.
ent justifications for the prices which he had allowed, pointing out
'inter a].ia' that the contractors had delivered goods of superior qual..
ity, that the small quantities involved represented a loss to them if
1 State of Business in the German Office, Nay 1765, Add. ?S. 382 t+ f.
2119. Contract between Bishop and Messrs. C. Bebrend and C. Lehman, 20
January 1761, SP/9/223. The Hessian authorities continued to make
their own arrangements for the supply of food-stuffs.
2 Contract between Bishop and Behremi and Lehman, 6 January 1762, SP/9/
223.
3 T/29/35 f.1133, 5 June 17611. T/29/36 r.16, 16 July 17611.. To take one
example, rye bread at 2 groechen per lb., or 12 groschen per six-pound
loaf, was more expensive than any other contractual agreement. See
above pp.211.2 - 21.
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charged at normal prices, and that the mere presence of hospitals in an
area had an inflationary effect on the market.' Furthermore, he contended
that overheads had been exceptionally high, for deliveries especially to
flying hospitals involved considerable transport and labour costs, while
losses to the enemy of provisions in transit had also been at the con-
tractors' charge. 2 Although there was some validity in this last argu-
ment, in that most other contractors were allowed full compensation for
goods captured by the enemy, 3
 the Commissioners were singularly unim-.
pressed by the replies. They were sceptical as to whether best butcher's
meat for example had actually been delivered, commenting that hospitals
only used meat to make soups and broths, and stating that • although the
delivery of small quantities might well be commercially unprofitable,
the accounts showed that most provisions had been supplied in bulk. The
Commissioners did not comment specifically on the claim that prices were
always high in the vicinity of hospitals, although they might have ar
gued that such tendencies could be minimized by purchasing in small qu-
antities over as wide an area as possible, and they could also have add-
ed that afl. contractors were obliged to make deliveries at their own ex-
pense, and that agreed prices always incltxied an allowance for transport
1 Bishop to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, (undated), T/52/
109 ff.].02 - 103.
2 Ibid. f.lOk.
3 Contracts of Cockburn, October - November 1762, T/1/l7 ff.2 l 2 - 261.
k Cuthbert 's Remarks on a Contract and Certificate granted by Bishop to
Behrerxl and Lehman, (undated), SP/9/223. The fact that Pownall, one of
the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, dM not sian the rep-
orts was probably because as director of the derartment of control he
had. approved the certificate granted to the contractors, the revision
of which was now being undertaken, and not, as Lehman suzgested, be-
cause he did not agree that the prices were exorbitant • Memorial. of
Lehman, Read 27 January 1766, T/l/4+9 ff.192 - 193.
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costs.
Seeking corroboration of the evidence of overcharging
fotmd by the Commissioners, the Treasury wrote to Peirson and Cockburn,
both of whom according to Bishop had confirmed the arrangements, 1 al..
though their replies showed quite clearly that they had exercised no
effective control over hospital contracting activities and had simply
rubber-stamped whatever agreements Bishop had cared to make ,2 Cockburn
wrote that he had 'never interfered with Bishop in any degree in the
management of the foreign Hospitals further than to desire that he would
on all occasions make the most advantageous terms he could for Govern-
ment •,,, it was impossible for me to give any direction in a department
I did not understand '. Thus it appears that Bishop's superiors had been
content to allow him to make contracts involving considerable sums of
money on whatever terms he thought proper, a freedom of action which no
other commissary of his standing enjoyed, and faced with his inability
to give any satisfactory explanation of his agreements, the Treasury de-
cided that, despite the regularity and validity of the contracts, the
prices charged would have to be subject to revision and deduction. 11 This
arduous task was undertaken by the Commissioners for Examining German
Demands over a period of nearly a year, as a result of which deliveries
made to flying hospitals were admitted at the rates charged in view of
the difficulties and dangers inherent in this font of supply, and where
1 T/29/35 ff. i133 .. L1311., 5 June 1764,
2 Cockburn to T. Whately, 10 July 17621 ., Peirson to Whately, 13 June 1764,
T/52/109 ff.105- 106.
3 Ibid. f.l06.
4 T/29/36 ff.l5 - 16 & 204, 16 July & 18 December 1764.
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possible other prices were adjusted according to what information could
be found on the actual state of the market in the various places where
the deliveries had been made. But in a number of cases reliable figures
could not be found, and the contractors' charges had to be allowed to
stand. 1
 A second major objection of the Commissioners to the accounts of
Behrend and Lehman concerned the vast amount of provisions which had
been delivered, for Bishop's agreements engaged the contractors to sup-
ply what was necessary without mentioning specific quantities, and this
had produced some decidedly suspicious figures of consumption, as for
example in the relatively small garrison hospital at Minster, where the
patients had apparently been getting throuh 58 lbs. butter, f5 lbs.
best refined sugar, 60 quarts wine and brandy and 25 lbs. tobacco each
day. 2 The Commissioners therefore recommended further significant re- -
ductions in the sums to be allowed, basins their calculations on the acc-
ounts of the numbers of patients maintained in the hospitals and the off-
icial tables of diet and provisions to which they were entitled, 'for it
cannot be supposed, that the Contractor had an unlimited Power, to throw
into the Hospital what Quantities of each kind of Provisions he pleas 'd;
nor had a Subdirector of a Hospital proper Authority to order more in
than was necessary'. 3 Altogether, for exorbitant prices and excessive de-
liveries the swi of 144,230 ducats, reported due to the contractors in
Germany, was reduced by more than 25% to 32,398 ducats, a saving of over
1 Letter of Cornwall & Cuthbert, 30 November 1765, T/52/109 ff.96 - 97.
2 Cuthbert 's Remarks on a Contract and Certificate granted by Bishop to
Behrend and Lehman, (undated), sP/9/223.
3 Ibid.
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£5,700.1
It is thus clear that Bishop's contracting activities in
the last year of the war were not above reproach. He had allowed some un-
justifiably high prices, and by making open-ended agreements in which
other prices and the quantities to be delivered had. not been fixed in ad-
vance, he had, permitted the contractors to mount a comprehensive cam-
paign of extortion. It is true that much of the threatened loss was re-
covered as a result of the investigations of the Commissioners for Exam-
ining German Demands, although the previous agreements with the same con-
tractors between 1759 and 1761 were never subjected to this close scriit-
my, and there remains a strong possibility that excessive payments were
made on the earlier accounts. In Bishop's defence it can be argned that
the fluctuating numbers of patients in hospital made it impossible to
estimate the quantities of provisions required, although this does not
relieve either him or the commissary of accounts in Germany of the char-
ge of having allowed many unjustified prices and deliveries in their ex-
amination of the accounts. The implications of this situation are that
if the British director of foreign hospitals was unable to keep a tight
rein on contractual terms and prices, it is unlikely that German offic-
ials, with even less incentive to do so, were any more successful in
formulating stringent and economical bargains for the supply of stores,
1 C.V C(ornwall) & D. C(uthbert) to C. Lowndes, 30 November 1765, SI'!
9/223. It should also be pointed out that the certificate for Ll4, 230
ducats granted by Legh, the commissary of accounts in the department
of control, already represented a reduction of 20,000 ducats on the
sum originally reported due to the contractors by Bishop, an adjust-
ment which was probably made largely on the basis of inadequate vou-
chers, Abstract of an Account of Provisions .... Delivered to the
Foreign Hospitals .... by Behrend and Lehman, 1 June 1763, SE'/9/223.
The saving is calculated according to the standard rate of exchange of
d,ucat : 5 guilders 5 stivers and £ z 10 guilders 15 stivers.
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equipment and medicines. Thus while the picture of hospital contracting
activities which emerges is limited and not clearly defined, there are
strong hints that the prevailing state of affairs was not such as to pro-
tect and further British financial interests.
Turning from these matters relating to the general
framework within which the hospitals operated to the day-to-day admin-'
istration of the service, it is obvious that some effective system of
supervision and control of the activities of both German officials and
the British director himself was essential if efficiency and honesty
were to be fully promoted and encouraged. It is conceivable that Bishop
as tart of his work made visits to individual establishments and per-
haps even general tours of inspection, 1 although as the hospitals were
numerous, scattered and frequently mobile, it seems improbable that he
could have executed such functions on any regular and adequate basis on
his own. Yet throughout his administration his superiors saw fit to pro-
vide him with no more than one clerical assistant, who was clearly not
of sufficient standing to be entrusted with supervisory responsibilit-
The activities of those concerned in the supply and general admin.
istration of the hospitals might have been subjected to proper supervis..
ion had Cockburn and Thomas Halsey, who were originally appointed comm-
issaries of control in Py 1760 and charged 'inter alia' with the in-
1 His admittedly scanty correspondence is devoid of references to such
activities.
2 In An Account of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany 1759 ...., T/1/397 f.67, Bishop was aliowed one clerk
to help him, and The State of the Commissariat •..., Add. !S. 38335
(.176, suggests that this establishment remained unchanged for the
duration of the war.
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spection of these affairs, ever acted in their intended capacities,1
or had any of the first effective commissaries of control, who began
work in Nay 1761 under Peirson's direction, 2 been given a similar re-
sponsibility. And even when in 1762 a comprehensive and active depert-
aent of control was brought into existence, no commissary was assigned
to the foreign hospital. service until the very last days of hostilities,
at which stage Pownall 's nomination of Webb really came far too late to
achieve any beneficial effects. 3
 Thus it was accurately said of Bishop
that 'after Mr. Hunter left Germany, he remain 'd in this Business with-
out any Controle, during the whole of the second Commissariat, & was
indeed only Nominally controll 'd at the latter end of the Third & last
Coamissariat,L4 a state of affairs which, in view of the fact that he
was a relatively minor official acting in the triple capacity of con-
tractor, certifying commissary and paymaster, 5 was to say the least in-
appropriate and unwise. In fact after 1759 Bishop's status itself was
dubious, for he had been appointed by verbal orders of Hunter with no
written commission, and after the latter's departure from Germany con-
tinued to execute his functions for three years on an informal basis.
So tenuous were his relations with his superiors that when Howard took
1 Instructions to T. Halsey and. Cockburn, 13 May 1760, Halsey !'S. 15027.
See above p.65.
2 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse !S.
D/HY/B/4/4. There is no evidence that Peirson assi gned a commissary of
control to the foreign hospital service.
3 Pownall to Granby, 14 October 1762, Rutland ?S. Granby Letter Book I.
The fact that Webb was in charge of the accounts branch of the office
of control suggests that the supervision he was supposed to exercise
was one based on reports and statistics rather than on actual inspect-
ion.
4 State of the Commissariat •..., Add. !3S. 38335 f,176.
5 State of Business in the German Office, May 1765, Add. ?S. 382011 f.
249.
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charge of the cominissariat in 1762 he felt obliged to enquire of the
Treasury, 'I beg to know what he (Bishop) is, and what must be done with
him') The Board somewhat bemusedly described this state of affairs as
strange, although it seems to have been more mystified by Bisho p 's read-.
incas to act without any personal security than by the risk to the pub-
lic interest, inherent in a situation which apparently allowed him tot-
a]. freedom of action.2
The way in which both the officials and the director of
the foreign hospitals were left very much to their own devices tempts
one to seek the reasons in inefficiency if not indifference, and clearly
after 1759 some indications of such faults and failings are not lacking.
Nevertheless, it may be suggested that the tendency at all administrat-
ive levels to push hospital affairs into the background and conveniently
allow them to manage themselves derived partly from their intricacy and
specialized nature, combined with the fact that relatively small sums of
money were involved. This consideration, while not totally exonerating
those concerned, at least reflects some attempt, albeit ne gative, to
concentrate the limited manpower and resources of the commissariat on
matters of more vital concern. And when in 1762 the hospitals were the
one major branch of the commissariat 's responsibilities to be left out-
side the new system of control, it was almost certainly because by then
it was too late to do anything to remedy previous failings and omiss-
ions • Thus Pownal]. 's description of their affairs as uncontrolled and
1 G. Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/1/4].7 f.395.
2 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, ibid. f.118.
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uncontrollable was a cry of despair, which at the same time recoRniz-
ed the realities of the situation.
The lack of any proper system of control meant that the
only effective check on the administration of the German hospital auth .
-orities lay in the statistical reports and accounts which they were ob-
liged to furnish. Bishop's description of the information which he re-
quired of the Hanoverian officials suggests that it was sufficiently de-
tailed and analytical to provide a comprehensive picture of their man-
agement, always assuming that it was regularly and accurately provided.2
As already noted, one matter of vital importance was the keeping of a
detailed current account of the actual numbers of sick and wounded in
hospital, for any over-estimate in this connection automatically just-
if led overcharging on the accounts of food, medicines, stores and equ-
ipment, while an under-estimate was no more to Britain's advantage as it
led to the regiments being under-charged for the reimbursement of the
subsistence money of their men maintained in hospital. Bishop therefore
insisted that each of the separate Hanoverian hospitals provide a weekly
general list of the patients in its charge, and a fully detailed one,
presumably giving names and regiments, each month, while at the same
time a cross-check could be kept on this information through the lists
drawn up by the individual regiments of the men sent to the hospitals
and the latter's own registers of entries and discharges. 3 It was the
1. Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts .... Appear to
be, 10 January 1763, T/l/1127 f.356.
2 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/l/L412 ff.237 - 238.
3 Ibid.
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existence of such records which enabled the Commissioners for Examining
German Demands to prove the charge of excessive deliveries of provis-
ions by Behrend and Lehman, and consequently to save a considerable sum
of money. 1
 But if the Hanoverian authorities seem to have acted with
regularity in these matters, it was quite otherwise with the Hessians,
for it was only after a lengthy and acrimonious dispute that the fixed
hospital at Casse]. eventually provided Bishop with a fortnightly acc-
ount of the numbers of sick and wounded maintained, although without de-
tails of names and regiments, while the other Hessian establishments re-
solutely refused to provide the necessary information. 2 It thus remained
quite impossible to check the justice of Hessian hospital expenditure,
and Bishop complained at the end of 1761 'as they refuse to give me act-
ual proofs of the number of men subsisted, they may even allot a certain
quantity of Provisions for the consumption of men non-existing, & per-
haps too, of the dead'. 3
 No way was found out of this impasse for the
duration of the war, and it was not until 1777, after a lengthy invest-
igation of all the Hessian hospital accounts, that Bishop was able to
pronounce that despite previous dffficulties and lack of co-operation it
did not appear to him that the number of patients maintained had been
overstated, or that the expenses were greater than if the service had
been more immediately under the direction of the British commissariat.4
In the absence of the detailed statistics on which this conclusion was
1 Other statistics demanded by Bishop incinded the numbers of hospital
staff employed, the quantities of stores and utensils, tables and
lists of the consumption of provisions and accounts of the hospital
train. Ibid.
2 Bishop to J.G. Lorentz, 5 March 1761, T/l/kl0 f.l63.
3 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/4l2 f.238.
Lj. Report of Bishop on Demands for Hessian Hospitals, 28 March 1777. T/
52/109 f.3l8.
325.
based it is impossible to verify its accuracy, but it is perhate signif-
icant that Bishop 's statement was not categorical, and only offered an
opinion. On the other hand. the adamant stand which he had taken in conn-
ection with this matter during the war 1 makes it unlikely that he would
have passed accounts, which were either totally inadequate or which bore
the haUinarks of an attempt to defraud. It thus seems unlikely that
Britain 'a financial interests were seriously compromised in this conn-
ection, but the fact that the whole basis of Hessian hospital expendit-
ure remained obscure throughout the war, and then took a further four-
teen years to elucidate and establish was both inefficient and risky.
Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that the
Hessian authorities complained of Britain's failure to reimburse their
legitimate hospital expenses, 2 although the problem of cash-flow in the
service had deeper roots than the mere insistence on prescribed account-
ing forms • On his appointment in 1759 Bishop was instructed to pay the
salaries of extraordinary hospital officers and employees and the bills
for goods supplied and services rendered, for which purposes sums of
money were issued to him on the understanding that he accounted monthly
with Hunter for his administration. 3 The original intention in making
these arrangements was probably to relieve the Hanoverian and Hessian
I. His attitude had called down upon him the wrath of the Hessian auth-
orities, who had threatened to report him to his superiors in London.
Lorentz to Bishop, 21 February 1761, T/l/410 f.171.
2 Lorentz to Bishop, (1]. February 1761), ibid. f.173.
3 An Account of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined
Army in Germany 1759 ...., T/1/397 f.67. Bishop's accounts with the
Exchequer, AO/]/l507/218, show that he did not make payments to the
provision contractors for the Hanoverian hospitals. These were presum-
ably ordered by the financial director of the cominissariat.
326.
authorities of the need to advance cash for the hospital services, but
this hope was never realized for Bishop was not provided with sufficient
funds each month, so that an increasing debt was incurred and the hosp...
ita]. officers were obliged to borrow money. 1 By the end of 1759 the de-
ficit on the Hanoverian hospital account alone already stood at some
£2,300.2 and it continued to increase in the course of 1760, when after
obtaining about £2,800 in April Bishop received no further cash for the
current expenses of the service until September. 3 Moreover, during the
same period the augmentation of the establishments of the fixed and fly-
ing hospitals, requested by Prince Ferdinand and authorized by the Thea-
sury, was financed by the issue of approximately £18,600, whereas Bishop
had calculated the real. cost to be some £21,000. This continuing slide
into the red was recognized as unsatisfactory, and at the end of 1760
Granby stated his intention to issue sums of money in advance when the
outstanding hospital debts had been discharged, although this hope prov-
1 Bishop to Granby, 18 November 1760, Rutland ?S. Granby Letter Book I,
2 A0/1/1507/218. In the course of 1759 Hunter granted Bishop warrants
totalling 109,250 guilders, or between £lO,022/18/8 and £].0,355/9/0,
calculating £ : 10 guilders 18 stivers and 10 guilders U stivers, the
limits of the rate of exchange at the time, PMG/2/3 ff.185 - 188. The
expenses of the hospitals during the same period came to £12,klk/l2/6.
Bishop was also supposed to receive sums of money from the Hanoverian
authorities for the subsistence of men in hospital, but these accounts
too fell into arrears, see below p.329.
3 A0/l/1507/218. In April the cash had been obtained by Hatton in the
form of a bill drawn on Pye and Cruickshanks for 30,000 guilders, or
£2,790/13/U, calculating £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, the current rate
of exchange, PNG/2/k f.l55.
Lf A0/l/1507/2l8. 200,000 guilders, or £18,60 4/13/0 , calculating £ : 10
guilders 15 stivers, the current rate of exchange, PMG/2/k f.156 , were
issued for this service in Nay 1760. whereas Bishop estimated the cost
to be 1513,800 dollars, Bishop to Granby, 1k May 1760, T/1/405 f.].Ol.
Assuming the ducat to have been worth 3.5 85 dollars at this time, the
mean between 3+ and 3 dollars, quoted as the rates of exchange curr-
ent in early 1760, A0/1/1507/218, and calculating ducat : 5 guilders
5 stivers and £ 10 guilders 15 stivers, 1513,800 dollars £20,963!
6/8.
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ed to be largely forlorn. 1 An overall view of the cash situation in 1761,
1762 and 1763 shows the issue of just under £44,000,2 while during the
same period hospital expenses amounted to at least £6O,000.
It is not difficult to envisage the evil effects of this
state of affairs on the hospital service and above all on the welfare of
the patients, but if first-hand evidence is required it is found in Fred-
crick Halsey's description of conditions at Fritzlar early in 1761.
"Mr. Keidel dlrectr. of the Hann. Hospital having reed.
H.S.H. orders to transport aU the sick immediately to Perkelsheim has
been with me to represent the distressful condition of the sick for want
of Money, he has at prest. about a thousand sick here, has exhausted all
his Credt. in borrowg. money to get a few necessaries for them, & can
upon his own Credt. get no more; those that are ailready transported he
1 Bishop to Granby, 18 November 1760, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I.
One warrant of 100,000 guilders was issued in January 1762 partly as
an advance for future expenditure, AO/1/1507/2l8.
2 Warrants were issued as follows; 24 April 1761 - 73,500 guilders, 25
June 1761 - 103,950 & 52,950 gui].ders, 30 August 1761 - 90,000 guild-
era, LI. November 1761 - 30,000 guilders, 17 January 1762 - 100,000 gull-
ders, 24 July 1762 - 21,000 guilders, A0/]./1507/218, a total of 471,1400
gul].ders, or £43,851/3/3, calculating £ : 10 guilders 15 silvers • Sums
of £16,l82/U/1*, received from the Hanoverian (ancery of War as a re-
imbursement of the subsistence of patients maintained in the hospitals,
and 39,519 guilders 1Lf dolts, for sales of hospital stores and provis-
ions, are not inclined in these calculations as they were not received
before the service came to an end. Ibid. Cockburn to 1rtln, 25 Prch
1763, 1/1/427 f.80.
3 Bishop accounted for expenditure as follows; January - November 1761 -
£38,551/1/ll+, December 1761 - January 1762 - £3, 630/0/7, February -
December 1762 - £14,570/16/ll, 1763 - £3,171/5/1l3, a total of £59,923!
5/54, A0/l/1507/218. The real amount involved was in fact more than
this, as a proportion of two sums of £9, 713/14/5 aM £853/9/k, which
are not assigned to a specific period, also belonged to the years in
quest ion.
4 His Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand.
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cou'd give no more than Six marienges. 1 pr. man pr. day to carry them
thro • to Perkeisheim & considering the country they must march thro
where allmost all necessaries of life have been consumed & are wanting,
I fear those poor creatures will have the misfortune of having Famine
addd. to their sufferings •,••2
It was such sorry conditions which led Halsey on this occasion, as some
Months previously, to ignore strict accounting propriety and grant cert-
ificates for advances of money to the hospitals, commenting that it was
ridiculous to give the certificate before the money was aid, but that
it was the only way to relieve the misery involved. 3 By such means the
additional sufferings of the sick and wounded might be occasionally and
partially alleviated, but these pal].iatives were scarcely an effective
remedy for the disease.
While it helped the patients, Halsey's conduct ran the
risk of compromising British financial interests, 4 which must also have
suffered from inflationary tendencies, induced by the calculation that
payment of accounts might well be significantly delayed. A more partic-
ular example of the harmful effects of cash shortages comes from the end
of the war, when because of lack of money to pay arrears of salary to the
extraordinary hospital employees and to settle the other outstanding
debts of his office, Bishop on leaving Germany aflowed the hospital es-
tablishments to remain in existence for some months at considerable and
1 Mariengroschen.
2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 26 March 1761, Halsey PS. 15031.
3 F. Halsey to Colonel de Lachevallerie, 3 November 1760, ibid. 15030.
4 It was for a similar action that he was dismissed in 1762, see above
pp.133 - 134.
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unnecessary expenee) His reasons were firstly, the hardship which would
be caused to employees if they were discharged without payment for their
services ,2 arid secondly, the fear, which he afterwards used in justific-.
at ion of a refusal to return to Germany, that had he wound up the busim.
ess arid closed his office an angry horde of creditors might have att...
empted to arrest him for debt and seize his papers, 3 As Bishop pointed
out, such difficulties would not have arisen had the German authorities
been willing to reimburse the considerable sujis of money which they had
been paid for the subsistence of men who had in fact been maintained in
the hospitals, but they insisted that they could not make this adjust-
ment until their other outstanding financial claims on Britain were sett-
led.4
 Eventually, the Hanoverians were persuaded to pay the salaries of
employees who had worked in their hospitals, although this left the oth-
era in 'a distressed Situation ', while Bishop's clerk was presumably
able to get his papers safely to England on payment of some £300 demand-
ed for office expenses. 6
 The Treasury felt that their commissary had
acted laxly in this matter by allowing hospital expenditure to continue
when it was no longer necessary, and strictly speaking its view was just..
ified, but at the same time the moral obligation and fears which governed
Bishop's behaviour are understandable, and had the necessary cash been
1 Bishop to Cockburn, 19 rch 1763, 1/1/42 .5 f.l49. P129/35 f.118, 6July 1763.
2 Bishop to J. Dyson, 22 July 1763, 1/1/4214 .
 f]99,
3 P129/35 f.128, 22 July 1763.
4 Bishop to Cockbum, 19 !rch 1763, 1/1/425 f.149. Cockburn to !.rtin,
25 !rch 1763, 1/1/427 f.80.
5 Bishop to Dyson, 22 July 1763, 1/1/424 f.199.
6 Bishop to C. Jenkinson, 27 AuguSt 1763, 1/1/425 f.1LI.5. There is no rep-
ort of any attempt to seize the papers.
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available he would not have found himself in such a problematic situat-
ion.
In all the ramifications of this unsatisfactory state
of affairs, it is evident that the failure to bring the accounts of the
foreign hospitals to a prompt and regular settlement in the course of
the war was a root cause of the chronic shortages of cash which afflict-.
ed the service. For this the Hessian authorities must bear a large ntea
sure of responsibility because of their refusal to present their acc-
ounts in an acceptable form, and it is possible that the Hanoverl.ans
were also partly to blame for failing to send in punctually full details
of all expenses, although the geograthical dispersion of the hosDitals
may have made this difficult to achieve. AM yet this is only one side
of the coin, for at the same time shortages of cash were a basic reason
for the failure to settle accounts which had been properly presented,1
while this in turn had the effect of preventing an accurate assessment
of monthly expenses, on the basis of which information adequate sums of
money could be made available. Thus debts were not paid and the full ex-
tent of Britain 's financial liability for the service remained an un-
known quantity. In this situation of actuarial inefficiency the inherent
tendency to regard hospital expenditure as of secondary importance, and
to channel the always inadequate supplies of cash towards what were con-
a idered more vital services could only be reinforced.
The end of hostilities marked only the beginning of a
1. Bishop to Granby, 14 May 1760, T/6L4./97 f.3.
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lengthy and arduous process to adjust and settle the foreign hospital
accounts. Debts amounting to 108,653 dollars were owed to the Hanoverian
authorities, 1 who in turn owed Britain a similar sum for the subsistence
of their troops in hospital. 2 The Hessians for their part claimed to
have expended no less than 476,620 dollars on their hospitals, of which
they demandei reimbursement and from which an unknown sum had to be de-
ducted for the subsistence of their men. 3
 On top of all this 78,120 dol-
laze was owed to various claimants for services involving the transport
of patients, stores and equipment.4
 In January l76i the Treasury directed
Bishop to proceed to a speedy casting up of his accounts and to deliver
them from time to time to the Commissioners for Examining German Dent-.
amls, 5
 and at some time in the course of that year he must have complied
with these orders, although in !'rch 1765 the Commissioners reported
that they were unable to undertake an examination and statement of the
accounts because Bishop had acted as contractor, certifying commissary
and paymaster, so that he alone could be the proper jxige of his finan-
cial administration. 6
 In arguing thus the Commissioners seem to have
somewhat overstated the case, for although the fact that Bishop had act-
ed in a triple capacity made it impossible to subject his accounts to
the usual checks and verifications, there was in fact no reason why they
1 Estimate of the Debts Due on Account of the Foreign Hospitals, 16 July
1766, T/1/452 f.298.
2 Bishop to Cockburn, 19 March 1763, T/1/425 f.l49.
3 Memorandum for Bradshaw ...., July 1768, SP/81/158/3.
4 T/l/452 f.298.
5 T/29/35 ff.283 - 284, 30 January 1764.
6 State of Business in the German Office, May 1765, Add. ?S, 38204 f.
249.
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could not have reviewed the appropriateness of their form, the accuracy
of their calculations and. the validity of their vouchers, and as a result
of these investigations produced an interim report. Instead, in recomm-
ending that Bishop be called to account before the Aiiitors of the Dii-
prests for money advanced to him, and claiming that a by-product of this
process would be a clarification of the accounts and a revelation of out-
standing claims, the Commissioners seem to have been at least partially
concerned to unload a difficult and tedious problem on to someone else 's
shoulders, a move which was to have most unfortunate consequences. For
in accepting these recommendations, the Treasury almost inevitably 'r,ost-
poned any clarification and settlement of the accounts to the Greek Cal-
ends by submitting them to the course of the Exchequer, which pursued
its inexorable ways oblivious of time. On the contrary, the office of the
Commissioners worked more speedily, not only because of the limited nat-
ure of its tasks but because its employees were experts and specialists
in matters concerning army supply in Germany. This consideration was
soon shown to be of some significance when the Aiñitors of the Imprests
demanded the translation of the vouchers in German which accompanied the
accounts, so necessitating the employment of a notary and causing fin'-
ther delays when Bishop objected that the total. cost of the work would
be exorbitart. 1 Eventually the Treasury ordered him to employ one of the
clerks o± the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 2 clearly the
most sensible arrangement and one that should have been ador,ted in the
first place. Further difficulties arose almost immediately, for no soon-
er had the Atriltors begun their examination than they found lar ge quan-
1 S. Schomberg to Bishop, 26 February 1766, T/l/k50 f.382. Memorial of
Bishop, 28 May 1766, ibid. f.383.
2 Grey Cooper to Bishop, 3 July 1766, T/27/29 f.339.
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titles of unpaid accounts, which they claimed they had no authority to
consider, 1 so effectively destroying the hope that Bishop's examination
before the Exchequer would clarify the general state of his accounts.
Faced with this dilemma Bishop suggested that it would be best to report
the state of his accounts to the Treasury, and he was ordered to proceed
2
on this basis. More than three years had now passed since the winding
up of the hospitals in Germany and no progress at all had been made to-
wards a settlement. Already in 1765 the Treasury had said. that it was of
great importance to the public interest to bring the account to a speedy
conclusion, and by stating its determination to admit of no further de-
lay 'under any Pretence whatsoever' had suggested that matters had not
been undertaken with the maximum efficiency. Certainly it should have
been possible to have recognized much earlier the precise nature. and
form of the accounts, in order to decide the most appropriate and eff-
ective way of dealing with them.
It was perhaps inevitable that Bishop 'a actual examin-
ation and. statement of his accounts would be a protracted affair, but
few can have envisaged that it would take no less than eleven years. The
delay was occasioned largely by the intrinsic difficulties of the Hess-
ian hospital accounts, which had not been reviewed for any part of Bish-
op's four-year administration and involved an examination of the detail-
4
ed reports of the directors of the separate branches of the service.
1 Memorial of Bishop, 30 September 1766, T/l/445 f.517.
2 T/29/38 f.142, 2 October 1766.
3 T/29/37 ff.7 - 8, 5 June 1765.
4 Memorandum for Bradshaw ...., July 1768, SP/8l/158/3.
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The Treasury for its part, despite its avowed intention to brook no de-
lay, was not prepared to accept these accounts in a partial or inadequ-
ate form, and even after nine years of effort in 1775 went as far as to
order a complete revision of all the reports presented by Bishop, so
that a fuller and more accurate state of the situation could be drawn
up.1 Thus it was not tint 1]. March 1777 that the accounts were finally
epted by the Board, which in July of that year authorized payment of the
balance of £4].,820/14/5 which appeared due to various claimants.2
As a result of these prolonged labours by Bishop a nuin-
ber of unjustified or excessive demands were eliminated from the foreign
hospital accounts , although this was no more than the minimum expected
of any accountant, and the inordinate time taken lessens the enthusiasm
for the achievement. Moreover, the final report showed a number of signs
of settlements effected on the basis of probability rather than of pos-
itive proof. For example, in stating the Hessian accounts Bishop spec-
ifically admitted that he had often been obliged to accept figures for
the numbers of sick and wounded maintained in hospital as given in the
reports of the individual directors without checking them, although he
1 T/29/14k f . 308 , 7 July 1775. Two years previously Bishop's accounts had
again been submitted to the Aulitors of the Imprests for their opinion,
and it was as a result of their report, and a long series of inter-
views with all concerned, that the orders for a general review were
issued. T/29/k3 f.280, 28 January 177k, ibid. f.412, 23 June 177k, Tf29/14k r.16, 22 July 177k, ibid. f.79, 1.5 November 177k, ibid. f.1k8,
17 February 1775, ibid. f.298 , 5 July 1775.
2 T/52/109 f.315, 30 July 1777.
3 Among the demands rejected as unjustified were claims for the upkeep
of prisoners-of-war, ibid. ff.319 & 32k, for losses of and damage to
property, such as boats and houses, used by the hospitals, ibid. f.
327, and for items which should have been at the expense of the medic-
al officers, ibid. f.323.
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affirmed that when he had been able to do this he had found no discrep-
ancies. 1 In addition, the acceptance of some accounts simply because pay-
merit had. been strongly solicited by a high-ranking military officer was
irregular, especially in one case where Bishop went as far as to say
that he would have rejected the demand had it not been earnestly recoinm-
ended by the Duke of Brunswick himself. 2 Thus there were aspects of the
final settlement, which were based on grounds other than those of Brit-
ain 'a strict liability, and others which were upheld either without
proof or at best with evidence which was purely circumstantial. Such a
denouement was far from satisfactory, but by 1777 it was the only way to
bring an otherwise interminable affair to any sort of conclusion.
1 Ibid. f.318. It would seem that the word 'mentioned' in the phrase 'the
numbers of sick actually mentioned in the hospitals' should read 'main-
tained'.
2 Ibid. ff.319 - 320 & 322. The account recommended by the Duke was for
the expenses of a separate hospital established at Boden Verden, which
Bishop felt had been superfluous as there were existing hospitals in
the neighbourhood.
3 That a very considerable proportion of these accounts lacked normal
justifications and proofs is suggested by the fact that, when in July
177k Bishop presented the Treasury with a list of demands against which
there were no objections or doubts, they amounted to only £3,14.32/18/k,
T/29/44 f.26, 28 July 177k, whereas his final report recommended pay-
ment of over twelve times that sum.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONU
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It has been observed that 'war is always conducted in
a nnzidle as a contest between rival systems of inefficiency', 1
 a prem-
ise which does not seem to lack ready and abundant supporting evidence
from all periods in the history of every country. Thus much historical
writing on military subjects is composed of gloomy catalogues of fail-
ures, leading directly or indirectly to death, injury, suffering, hard-
ship, material destruction and waste of resources, frequently with few
positive results to show for it, and so containing all the elements of a
large-scale tragedy. Moreover, as there is often a tendency to seek ex-
planations for this sorry state of affairs in the realm of human inad-
equacy, error and incompetence, sometimes of the most grotesque sort,
war comes to assume more the characteristics of a tragicomedy, in which
the gods apparently mock the follies of feeble men. Such analyses accord
we].]. with modern conceptions of the futility and obscenity of war and
the belief that man is, or should be, master of his own destiny, but
while containing a measure of truth they are nevertheless partial. Mil-
itary affairs and wars have rarely been an unmitigated record of disas.-
ter, and the historian's vision is of necessity clouded and his judgment
biased if he approaches his task only looking for or high-lighting those
examples which suit his preconceptions, and ignoring or failing to give
due recognition to the elements and. examples of success and achievement
which are to be found. Furthermore, any explanation of military failure
1 P. Addison, New Statesman, 2 September 1977, p.311.
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which does no more than identify human mistakes arid inadequacies must
be regarded as superficial, satisfying a primordial need to find a scape-
goat, but hardly providing an historical explanation of any depth and re-
finement. Finally, an adequate analysis of the affairs of armies and the
events of war must always take proper account of the severe and often
unique difficulties of military administration in the field, where con-
ditions are sometimes such as to make the attainment of any normal degree
of efficiency impossible, as well as of the obstacles presented by estab-
lished and traditional bureaucratic forms on the one hand, and political
and financial realities on the other.
In examining the detailed work of the Treasury and its
commissaries in supplying non-military goods and services to the Combined
Army in Germany during the Seven Years War, it has been assumed that the
twin tests of the efficacy of such operations are whether the arrange-
ments made are such as to encourage the optimum provision of essentials,
and the extent to which such provision is achieved with the greatest
possible measure of economy. The two are not necessarily contradictory,
for the latter, as well as upholding the financial interests of supp-
liers, also safeguards the best interests of consumers, who must suffer
directly if the limited sums of money available are wasted, and indirect-
ly if spendthrift policies exacerbate the inflationary tendencies always
inherent in a war situation. This study has concentrated on four aspects
of such matters for special consideration, in the first of which, the
formulation of general policies, British administrators enjoyed a fair
measure of success. There is little if any evidence of a reluctance to
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provide adequate quantities of provisions and levels of service, or to
introduce and maintain appropriate qualities and standards, as a con-
sequence of that short-term and short-sighted quest for economy which
can be so detrimental to effective administration. Moreover, in the ex-
periments dispensing with the services of private contractors for the
provision of bread and train services, the Treasury and some of its
commissaries made attempts to undertake supply by means of a more close-
ly controlled and economical system of public ownership and management,
not found in the British army because of the prevalence of anti-milit-
ary prejudice. Such developments, while not entirely the result of the
positive initiative of British administrators and not adhered to with
consistency throughout the war, none the less revresent significant and
forward-looking experiments with new methods of army supply. On the oth-
er hand, the failure to extend Britain 's control over all aspects of
policy formulation and the resultant freedom of action allowed to Ger-
man civilian officials and military officers, a situation not calculated
to encourage maximum efficiency and minimum costs, was much less satis-
factory, while in these and other essential matters the Treasury some-
times showed an unhealthy inclination to provide little direction, or to
procrastinate when faced with awkward and difficult problems, the Drompt
resolution of which would have avoided future troubles and complexities.
In connection with the detailed arrangements for sutrnly,
the Board and its envloyees made a fundamentally unsatisfactory start in
1757 - 1758, characterized by vague and uneconomical areeinents, unnec-
essary delay and considerable confusion, while in 1762 the Treasury made
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a dramatic intervention in forage supply arrangements, which was bedly
misjndged and devoid of any beneficial effects. After 175 8, however,
contracts and agreements as a whole were promptly made and drafted with
care and precision, while any remnants of slackness which still remained
were eradicated by the work of the department of control in 1762. Exai-
pies of what may be justly considered to be artificially inflated prices
are to be found in all areas of supply in all periods, while the basis
on which compensation was awarded to train contractors appears to have
been unnecessarily generous • But making allowances for these factors
and for the example of the hospital services, the details of much of
whose supply either remained outside the direct control of the respons-.
ible commissary or was uneconomically managed by him, the evidence -
does not warrant the genera]. conclusion that British officials proflig-
ately wasted their country's resources, or that suppliers were permitt-
ed to wage a continuous and successful campaign of extortion, both of
which premises figured prominently in the battery of opposition argu-
ments against government foreign policy.
Although the execution of these genera]. policies and
detailed arrangements was far from totally unsuccessful and ineffici-
ent before the final period of the war, the practical details of imple-
mentation received inadequate emphasis and were left unnecessarily to
chance before that time. It was only with the establishment of the dep-
artment of control that a formal and effective framework of supervision
was brought into existence, and even then, as in most other instances,
the hospital services remained outside the main stream of developments.
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It was thus only very late in the day that it proved possible to over
turn the assumption that matters of control were of secondary or even
peripheral importance, to whose value lip-service might be paid, but
which were top of the list of sacrifices if staff shortages and pressure-
of work demanded an economy of effort. AU parties must share the blame
for this mistaken under-emphasis; many commissaries for not seeing be-
yond the limited point of view that the extra effort required would make
their tasks more difficult and complex, although it would in fact have
improved the efficiency of supply and saved money, and the Treasury for
failing to realize or refusing to recognize before 1762 that the eff-
iciency of its work in Germany was being badly compromised by slackness
in execution. And yet the fact that important and far-reaching reforms
were introduced at the end of the war, when a fatalistic resignation
that it was too late to make any significant or beneficial, improvement
might have been expected in an age still associated with the principles
of 'quieta non movers', is evidence of a genuine commitment to the up-
holding of high standards, however imperfectly the theory was sometimes
translated into practice.
Similar conclusions apply in the sphere of records and
accounts, where it is difficult not to feel considerable ill-ease at the
way in which incomplete statistical information and, vast arrears char- -
acterized so many branches of supply until almost the end of the war.
Ignorance of the exact state and levels of provisions and services and a
steadily growing backlog of accounts were certainly not solid foundat..
ions on which to build an efficient administrative system, and while
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shortages of both staff and cash were influential in bringing about this
state of affairs, some of those involved placed too much reliance on the
belief that everything could be safely postponed to a final day of reck-
oning and juignent at the end of hostilities. But that this view was not
universally held is again proved by the creation and work of the depart-
ment of control, which did a great deal to correct the worst abuses.
Much effective work was also done by the Commissioners of Enquiry, des-
pite the fact that their juigments tended to lack balance, while it is
difficult not to be impressed by the achievements of the Commissioners
for Examining German Demands • Presented with a truly daunting task, they
tackled it with determination, perseverance and ingenuity, and in nearly
six hundred reports, issued in a relatively short space of time, settled
the outstanding accounts with justice and as much accuracy as was human-
ly possible, as a result of which demands amounting to over £6,600,000
were reduced to less than £1,300,000.l Of course the work should never
have been necessary, but that does not detract from the actual achieve-
ment of Pownall, Cornwall and Cuthbert.
Some of the inadequacies noted above would not have ax-
isen or become so serious had the administrative structure which was
created to execute Britain's responsibilities been more perfectly formed.
Failures to appoint the necessary numbers of staff to the commissariat
at an early date, to assign then specialized functions, to endow supex-
1 T/29/37 ff.59 - 60, 5 July 1765. Their work contixEed until May 1766
and the final totals were somewhat larger than these figures.
br officials with the powers essential for carrying out their tasks and
to pay inferior employees more than a pittance of a wage were all fact-
ors which compromised efficiency. AM yet here again improvements were
made, albeit slowly, as the war progressed, so that by 1762 there exist-
ed a well-staffed and coherently organized body, possessing powers of
independent action and justifying for the first time the title of 'coinm-
issariat'. In this process of evolution it took the Treasury some time
to grasp the importance of some basic lessons, and to appreciate that
the true interests of both the Army and. Britain lay in such developments,
but if the Board was a slow learner it was nevertheless ultimately rec-
eptive to the need for change and improvement. Failures were also some-
times attributable to persona]. inadequacies among those who staffed the
commissariat, and examples of lack of understanding, effort, attention
to detail and jxiginent are all to be found, although much less frequent-
ly than is often imagined. The commissaries as a class do not merit that
tarnished reputation for scandalous incompetence and dishonesty, which
they enjoyed with soldiers and the general public at the time, and which
has on the whole continued to be accepted by historians. In men such as
Hunter and Pownall the commissariat possessed administrators, who came
from a background of experience and success in the public service and
brought to their tasks much ability, perspicacity and determination. If
therefore there are reasons to see a significant development in the em-
ergence of the commissariat as an institution and to trace the presence
of professional standards and performance on the part of at least some
of those who staffed it, the ultimate tragedy of the story is that the
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new structure was unceremoniously demolished at the end of the war and
its employees dispersed to various other occupations. Through its con-
tinued existence the coinmissariat could have improved the understanding
of the basic problems and the practical difficulties of army supply, and
nurtured on a corporate basis the standards of professional competence
to which many of its members aspired. Instead, two decades later in the
American War of Independence, a conflict in which the logistical prob-
leme were far more intractable, many of the lessons bad to be re].earned,
and this time the accompanying experience was a far more bitter one.
Much recent research has convincingly demonstrated that
the administrative institutions of the eighteenth century were often sad.
ly lacking in vitality and efficiency. Conservative in outlook, clinging
to traditional forms and seeking to maintain and preserve established
practices as their principle of action, or rather inaction, they were
inevitably somewhat lethargic in operation and slow to appreciate and
respond to the need for change and reform. It has not been the purpose
of this study to attempt to prove that the operations of the Treasury
and the commissariat do not fit into this pattern, for while it has been
at pains to point out that the record was by no. means devoid of success,
it has also shown the presence of some of the administrative inadequacies
typical of the age. Yet to be able to see these failures in their true
context and to start to provide some explanation of why they occurred, it
is essential to give due recognition to the preconceptions. and concerns,
which governed the thinking of British administrators and influenced
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their decisions and actions, and equally to the severe practical diffic-
ulties and obstacles, which were involved in the actual. task of supply-
ing the Combined Army in Germany. Thus it was hard for the Treasury to
escape from the restrictions imposed by an age in which acute suspicions
of armies and aU things military and antagonism to placemen were domin-
ant political. themes • In addition, the Board was inevitably torn between
its duties and obligations as the upholder of British interests and the
guardian of the public purse, and the need to do nothing to upset the
military situation in Germany, on which the continued resistance of Fred-
erick the Creat and consequently the whole global strategy of the war de..
pended. Finally, it found itself charged with the maintenance of a large
multi-national army, whose Commander-in-Chief was a foreigner and not a
servant of the British Crown, campaigning in a country, where despite the
Hanoverian connection, British administrators had no real authority and
influence, and with which communications provided not a few obstacles.
Some of these difficulties affected the work of the commissariat, which
also had to face all the problems associated with supplying an army
which sometimes campaigned from one end of the year to the other, whose
troops rarely acted as a single unit and were frequently engaged in rap-.
id diversionary manoeuvres, operating in an area where agricultural re-
sources were not limitless, the transport network somewhat rulimentary
and which was characterized by a notorious political and administrative
fragmentation. Nor should it be forgotten that the comaissariat 's em-
ployees had to work under conditions of great physical and mental stress
and strain, deriving from the pressures, hardships and dangers involved
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In supplying an ariiy in the field, and from which their counterparts in
civilian spheres, comfortably ensconced behind their desks, were happily
exempt. With all these factors in mind, one is tempted to apply John-
son's dictum that 'it is not done well, but you are surprised to find It
done at all' to the supply of the Combined Army. In this way the impeD-
fect record of British administrators can be seen in a truer perspective,
which enables due credit to be given to the successful aspects of their
work and due recognition to the elements of vitality which it contained.
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ptendix I
	 Superior Commissariat Officers 1
1) AMHERST, Colonel Jeffrey, 1717 - 1797.2
Appointed to have the care and inspection of providing and con-
tract ing for bread, bread wagons, forage, firing and straw for the
Hessians @ £3 per day, 22 February 1757 - 4 January l758.
2) AMMON, Councillor. (Prussian official)
Acted as a commissary to the army stationed at Mfinster in 1761.
3) ARNOLD, Charles.
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761 6 - 12 August 1763.
4) BILCEN, Casimir. (Prussian) 8
Inspector and controller of the great foreign artillery train @ £1
9	 , 10per day, February 1759 - late 17o2.
1 This List is composed of commissaries with salaries of at least £1
per day and German officials who held commissariat positions of re-
sponsibility. It does not include the names of the three British
Commanders-in-Chief, the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville
and the Marquis of Granby, who exercised coimnissariat functions by
virtue of their military office.
2 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.1, p.357. The military
ranks given are the most senior held by the individual during his
period of service in the commissariat.
3 Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, Tfl/375 No.23,
ff .5l - 52. Amherst to Treasury, 2 !'larch 175 8, Tf1/3811. No.32.
4 The date of his successor's instructions, Treasury to H. Boyd, 4
January 1758, T/l/388 No.5.
5 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048
ff.149 - 150.
6 T/52/52 f.325, U June 1761.
7 T/52/55 ff.283 - 284, 3 November 1763.
8 Add. ?S. 33048 f.150.
9 T.0. Hunter to (S. Martin), 11 February 1759, T/64/96 f.26. An Acc-
ount of .... Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army
in Germany ...., 1759, T/l/397 f.66.
10 G. Howard to (Treasury), 10 August 1762, T/l/4l7 f.486. Howard said
that it was not prudent to dismiss Bilgen until his accounts had
been settled.
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5) BISHOP, Thomas.
Director of fixed and flying hospitals to the foreign troops @ £1
1	 ,2per day, 1 May 1759 - 7 July 17o3.
6) BLAKENEY, Edward, 1716 - 1799.
Commissary general @ £3 per day, 9 June 1760 - 21 April l763.
7) BOYD, Colonel Robert, 1710 - 179111.6
Commissary to supply the Hessians with bread, bread wagons, forage,
firing and straw £3 per day, 7 4 January 1758 8 - 28 December
1758. Commissary of musters to the Hessian troops @ £3 per day,
March 1759 10 - 25 December 1762.11
8) BOYVE, Jerome. (Swiss) 12
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £2 per day, April
1762 13 - 13 August 1763.14 First clerk to the Commissioners for
Examining German Demands @ 10/Cd - 12/6d per day, 15
 18 October
1 T//397 f.66. Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/l/
1507/218.
2 T/52/55 f.218, 12 September 1763.
3 Burke's Irish Family Records. (1976) p.12k.
4 T/52/50 f.k78, 9 June 1760.
5 T/52/55 f.31+1, 22 December 1763.
6 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
(1763) p. 8. The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.11, p.
1,007.
7 J. West to Boyd, 12 May 1758 , T/27/27 f.334.
8 Treasury to Boyd, Li. January 1758, T/l/388 No.5.
9 The date of his successor's appointment, T/52/ Lf9 ff.312 - 314, 28
December 1758.
10 T/29/33 f.160, 21 March 1759.
11 T/52/55 f.l32, 5 July 1763.
12 Memorial of J. Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/1/4LiLl. f.222.
13 Ibid. Tf29/34 f.28Li, 18 May 1762.
14 T/52/55 f.341, 22 December 1763.
15 T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763. T/29/36 f.1Li5, 20 November 176k.
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1763 1 - February 1766.2
9) BROMFIELD, Charles.
Deputy commissary in the office of control @	 per day, 2k May
1762 - k August 1763.
10) BROWNE, Lieutenant-Colonel James.6
Commissary for settling the expenses of maintaining prisoners of
war, March 1760 ' - 22 November 1763.8
ii) cLARK, Andrew.
Deputy commissary of supply @ £2 per day, 1 August 1762 - 11 Dee-.
ember 176k.9
12) COCKBUBN, Sir James, 1729 - 18011.10
Commissary of control and commissary general @ £3 per day, May/June
1760.11 Commissary general of supplies @ £5 per day, 25 March 1762 12
- 23 August 1763.13
1 The salades of the secretary of the Commissioners for Examining German
Demands and presumably their other clerical officers were calculated
from this date, T/52/.55 f.k6k, 7 May 1764. T/29/35 ff.l85 - 186, 10
October 1763.
2 His appointment must have been terminated when he suddenly left the
country at this time, Bore to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/1/451
ff.292 - 293.
3 Letter of T. Pownall, 2k June 1763, Add. !S. 38335 f.111.
11. T/52/53 ff. 1466 - 1467, 1 June 1762.
5 T/52/55 f.331, 16 December 1763.
6 Ibid. f.369, 16 January 1764.
7 T/29/33 f.307, 26 March 1760.
8 T/52/55 f.369, 16 January 1764.
9 Declared Account of A. Clark, 3 June 1767, A0/l/519f2211 . He was gran-
ted an extension of salary for attending the Commissioners for Exam-
ining German Demands, and for making up and translating the vouchers
of his accounts.
10 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Fds., The History of Parliament2 the
House of Commons, 175k - 1790 , (1964) Vol.IL, p.229.
11 T/52/50 f.1179, 2 May 1760. R. Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/l/405
f.6l.
12 T/52/53 f.350, 7 April 1762.
13 T/52/55 f.282, 3 November 1763.
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13) COLLINS or COLLINGS, Leonard.
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid.-
1762 1 - c. June 1763.2
14) COLSWORTRY, John Oliivaxit.
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 21 July 1762 - 27 June l763.
15) COSNE, Colonel Ruvigny dc.5
Commissary for settling the claims of the Duke of Brunswick and the
Landgrave of Hesse-Casse]. @ £3 per day, 31 July 1762 6 - 23 July
l763.
16) CRAWFORD or CRAUFURD, John.
Acted as a book-keeper in 1759 8 and probably continued to serve in
this capacity until becoming deputy commissary in the office of con-
trol @ £2 per day, mid-1762 - 29 June 1763.10
17) CUTHEERT, David, d. 1768.
Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 Nay 17 1 	 - 12 Augnst
1763.' Acted as a Commissioner of Enquiry from late 1761 onwaris.
1 State of the Office of Control, 1762, T/1/417 f.351. This document
was sent to the Treasury on 16 July 1762, T/1/ Lf20 f.105, and describes
appointments made by Pownall after he became director of the office of
control in March 1762.
2 Add.. ?3S. 38335 f.113.
3 T/52/511. ff.l12 - 113, 21 July 1762.
4 T/52/55 f . 133, 5 July 1763.
5 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
(1763) p.7.
6 T/52/5 f.350, 10 January 1763.
7 T/52/55 f.290 , 14 November 1763.
8 T/1/397 f.66.
9 T/l/417 f.35l.
10 'r/52/55 f.399, 22 February 1764.
11 Sir W. ?!usgrave, Obituary Prior to 1800 ...., 6 Vols. (1899 - 1901)
Vol.11, p.127.
12 T/52/52 f.361, 20 June 1761.
13 T/52/55 f.284, 3 November 1763.
14 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.70.
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Commissioner for Examining German Demands @ £2 per day, 1
 21 Sept-
ember 1763 2 - 2 May l766.
18) DURAND, Major-General James.1
Commissary to muster the King's troops in Germany @ £3 per day,
April 1758 - August 1760.6
19) DYER, John or Samuel.7
Deputy commissary in the office of control 8 @ £2 per day, 9 May
'9	 ,1O17o1 - 'i August 17o3.
20) ELLIOT(T), William Nassau.
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761
	
- March/April 1762.12
21) FABER, Councillor Thilip Ernst. (German) 13
Director of the foreign	 October 1759 15 - 1763.16
1 T/52/56 f.213, 22 October 17624.
2 T/52/55 f.463, 7 May 176k.
3 T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.
4 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
(1761) p.4.
5 T/29/33 ff.39 - LIO, 19 April 1758.
6 T/52/51 f181, 22 September 1760. Earl of Holdernesse to Peirson &
Boyd, 15 Augtt 1760, SP/87/30 f.155.
7 A memorial of Samuel Dyer, 14 November 1763, T/1/428 f.70, states
that he was appointed a deputy commissary in May 1761, but this app-
ears in the Treasury warrant book as John Dyer, T/521 52 f.325, 11
June 1761, until 1 July 1762 when it changes to Samuel Dyer, T/52/56
f.l98, 28 September 176k. As no reference has been found to both
names serving at the same time it is assumed that they are one and
the same person.
8 Add.. S. 38335 f.]U.
9 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
10 T/52/56 f.198, 28 September 176k.
11 T/.52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
12 Martin to W.N. Elliot, 30 March 1762, T/27/28 f.273.
13 Add. ?S. 33048 f.150.
14 No positive information on his salary has been found, but it is un-
likely that he was iaid less than Bilgen.
15 Instructions for Hatton .... (1759) Add. S. 32905 1.148.
i6 McI. !S. 38335 f.109.
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22) FAWCETT or FAUCITF, Lieutenant-Colonel William, 1 1728 - 18014.2
CommisBary @ £3 per day, 25 March 1762. Commissary for collecting
together, depositing and keeping in safe custody at Hanover all
the vouchers on which commissaries in Germany granted certificates
for money @ £5 per day, 29 April 1763 - 18 June l766.
23) SER, Wilhian, d. 1802.6
Deputy commissary @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761 - 11 April 1763.8
Z'i) FUHR, Johann Philip. (German)
Accountant @ £1 per day, 1759 - 1760.10 In 1761 he acted as ass-
essor to the Commissioners of Enquiry, 13
 and in 1762 was paid £3
per day.12
25) GUNN, Cornet William.13
Deputy commissary @ £1 per clay from August l762.1 Date of termin-
ation of employment unknown.
1 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in_the Army
(1761) p.11.
2 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,125.
3 T/52/53 f.372, 28 April 1762.
14. T/52/55 ff.33 - 3L1., 29 April 1763.
5 T/52/57 f.506, 2k June 1766.
6 J.C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Vol.!!, Officials of
the Secretaries of State, 1660 - 1782. (1973) p.79.
7 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
8 T/52/55 f.1, 29 June 1763.
9 Fuhr was described as a German who had lived for many years in Eng-
land, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.5.
10 T/l/397 f.66. Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/l/140,5 f.91.
11 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.119.
12 Martin to Howard, 8 July 1762, Howard Vyse S. D/HVIB/k/12.
13 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
(1763) p.30.
1k Howard to Treasury, 15 August 1762, T/h/k17 1,2+93,
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26) HALSEY, Frederick, c. 1727 - 1762.1
Commissary of accounts @ £3 per day, 2 May 1760 2 - March 1762.'
27) HALSEY, Thomas, ?1731 - l788.
Commissary of control £3 per day, 2 May 1760 - October/Noveii,-
ber 1762.6	 -
28) MATrON, Michael, c. 171 11. - 1776.
Commissary, salary unknown, 1 July 1758.8 Commissary @ £3 per day,
28 March 1759. Commissary general @ £5 per day, 2 May 1760 -
April 1762.11
29) HIGGINS or MIGGONS, Thomas.
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 Nay 1761 12 - 18 June 1763.13
Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 7/6d -
10/C)1 per day, February 1764 14 - 2 May 1766.15
1 J. Foster, Alumni Oxonienses: the Members of the University of Ox-.
rd, 1715 - 1886. (1888) Vol.11, p.591.
2 1/52/50 f.480, 2 May 1760.
3 T/29/13L4. f.235, 2 March 1762.
4 Namier & Brooke, Fds., op. cit. Vol.11, p.568.
5 T/52f50 f,479, 2 May 1760.
6 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, 1/1/417 f.123.
7 Duke of Newcastle to Earl of Hardwicke, 1 May 1760, Add. ?S. 32905
f.196. Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. XLVI, 1776, p.386. There is no
conclusive proof that the Michael Hatton who died in 1776 was the
commissary.
8 Accounts of N. Hatton, 1758 - 1760, Orlebar !S. OR/1869.
9 T/52/50 ff.369 - 370, 12 February 1760.
10 mid. f.477, 2 May 1760.
1]. State of the Commissariat ...., Add. !S. 38335 f.177.
12 1/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
13 T/52/511. f.395, 28 July 1763.
14 1/29/35 f.313, 23 February 1764. 1/29/36 f.145, 20 November 1764.
15 1/52/58 ff.511 - 55, 15 July 1766.
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30) HOWARD, Lieutenant-General George, 1 1718 - 1796.2
Superintendent of commissaries @ £10 per day, 25 March 1762 - 26
February 1763.
3].) HULTON, Henry, 1. 1790.
Commissary @ £3 per day, 11 June 1761 - 12 August 1763.6 Acted
as a Commissioner of Enquiry from late 1761 onwards.7
32) HUNTER, Thomas Orby, c. 1716 - 1769.8
Superintendent or director of forage, provisions, necessaries and
extraordinaries @ £10 per day, 28 December 175 8 - 1.5 April 1760.10
33) JOHNSTON, Colonel James.11
Commissary for mustering the foreign troops in the army in Germany
@ £3 per day, 1 May 1761 12 - 25 December 1762.13
34) K!D, Robert, ci. 1793.
Deputy commissary © £1/S/ C per day. Date of appointment unknown -
4 August 1763.15
1 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
...., (1763) p.l4..
2 Nainier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.11, p.645.
3 T/52/55 f.]]., 12 April 1763.
4 Musgrave, op. cit. Vol.111, p.275.
5 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
6 T/52/55 f.284, 3 November 1763.
7 T/29/34 f.197, 1 December 1761.
8 Nazier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.11, p.656.
9 T/52/49 ff.3].2 - 314, 28 December 1758.
10 T/52/51 f.490, 4 March 1761.
11 A List of the General and Field-Officers_as they_Ra in the Ar
...., (1763J p.6.
12 T/.52/53 f.269, 8 March 1762.
13 T/52/55 f.1O4, 29 June 1763.
14 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XI, p.348.
15 T/52/55 f.355, 9 January 176k.
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35) LEACH, Joseph.
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £2 per day, 16
June 1762 2 - c. June 1763. Clerk to the Commissioners for Exam-
ining German Demands @ 7/6d - 10/Od per day,k 18 October 1763 -
2 May 1766.6
36) LEGH, Peter
Commissary in the office of control @ £3 per day, 25 March
1762 8 - 19 September 1763.
37) LEVETT, John.
Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761 10 - 14. August
1763.11
38) MASON', Charles.
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761 . 12
 Commissary @ £3 per
day, 2k March 1762 - 23 March 1763.13
39) von MASSOW, President of the Chamber of War of Minden. (?russian
official) 1k
1 Add. ?S
.38335 f.113.
2 T/52/51 f.19, 16 June 1762.
3 Add. ?S. 38335 1.113.
14' T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763. T/29/36 f.145, 20 November 176k.
5 See above p.350, n.].
6 T/52/58 ff.5k - 55, 15 July 1766.
7 Add. ?S. 38335 1.111.
8 T/52/53 ff.391 - 392, 7 May 1762.
9 T/52/55 f.293, 25 November 1763.
10 T/52/52 1.361, 20 June 1761.
11 T/52/55 f.k22, 23 March 176k.
12 T/52/52 1.325, U June 1761.
13 T/29/35 f.6, 12 November 1762. T/52/55 f.67, 7 June 1763.
1k A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury 'a Corres-
pondence with the Conunissariat in Germany ...., Dashwood ?'S. D/D/
19/6 f.1.
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He had no official position in the commissariat, and there is no
evidence that he received any salary from British sources. But
between 1759 and. 1762 at the invitation of Prince Ferdinand. and
various British commissaries he exercised a far-reaching and even
dominant influence over many aspects of army supply.1
1+0) von MEYEN, Director of the Chamber (of War) of Cleves. (Prussian
official) 2
No details of any salary have come to light, but he exercised im-
portant commissariat responsibilities in l759, 1760 and 176l,
and may have continued to serve in the early part of 1762.
41) MEYER or MEJER, Frederick. (Assumed to be Cerman)
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762 6
- c. May l763.
1+2) MUDIE or MOODIE, John.
Commissary @ £3 per day, 5 July 1762 8 - IF August l763.
43) OSWALD, Richard, 1705 - 1784.10
Commissary @ £3 per day, 19 February 1759 - 8 June 1760.11 Super-
intendent of the English and Hessian wagon trains @ £3 per day,
1 Ibid. ff.l - 5. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.l1. Prince
Ferdinand to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. S. 32905 f.32.
2 Add.. ?S. 33048 f.11+9.
3 Hunter to Martin, Reed. 29 December 1759, T/6Lf/96 f.289.
1+ Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/l/405 f.61.
5 Add. 1S. 33048 f.149.
6 T/1/Lf17 f.351.
7 Pownal]. to J. Dyson, 15 May 1763, Tf1/1427 f.190.
8 T/52/.54 f.65, 5 July 1762.
9 T/52/55 f.390, 1 February 1764.
10 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.
11 Declared Account of R. Oswald, 16 January 1794, A0fl/519/223.
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1 June 1762 - 31 December 1762.1
4i) PAUIqIER, Peter.
Deputy conunissary for the sale of wagon trains and stores @ £2 per
day, 1 January 1763 - 31 October 1763.2
45) PEIRSON, Colonel Richard, 3 d. l78l.'
Supervisor, director and controller of commissaries @ £5 per day,
8 May 176O. Director general of all commissaries @ £8 per day, 3
June 1761 6 - 28 June 1762.
46) POWNALI, Thomas, 1722 - 1805.8
Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 May l76l. Director of the
office of control @ £5 per day, 25 March 1762 10 - July 1763.11
Commissioner for Examining German Demands @ £2 per day, 12 21 Sept-.
13	 ,,l4ember 17o3
	
- 2 May l7oo.
47) RAMBERG, 'OverStalmeister'. (Assumed to be German)
Director of the great provision or proviant train, 1759 - 1760.15
48) REDECKER, Councillor Francis. (Prussian official) 16
1 Ibid.
2 Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225.
3 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army
...., (1761) p.6.
4 Muegrave, op. cit. Vol.V, p.8.
5 T/52/50 ff.493 - L94, 8 May 1760.
6 T/52/52 ff.295 298, 3 June 1761.
7 T/52/5!l. f.282, 23 November 1762. His salary was paid until this date.
8 Namier & Brooke, Eis., op. cit. Vol.111, p.316.
9 T/52/52 ff.360 - 361, 20 June 1761.
10 T/ .52/53 f.349, 7 April 1762.
11 T/52/55 f.170, 28 July 1763.
12 T/52/56 f.2l3, 22 October 1764.
13 T/52/55 f.463, 7 May 1764.
14 T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.
15 Add. S. 32905 f .150. No positive information on his salary has
been found, but it is unlikely that he was paid less than Bilgen.
16 Pro Memoria of F. Redecker, 22 November 1765, SP/91230 . Add. !3SS
33048 ff.l49 - 150.
3 .9.
Commissary for the direction of the transport of the depots on the
Weser @ 6 cus per day, 25 April 1760 1 - November 1761.
49)RODEN, Councillor. (Prussian official)
Commissary @ £1 per day, 1759 - 1761.
50)ROSS, Alexander.
Inspector of magazines, 1759.6 Assistant deputy commissary- of con-
trol @ £1 per day, mid-1762 - 15 September 176:3.8
51)SCHEEDLER, J.G. (Assumed to be German)
Director of the great provision or proviant train, l760.
52)SMTrH, George.
Deputy commissary @ £1 per day,1° 1762
	
- February 1763.12
53)STANTON, Frederick.
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1. per day, mid-1762 13
- mid_l763.14 Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Dem-
ands @ 7/&1 per day, February 1764.15 Date of termination of emp..
1 Me'inoire pour Servir a 1 'Instruction du Sieur Redec,ker, 25 April 1760,
T/i/405 f.252. His salary was approximately £1, Memoire of Baron Miin-
chausen, 26 February 1760, T/64/96 f.301.
2 Expose of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham IS. DDHO/
4/313 f.285.
3 Add. !S. 33048 f.]J+9.
4 T/]./397 f.66.
5 Add. 1'S. 33048 f.149.
6 Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/1/410 f.].51.
7 T/1/417 f.35L.
8 Pownal], C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 13 October 1761+,
T/52/56 f.273.
9 He had. replaced Rainberg, q.v, by August 1760, Marquis of Granby to
Newcastle, 7 August 1760, Add. 1S. 32909 f.300. The train was put
under contract at the end of the year, see above p.267.
10 State of the Commissaries in the Department of Sir J. Cockburn, 25
February 1763, P11/425 f.41.
11 1). Veir to Howard, 1+ October 1762, Howard Vyse ?S. D/HV/B/.5/'22.
12 P11/425 f.4l.
13 P11/417 f.351.
1.1+ Add. !S. 38335 r.1i4.
15 P129/35 f.313, 23 February 1764.
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loyment unknwn)
54) TozER, Aaron.
Deputy commissary in the office of control £1 per day, mid-1762 2
- mid-1763.3 Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Dem-.
ands @ 7/6d - l0/( per day, 4 18 October 1763 5 - 2 May 1766.6
55) TROTrER, Joseph.
Deputy commissary @ £1 per day, 8 - 27 June l759.
56) ,!TON, Ensign Thomas8
Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, September 1762. Date of terminat-
ion of employment unknown.
57) VOSS, Councillor. (Prussian official) 10
Acted as an adviser to the commissariat and commissary 1760 -
1761
58)WEBB, Colonel Richmond, 1714 - 1785.12
Accountant general in the office of control @ £ 3 per day, 13 25
March 1762 14 - 21 September 1763.15
1. He received no payment when the office of the Commissioners was wound
up, T/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.
2 1/1/417 f.351.
3 Add. ?$S.38335 f.114.
4 1/29/35 f.l85, 10 October 1763. T/29f36 f.145, 20 November 1764.
5 See above p.350 , n.].
6 1/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.
7 Certificate of Hunter, 29 June 1765, T/l/z#.44 f.242.
8 A List of the General and ie1d-Officers as they Rank in the Army
(1763) p.45.
9 Howard to Martin, 24 September 1762, 1/1/417 ff. 1464 - 462 (sic).
10 Add. ?S.330Lf8 f.150.
11 mid. Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, 1/1/405 f.61.
12 The Dictionary of National Biograpy, VoLXX, p.1,014. Webb retired
from the amyIn 1755.
13 T/1/417 f.351.
1.4 T/52/.53 ff.350 - 351, 7 April 1762.
15 T/52/55 f.282, 3 November 1763.
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59) WEIR, Daniel, d. 1781.1
Commissary @ £5 per day, 2.5 March 1762 2 - mid-1763.3
1 R.A. Bowler, The Influence of Loistiea1 Problems on Briti.sh Operat-
ions in North America,1775 - l72. (1971) p.L4 , n.2.
2 Tf52/53 ff.351 & 37L, 7 & 28 April 1762.
3 Add. ?S. 38335 f.U3.
Z Cal III. Preserved
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±Pendix II	 Inconclusive Information on Commissaries' Backgrounds.
There are references which suggest possible back-
grounds for four of the commissaries listed in Appendix I, although
no corroboration of them has been found. Thomas Bishop may have been
the tide-surveyor of that name at Weymouth) John 011ivant Colsworthy
possibly came from a mercantile background, for in 1765 he wrote a
letter offering inside information about the commercial and financial
activities of French agents. 2 It is tempting but impossible to ident-
ify Peter Legh with the elusive M.P. of that name, who was the head
of one of the oldest Cheshire families.3 Finally, Aaron Tozer may
have been the Exeter bookseller and. publisher of that name or a rel-
k
ative of the same.
1 Calendar of Treasury Books and Paners, 1142 - 1
Public Record Office. (1903) p.5.
p.c,-j1.
3 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Fs., The History of Parliament: the
House of Cominors 175 4' - 179Q. (l96Lf) Vol.111, p.32.
L1. am indebted to Mrs. M.M. Rowe, the Area Archivist of the Devon Rec-
ord Office, for information on the name of 'Tozer'.
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Appendix III	 Value of J.J. Uckerman 's Forage Contracts, 1759 - 1761.
Contract of 20 September 1759.1	 gu.tlders
Some 25,000 complete rations
were to be delivered daily for
approximately two months @ 15
stivers per ration. Calculat-
ing 25,000 rations per day for
61 days -	 1,1113,750
Contract of 3 June 1760.2
95,000 complete rations weekly
for two months @ 15 stivers
per ration. Calculating for a
period of nine weeks -	 6141,250
Contract of 25 August l760.
30,000 rations of oats daily
at various places on the Weser
for 97 days @ 7 - 8 stivers
per ration. Calculating an av-
erage price of 7+ stivers per
ration - 1,091,250 guilders.
2,000,000 rations of oats to
be collected at Bremen and
delivered to various places on
the Weser. Calculating an av-
erage price of 7* stivers per
ration 750,000 gullders.
1 T/621./96 ff.232 - 233.
2 Tf1/Li.05 f.k0l1.
3 Thid. f.4246.
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100,000 rations of oats at
	 guilders
Bielefeld @ 7 stivers per
ration - 5,000 ui1ders.
50,000 rations of hay and
straw at Bielefeld c 6
stivers per ration
l5,000 guilders.
300,000 rations of oats at
Minden @ 7 stivers per rat-
ion 105,000 guilders.
300,000 complete rations at
Viotow @ 14 stivers per
ration - 210,000 guilders.
300,000 complete rations at
Leingo @ 13 stivers per rat-
ion 195,000 guilders.
Total cost of this contract	 2,401,250 1
Contract of 25 ?y 1761,2
1,000,000 rations of oats @
9 stivers per ration -
450,000 guilders,
220,000 rations of hay @ 4.
stivers per ration =
46,75) guilders.
Total cost of this contract -
	 496,750
1 The calculations of the cost of this contract found in Add. Y'S.
33048 f.57 have been ignored, for by mistakenly taking rations of
oats for complete rations and by giving the cost of 300,000 complete
rations at Vlotow as £194,000 instead of £19, 400 (& : 10 guilders
16+ stivers), they arrive at the enormous and erroneous total of
£541,285/14/3. At the same rate of exchange this would represent
5,859,417 guilders 16 stivers.
2 T/1/410 f.251.
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Contract of 11 June 1761.1
1,000,000 rations of oats @
8+ stivers per ration -
k12,500 guilders.
1,500,000 rations of oats @
9 stivers per ration
675,000 guilders.
Total cost of this contract
Contract of 7 December 1761,2
6,000,000 rations of oats @
10 stivers per ration =
guild ere
1,087,500
3,000,000
Total cost of all contracts -	 8,770,500
The sterling value of this sum depended on the rate of exchange, which
from September 1759 to December 1761 fluctuated between 10 guilders 8
If
stivers and 11 guilders to the £. But the average value of the £ in
this period was usually taken to be 10 guilders 1k stivers or 10 gull.'
ders 15 stivers, 5 at which rates the value of 8,770,500 g'uilders was
1 Thid. f.252.
2 No copy of this contract scene to have survived but Hulton stated
that it was for six million rations of oats, Journal and Copy Book
of Henry Hulton, ff.82 - 83, and a letter of 1'. Pownall arid. C.W.
Cornwall to C. Jenkinson, 31 ?rch 176k, T/1/k31 No .3, f.l51/5 gave
the price as 10 stivers per ration.
3 This figure does not represent the full extent of Uckerinan's involve-
ment in forage supply, for his contract of 20 September 1759 was ex-
tended for an unknown period after its expiry, T.0. Hunter to S. Mar-
tin, 22 November 1759, T/6 Lf/96 f.275, while he held other contracts
of which full details have not been traced, M. Hatton to T. Halsey,
25 December 1760, T/1/44 f.342.
If PNG/2/5 ff.257 & 299. PMG/2/6 f.231.
5 Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/1/1507/218.
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between £815,860/9/2 and £819,672/17/1O.
The quantities of forage involved in these contracts were as follows -
Date of
Contract
20/9/1759
3/6/1760
2 5/8/1760
25/5/1761
11/6/1761
7/12/176 1
Complete
1,525,000
855,000
600,000
No. of Rations
Oats
	
5,310,000	 50,000
	
1,000,000	 220,000
Straw
50,000
2,500,000
6,000,000
2,980,000	 ik,810,000	 270,000	 50,000
Breaking down the complete rations into their component parts gives the
following totals:-
Oats	 2,980,000 + ik,8io,000 - 17,790,000.
Hay	 2,980,000 + 270,000 3,250,000.
Straw	 2,980,000 + 50,000 3,030,000.
17,790,000 rations of oats @ 8 lbs. per ration - 63,535.71 tons.
3, 250 , 000 rations of hay @ 10 lbs. per ration - 1 4,508.93 tons.
3, 030 , 000 rations of straw @ 5 lbs. per ration - 6,763.39 tons.
63,535.71 tons of oats represents 296.9 days • supply for every horse in
the Combined Army on the basis of a total daily consumption of 214 tons
of oats)
1 See above p.145.
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Appendix IV Cost of Shipping Grain from England to Gersany in 1762.
The following accounts give details of the purchase
and shipment of grain by merchants acting as agents on commission.
Invoices of Shipments by J. Tierney.
ii.,l86quarters of rye
13,153 quarters of barley
17,k984 quarters of oats
3k , 837* quarters
Total cost £30,865/2/0.
Average cost per quarter = 17.72 shillings.
Invoices of Shipments by J. Tierney.2
b10,0901 quarters of oats.
Total cost - £9,09l/15/6.
Average cost per quarter = 18.02 shillings.
Accounts of Amyand, Rucker & Co.3
110,923 quarters of wheat, rye, barley and oats.
Total cost - £IOO,897/e/O.k
Average cost per quarter - 18.19 shillings.
Accounts of F.
1 5, 865 quarters of oats.
Total cost £13,Wf5/19/0.
Average cost per quarter - 16.95 shillings.
1 Recapitulation of 31 Cargoes ...., 30 June 1762, T/6A/98 f.17.
2 Recapitulation of 11 Cargoes ...., 16 November 1762, T/6k/99.
3 Amyand & Co's. Accounts of Corn Sent to Bremen ...., 16 November 1762,
T/l/420 f.15.
Lj. Figures taken from the docket of the document.
5 Accounts of F. Care, 11 October 1762, Tfl/Li.20 f.178.
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Thus the overall average cost of a quarter of grain was 17.72 shillings.
1 quarter 272 lbs.1
1 ration of oats - 8 lbs.
1 quarter 34 rations.
Thus if one quarter of grain cost 17.72 shillings, one ration would
cost 6.251. But because of wastage one quarter of grain might produce
only 28 rations, 2 and thus the average cost of each ration would be
7.59d . In 1762 the value of the £ fluctuated between 10 guilders 10
stivers and 11 guilders, 3
 and thus 7.59d = 6.6k stivers at the former
rate and 6,96 stivers at the latter.4
Care was also awarded a contract for 500,000 rations
of oats at 7 stivers per ration, 5 and it would thus appear that pur..
chases on commission were the more advantageous method of supply.
All the above costs and. prices were for deliveries at
Bremen, from whence the provisions had to be shipped up the Weser to
the various positions of the Army. The accounts of a number of shipp..
ers 6 yield the following figures for the cost of transporting one last
1 T/29/34 f.221, Lf February 1762.
2 Peirson to Martin, 4 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.220.
3 PMG/2/6 ff . 23]. - 232 & 271 - 273.
4 These figures do not reflect completely accurately the cost of a rat-
ion of oats as they are based on the prices of other kinds of grain
aswell. But using the accounts of Tierney and Care, which are for
oats alone, and calculating 28 rations per quarter, the figures are
7.49d and 6.55 - 6.87 stivers, so that the difference is marginal.
5 Accounts of F. Care, U October 1762, T/1/420 f.178.
6 Specification of Certificates Granted .... for the Payment of the
Freights of the Weser ...., June - July 1762, Howard Vyse !'S, D/HV/
B/5/9 A & B.
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of oats:-
Bremen - Nienburg
Bremen - Minden
Nienburg - Minden
4 dollars,1
7.5 dollars.2
3.5 dollars.
Nienburg - Hamein	 9.88 dollars, 4 9.75 dollars and 9.51 dollars.6
Average - 9.71 dollars.
Hamein - HSxter	 5.13 dollars.7
Hence the cost of transporting a last of oats from Bremen to various
places was:-
Nienburg	 4 dollars, which @ 3 dollars per ducat 8 - 1.33 ducats,
which @ 5 guilders 5 stivers per ducat - 6.98 guilders.
Mind en
Haineln
Hxter
7.5 dollars, which at the same rates 2,5 ducats 13.13
guilders.
13.71 dollars, (i.e. 4 + 9.71) which at the same rates
457 ducats - 23.99 guilders.
18.84 dollars, (i.e. 13.71 + 5.13) which at the same rates
6.28 ducats - 32.97 guilders.
1 mid., Certificate No.46, 61 lasts 2 kimptens @ 2 1411.
 dollars 3 groech-
en, Certificate No.47, 60 lasts @ 2140 dollars. As one kintpten weighed
24 lbs., Report on the ?gazines ...., 20 November 1761, T/l/4l0 f.
239, and one last produced 288 rations of 8 lbs. eaãh, Peirson to
(Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/1/405 f.90, one last contained 96
kintptens.
2 Howard Vyse 1SS D/HV/B15f9, Certificate No.56, 91 lasts @ 682+ doll-
ars, and Certificate No.108, 36 lasts @ 27 0 dollars.
3 Ibid., No.87, 33 lasts @ 115 dollars.
11. Ibid., No.83, 36 lasts @355 dollars 28 groschen.
5 mid., No.170, 33 lasts @ 321 dollars 27 groachen.
6 mid., No.175, 31 lasts 811. kimptens @ 303 dollars.
7 Ibid., No.52, 32 lasts @ 164 dollars, No.147, 34 lasts @ 174 dollars
11 groschen.-
8 mid. The rate of exchange used in these accounts.
9 Declared Account ofT. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/1/1507/218. Sir Law-
rence Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive, ZNK
X 1/1/6 f.13.
370.
Thus if one last produced 288 rations, 1
 the following sums must be add..
ed to the cost of each ration for freight charges between Bremen and
the various points of delivery:-
Nienburg	 0.148 stivers,
Minden	 0.91 stivers.
Hamein	 1.67 stivers.
Hxter	 2.29 stivers.
And if the cost of a ration delivered at Bremen by the Treasury 'a agents
varied between 6.61+ and 6.96 stivers according to the rate of exchange,
its price higher up the Weser was as follows:-
Nienburg	 7.12 - 7.141+ stivers,
Minden	 7.55- 7.87 stivers.
Hainein	 8.31 - 8.63 stivers.
Hóxter	 8.93 - 9.25 stivers.
When taking into account the many additional charges
involved in transporting grain, such as demurrage, warehouse hire,
renting of sacks, labourers' wages and expenses of land carriage, Peir-
son calculated that the real cost of a last o± oats was:
Nienburg
Mind en
£12/3/8,2 which with the £ @ 10 guilders 10 stivers - 8.88
stivers per ration and with the £ @ 11 guilders 9.31 stiv-.
era per ration.
£12/16/6, which at the same rates - 9.35 and 9.80 stivers
per ration.
1 T/1/L+05 f.90.
2 Dtai1 des Fraix qu 'U y a 'a faire pour transporter un Last d 'Avoine
depuis le port de Bremen ...., Add. ?S. 32935 f.235.
3 mid. f.231+.
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Hamein	 £13/l9/0,1 which at the same rates 10.17 and 10.66 stiv-
per ration.2
Thus although it is impossible to discover the quan-
tities of provisions sent to different places on the Weser, and so to
calculate the exact cost of the whole operation to the Treasury, the
above figures strongly suggest that the Board gained very little, if
anything, by annulling Uckerinan 's contract.
1 Ibid. f.23l.
2 Peirson 's figures do not include an estimate for H6xter.
3 The Treasury 's contract with Care to deliver oats at Bremen was cert-
ainly more expensive than (Jckerinan 's agreement with the coirnnissariat,
for if freight charges as detailed above are added to his contract
price of 7 stivers, together with a further 25% for supplementary
charges, the approximate level suggested by Peirson's figures, the
price of a ration was in excess of 10 stivers anywhere on the Weser.
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Appendix V
	 Forage Accounts of the Great Foreign Artillery Train.
The train was supplied with forage at the government 's
expense, and by the end of the war Dundas had been paid the sum of
£12,666 for provisions which he had purchased himself for this service,
Had he supplied all the forage consumed by the animals of the train it
was calculated that he would have been owed £336,72Z/ll, although it
was estimated that in fact he had only expended one sixth of this
Thus the first method of calculating the amount owed
to Dundas was as follows :-
£336 ,722/2/ll - £12,666 - £324. , 056/2/ll, of which one sixth
£511' , 009/7/2.
But according to the second method:-
One sixth of £336 ,72212/ll - £56 , 120/7/2 - £12,666 - £k3,454L7/2.
2
Difference - £10,555.
In the end the Commissioners for Examining German De-
ntands seem to have adopted the second method, as suggested by Cuthbert,
although the saving was diminished, 'by other changes in the calculations
concerned with the cost of bread supplied to the trains.3
1 Reasons Offered by Mr. Cuth'bert ...., 12 June 1764, T/1/432 No.28,
ff.208 - 209/62 - 63. Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown Against
SirL. Dundas ...,, T/1/f51 f.0.
2 T/1/1f32 No.28, ff.208 - 209/62 - 63.
3 State of Adjustment .,. between the Crown and Sii L. Dundas, Till
k51 ff.33 34, Ibid. ff.39 - kO. A Treasury Minute of 22 March 1765,
T/29/36 ff.299 - 300, eventually accepted £17,000 as the sum due from
Dundas, a figure which presumably represents a rounding off of the
£17,52O/16/+, reached by calculations incorporating the second method.
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Appendix VI
	 Cost of Bread Produced by the Great Forei gn Bakery.
The accounts of the bakery as stated by the Conuniss-
loners for Examining German Demands show that 551f, 802 quintals 13 lbs.
of meal were received between 1 lfly 1760 and 31 March 1763, of which
43,857 quintals 68 lbs. were redelivered to magazines and 2,009 quin-.
tale 52 lbs. sold, 1 thus leaving 508,935 quintals 1 lb. used for baking
bread.
In these years the lowest price for a quintal of rye
meal which has been traced is 2f dollars 2 and before November 1762 the
highest 4 dollars 6 groschen. 3 Thus at the lowest price the total quan-
tity of meal used in the bakery would have cost 1,272,337 dollars 18
groschen, and at the highest price 2,120,562 dollars 14 groechen.
The bakery used or purchased 277,682 sacks,4 which at
a low price of 16+ groechen per sack amounted to 127,270 dollars 33
groachen, and at a hi gh price of 20 groschen per sack 6 l5 1 , 267 dollars
28 groschen.
1 Summary State of the Cash Accounts of the Foreign Bakery .... in T.
Pownall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 16 March 1765, T/52/56 f.45i.
The quantity sold was made up of 1,564 quintals 62 lbs. lent to Uck-
erman and charged to his account, and 444 quintals 98 lbs.
2 Contract between N. Hatton and C. Lehman, 7 August 1760, T/1/o5 f.
433.
3 F. Halsey to Mr. de Knig, 10 May 1761, Halsey !S. 15031. Examples of
higher prices can be found in November 1762, see above p.135, but
these are discounted as Isolated examples of possible profiteering.
4 T/52/56 f.145l.
5 T/l/4O5 f.435.
6 Contract between Hatton and J. Paken, 22 September 1760, ibid. f.40.
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l3,657 clafters of wood were burned, which at a low
price of 2+ dollars per dafter cost 34,143 dollars I4 groschen, and
at a high price of 2 dollars per dafter 2	 dollars l5 groechen.
The cash accounts of the bakery show that between 1. Oct..
ober 1759 and. 10 September 1762 expenses amounted to 55,631 ducats 2
dollars 31 groschen. From this sum 9,935 ducats 2 dollars 32 groschen is
deducted for sums paid to the troops for vacant portions, 3
 leaving a
total of 45,696 ducats for actual bakery expenses.
The accounts of provisions cover a period of 1,065 days,
while the cash accounts are for 1,076 days. Taking a daily average of
cash expenditure and reducing the total by eleven days gives a figure
of 45,228.85 ducats, which @ 34 dollars per ducat 150,762 dollars 30
groschen, and @ dollars per ducat - 211,067 dollars 3L4 groschen.5
Hence:-
Meal
Sacks
Wood
Expenses
Total
Minimum Costs
dollars	 groschen
	
l,2,337
	
18
	
127,270	 33
34,143
	
150,762	 30
	
1,584 ,514	 13+
Maximum Costs
dollars	 groschen
	
2 , 120 ,562	 114.
	
154 , 267	 28
	
37,557	 l5
211,067
2,52,455
I State of the Accounts for the Supply and Subsistence of Luckner's
Corps ...., 15 September 1763, T/l/428 f.44.
2 State of the Demand of the Bishopric of Hildesheim ...., in Pownafl &
Cuthbertto Jenkinson, U. March 1765, T/52/56 f.497.
3 Ibid. f.453.
4 Making an adjustment of one groechen.
5 These are the rates of exchange of the dollar in late 1759 and early
1762 quoted in the Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789,
AO/l/l507/218. No figure is given for late 1762.
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The bakery produced a total of 36, 1443,837 portions of
bread of 2 lbs. each, 1 so that the cost of a six-pound loaf on the basis
of the iniinui and maxiDnhin costs was 11.7 and 7.L48 groschen.
1 T/52/56 f.Lf5l4.
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Appendix VII	 Numerical Levels of Train Services ii 1762.
John Levett 's 'States of the Establishment of the
Trains 1,1 reproduced on the next page, although the most detailed sur-
vey to come to light, is not a complete recoid. It gives no account of
the numbers of carriages and carts in the foreign artillery train, 2 nor
of superior officers in most of the other services. Neither of these
omissions, however, affects the calculations in Appendix VIII, as pay-
ments in the foreign artillery train were based on the numbers of per.
sonnel and horses and in all other trains on the numbers of wagons.
What Levett calls the 'British Bakery and Infirmary
Trains • presumably included bread wagons.
The document contains one obvious error in assigning
726 drivers and 237 horses to the foreign hospital. train. This has been
corrected to 257 drivers and 726 horses and the totals adjusted accord-
ingly.
1 Tfl/i120 f.125, 2k !y 1762.
2 Although Levett calls it the Nanoverian artillery train, it included
the Hessian, Brunswick and Buckeburg contingents, ibid. f.127.
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Apiendix VIII	 Total Cost of Trains in 1762 1
Daily Upkeep as per Establishments
Foreign Artillery Train 2
6,731 horses @ i/&i each
2,400 drivers @ 1/Cd each
247 other personnel @ 2/6d each 3
Total, daily cost of upkeep
1.
Proviant Train
1,010 four-horse wagons @ 9/9.2d each 5
91 six-horse wagons @ 14/i.3d each 6
Total daily cost of upkeep
Other wagon Trains
1,123 four-horse wagons @ 9/Cd each
225 six-horse wagons @ 13/Cd each
Tota]. daily cost of upkeep
£	 s	 d.
	
560	 18	 4
	
120	 0	 0
	
30_	 17	 6
	7 1	 15	 10
	
1+93	 4	 4
	
64	 3
	557	 8	 2
505
	 7	 0
	
5	 0
65].	 12	 0
1 These calculations apply to the period before June and July 1762, when
a number of trains were taken into public ownership.
2 Establishment of the train as in Appendix VII. Prices from Abstract of
an Account of the Hire of Horses and Pay of Conductors and Drivers Em-
ployed in the Foreign Train of Artillery ...., 6 April 1763, in the
letter of Sir J. Cockburn to H.P. Taylor, 17 April 1763, A0/3/124.
3 A few high-ranking officials were possibly paid more than 2/6d per day.
4 Establishment of the train as in Appendix VII.
5 Sir Lawrence Dundas • Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive
ZNIC X 1/1/6 f 13. Dundas gave the price of a four-horse wagon as one
ducat, and calculated 292,531.18 ducats to be worth £142,864/l/l0.
6 This price is calculated on the basis that when a four-horse wagon cost
9/Od, a six-horse wagon cost 13/Cd. Abstract of an Account of the Pay
of Wagons Furnished by Dundas •..., 6 Avril 1763, in the letter of
Cockburn to R.P. Taylor, 19 April 1763, A0/3/124.
7 Thid. For the price of Oswald's trains see above p.275, n.1. Establish-
ments of the trains as in Appendix VII.
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Effective Daily Upkeeo
Foreign Artillery Train
For 183 days between 25 June and 24 December 1762 Dun-
das charged £112,890/13/8 for the upkeep of the train, 1 or £616/17/9
per day. The train was thus kept 86.67% complete.2
Proviant Train
For 303 days between 1 October 176]. and 30 July 1762
Dundas charged £166,3 02/12/5 for the upkeep of the train, or £548117/i
per day. The train was thus kept 98.47% complete.
Other Wagon Trains
For 395 days between 5 November 1760 and 4 December
1761 Dundas charged £128,283/].1/0 for the upkeep of a number of these
trains, 5 or £324115/k per day. In his services he had 487 four-horse
wagons and 180 six-horse wagons, 6
 which at 9/Od and l3/Od per wagon ver
day respectively amounted to a total daily cost of £336/3/ 0. These
trains were thus kent 96.61% complete, and assuming that comparable fir..
ures applied to Oswald's trains, the effective daily cost of the upkeep
of all, these services was 96.61% of £651/12/0, or £629/10/3.
Thus the effective daily cost of the upkeep of all
trains was £].,795/5/l.
1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.2]. - 22.
2 When Dundas undertook the contract for this service in 1760 an unas-
certained part of the train remained in public ownership, so that this
percentage is too low.
3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNX X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 16.
4 Ibid. f.7. The figures for 1762 in the account are insufficiently det-
ailed to be used in these calculations.
5 IbId.
6 See Appendix VII; figures for the Hanoverian and Brunswick bread wag-
ons and the foreign bakery and foreign hospital trains.
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Compensation
Foreign Artillery Train
Altogether Dundas charred £51 L1. , 1l70/l8/6 for the upkeep
of the train and £176 ,659/8f9 compensation for losses and damage. 1
 Thus
the amount of compensation expressed as a percentage of the cost of up-
keep was 31+.3M, which of £61611719 = £211/16/9.
Proviant Train
A1toether Dundas chared £3l0,1]. 11/11/8 for ui,keep and
£118,578/17/0 compensation for losses and damage. 2 Thus the amount of
compensation expressed as a Dercentage of the cost of upkeep was 38.2,
which of £.548/17/1	 £20911718.
Other Wagon Trains
Altogether Dundas charged £407,812/l Lf/0 for upkeep and
£118,845/12/0 compensation for losses and damage. Thus the amount of
compensation expressed as a percentage of the cost of upkeep was 29.11%,
which of £629/1O/3 £183/8/10.
Thus the total daily cost of compensation in all, trains
was £605/3/3.
Hence the total daily cost of the trains, comnt,risin g both
upkeep and compensation, was £1 ,795/5/l + £605/3/3 £2,LK)0/8/ll., and the
total annual cost amounted to £876,152/1/8.
1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNIC X 1/1/6 ff.19 - 26. The accounts for the
upkeep of the train incltxie the sum of £34, 580/0/0 i*id for compensat-
ion in 1761. This sum has therefore been deducted from these accounts
and added to the compensation accounts.
2 Ibid. ff.]3 - 18. The sum of £69,451/9/0, ,aid to Dundas when the train
was taken back into public ownership, has been deducted from the total
charge for the upkeep of the train.
3 Ibid. ff.7 - 12.
4 This calculation assumes that levels of compensation were the same in
Oswald 's trains.
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Apiendix IX	 Cross Profits on Train Contracts
On 25 June 1762 Dundas entered into a partnership with
four of his assistants for carrying on his contracts for the foreign
artillery train and for the foreign bread, bakery and hospital wagon
trains. 1 From that date until their termination the contracts yielded a
profit of £49,968/0/O.2
The profit was declared before any charge had been made
for the forage and bread supplied to the animals and employees of the
trains from the Crown 'a magazines aM. bakeries • A deduction of 6d per
ration was eventuafly made for forage thus taken by the animals of the
wagon trains, 3
 where in 1762 there were 2,936.94 effective horses,4
which for the 213 days of the partnership carried out 625,568.22
days • service. As in the whole period of Dundas • contracts his wagon
train horses performed 6,247,k].k days' service, 6 10.01% of this total
took place during the period of the partnership. The final forage charge
against Dundas for all his wagon train horses was £78,092/13/6, of
which 10.01% is £7,817/l/6.
1 Agreement of L. Dundas with Jj. Colier, C. Ogilvy, A.Clark and A.
Ceddes, 24 July 1762, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/12k.
2 Sir L. Dundas, J.F. Collier, C. Ogilvy, A. Clark and A. Geddes, their
General Account in Company ••.•, 16 August 1764, ibid • ZNK I 1/1/126.
3 Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown against Sir L • Dundas, T/1/451
f.39. No deduction was made for forage taken by artillery train horses.
4 The Hanoverlan and Brunswick bread wagon trains, the foreign bakery
train and the foreign hospital train had a total establishment of 3,040
horses, see Appendix VII, and the services were maintained 96.61% eff-
ective, see Appendix VIII.
5 The contracts were terminated on 23 January 1763, Dundas' Pocket Book
of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZIK I 1/1/6 f.9.
6 This figure is obtained by calculating the number of sixpences in
£l56,185/7/0, the sum that Dundas would have owed the Crown had he dr-
awn forage from its magazines for every day's service of every wagon
train horse for which he was paid. T/l/451 f.39.
7 Ibid.
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Dundas was charged £26,406/18/0 for bread sup!)lied by
the Crown to his employees for the duration of all his train contracts.1
The foreign artillery train contract lasted for 807 days, 2 the proviant
train contract for 588 days, 3 and the wagon train contracts for 1,450
days.4 In 1762 the foreign artillery train had 2,2911.15 effective per-
sonnel, the proviant train 1,206.26 and. the wagon trains 824.08.6 Thus
the total number of days • service performed by all Dundas • train employ-
ees was 3,755,575.88. During the period of the partnership the foreign
artillery train employees performed 254 days' service and those of the
wagon trains 213 days' service, a total of 758,243.14, which represents
20.19% of 3,755,575.88. Thus the charge for bread during the period of
the partnership was 20.19% of £26, L106/18/0, or £5,331/li/i.
The total charge for forage and bread durin g the period
of the partnership was therefore £13,148/12/7, which deducted from the
stated profit of £49,968/do - £36,819/7/5.
From 25 June 1762 until the end of the contract Dundas
charged £144,004/il/k for the upkeep of the foreign artillery train,7
1 Ibid.
2 19 December 1760 - 5 Iarch 1763, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNX X 1/1/6
ff.19 - 22.
3 20 December 1760 - 30 July 1762, ibid. ff.l3 - 16.
4 4 February 1759 - 23 January 1763, ibid. ff.7 - 9.
5 Dundas had presumably employed fewer personnel in previous years, when
the numerical strength of the Combined Army and therefore of his trains
had been less, but as Levett s figures for the numbers of superior off-
icers in the proviant and wagon trains are apparently incomplete, some
balance is struck between these two unknown quantities.
6 The establishments of personnel and their percentage effectiveness were
as follows: foreign artillery train, 2,647 and 86.67%; proviant train,
1,225 and 98.47%; wagon trains, 853 and 96.61%. See Appendices VII and
VIII.
7 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK x 1/1/6 f. 21.
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and from 25 March 1762 until the end of the contracts £].Ol,685/3/o for
the maintenance of the wagon trains . The proportion of the latter sum
for the period of the partnership, viz. 213 days out of 305 days, was
£71,012/18/2. Thus the total payments for the upkeep of a].]. trains under
the partnership was £215,017/9/6.
So it appears that Dundas and his partners made profits
of £36,819/7/5 on charges of £215,017/9/6, or 17.12%.
Altogether Dundas charged £].,232,398/k/2 for the upkeep
of his trains, 2 from which is deducted £78,092/]3/6 and £26,1I.06/].8/0
for the forage and bread supplied by the Crown, leaving £1,l27898/12/8.
Assuming that profits of 17.12% were made on aU contracts throughout
the war, 3 total. profits amounted to £193, 096/k/9. Four-fifths of the
profits of the partnership, or £29,455/9/ll, did not go to Dundas, whose
profits were thus £163,6140/14/lO.
The trains supplied by Oswald in 1762 contained 636
four-horse wagons and 45 six-horse wagons . At 9/Od and 13/Od respect-
ively per wagon per day the contractor would have received £67,506/6/O
for 2].4 days • service, and assuming that the trains were 96.61% effect-
ive, 5 the actual. cost would have been £65,217/16/9, on which coinpensat..
ion for losses and damage at 29.l 6 would have been £19,004/9/6.
1 Ibid. f.9.
2 £5lL1. ,470/18/6 for the foreign artillery train, £310,llk/U/8 for the
proviant train and £1407,812/l11./O for the wagon trains, see Appendix
VIII.
3 This can only be an assumption as no information has been found on the
profits of the proviant train.
4 The establishments of the British bakery and infirmary trains, the
Hessian bread wagon train and Prince Ferdinand's baggage train, see
Appendix VII.
5 The figure for Dundas' equivalent services, see Appendix VIII.
6 Ibid.
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As a commissary administering the same trains from 1
June to 3]. December 1762, viz. 21k days, Oswald disbursed or was allowed
the following sums.1
466,040 uilders 10 stivers 2
335, 077 guilders 5 stivers 14. pennings
For differences in the rates of exchange
and losses on currency exchange
Salary, inc11ing one month 's additional pay
Contingent charges and expenses
Fees and charges of settling accounts
£	 s	 d
	
43,352
	
12	 1
	
31,169	 19	 63
	
99	 10
	
1,988	 5	 U
	
118	 U	 8
	
735	 0	 0
	
97	 13
	
98	 1	 0
	200	 0	 0
	
77,859
	
i4
From this total certain sums relating to periods after
3]. December 1762 have to be deducted . Despite the fact that the expen-
ses concerned are said to be for periods running into the middle of 1763,
it may be assumed that all train services of the Combined Army had come
to an end by 31 March l763, which is therefore taken as a hypothetical
terminal, date in the following calculations.
1 Declared Account of R. Oswald, 16 January 17914., AO/l/519/223.
2 £ t 10 guilders 15 stivers.
3 Idea.
Li. Presumably Oswald continued to advance money for the service of the
trains after this date, as Paumier had only been appointed to sell.
them, see Appendix I.
5 The last British troops left Germany on 23 March 1763, Sir fl. Savory,
His Britannic Majesty 'a Army in Germany during the Seven Years War,
T1966) p.447, and a month later it was reported that the trains had
been disbanded and sold, T. Pownall to S. Martin, 22 April. 1763, T/l/
427 f.422.
16 1014,706
010508
183,005 15
10104 10
13169,623
1,454
	 8	 10
29, 404	 1	 10
385.
guild ers	 stivers	 pennings
Sundry expenses of Hessian bread
wagons from 1 June 1762, amounting
to 49,676 guilders 8 stivers 4
pennings.
1 June 1762 - 31 !'.rch 1763 304
days; proportional deduction for
period of 90 days, 1 January -
31 !'krch 1763 -
Sundry expenses of Hessian trains
from 13 September 1762, amounting
to 1,130 guilders.
13 September 1762 - 31 1rch 1763
- 200 days; proportional deduction
for period of 90 days as above -
To P. Paumier for sundry expenses
of English and Hessian trains
from 18 July 1762, amounting to
6,583 guilders 13 stivers.
18 July 1762 - 3]. )krch 1763 -
257 days; proportional deduction
for period of 90 days as above -
To J. Levett for wages of a 'sch-.
affer • from 7 June 1762 amount.-ing to 346 guilders 2 sivers 4
pennings.
7 June 1762 - 31 Prch 1763 =
298 days; proportional deduction
for period of 90 days as above -
Bread delivered to the drivers
and servants of the trains from
1 June 1762, amounting to 32,507
guilders 4 stiverz.
1 June 1762 - 31 rch 1763 - 304
days; proportional deduction for
period of 90 days as above
Pay for his secretary from 1. June
1762, amounting to 4,912 guilders
15 stivers.
1 June 1762 - 31 ?rch 1763 304
days; proportional deduction for
period of 90 days as above a
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One further charge of 2,617 guilders 12 stivers Lf
pennings, representing an advance to 3. Miii for the pay of his secret-
ary, is deducted in its entirety as it relates to the expenses of the
British artillery train.1
Total deductions thus amount to 32,021 guilders 13
stivers 1Li pennings, or £297811513.2
Thus the real cost of the public management of the
trains from 1 June to 31 December 1762 was £77, 859/14/6+ - £2,978/15/3
- £74,880/].9/3+.
But this figure inclixles the cost of making good cx-
cessive losses and damage in the trains, which under the contracts form-
ed a separate compensation account. Assuming that such charges were the
same under contract and public management, the cost of the simple upkeep
of the trains under public management was £7k,880/19/3+ - £].9, 00k/9/6 -
£55, 876/9/9+.
Thus the difference between the cost of the contracts
and the cost of public management, representing Oswald 's profit, was
£65, 2l7/16/9 - £55,8 76/9/9+ - £9,31+1/6/11f.
Profits of £9,3kl/6/U3 on payments of £65,217/l6/9
represent l4.32.
1 Miii was Oswald 's partner in the contract for the British artillery
train, Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol.XXIX p.
637.
2 £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers.
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ApDendix X	 Wagons in Ret'air in the Proviant Train in late 1762 1
Date	 No. of WaE0YIS in ReDair	 Total No. of Wagons
2 July	 26	 900
9 July	 20	 900
13 July	 13	 900
16 July	 24	 900
20 July	 141f	 900
23 July	 52	 900
31 July	 6].	 900
3 August
	 62	 900
7 August
	 66	 900
13 August	 91	 900
18 August
	 112	 900
20 August	 118	 900
28 August	 lOLl.	 900
1 September	 83	 900
4 September	 89	 900
8 September	 49	 900
1]. September	 900
15 September	 79	 900
17 September	 96	 900
22 September	 119	 900
211. September	 137	 900
29 September	 158	 900
1 October	 139	 898
12 October	 203	 898
15 October	 176
	 898
19 October	 158	 900
22 October	 168	 900
2 November	 167	 900
5 November	 187	 coo
1 Rapports du Service Journalier du Proviant Train, Howard Vyse MSS.
D/HV/B/6/1 - 39.
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Date	 No. of Wagons in Reoair
9 November	 22k
13 November	 183
16 November	 188
23 November	 218
28 November	 180
1 December	 182
14'
 December	 182
Average No. of Wagons in Repair - 117.31.
Average Total No. of Wagons - 9011..k2.
Average Percentage of Wagons in Repair - 12.97%.
Total. No. of Wagons
900
949
929
929
931
921
906
:389.
Appendix XI
	 Percentage Losses of Proviant Train Horses
Under Public Ownership
The genera]. reports of the state of the train show loss-
es of 1,725 horses over a period of four months between July and October
1762.1
 This represents a monthly loss of 431.25 horses at a time when
the average effective monthly establishment of healthy and sick animals
was 3,482.25.2
Thus the average monthly loss of horses was 12.3.
Under Contract
The total value of the train when it was transferred to
the Crown by Dundas on 30 July 1762 was £ 69, 652/5/O, of which £48,33,
or 69.39%, represented the value of horses.
For the whole period of his proviant train contract Dun-
das claimed £1l8,578/l7/0 compensation, 1' of which 69.39% - £82,281/17/3.
The value of each horse was £].l, and £82,281/17/3 thus represents
-	 7,480.17 animals.
The contract lasted for 19.33 months front 20 December
1 Rapports Genraux du Train des Vivres, July October 1762, Howard
Vyse !S. D/HV/B/6/k0 - 43. The monthly figures were July 113; Au.
u.st - 256; September - 626; October - 730.
2 Ibid. The monthly figures for healthy and sick horses respectively
were July - 3, 14119 & 1 83; August - 3,410 & 142; September - 3,1144 & 230;
October - 3,090 & 281.
3 Value of the Great Provision Train ...., 14 August 1762, T/l/417 f.149.
4 Sir I.. Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X
1/1/6 ff.17 - 18.
5 T/l/417 f.l49.
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1760 to 30 July 1762,1 and so the monthly loss of horses amounted to
386.97.
The train's establishment stood at 4,586 horses 2 and
it was kept 98.47% complete. 3 Thus the number of effective horses was
4,515.83.
The monthly loss of horses therefore represented 8.57%
of the effective state.
1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 16.
2 See Appendix VII.
3 See Appendix VIII.
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